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PROCEEDINGS OF 1957

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

VOLUME 2

The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

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THE POLITICS OF NONPARTISANSHIP IN CALIFORNIA CITY ELECTIONS

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This is a report of some of the findings of a study of the "politics of election" to municipal office in California. The study, in describing selected aspects of the local election process, included an examination of these subjects: the groups and individuals engaging in the local election process and their activities; the campaigning characteristic of municipal elections; the relationships and contrasts apparent between partisan state or national politics and nonpartisan city politics; other features characteristic of local elections, such as the frequency and intensity of competition, the extent of voter participation, the impact of election systems in which plurality victories are permissible in contrast to systems in which a run-off is required, and the importance of incumbency in electoral success.

In undertaking this analysis, attention was given to several types of studies. An attempt was made briefly to place the electoral system within the total community setting of social forces. Considerable attention was devoted to what might be termed the "community power structure," although the area of politics--private or public--outside the realm of the electoral struggle was not a direct subject of inquiry. Similarly, the "pressure groups" active in the community were examined, but again

the emphasis was not on their total role but merely that aspect related to the local election. More concern was evidenced with the political party in the community as incidental but highly important to any true description of the nonpartisan system. In the field of citizen behavior, relationships between partisan characteristics and local voting behavior were examined, and the extent of voter participation was subjected to investigation. No attempt was made, however, to investigate individual voter perceptions or the pattern in which the electoral decision was reached nor to relate demography to voting behavior. In brief, the study attempted to describe the local election process from several aspects and, by design, did not concentrate on any single approach.

Of necessity, because of the absence of previously published material, and by choice, because of the desire to gain experience with research techniques new to the writer, the description of local election politics was based primarily on detailed studies of six California cities, involving personal interviewing and the collection of other data. In addition, information was gathered through the medium of questionnaires sent to approximately 720 civic leaders in every city and county of the state and returned by more than 320 or 45 per cent of these persons. Existing published data were examined, and several other analyses attempted.

To permit more ready comparison and to increase the possibility of generalization, it was decided that none of the six cities to be visited would be larger than 150,000 in population. This ruled out as possible areas of investigation the five large metropolitan centers of Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, Oakland and Long Beach. It was similarly decided that in a state as diverse as California, no six cities could provide a thorough "cross-section" of the state. Instead, communities were

selected which, collectively, represented as many different aspects of the state's life as possible. The group of cities--Berkeley, Chico, Fresno, Maywood, Pomona and San Leandro--included communities ranging in population from 13,000 to 118,000; four cities used the council-manager, one the mayor-council, and one the commission form of government; four were located in metropolitan centers and two in rural areas; four were racially homogeneous and two racially and ethnically mixed; each had varying degrees and types of local industry and commercial development; the cities were distributed geographically throughout the state; three were relatively stable in terms of physical and population growth and three were rapidly expanding.

In these cities, a combined total of more than 100 informants was interviewed. These generally included in each city the incumbent city officials, newspapermen, business, labor and political party leaders, ministers, women's club officers, and others with a similar background and knowledge concerning local politics.

The written questionnaire was sent to every mayor, city manager, daily newspaper editor and county political chairman in the state. At least one reply was received from 192 or 61 per cent of the state's 315 cities, including 139 or 75 per cent of the 185 cities over 5,000 population.

In discussing city politics in California, it is important to realize that, legally, a California city may be a small village of less than 1,000 population or a metropolitan center of several million. All incorporated communities in the state are classed as cities, regardless of size. Fifty-eight per cent of the state's 315 cities in 1955 were under 10,000 in population, and only 9 per cent were over 50,000. It is equally significant to understand that many urban centers in the state, including

communities of 100,000 population, are not legal cities at all but are primarily governed by the county and classed as unincorporated territory.

Against this general background, three points concerning California municipalities make a study of the state's cities of special interest: home rule, the council-manager plan, and the nonpartisan system of elections.

Not only do charter cities in California enjoy a greater measure of municipal independence than is probably true anywhere else in the nation, but general law cities, those governed by state legislation, have been able to obtain almost as great a measure of local autonomy through successful legislative and judicial action. This high degree of home rule is one of the key reasons for the fact that the council-manager or chief administrative officer plans are in such widespread use throughout the state. The great majority of all cities above 5,000 employ a professional appointed general executive of one kind or another.

The third general characteristic of California cities of note is that of nonpartisan elections. That term, as used here, describes an election system in which the party label, either national or local, of the competing candidates does not appear on the ballot nor are party nominating primaries employed. This form of election is now in use in 65 per cent of all American cities above 25,000 population. The system has been in universal use in California cities since 1913. As a result of this fact, as well as the relative weakness of the party system generally, or so it is asserted, the state provides probably as "pure" an example as possible of the effect of the absence of formalized party structure on the local political scene. The problem of isolating this "effect" and describing

it separately, however, presents a methodological problem which is well-nigh insoluble.

Characteristics of Local Officials

Political science throughout the centuries has concerned itself with the characteristics of the formally designated leaders of a society. In a city, perhaps even more than a state or nation, the real locus of civic leadership may not always be found in the roster of public officials. Despite this fact, the elected representatives of the city will have much to do with the character and quality of municipal government and administration. In addition, they will reflect, to some degree or another, the pattern of groups and interests involved in the political life of the community and, in a sense, the characteristics and attitudes of the citizenry itself. This report of findings concerning local election politics commences, then, with an examination of the elected councilmen and mayors.

The data may be most readily summarized by describing a "composite" councilman, attributing to a hypothetical individual those characteristics most frequently encountered in the group as a whole. It should be noted that the description is based on the 38 incumbents in office in the six cities in 1955, an admittedly small sample.

The "composite" councilman is a man of 45 to 50 years of age, engaged in some sort of professional, managerial or sales capacity and living in the "better" part of town. He belongs to a service club and, in addition, is likely to be a Mason; he may also be a member of a veterans group and the chamber of commerce. He is a Protestant but is not necessarily affiliated with any church. He will probably not have had previous official city experience, although he may have been active in community chest, Red Cross or related activities. He is a registered

Republican, but he will most probably not have taken a very extensive part in partisan politics. He will have lived in the city for a considerable length of time, but this may be less likely if the city is one which is growing rapidly.

You will note the emphasis on "man." Of the six cities, only three of the council personnel were women. In one instance, the woman was the first of her sex ever to serve on the city council, while in a second city the woman was the first in over 30 years. In only one of the six cities was there a tradition of regular service of women on the council. Whether the sparsity of women is a result of their reluctance to stand the gaff of public service or of their husbands' reluctance to see the fireside unprotected was not determined. In view of the continuous complaint that qualified and capable council personnel are difficult to find, the apparent automatic exclusion in many cities of 50 per cent of the citizenry from consideration is of substantial importance.

Certain other of the above-mentioned characteristics might also be stressed. With regard to occupational status, for example, almost all of the group held professional, managerial or sales positions. No councilman in any of the six cities came from these classes of occupations: operatives, private household workers, service workers, and laborers. This fact is related, of course, to the finding that there is a definite tendency for elected officials and advisory board members appointed by the council to reside in the more well-to-do sections of the community and, at times, within particular neighborhoods. In Fresno, for example, all seven commissioners resided within a few blocks of each other in one of the more expensive residential areas of the city. In Berkeley, only five of the 42 incumbent councilmen and advisory board members had their homes

in the south and west sections of the city, an area including about 50 per cent of the city's residents and featured by less expensive homes. The remaining 37 officials lived in the more well-to-do hill neighborhoods. In cities with a district plan of council representation, a certain degree of geographical dispersion was forced, as in Pomona and San Leandro.

With reference to community affiliations, 28 of the 38 belonged to one or more service clubs, Kiwanis, Lions and the like, and a somewhat smaller number belonged to fraternal organizations such as the Moose or Elks. Significantly, fifteen of the men belonged to some Masonic order. All but four of the 38 indicated they were Protestants, although several stated they were not affiliated with any church. Political affiliation will be discussed below.

Group Activity in Local Politics

In addition to formally designated leadership, political science has traditionally examined the organizations and groups active in the political process. Suggestive of this emphasis, one finds mention of pressure groups, unofficial decision makers and similar terms, all used to describe the role of a large number of persons and organized groups participating in an even greater variety of activities in every phase of the political life of the community, the state or the nation.

In this regard, perhaps the most important finding to emerge from this study is the fact that organized activity is more often absent than present in California city election politics. For example, of the 192 cities replying to the questionnaire, only 49 or 25 per cent answered "yes" to the question of whether there were in the city any organized groups that regularly engaged in the local election process; in almost

half of the cities, neither organized nor even informal activity was reported. In the six cities, also, there were only rare examples of groups which could be said the meet the description of a formal and identifiable organization, publicly engaged in local election politics on a continuing basis.

Instead of formal activity, leadership or structure, a myriad of groups and individuals constitute the cast of political participants, differing according to the traditions, conditions and personalities of each community and changing over time, frequently with amazing rapidity. Improvement associations, women's organizations, labor unions, city employees, lay church groups, service clubs and Masons were some of the groups cited most frequently as participants. Importantly, in many cities, the incumbents themselves are the most active in recruiting other candidates and in organizing support behind their choice.

Typical of local elections, it would seem, is the development of support, organization and funds by the individual candidate himself on an ad hoc basis. Rather than being recruited by a group and assuming its apparatus, the average candidate must build his own campaign from the ground up. Successful election politics depends in the given community on the activation and mobilization of the right combination of individuals and groups behind the candidate or slate. Never can there be complete assurance that the "right combination" will influence a majority of the voters, although at times predictability is high. In some communities, there appear to exist "keys" to the tapping of a coalition of group support, that is, the approval of one group will almost certainly bring the support of others. In other cases, however, no such implied hierarchy

exists, and each community segment must be won independently.

In this regard, the question was asked as to which groups in the community would be of help to a prospective candidate. The local newspaper, merchants, service clubs and women's organizations were cited most frequently, each by more than half of the 192 cooperating cities. In sum, there is little question that of all the groups engaged in formal or informal political activity, in the recruitment of candidates and in organizing and financing their campaigns, the business elements of the community, Main Street, most often enjoy the dominant role. It should be emphasized that their influence in any given community at any particular time cannot be automatically assumed, nor their organization and unanimity.

Sharing this important position is the local press, sometimes complementing the "Main Street" influence, and sometimes exercising an independent role. Of significance in the California context, the press reportedly assumes special importance in a rapidly growing community in which new-comers look to the local paper for the information and guidance which they lack in their personal experience and contacts.

The Local Election Campaign

A third general area of investigation was that of the conduct of the campaign. It is obvious that not all groups or individuals participate in a local election campaign in an identical or even similar manner. The support of some is sought primarily to obtain campaign contributions; in the case of other groups and individuals, little more than a public endorsement is desired; other individuals or groups are solicited not for their published support but to request their personal effort on behalf of the candidate, either in word-of-mouth campaigning among their friends or in actual campaign activity; and, in some cases, nothing more is desired than the neutralization of potential opposition with no thought of positive support.

A local campaign activity of special significance at the local level, at least in cities up to 125,000 population or so, is the "politics of acquaintance." By that term is meant the informal word-of-mouth politicking between friends and associates that takes place at the luncheon meeting of the service club, the legion hall, the women's book club and the union headquarters. It is a form of politics not generally identifiable as such. Rather, it is the by-product of a highly organized community in which these groups and others such as lodges, chamber of commerce committees and charity organizations provide the principal avenue of the day-to-day communication and contact pertinent to city politics. In most cases, such activity appears to involve nothing more than a conversation between friends concerning their choice on election day. The cumulative effect of such informal discussions repeated by the hundreds, however, looms as one of the most important aspects of any local campaign, particularly in small to medium-size cities. This is true not only in influencing the choice as to a particular candidate but also in stimulating the individual actually to go to the polls.

To indicate an example, in Chico, a city of 13,000, a vote of 2,000 would win any council election. A vote as low as 1,100, in a race with many candidates and with plurality victories permitted, has been sufficient to gain office in recent years. A popular and active Mason in Chico is probably known personally or by name to a majority of that organization's 500 to 700 members, most of whom also have voting members in their families. A solid vote of this group alone, based not on the fact that the candidate is a Mason, but that he is identifiable by name and well-regarded, would nearly bring election success to the individual. If a typical candidate, however, he would also belong to the Elks, Rotary, the chamber of commerce and to one of Chico's many churches, each group including some persons not members of the other groups and bringing the candidate within striking range of 2,000 votes, solely on the basis of the memberships and family relations of the few organizations to which he personally belongs.

Not all groups or candidates in the community, of course, possess in equal measure the avenues of internal communication involved in such a method of politics. To those who do, the informal activity suggested above can constitute an asset of the greatest importance and, in fact, can frequently be turned into a more formal political mechanism. For example, although not publicly identified, the ladies aid society becomes an arm of the political campaign of the favored candidate or slate in as meaningful a fashion as though it were a regular political organ. Of all the groups, Main Street, is most often best equipped to engage in the "politics of acquaintance." The business community possesses important sources of communication, both internal and external, which provide it with certain advantages. Service clubs and the chamber of commerce, for example, provide important contacts at which local politics and candidates are normal topics of conversation. At the same time, many of this group are in a position to have their views

solicited by others outside the immediate interest group. The net effect is to provide Main Street with certain natural advantages in the local political process, not possessed by other groups, at least to the same degree.

The second general finding concerning the campaign is that local elections most often center on personality factors rather than issues. In only one-eighth of the 192 cities responding to the questionnaire were issues reported as more important than personalities in recent years, and this was generally borne out in the six cities. Two important qualifications must be made to this description of issueless politics, however.

The first is that the most important issue in municipal politics is frequently that of the background and qualifications of the candidates. Community consensus on the issues facing the city is frequently so general that the only serious problem of choice centers not around, "What does he stand for?" but, "What are his qualifications?" It need not be emphasized in this period of national political history, with the tendency toward ticket-splitting, that the concentration on men rather than platforms is not peculiar to local government. The quality and integrity of officials at any level of government is an important issue, regardless of their political philosophy.

The second qualification is that in every one of the six cities, there was a recent example of a campaign which turned as much upon questions of policies and programs as it did on personalities; when community consensus was not present and when programs and policies of local government became objects of concern, candidates rose and fell, not on their qualifications or personalities, but because of their stand on whatever happened to be the burning question of the day.

Partisanship in Nonpartisan Elections

Of all the above-mentioned groups active in community affairs, the two national political parties are, quite naturally, most often of interest to the

political scientist. Without knowing beforehand whether the national party organizations and leadership were participants in the nonpartisan local election process or the extent to which they were active, their place in the city political scene was made an object of inquiry. It should be emphasized that, although the party is not legally recognized and does not appear on the nonpartisan ballot, there is nothing illegal about party activity in local elections. This report, then, constitutes not only a phase of a study of local politics but a brief chapter in the study of political parties generally, a study which has only infrequently in recent years concerned itself with the municipal environment.

In only eighteen or 9 per cent of the 192 cities responding to the questionnaire was "public or openly visible activity" on the part of either party organization reported. The larger the city, the more frequently was activity indicated, 25 per cent of the 20 cities over 50,000 so reporting. Similarly, in less than half of the cities did respondents report that "some" or "many" party leaders were active, and again there was a tendency for this response to be indicated more frequently in larger cities.

This relative absence of activity was the general finding of the case studies in four of the six cities. Although party leaders were occasionally active in city politics and city leaders in party affairs, there seemed little carry-over from one level to the other. Party affiliation did not appear to be the key to any significant support, and frequent examples could be found of Republicans supporting Democrats for city office and vice versa. Party organizations took no official part in city politics, although members might participate on behalf of friends and associates.

In the remaining two cities, however, Berkeley and Pomona (one a city of 120,000, the other a city of 50,000), the situation was quite different. In both cities, the economic leaders of the community were the dominant force in city affairs. Although there were frequent exceptions, in both cities there

was a high correlation between those successfully active in city politics and those active in Republican party politics. The Republican campaign apparatus was employed upon occasion in city elections for Republican candidates. In both cities, the parties were evenly divided as to registration, but Republicans currently held more than 85 per cent of the elective and appointive city offices. In Berkeley, over a 25-year period, only five of the 30 councilmen had been Democrats; in Pomona, four out of 29.

There were important differences between the two cities, however. In Pomona, Republican dominance was the result of the absence of Democratic personnel and leadership. In Berkeley, Republican dominance was the result of victory in a strongly contested and at times highly partisan competition; whether this competition would continue it was difficult to predict..

Despite the general indication of minimal party activity per se in most local elections, there are frequent examples of local officials going on to seek state or national office. In 1954, of the state's 162 partisan elected officials, one-third had held some official local government office. A slightly higher proportion of Democrats in partisan office had previous local government experience than Republicans, although the margin was small. It should be noted that this finding is the opposite of that reported by Charles Adrian in 1952 when he set forth the following as one of eleven propositions appearing to be characteristic of nonpartisan elections. "It is unusual for a successful nonpartisan politician to move up into higher partisan ranks," Adrian indicated, but this finding is contradicted by the California experience.

Indicated previously was the fact that local officials tend to be registered Republicans. During the course of the study the registration of almost 3,000 city and county officials, both elected and appointed as of 1955, was determined. About 60 per cent of the local officials were affiliated

with the G.O.P. and 40 per cent with the Democrats. These figures are almost the direct reverse of the distribution of the state's registered voters. Of the state's partisan officials holding state or national office, 62 per cent were Republicans and 38 per cent Democrats at the time of the study; the distribution is now 54 per cent Republican and 46 per cent Democrats.

In the larger cities of the state, the Republican strength among the ranks of city officials is even more pronounced. Of the 26 cities above 50,000 population in 1955, 80 per cent of the mayors and 68 per cent of the city councilmen were Republicans, while in eleven of the twelve elective mayor cities above 50,000, the mayor was similarly registered.

As has been suggested, this Republican predominance appears to be much more the result of the importance of Main Street in local politics than party activity per se. Although the relationship of these facts to the state's political pattern is difficult to determine, it cannot but be argued that the G.O.P. is aided by having its registrants in influential community positions. That this natural strength of the Republicans may lead in certain communities to more direct and formal Democratic activity in reaction is a real possibility, as suggested by the Berkeley experience in 1955.

The Voting Public and the Election System

One of the most intriguing and suggestive, yet at the same time inconclusive, areas of this study of local election politics concerns the behavior of the electorate and the relationships between this behavior and the election system. Research in voting behavior has generally ignored the city election, one reason being, perhaps, if the California experience is typical, the absence of adequate local voting records over a period of time. However, it was found possible to investigate certain areas of voting behavior and to provide information on the following subjects.

One fact that is often overlooked in examining local election data is that, in many states, the number of persons registered and eligible to vote

in municipal races in the spring of the year is a great deal smaller than is the case with either state or national elections held in the fall. In California this is true because of the fact that following the November state or national election in each even-numbered year, some 20 to 25 per cent of the registrants are cleared from the rolls for non-voting, change of residence and other causes. This purge of the rolls does not appear to affect the two parties disproportionately.

In addition to this decline in the size of the registration roll, it is a well-known fact that far fewer voters troop to the polls on city election day than is true in either state or national elections. Generally speaking, some 30 to 40 per cent of those who vote in the general election fail to participate in municipal races, an item rarely suggested in the early discussions concerning the pros and cons of separate local and national elections dates.

These two characteristics of low registration and low turnout are especially important because of a third little-studied fact, namely that with few exceptions in California, the local election system does not provide for a run-off but makes possible a plurality victory. Of the six cities directly studied, only Pomona requires a run-off in those cases where candidates fail to obtain a majority vote in the first election. In the remaining five cities, approximately half of the candidates in the last ten years have come to office without a majority vote.

This fact assumes significance in the light of the Pomona experience. In that city, of those candidates who led by a plurality only in the primary election (and who would have been declared elected in most California cities), one-third were defeated in the ensuing run-off contest in the same ten-year period.

Much more analysis is required in other cities in which run-off elections are required. It would appear that, in theory at least, a system requiring the mobilization of a majority of the electorate might necessitate a different

pattern of local politics than one in which victory is possible with a much lesser vote. Particularly would this be true where there is a tradition for large fields of candidates to compete, making possible a victory, for example, with only 26 per cent of the total vote cast as occurred in Fresno in 1953. In other words, only 15 per cent of the registered electorate in that city were able to elect a candidate.

In any event, this feature of local elections may have relevance to the existence of a relatively unstructured formal political pattern by providing interest groups with an added opportunity to elect candidates despite the group's minority position in the city. Alternatively, it might be argued that this same factor would impede the mobilization of majorities necessary to the effective implementation of some program. The whole problem seems worthy of concentrated attention of both a factual and theoretical nature.

In examining questions of participation, it is not sufficient to look only at city-wide totals. More important is a study of the spread of participation throughout a given city. As might be expected, there is a very high range of turn-out when each precinct is noted separately. In the Berkeley city election of 1955, for example, precincts varied in the percentage of voters to registration from 15 to 71 per cent. It has long been recognized as a general rule of thumb with reference to national elections that Republican areas tend to produce a larger vote relative to registration than do Democratic areas. The evidence of this study suggests that this relationship between Republican registration and high participation is even more pronounced in city elections than in state or national races. On the basis of a preliminary inspection of voting data, precincts which are relatively more Republican in registration exercise an even greater influence in city elections than in partisan state or national contests. In other words, those precincts which show the heaviest decline in vote from a state election to a subsequent city election tend to be Democratic in their registration and voting behavior.

One final area concerning the election is deserving of brief mention. With reference to the frequency of candidate competition (or the absence of uncontested races) and the intensity of that competition, as indicated by the closeness of the vote, the data indicate that local races are more frequently and more intensively competitive than contests for state office. Similarly, and subject to the same difficulties of comparison, incumbents at the municipal level appear to be defeated considerably more frequently in contests for reelection than do their counterparts in the state legislature and in Congress.

In concluding these remarks, several brief observations might be made which cut across the more detailed points raised above.

The first concerns the impact of the physical environment upon the political process. This is an obvious point, but in the context of California it assumes perhaps primary importance. The size of the community is, of course, a controlling factor. As one moves from the small town to the larger city, the emphasis becomes less one of the politics of acquaintance and more the politics of group mobilization. In this study, formal political organization made necessary by the need to focus the campaign at the unaffiliated man-in-the-street or housewife was more frequently found in the larger communities, although there were many exceptions in either direction. This was paralleled by an increase in campaign costs in larger cities as emphasis was placed not only on face-to-face politicking but on the use of various campaign media.

More peculiar to California and equalling size as a conditioning factor is the impact of growth on the typical California city. Population and areal changes of 100 per cent in a city in a ten-year period are not exceptional, and both the magnitude of change and the rate at which it has taken and continues to take place profoundly shape the political process. Growth brings with it the problems and pressures with which local politics are often concerned, the

conflict of personalities that features personal struggles for influence, the creation of new interest groups and a change in the character of existing ones. And it is not growth alone that influences the community scene, but the fantastic rate at which change is taking place. In almost every community of the state, large segments of the population, and in some cities the entire population, are newcomers, and the adjustment of new and old is the dominant note. While no uniform description of the adjustment can be made, one important feature in many cities is the tendency of the large subdivisions, inhabited by hundreds of families virtually overnight, to organize themselves politically. The neighborhood localism which frequently features community politics and the demands for representation leading at times to a district or ward system of elections are certainly phases in the political pattern accompanying growth.

In addition to the environmental factors, a second general area of observation concerns the form of local government. Considerable discussion has taken place over the years as to the appropriate role of the mayor, particularly in the council-manager form of government, and as to whether or not he should be separately elected. Without opening up this entire question, it can be reported here that there is evidence that in those cities with a separately elected mayor there is a greater intensity of organizational activity and interest, a more concentrated and vigorous attempt at recruitment and a record of higher voting participation in those elections in which the post of mayor is at stake than is the case at the council level. In terms of community leadership, however, it is not clear that these mayors are in a stronger position than their appointed counterparts in other communities.

It is more generally the case that the city manager's office has become a key source of civic leadership, although here too, the pattern is different depending on the particular community or person. In each of the four council-manager cities, the administrative head of the city has assumed responsibility,

to one degree or another, for what might be termed "professional civic leadership." Included under the phrase are the anticipation and determination of city needs, their presentation to the council and to the public and their implementation once accepted. The administrative head is an expert, not only in the field of management techniques but, and probably more importantly, in the field of politics, not the politics of election, the central focus of this study, but politics as defined in the dictionary: "The theory or practice of managing or directing affairs of public policy."

These findings are not new, of course, but of concern here are the decided implications which they have for the election process. There would be little argument, it is here felt, with the statement that the manager regards it as one of his prime tasks to resolve conflict, to seek community consensus, to bring all elements of the city to a meeting of the minds. It is his job to raise the alternative viewpoints and suggest their reconciliation, and, in a sense, his success may be measured by the degree to which such conflicts are resolved before they become campaign issues.

This positive role of the administrator in policy creation and development and in conflict resolution is not peculiar to the municipality, of course, and exists at every governmental level. But one is inclined to feel that given the low intensity of much of community politics, the degree of consensus on city needs and programs and the apparent difficulties of recruitment of elected officials and their part-time responsibilities, that this political role may assume a relatively greater importance in the municipal context. If this is the case, a key factor is present in the community political structure which must be kept to the forefront in any analysis. The distinction between the election of the key policy-creating official, a president, governor or strong mayor, as contrasted with his appointment under the council-manager form, suggests the direction which future discussions must take.

The final observation concerns the role of the political party in nonpartisan city politics and elections. These two partially contradictory comments are offered.

Nonpartisan advocates are faced with a problem of attempting to see to it that the natural Main Street activity in local affairs does not lead, in fact, to strictly Republican dominance, with a resulting partisan structuring of the local political scene. Proponents of nonpartisanship must consciously and actively concern themselves not only with "good government," but with representative government.

Secondly, examples of partisan activity in nonpartisan city elections which were revealed in this California study were both healthy and desirable: the recruitment of an able candidate, the sponsorship of a new charter, the development of an alternative choice. With the city manager plan in full flower, with civil service in a strong position, with fiscal practices in an excellent condition, with the parties themselves generally operating under a different moral standard than heretofore--all of which are generally characteristic of California municipal government--it is possible now to consider and encourage the participation of local party groups into civic life without the fear that their entrance into the local political arena must mean the graft and spoils of an earlier day or a less congenial environment.

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THE REPRESSION OF CIVIL RIGHTS AS AN AFTERMATH OF THE SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASES

McKay

I

Introduction

When the first Congress of the United States met in 1789, a majority of the delegates from states which had ratified the new Constitution were committed to the addition of a Bill of Rights. High on the list of the demanded guarantees were assurances of the freedom of speech and of assembly.[1] James Madison, reinforced in his own beliefs by the strong urgings and cogent arguments of Thomas Jefferson,[2] took the lead in Congress in proposing nine formal amendments to the Constitution, embracing some nineteen substantive items, including of course guarantees of the freedom of speech and peaceful assemblage.[3]

The importance of these rights, from that time secured by the first amendment against federal intrusion and subsequently against state interference,[4] has been eloquently attested by Alexis de Tocqueville:

> If men living in democratic countries had no right and no inclination to associate for political purposes, their independence would be in jeopardy.[5]

That inclination "to associate for political purposes" has of course remained at the core of the American democratic philosophy. Challenges to that concept have in general been sharply rebuked and set aside. Now, however, these cherished freedoms are being assaulted in new and more subtle ways in many of the Southern states.

These attacks date essentially from the 1954 and 1955 decisions by the United States Supreme Court that the segregated public schools affected by those decisions should be desegregated "with all deliberate speed."[6] With each additional instance of desegregation, whether voluntary or done in compliance with court orders, the zeal of the oppositionists appears to increase.[7] Thus, a number of states have adopted resolutions of so-called interposition[8] and elaborate school-assignment plans which more or less openly seek to preserve segregated school systems.[9] Meanwhile, private groups, often known as White Citizens Councils, have been formed to oppose desegregation at all levels and by all means.[10] A more recent manifestation of this program of resistance has been that which seeks to destroy or at least to frustrate the functioning of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. It is this effort, whose outlines are now fairly clear, which is the subject of this paper: the legislative program, the harassment in the courts, the economic coercion, and the threat of even physical danger. The central objective seems to be to compel public identification of NAACP members and contributors who can in turn be subjected to other legal and economic pressures, and perhaps even to physical hazard; to force the NAACP and its lawyers to terminate their sponsorship of litigation to enforce racial equality; and to have the NAACP defined as a profit-making organization operating in violation of state revenue laws. Exploration of these topics will here be limited primarily to the constitutional aspects of this onslaught:[11] freedom of speech and assembly, freedom

of movement in interstate commerce, due process of law, and equal protection of the laws. Throughout it must be remembered that these issues, important as they undoubtedly are in the context of the present struggle, have wider implications as well. The present measures, while now aimed primarily at the NAACP, are broad enough to be used against other organizations and other groups. If they withstand constitutional challenge now, they will remain important weapons in other contests involving other groups and other principles.

II

THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE

Like all organizations which support unpopular causes and challenge existing patterns of society, the NAACP has had a stormy history;[12] and it has been soundly praised and roundly condemned. In one respect, however, and perhaps in that connection only, friends and foes agree: The NAACP is now and has long been the single most effective catalytic agent in breaking down existing patterns of segregated society, in the North as well as in the South. It has been aptly described as "without question the most important agency for the Negroes in their struggle against caste."[13] Its legal record has been truly phenomenal. "The NAACP has won more victories in the Supreme Court than any other single organization."[14] Senator Herman E. Talmadge, no admirer of the NAACP, has conceded its impact. When governor of Georgia he wrote: "The leader, director and field general in the fight to break down all forms of racial segregation is the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People."[15] It is

small wonder then that much of the current effort to preserve segregation takes the form of attacks, more or less overt, upon the NAACP. It is, indeed, a kind of compliment, grim and unwelcome though it may be.

The Beginnings.--Whatever gains the Negro may have made by virtue of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments and the Civil Rights Acts of the Reconstruction Period, by the end of the nineteenth century these advances had been largely nullified by legislative indifference and judicial hostility. Seeking to recover lost ground, W. E. B. DuBois, the acknowledged leader of the Negro intelligentsia at that time, called a meeting of Negro leaders at Niagara Falls in 1905. From this came the so-called Niagara Movement. The organization, however, was hampered by a lack of funds; and in 1909 a new organization was formed, made up of Negroes and whites, into which the earlier group merged. The new group took the name National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in that year and by 1911 was incorporated in New York as a nonprofit membership corporation. Its basic aims were then and now the elimination of all racial barriers. The articles of incorporation state the objectives as follows:

> . . . voluntarily to promote equality of rights and eradicate caste or race prejudice among the citizens of the United States; to advance the interest of colored citizens; to secure for them impartial suffrage; and to increase their opportunities for securing justice in the courts, education for their children, employment

according to their ability, and complete equality before the law.

To ascertain and publish all facts bearing upon these subjects and to take any lawful action thereon; together with any kind and all things which may lawfully be done by a membership corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York for the further advancement of these objects.

The sweeping character of these aims, as reinforced by strong leadership, were undoubtedly important in the significant progress of the NAACP from its modest origins in 1909 to the influential position which it holds today. Within ten years of that first meeting there were 310 branches of the NAACP with 91,203 members.[17] By 1956 the organization could report 350,424 members in 1,467 branches, youth councils, and college chapters.[18] During the year 1955, the last year for which a financial statement has been made public, the NAACP reported a gross income of $672,422.48.[19]

Organization.--Since 1939 the NAACP has really consisted of two separate corporations, divided in function, apparently for tax purposes.[20] The NAACP proper continues to devote itself to organizational matters, membership recruitment, and legislative activities. A separate organization, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., has been charged with the planning and conduct of litigation. Policy of a political and a legal nature is thus fixed at the national level; but the principal operating function is at the level of the local

branches, youth councils, and college chapters. From an organizational standpoint this is probably a source of strength; but at the same time it may be a source of some legal vulnerability, as will be subsequently noted.

The Constitution of the NAACP authorizes the board of directors to create branches, youth councils, and college chapters which operate under charters granted by the national board of directors.[21] These local organizations function as independent, unincorporated associations which ordinarily operate on a state-wide basis through a state conference of branches. Through this loose confederation the branches are able to act in concert and to pool their strength on issues of state-wide interest. In addition, there are several regional offices staffed by full-time employees.

The principal responsibility for legal action falls on the national organization, headed by Robert L. Carter, General Counsel, and Thurgood Marshall, Special Counsel.[22] In addition, there is a National Legal Committee, composed in 1956 of forty-four lawyers, white and Negro, in twenty-two cities.[23] Members of this group serve both in an advisory capacity and as active counsel in litigation as the need may arise.

At the local level, although the Constitution and By-Laws for Branches calls for a standing legal redress committee in each branch, that committee's action is confined to investigation, consulting with members of the National Legal Committee, and watching over litigation in which the branch is interested. Members of the local legal redress committees are specifically cautioned against giving "general legal advice."[24]

It is this organization, then, and these local units which are now threatened as never before with a serious challenge at least to continued effectiveness and perhaps to continued existence. The balance of this study will be devoted to an analysis of the attacks already made and the counterattack now in preparation; and an estimate will be made of the constitutional merits of the arguments advanced on both sides of the controversy.

III

Foreign Corporations and Interstate Commerce

Even as the course of a battle may be shaped by the outcome of preliminary skirmishes, so important legal principles may depend upon matters essentially procedural. It seems a little thing, and not entirely unreasonable, to require an out-of-state corporation to register with a state official when it wishes to do business in a state other than its place of incorporation. Probably all states have at least a minimal requirement of this nature. Indeed, in most states where the NAACP is active, it has complied with the formal registration requirement.[25] One exception which resulted in litigation was the refusal to comply with the North Carolina registration statute which requires, in the case of non-stock foreign corporations, payment of a registration fee of $40.00 and a filing fee of $5.00.[26] In addition, the foreign corporation is required to file a copy of its charter, the address of its principal office in North Carolina, the name of the agent in charge thereof, the character of its business, and the names and addresses of officers and directors.

North Carolina also requires, as do many other states, that corporations "principally engaged in the activity of influencing public opinion and/or legislation" shall register with the secretary of state, filing information similar to the above plus a financial statement "itemizing in detail any contributions, donations, gifts or other income and from what source or sources received."[27]

In the belief that neither of these provisions could constitutionally be applied to it, the NAACP filed an action in the superior court of Wake County, North Carolina, seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not bound to comply with either provision.[28] Defendants, North Carolina's secretary of state and attorney general, demurred on the ground that the two causes of action could not be joined in a single proceeding because one involved a civil penalty and the other a criminal sanction and that a declaratory judgment proceeding could not be used to test criminal responsibility.[29] The trial court sustained the demurrer,[30] and that judgment was affirmed by the North Carolina Supreme Court for the reasons given by the trial court and because the alleged causes of action did not affect both defendants.[31] Subsequently, the NAACP filed with the North Carolina secretary of state the information required of foreign corporations, but did not comply with the provision requiring registration of organizations concerned with influencing public opinion.[32] Thus, no immediate test of the constitutionality of either North Carolina Statute is likely. However, the issues raised

but not decided are sufficiently important to justify further discussion. Analysis at this point will be limited to the foreign corporation registration statute, while the problems raised by requiring public-opinion-shaping groups to register will be deferred for later discussion.

The NAACP alleged in its complaint in the North Carolina case that its contacts with the state do not constitute "doing business" in any sense that could constitutionally make it subject to North Carolina's registration requirement. The argument seems not well founded. Although the NAACP is undoubtedly engaged in interstate commerce,[33] this of course does not give it immunity from reasonable regulation to the extent its local activities within a state constitute a doing of business.[34] Of course, "doing business" may be something of a misnomer as applied to a nonprofit organization such as the NAACP, dedicated as it is to the advancement of principles of equality. But there seems to be no good reason for rejecting the now-current test of "traditional conceptions of fair play and substantial justice,"[35] in determining whether the NAACP has had sufficient contacts with a state to warrant an inference of its presence. If so, there could hardly be any doubt that the NAACP is doing business in this sense. After all, its objective is the promotion of racial equality throughout the nation, operating principally through local branches, youth councils, and college chapters. In North Carolina, as in other states, there is a state conference of branches; and local agents and members solicit members, investigate cases of alleged discrimination, and generally perform the

business of the NAACP. In short, the NAACP can hardly have it both ways: if it is engaged in interstate commerce, as assuredly it is, then it follows almost inevitably that it is "doing business."

On the assumption that the NAACP is thus doing business in each of the states where it has branches, it is of course amenable to reasonable regulation that does not unduly burden interstate commerce. There seems, then, little doubt that the North Carolina requirement for registration, furnishing of reasonable information, and payment of a nonrecurring license fee would violate neither the commerce clause[36] nor the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.[37]

IV

Membership Lists and Freedom of Speech and Association

The NAACP also alleged in the North Carolina proceeding that the registration requirement amounts to a violation of "freedom of speech and the right to petition for redress of grievances" protected by the first and fourteenth amendments.[38] However, unless such an organization is constitutionally protected against any disclosure of its purposes, officers, and directors -- which is surely not the case -- there appears to be no first amendment objection to the disclosure of this minimal amount of more or less routine information.

North Carolina's requirement of disclosure of financial information, including sources, by organizations concerned with influencing public opinion is a very different matter which raises more difficult questions under the first and fourteenth

amendments. Related issues are before the courts already in litigation now pending in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, and Virginia, all of which can conveniently be discussed together.[39]

North Carolina.--The North Carolina statute, it will be remembered, calls for disclosure of financial sources. If this means that names of all members must be listed because as members they are also contributors, that requirement would destroy the confidential character of the membership lists which has previously been preserved. And, in any event, because the statute is directed exclusively at organizations which seek to influence opinion and legislation, the free speech issue seems inescapably raised.

Alabama.--Although the Alabama foreign corporation registration statute[40] does not call for full disclosure of membership, the same issue was quickly reached in that state. The state attorney general sought an injunction in a state court to restrain the NAACP as a foreign corporation from doing business in Alabama without complying with the registration law. At an ex parte proceeding a temporary restraining order was issued broad enough in effect to prohibit the continuance of activities of the NAACP in the state during its pendency.[41] Later the state filed a motion to require the NAACP to produce certain books, documents, and other papers, significantly including its membership lists. Over defendant's objection production was ordered, and the NAACP was adjudged in contempt of court when it refused to produce the membership lists, although complying with other parts of the order. The punishment was fixed at $10,000.00, to be raised to $100,000.00 if compliance was not effected within

five days; but it was not made clear whether the contempt was civil or criminal.[42] The size of the fine compelled the Association to cease functioning altogether in Alabama.[43] The Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari.[44] Although the NAACP offered to produce some of the demanded records, its refusal to give up membership lists brought an order from the trial court confirming the fine at the $100,000.00 level. The state supreme court again denied certiorari, but this time with an opinion explaining that the fine was for civil contempt because it was coercive in purpose.[45] The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari for argument in the October 1957 term.[46] The principal question for argument there will be the question of freedom of speech and association guaranteed against state intrusion by the fourteenth amendment.[47]

Georgia.--The sole litigation against the NAACP in Georgia was brought by the state revenue commissioner, who made a demand on the Association and certain of its local officers and employees for production of records for the stated purpose of assessing tax liability. When the records were refused because compliance would disclose membership lists, the court found the Association and some of the individual defendants in contempt.[48] After the president of the local chapter was imprisoned, he gave up the records and was released.[49] After examination of the records the state levied an assessment against the NAACP for back income taxes of $17,459.08. Liability for back taxes is claimed even if the NAACP should sustain its claim as a nonprofit organization because it had failed to apply for tax exemption in the past.[50]

Louisiana.--Ironically, the legislation which the NAACP was charged with having violated in Louisiana was the anti-Ku Klux Klan legislation which the NAACP undoubtedly supported at the time of its enactment in 1924.[51] That legislation calls for the annual filing of membership lists of "each fraternal, patriotic, charitable, benevolent, literary, scientific, athletic, military, or social organization . . . operating in this state . . . ."[52] For failure so to file the state attorney general sought and obtained an injunction "forever enjoining, restraining and prohibiting" the Association and its branches, agents, and members from holding any meetings or doing any business within the state.[53] Meanwhile, however, before this injunction had been made permanent, the NAACP sought to remove the case to the appropriate federal district court, as provided in section 1446 of title 28 of the United States Code. Although that section provides that after proper steps for removal have been taken, "the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded," the state court proceeded to the permanent injunction, as already noted. In these irregular circumstances the federal district court refused to enjoin the state court from further action in the case,[54] pending state court review. Some seven months later the matter was resolved when the state intermediate appellate court held that the removal had been properly effected and that it accordingly lacked authority even to entertain the appeal.[55] Although this ruling would seem to have left the way clear for a test of the constitutional issue in the federal court, the state attorney general announced his intention to

enforce the penal provisions of the law. Accordingly, at the end of 1956 the New Orleans branch and other branches filed lists totaling 475 members;[56] however, it was several months before the NAACP again held meetings in Louisiana.[57] Clearly the freedom of speech and freedom of association issue remains critical and unresolved in the state.

Texas.--In most states it is conceded without question that the NAACP is a nonprofit corporation. But such an admission in Texas would apparently mean that the Association would not be required to register as a foreign corporation[58] and would not be subject to the franchise tax assessed against profit-making foreign corporations.[59] It is perhaps not surprising then to find that the state attorney general charged that the NAACP was not a nonprofit corporation, as it claimed, and therefore required a state permit which it did not have; that it had engaged in political and lobbying activities; that it had practiced law illegally; that it had unlawfully solicited and recruited plaintiffs for lawsuits opposing desegregation; that it had failed to pay franchise taxes; and that its activities would result in "racial hatred and inflamed communities." These charges were faithfully echoed in the temporary injunction granted by the state district court.[60] Some months later the same court issued a permanent injunction against the NAACP, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund Inc., the Southwest Regional Conference of the NAACP, the Texas State Conference of Branches, and 113 named branches in the state. The original order was modified somewhat to permit educational and charitable activities, and the NAACP was now found to be a nonprofit organization. Nevertheless, it was held required to pay franchise taxes for the

privilege of operating within the state and it was forbidden to engage in litigation or lobbying activities.[61] This order, on appeal to the Texas Civil Court of Appeals, raises questions of interpretation under Texas law as to whether a nonprofit corporation can be subjected to regulation of the kind sought; and of course it raises questions of freedom of speech and association.

Virginia.--Without doubt the most important legislative threat to the NAACP is contained in the package of statutes adopted by the 1956 Special Session of the General Assembly of Virginia. While others of those acts will be discussed subsequently, the ones here relevant are chapters 31 and 32 of that special session. Chapter 31 provides that any corporation which plans to solicit or spend funds for a legal proceeding in which it has no liability or pecuniary interest must file with the State Corporation Commission a copy of its charter, a list of names and addresses of officers and contributors, a detailed statement of financial transactions, and a statement showing the location of all offices and branches. Violation by a corporation permits a fine up to $10,000.00 and revocation of its authority to do business in Virginia. Chapter 32, after declaring the essentiality "to the welfare, health and safety of the people of Virginia" of the "continued harmonious relations between the races," requires submission of information similar to that required by chapter 31 as to persons and organizations advocating "racial integration or segregation or whose activities cause or tend to cause racial conflicts or violence . . . ."

Provisions for enjoining activity in violation thereof are included in both sections. These statutes were enacted along with provisions outlawing barratry and acts providing for legislative investigation of the sufficiency of the anti-barratry legislation and of groups seeking to influence or promote litigation involving racial activities. The combined effect of the legislation creates a neat statutory dilemma for the NAACP. If it fails to register as an organization which plans to solicit or spend funds for a legal proceeding in which it has no liability or pecuniary interest, it will be subject to fine and revocation of authority to do business in Virginia, under the provisions of chapter 31. However, if it so registers, it will in effect convict itself under chapters 33, 35, and 36 of malpractice, thus becoming subject to fine and revocation of its authority to do business in Virginia. The latter chapters are discussed in part V, infra. The entire package has been challenged by the NAACP in an action for declaratory judgment before a three-judge federal district court.[62] Hearing has been set for the fall of 1957 before Judges Soper, Hutcheson, and Hoffman.

A. Corporations as "Persons"[63]

Shortly after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court denied that corporations could be citizens within the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause of the amendment;[64] and this remains the view at the present time.[65] On the other hand, the Court had no difficulty in concluding that corporations are persons within the protection of the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment,

at least so far as property is concerned.[66] However, also without discussion or apparent reflection as to possible consequences, the Court has held that the liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment is the liberty of natural, not artificial persons.[67] The most recent statement on this issue was in Hague v. C.I.O.[68] This was a suit by individual citizens, unincorporated labor organizations composed of such citizens, and a membership corporation (the American Civil Liberties Union) to enjoin city officials from enforcing municipal ordinances forbidding the distribution of printed matter, and the holding without permits of public meetings, in public places. Five of the seven participating justices held that the ordinances as enforced violated the rights of the individual citizen plaintiffs. However, in each of the two opinions necessary to the majority result there were explicit holdings that only the individual citizens were protected by the fourteenth amendment. Mr. Justice Roberts (with the concurrence on this point of Chief Justice Hughes and Mr. Justice Black), relying on the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment to protect the individuals' right of peaceful assembly and freedom of communication, nevertheless specifically excluded corporations from that protection: "Natural persons, and they alone, are entitled to the privileges and immunities which § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment secures for 'citizens of the United States.'"[69] Mr. Justice Stone (with the concurrence of Mr. Justice Reed) rejected the privileges and immunities argument, but found the ordinances violative of the due process clause.

However, he continued:

> As to the American Civil Liberties Union, which is a corporation, it cannot be said to be deprived of the civil rights of freedom of speech and of assembly, for the liberty guaranteed by the due process clause is the liberty of natural, not artificial, persons.[70]

Despite this apparently unequivocal holding that corporations are not persons within the protection of the first amendment as incorporated into the fourteenth, the Supreme Court has been somewhat ambivalent on this issue. First amendment protection has been accorded newspaper corporations[71] and moving picture companies,[72] with no indication that this might be inconsistent with such sweeping pronouncements as have already been cited. And of course, as demonstrated in the Hague case itself, the Court finds no difficulty in recognizing the free speech protection due individuals who act in behalf of unincorporated associations,[73] or presumably those who act in behalf of corporations.[74] Moreover, as already noted, though a nonprofit corporation may not be protected against deprivations of liberty, it is guaranteed against denial of property without due process.[75]

These distinctions seem to have developed almost by chance. In each case the Court appears to have decided these important issues in an ad hoc fashion, without explanation or meaningful citation of precedent. Indeed, this labyrinthe of distinctions

without difference suggests that the Court has not developed a coherent philosophy in this area. The apparent state of the law now would permit an officer or other agent of a corporation to complain of a denial of freedom of speech or assembly as to himself when acting on behalf of the organization, but deny the corporation any right in its own behalf. Moreover, the corporation can raise the issue directly if it is hit in the pocketbook (through loss of members or contributions), but cannot otherwise defend its freedom of expression. Such sinuosities in the law encourage new and unwelcome fictions at best, and downright evasion at worst. This anomaly in the law of the first and fourteenth amendments should be eliminated by overruling the objectionable statements in Hague v. C.I.O. and its predecessors. If corporations are persons as to property rights and equal protection of the laws, they should be entitled to no less security in connection with liberty, the most cherished right of all.

Even within the existing legal framework, the NAACP is by no means unable to assert its claimed first amendment rights. If it can show, as it has alleged, that the furnishing of membership lists will adversely affect its recruitment of members, it can of course demonstrate a financial loss that will amount to a denial of property (through interference with freedom of speech and assembly). As an alternative means of satisfying the vagaries of the present doctrine relating to corporations, the NAACP could join with it as plaintiffs in each suit individual members of the organization from the affected state

conference or local branch. Those individual plaintiffs would then be entitled to demonstrate the way or ways in which state action invaded their freedom of speech or assembly.

B. Identification of Members.[76]

As has already been noted, a number of states now require the filing of membership lists or, what may amount to the same thing, lists of contributors. Some of these requirements are based on statutes going back to anti-Ku Klux Klan legislation, as in Louisiana; at least one, North Carolina, is essentially a lobbying registration statute; others have enacted special legislation directed primarily at the NAACP, as in Virginia; and in Alabama and Georgia the direction to produce membership lists was not based on any statute, but on court order pursuant to motion by a state official. Despite this diversity of sources, all have been applied only since the decision in the School Segregation Cases, and all have been resurrected or enacted in a context which shows clearly an aim to frustrate the effectiveness of the NAACP. Indeed, if the facts of history were otherwise -- if, for example, it could be shown that such a requirement in state was reasonably drawn to achieve a justifiable purpose, it may well be that the requirement would be sustained.

The precedent in favor of disclosure appears at first impression to be strong. Thus in Bryant v. Zimmerman[77] the Supreme Court upheld New York's requirement of disclosure of membership lists by any organization requiring "an oath as a

prerequisite or condition of membership, other than a labor union or a benevolent order . . . ."[78] There was no doubt that the law was aimed at the Ku Klux Klan. Indeed, its very specificity almost seems to have been helpful to the Supreme Court in upholding the statute. "It is a matter of common knowledge that this organization functions largely at night, its members disguised by hoods and gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror into the minds of the people. . . ."[79] Nevertheless, the restricted nature of the class at which the statute was directed was not found to violate the equal protection of the laws, even though other oath-bound organizations were specifically exempted from the provisions of the statute. The Court took judicial notice that the exempted groups "have a recognized lawful purpose," leaving for penalty under the statute only those whose activities tend "to the prejudice and intimidation of sundry claims of our citizens,"[80] such as the Klan.

Although this decision supported state control in these special circumstances, the precedent hardly seems applicable to the NAACP whose objectives and methods have been recognized as worthy and not criminal. Indeed, it is at least implicit in the Bryant ruling that a similar exaction of membership lists from "benevolent orders, labor unions, and college fraternities" would have been unconstitutional because they "have existed for many years, and, while not immune from hostile criticism, have on the whole justified their existence."[81]

Surprisingly, the Supreme Court did not even mention the

free speech limitation imposed by the New York statute involved in the Bryant case. In a number of subsequent rulings, however, the Court has emphasized the constitutional problems involved in the requirement of membership registration of any kind. The Court has given reluctant approval to two kinds of federal statutes which directly or indirectly require identification of individuals engaged in political or public opinion activities. In American Communications Ass'n v. Douds[82] the Court upheld section 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, which denies certain benefits under that act to labor organizations whose officers fail to file affidavits of non-Communist affiliation. The Court recognized that the negative identification called for (that is, denial of membership) might impose a limitation on free speech. But it concluded that the legitimate public purpose involved in preventing political strikes in essential industry justified this minimal restraint. By way of general caution the Court noted:

> Under some circumstances, indirect "discouragements" undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes. A requirement that adherents of particular religious faiths or political parties wear identifying arm-bands, for example, is obviously of this nature.[83]

In United States v. Harriss[84] the Supreme Court upheld the registration provisions of the Federal Regulation of

Lobbying Act, but only by virtue of a narrow definition of the term lobbying to refer solely "to direct communications with members of Congress on pending or proposed federal legislation."[85] There was recognition that a broader construction might impinge on first amendment rights; but the majority of the Court found that hazard "too remote to require striking down a statute which on its face is otherwise plainly within the area of congressional power and is designed to safeguard a vital national interest."[86]

It is plain that the lack of concern over first amendment invasions by a statute requiring identification of members, as evidenced in the 1928 decision in Bryant v. Zimmerman, is no longer characteristic of the Court. Even minimal and indirect restraints can be justified only if there is involved a sufficiently vital public interest which can not otherwise be effectively protected.[87] To put the case mildly, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will find that suppression of the NAACP and its activities in the Southern states is a sufficient public purpose to justify such a limitation on free speech[88] and assembly.[89] There can be little doubt in fact that a requirement that NAACP disclose its state membership lists in some of the Southern states will subject members to fear of reprisal[90] and may make prospective members reluctant to associate themselves with the organization.[91] There should similarly be little doubt in law that such restrictions, absent sufficient public purpose, are violative of the Constitution.

V

Malpractice of Law and the NAACP

Over the centuries lawyers have frequently, often deservedly, been subjected to restrictive legislation by an outraged public. In large part the complaints against the practice of law -- or more accurately its malpractice -- have centered on offenses known as champerty, maintenance, and barratry. The confused history, in ancient Greece and Rome, and in feudal England, relating to the origins and common-law development of these offenses, has been competently investigated.[92] For present purposes, however, the knowledge of the past can be sufficiently summarized in a single statement from a leading American case:

> The general purpose of the law against champerty, maintenance, and barratry was to prevent officious intermeddlers from stirring up strife and contention by vexatious or speculative litigation, which would disturb the peace of society, lead to corrupt practices, and prevent the remedial process of the law.[93]

Complex distinctions have been drawn among these offenses; but in the last analysis they are all activities indissolubly associated in the public mind with the practice of law. As Professor Radin has said:

> If a maintainor is one who stirs up vexatious suits to which he is not a party, if a barrator is one who makes a profession of doing so,

> if a champertor is one who does so for pecuniary gain and if an embracer is one who in the course of such proceedings seeks to influence or intimidate judge or jury, it must be admitted that in the minds of the lay public, the chief maintainors, barrators, champertors and embracers of today are the members of the legal profession.[94]

These "vexatious" activities of lawyers, perhaps best summarized as "stirring up litigation," are widely condemned in the United States today.[95] Penalties are sometimes imposed for the common-law offense of barratry, even in the absence of statute;[96] more often barratry has been made a statutory offense;[97] and the canons of professional ethics forbid certain practices that relate at least generally to the activities prohibited at common law.[98] In addition, attorneys are generally subject to the inherent disciplinary powers of the court to protect against any activity in derogation of the principles of the profession. And finally, the corporate practice of law is generally forbidden.[99] These various restrictions, in terms of general principles, however, have little meaning; for each state is free to adopt or reject the common law, to legislate or not to legislate, to adopt canons of ethics, and to forbid or permit the corporate practice of law. Accordingly, it may be useful to examine the legislation and decisions of

a single state. Virginia has been selected for this purpose because in 1956 the General Assembly completely recast the Virginia law regulating the practice of law, directed more or less specifically at making unlawful some of the practices of the NAACP and its attorneys.[100] This legislation is further important because, if successful in withstanding present attacks,[101] it will undoubtedly be the pattern for similar legislation in other states.[102]

The previously existing legislation in Virginia authorized disbarment for "Any malpractice, or any unlawful or dishonest or unworthy or corrupt or unprofessional conduct," including "the improper solicitation of any legal or professional business or employment, either directly or indirectly . . . ."[103] This provision, when coupled with the inherent disciplinary power of the court, had been found sufficient for civil proceedings of disbarment for corrupt and dishonest conduct.[104] In addition, it was unlawful for any person or organization to act as a "runner" or "capper" in the solicitation of business for an attorney.[105] It was evident, however, that these statutes were by no means sufficient as a basis for sanctions to be imposed against the NAACP and its attorneys in that the Association's normal activities clearly did not violate any of these provisions. Accordingly, new and more stringent legislation was devised and enacted.

Chapter 33 of the new legislation amends the existing provisions described above, principally by enlarging the definitions of acts prohibited to attorneys. Section 54-74(6) of

the Code of Virginia now reads as follows:

> (6) "Any malpractice, or any unlawful or dishonest or unworthy or corrupt or unprofessional conduct," as used in this section, shall be construed to include the improper solicitation of any legal or professional business or employment, either directly or indirectly, or the acceptance of employment, retainer, compensation or costs from any person, partnership, corporation, organization or association with knowledge that such person, partnership, corporation, organization, or association has violated any provision of Article 7 of this chapter, or the failure, without sufficient cause, within a reasonable time after demand, of any attorney at law, to pay over and deliver to the person entitled thereto, any money, security or other property, which has come into his hands as such attorney; provided, however, that nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to in any way prohibit any attorney from accepting employment to defend any person, partnership, corporation, organization or association accused of violating the provisions of Article 7 of this chapter.

Section 54-78(1) (the beginning section of article 7 referred

to in section 54-74(6)) reads as follows:

> (1) A "runner" or "capper" is any person, corporation, partnership or association acting in any manner or in any capacity as an agent for an attorney at law within this State or for any person, partnership, corporation, organization or association which employs, retains or compensates any attorney at law in connection with any judicial proceeding in which such person, partnership, corporation, organization or association is not a party and in which it has no pecuniary right or liability, in the solicitation or procurement of business for such attorney at law or for such person, partnership, corporation, organization or association in connection with any judicial proceedings for which such attorney or such person, partnership, corporation, organization or association is employed, retained or compensated.

Chapter 35 prohibits and provides penalties for the crime of barratry, defined as "the offense of stirring up litigation." This in turn is defined to mean payment of all or part of the expenses of litigation by persons other than plaintiffs unless the instigation is by a person related to the plaintiff or by a person having a personal right or pecuniary interest in the litigation. Numerous exceptions are made, including approved legal aid societies, contingent fee contracts where the

attorney does not assume the litigation costs, suits involving the title of real or personal property, collection of taxes, rates or services of common carriers, and criminal matters. In short, the offense was defined as narrowly as possible to include the NAACP and little else.[106] The thrust at the NAACP is indicated also in the penalty provision:

> § 3. A person found guilty of barratry, if an individual shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and may be punished as provided by law; and if a corporation, may be fined not more than ten thousand dollars. If the corporation be a foreign corporation, its certificate of authority to transact business in Virginia shall be revoked by the State Corporation Commission.

Finally, chapter 36 supplements the anti-barratry provision by making it unlawful for any person or organization lacking a direct interest in litigation to give or receive money or other assistance as an inducement to any person to commence any legal proceeding in Virginia. As a special enforcement device, plaintiffs and their attorneys may be required, on motion of opposing parties or the court, to submit affidavits disavowing violation of the section. Additional penalties for false swearing, including disbarment of Virginia attorneys, are provided.

The legislation is so drawn that, if it should be upheld, the NAACP would be virtually barred from its normal litigation activities in Virginia, which of course was precisely the intent

of the drafters. Whatever may be the internal details of the Association's operation at the national and at the local level, there seems no doubt that officers and members of the NAACP have encouraged Negroes to resort to state and federal courts in the constant seeking after the objective of full equality of rights for Negroes. Under its charter to do less would be dereliction. Undoubtedly, too, all or a portion of the expenses of such litigation are sometimes borne by local branches or by the national office, despite the absence of blood relationship or personal or pecuniary interest in the litigation. Clearly within the intendment of the statute as it is, then, can the NAACP make good its challenge to these acts as a part of the Virginia legislative program enacted in 1956? A qualified affirmative seems appropriate, for the reasons outlined below.

A. Commercialization of the Professional Ideal

There can be little doubt that modern statutes forbidding solicitation of legal business[107] and prohibiting the corporate practice of law,[108] as well as the canons of ethics,[109] are designed to preserve the personal relationship between the lawyer and his client, and to protect against commercialization of the practice of law.[110] Thus it has been recognized that it is not only permissible,[111] but may be obligatory,[112] to represent an indigent client. And it has generally been assumed that litigation which was free of any commercial taint, and whose aim was the vindication of a valid public purpose,

was not within the prohibitions imposed against champerty, maintenance, and barratry.[113] There may even be an exception where there is no public purpose as such involved, but only vindication of a private right not otherwise subject to protection.[114]

Presumably, organizations such as the NAACP, ACLU, Jehovah's Witnesses, and other organizations[115] which participate in litigation to further their announced policy objectives are motivated by a public purpose within the meaning of the public purpose exception. Even though such organizations have often "stirred up" litigation in the sense of seeking advantageous cases to be used as a basis for challenging existing laws, practices, or precedents, this has always been considered a constitutionally protected right of freedom of expression and free access to the courts. Indeed, much of the constitutional development has been in response to "test" suits sponsored by one or more of these organizations. In this respect the NAACP seems to be in a peculiarly advantageous position because its principal objective at the present time is to seek judicial enforcement of the principle of desegregation enunciated by the Court in relation to public schools, public transportation, and recreation.

The one point at which the NAACP might be vulnerable under the construction ordinarily given these statutes would be if members were encouraged to seek legal advice on personal matters from lawyers employed by the Association.[116] However, this is expressly forbidden by section 2(d) of article III

of the Constitution and By-Laws for Branches. Accordingly, all the legal work done in behalf of the Association objectives by members of branch legal redress committees, by members of the National Legal Committee, or by the staff of the NAACP Legal Aid and Defense Fund would seem to relate directly to the organization's purpose of promoting racial equality.

Of course, it is true, as pointed out above, that the Virginia legislation seems aimed specifically at these ordinarily unobjectionable practices. Therefore, the Virginia courts may well hesitate to carve out an exception of the kind here suggested. Similarly, since the interpretation of this legislation will be a question of state law, it may be difficult for a federal district court or for the Supreme Court to find that the statute does not prohibit present practices of the NAACP. That being the case, if the practices are to be permitted to continue, attack must be directed at the constitutionality of the legislation.

B. The Constitution and the Practice of Law

Several propositions are clear. In the first place, each state has the authority to fix reasonable standards for the admission to practice in the courts of that state and for the continuance of that practice.[117] In the second place, one of the few privileges and immunities which is accorded constitutional protection is the citizen's right of access to the state and federal courts.[118] Finally, it is axiomatic that every litigant, plaintiff and defendant alike, is

entitled to exercise freely his choice of whatever counsel he can procure and pay for. But when a state seeks to exert its admitted right of control over the practice of law in a way that effectively deprives one group of its citizens of the only kind of representation likely to be effective, there may be a denial of a protected privilege and immunity, denial of the equal protection of the laws, and an abridgment of freedom of speech and assembly. Thus, where the prevailing climate of opinion discourages members of a class from independent assertion of their constitutionally protected rights, it perhaps follows that a nonprofit organization dedicated to preservation of those rights should be immunized against this kind of harassment. This seems particularly justifiable when the complained-of state action is directed in discriminatory fashion against a single organization and an identifiable class of citizens whom that organization serves. Refined though the device may be, and shielded though it is under the respectable mantle of regulation of the practice of law, the discriminatory purpose cannot be concealed. This bears every mark of unfairness which calls for its elimination as a violation of equal protection and an intrusion upon first amendment freedoms.

VI

Intimidation by Investigation

Of the several Southern states which have authorized investigations of organizations "which encourage and promote litigation relating to racial activities,"[119] Virginia is again the leader whose example other states will assuredly

follow if the scheme proves successful in its objective of harassment of the NAACP. Chapter 34 of the Virginia legislation provides for the creation of a joint legislative committee to study

> the administration and enforcement of those laws relating to champerty, maintenance, barratry, running and capping and other offenses of any other nature relating to the promotion or support of litigation by persons who are not parties thereto.

In addition to the powers regularly conferred upon legislative committees of the General Assembly this committee is empowered to administer oaths, examine witnesses, employ counsel, and compel attendance of witnesses or production of documents.

Chapter 37 establishes a legislative committee

> authorized to make a thorough investigation of the activities of corporations, organizations, associations and other like groups which seek to influence, encourage or promote litigation relating to racial activities in this State.

This committee, too, is given broad investigative authority, the stated purpose being to consider the necessity for legislation and to determine "the effect which integration or the threat of integration could have on . . . the general welfare of the State. . . ."

The apparent, albeit unstated, premise underlying these investigative programs is an intent to force disclosures relating to the NAACP and its members that will establish violation of other provisions of the statutory package; and if membership lists and financial statements are not made public pursuant to the other statutory requirements, here then is another way to accomplish the same objective. Even if the statute is not unconsitutional on its face, it seems almost certain that any committee investigation conducted in furtherance of the legislative intention would run into several constitutional obstacles. If, for example, the committee demands membership lists or names of contributors, the same objections can be made as described above in connection with the registration statute.[120] This conclusion is reinforced in connection with refusals to answer the improper questions of a state legislative investigating committee by the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire[121] Although that case involved a committee attempt to require disclosure of past associations of a political nature, that problem is clearly analogous to the right to associate with an organization dedicated to preservation of approved social ideals. Indeed, if anything, the case for the NAACP is stronger. Political associations of a subversive character have on occasion been subjected to limitation in the exercise of first amendment rights;[122] but it seems unthinkable that an organization devoted to the promotion of racial equality--a Supreme Court-endorsed objective--would ever be restrained from the free exercise of its right of association.

VII

Summary and Prospectus

The legislative, judicial, and executive action designed for the harassment, or worse, of the NAACP is remarkably ingenious. Logic tells one that an organization truly dedicated to the promotion of equality should not be reluctant to disclose its purpose, members, financial structure, or way of doing business. Similarly, having nothing to hide, such an organization should arguably welcome investigation rather than shun it. And finally, no respectable lawyer or organization devoted to these public service ideals would knowingly become involved in the historically nefarious practices associated with champerty, maintenance, and barratry.

The ring of plausibility is there. But behind the facade the discriminatory purpose is all too evident. The Virginia legislation, for example, was part of a program designed to implement Governor Stanley's announced policy of "unyielding resistance" to the decision in the School Segregation Cases.[123] To whatever extent a single act does not on its face manifest discriminatory aims, the package clearly demonstrates the pattern. Thus the NAACP seems to have exercised sound judgment in seeking a declaratory judgment as to the invalidity of the entire scheme in a single suit before a three-judge federal district court. If the Association is successful in invalidating this legislative

program, other legislation in other states, in some cases identical and nowhere more skillfully drawn, should similarly be held unconstitutional. As the Supreme Court has stated, it will nullify "sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination."[124]

August 1957

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Footnotes

1 Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights 10-33 (1957).

2 See Cahn, The Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 Yale L.J. 464 (1956).

3 Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights 33-38 (1957).

4 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).

5 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America 319-20 (Galaxy ed.).

6 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).

7 For a general review, see McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed" -- A Study of School Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 991 (1956).

8 The Doctrine of Interposition: A Round Table, 5 J. Pub. L. 1 (1956); Interposition vs. Judicial Power, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 465 (1956).

9 Wettach, North Carolina School Legislation -- 1956, 35 N.C.L. Rev. 1 (1956); Study, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 561 (1957); Note, Effect of School Assignment Laws on Federal Adjudication of Integration Controversies, 57 Col. L. Rev. 537 (1957).

10 Fleming, Resistance Movements and Racial Desegregation, 304 Annals 44 (March 1956). See also Martin, The South Says "Never" (1957).

11 For an effective, popular summary, see American Jewish Congress, Assault Upon Freedom of Association (1957).

12 See Jack, History of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (1943); Ovington, The Walls Came

Tumbling Down (1947); Rose, The Negro in America 263-67 (Beacon Paperback Ed. 1956); Wynn, The NAACP Versus Negro Revolutionary Protest (1955).

13 Rose, The Negro in America 263 (Beacon Paperback Ed. 1956). To the same effect, see Comment, Private Attorneys-General; Group Action in the Fight for Civil Liberties, 58 Yale L.J. 574, 581 (1949).

14 Vose, NAACP Strategy in the Covenant Cases, 6 Western Res. L. Rev. 101, 102 (1955).

15 Talmadge, You and Segregation 26 (1955). One of the few apparent dissenters from this view is Mississippi's Governor J. P. Coleman who denied the necessity of passing legislation outlawing the NAACP in the state because "I personally don't feel that the NAACP is a powerful organization in Mississippi up to this time." Southern School News, Aug. 1957, p. 15, col. 5. It should be noted, however, that Mississippi, like other deep-South states, has in recent years enacted legislation that works to the disadvantage of the NAACP.

16 Factual data in the historical sketch which follows was largely drawn from Frazier, The Negro in the United States 523-26 (Rev. Ed. 1957). See also the materials cited in note 12 supra.

17 Tenth Annual Report of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 7 (1919).

18 NAACP Annual Report: 48th Year 11-12 (1957).

19 NAACP Annual Report: 47th Year 75 (1956). This is in addition to that portion of the membership fees retained by the

branches, which amounted to $250,000.00 for the year 1956. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1957, p. 19, col. 3.

20 Comment, 58 Yale L.J. 574, 581-82 (1949).

21 NAACP Const., art. I, § 1.

22 NAACP Annual Report: 48th Year 72 (1957).

23 Id. at 70.

24 NAACP Const. and By-Laws for Branches, art. III, § 2(d).

25 E.g., the NAACP has registered as a foreign corporation with the Virginia State Corporation Commission and has been granted a certificate of authority to do business in Virginia. Southern School News, Nov. 1956, p. 5, col. 5.

26 N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 55-118 (1943), as amended, (Supp. 1955).

27 N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 120-48, 120-49 (1943).

28 NAACP v. Eure, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 405 (1956).

29 Id. at 410.

30 Id. at 405.

31 245 N.C. 331, 95 S.E.2d 893 (1957).

32 Southern School News, March 1957, p. 11, col. 3-4.

33 Transactions involving services or intangibles moving across state lines are consistently held to constitute interstate commerce. E.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (news gathering). United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (insurance); American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (medical services).

34 Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300 (1937);

Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert, 239 U.S. 560 (1916). Cf. Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914).

35 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S., 310, 320 (1945). See Note, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations -- An Analysis of Due Process, 104 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 381 (1955).

36 Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944).

37 Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22 (1937).

38 Complaint, par. 8, 1 Race Rel. L. REp. 407 (1956).

39 In addition, several other states have proposed or adopted legislation designed to require production of membership lists; but test litigation has not yet reached the courts.

Ark. Acts 1957, No. 85, 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 495 (1957). This act requires the registration with, and the making of periodical reports to, the State Sovereignty Commission by persons and organizations promoting school desegregation by legislation or litigation. In addition to requiring in effect disclosure of membership lists, there are extremely burdensome requirements for detailed receipting and listing of expenditures. This may exceed permissible limits of regulation. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 204 (1927).

In Georgia the attorney general proposed a resolution which, if enacted, would have authorized an investigation of the NAACP, described as"an enemy of the South," with authority in the committee to subpoena all Association records, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 956, 957 (1956).

In Florida,a package of proposals to preserve segregation, including disclosure of membership lists, was debated but not

enacted in 1957. Southern School News, May 1957, p. 4, col. 1; id. July 1957, p. 12, col. 4.

Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, cc. 151, 152, 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 497, 498 (1957). These acts require the filing of membership lists by organizations which solicit funds to finance or maintain litigation or which promote or oppose legislation relating to racial matters.

A proposed Texas statute requiring registration of persons advocating segregation or integration was ruled unconsitutional by the attorney general of the state. Southern School News, June 1957, p. 2, col. 1.

40 Ala. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 192-94 (1940).

41 Alabama ex rel. Patterson v. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 707 (1956).

42 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 917 (1956).

43 NAACP Annual Report: 48th Year 28 (1957).

44 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 919 (1956).

45 91 So. 2d 214 (Ala. 1956).

46 353 U.S. 972 (1957).

47 This argument will have a somewhat unusual cast in that the state action complained of does not derive directly from state statute, but from a court order to produce membership lists, granted on motion of the attorney general. However, it has long been clear that judicial action which denies due process is state action violative of the fourteenth amendment. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); State Action: A Study of Requirements Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 613 (1956).

In addition, there are complex questions of Alabama procedural law. The NAACP argues that the state court's denial of certiorari (on the ground that mandamus was the proper remedy) was in conflict with Alabama precedent. Thus, to reach the substantive issue the United States Supreme Court will have to determine that there was no adequate state ground for the denial of certiorari. This may be troublesome, but is certainly not an insurmountable obstacle if the state court abused its own precedents to arrive at a discriminatory result. Cf. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904).

48 Williams v. NAACP, 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 181 (1957). Appeal from this decision has encountered procedural delays and difficulties under Georgia law. Southern School News, July 1957, p. 9, col. 2.

49 N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1956, p. 16, col. 1.

50 Southern School News, July 1957, p. 9, col. 2.

51 La. Rev. Stat. §§ 12:401-405 (1950). See Comment, Anti-Mask and Anti-Klan Laws, 1 J. Pub. L. 182 (1952).

52 Id., §§ 12:401, 12:402.

53 Louisiana ex rel. LeBlanc v. Lewis, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 571 (1956).

54 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 576 (1956).

55 Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 2 Race Rel. L. Rep.

185 (1957).

56 Southern School News, Feb. 1957, p. 16, col. 5.

57 Id., June 1957, p. 6, col. 2.

58 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1529 (Vernon Supp. 1955) requires the issuance of a permit to "Any corporation for pecuniary profit," but apparently has no similar requirement as to nonprofit corporations. This distinction is of course consistent with the well-recognized difference between the power of the state to regulate commercial enterprise generally as compared with its inability to impose prior restraint upon the operation of organizations concerned exclusively with the dissemination of ideas.

59 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7084 (Vernon Supp. 1955).

60 Following a similar, ex parte temporary restraining order. Both appear in 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1068, 1069 (1956).

61 Texas v. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 678 (1957).

62 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Almond, Civ. No. 2435 (E.D. Va.), filed Nov. 28, 1956.

63 See Note, State Control Over Political Organizations: First Amendment Checks on Powers of Regulation, 66 Yale L.J. 545, 546-50 (1957).

64 Orient Insurance Co. v. Daggo, 172 U.S. 557, 561 (1899).

65 Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939).

66 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522 (1898). But cf. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85 (1938) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black); Wheeling

Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576 (1949) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Black concurring).

67 Northwestern National Life Insurance Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906); Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907). See also Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 362 (1904) (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brewer).

However, there was not a freedom of speech or association issue in any of these cases. Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), where the Court denied that corporations were protected as to liberty, but granted protection to the claimed right of religious freedom on the basis of a denial of property.

68 307 U.S. 496 (1939).

69 Id. at 514.

70 Id. at 527.

71 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).

72 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).

73 In Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939), the individual plaintiffs were labor organizers acting in behalf of unincorporated labor organizations.

74 Comment, State Control Over Political Organizations: First Amendment Checks on Powers of Regulation, 66 Yale L.J. 545, 548 (1957).

75 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 263 U.S. 510 (1925). Cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). In that case unincorporated associations and

corporations had been listed by the Attorney General as Communist without notice or hearing. Although the complaint raised essentially first amendment issues, the majority found the complaint stated a cause of action as a denial of property without due process under the fifth amendment.

76 Comment, State Control Over Political Organizations: First Amendment Checks on Powers of Regulation, 66 Yale L.J. 545, 560-66 (1957).

77 278 U.S. 63 (1928).

78 Id. at 66, quoting from N.Y. Civ. Rights Law art. V-A, as it read at that time.

79 Id. at 75, quoting from the opinion of a state court in the case.

80 Ibid.

81 Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 76 (1928).

82 339 U.S. 382 (1950).

83 Id. at 402. Cf. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 223 F.2d 531, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (registration provision of Subversive Activities Control Act upheld in circumstances, although recognizing that there was a restriction on freedom of expression), rev'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 115 (1955).

84 347 U.S. 612 (1954).

85 Id. at 620.

86 Id. at 626. Cf. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953) (narrow construction of congressional resolution defining powers of committee investigating lobbying activities,

thus avoiding first amendment problems).

87 Comment, Legislative Inquiry into Political Activity: First Amendment Immunity from Committee Interrogation, 65 Yale L.J. 1159, 1173-75 (1956).

88 See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).

89 See also De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937). "The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental . . . . the right is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions, -- principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause."

90 A South Carolina statute making unlawful the employment of NAACP members in the state school system (S.C. Acts 1956, No. 751, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 751 (1956)), was repealed after the act was tested before a three-judge federal district court. Bryan v. Austin, Civ. No. 5792 (E.D.S.C. 1957), 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 378 (1957), dismissed for mootness, 77 Sup. Ct. 1396 (1957). The 1956 act was repealed by S.C. Acts 1957, No. 324.

91 For statements of public officials and others hostile to the NAACP, see American Jewish Congress, Assault Upon Freedom of Association 35-37 (1957).

92 Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 Calif. L. Rev. 48 (1935).

93 Gammons v. Johnson, 76 Minn. 76, 81, 78 N.W. 1035, 1037 (1899).

94 Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 Calif. L. Rev. 48, 66-67 (1935).

95 And still more widely so in England. Id. at 76.

96 E.g., State v. Batson, 220 N.C. 411, 17 S.E.2d 511 (1941).

97 139 A.L.R. 620, 621 (1942). Such statutes may include the old offenses of champerty and maintenance. 10 Am. Jur., Champerty and Maintenance § 5 (1937).

98 The relevant Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association are Numbers 27, 28, and 42.

99 Note, 44 Harv. L.R. 1114 (1931).

100 Va. Acts 1956, cc. 33-36.

101 NAACP v. Almond, Civ. No. 2435 (E.D. Va.), complaint filed Nov. 28, 1956.

102 The State of Tennessee has already enacted an anti-barratry statute based on the Virginia act. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 104. Other anti-barratry legislation enacted since 1954 includes the following: Ga. Laws 1957, No. 514, 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 501 (1957); Miss. Laws 1956, H.B. No. 33, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 451 (1956); S.C. Acts 1957, No. ____, 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 502 (1957).

103 Va. Code Ann. § 54-74 (1950).

104 Campbell v. Third Dist. Comm. of Va. State Bar, 179 Va. 244, 18 S.E.2d 883 (1942); Norfolk & Portsmouth Bar Ass'n v. Drewry, 161 Va. 833, 172 S.E. 282 (1934). Cf. Legal Club of Lynchburg v. Light, 137 Va. 249, 119 S.E. 55 (1923).

105 Va. Code Ann. § 54-78, 54-79 (1950).

106 Perhaps inadvertently, the statute appears to include labor organization within its strictures.

107 For a recent discussion of one aspect of this problem, see Note, Legal Ethics -- Ambulance Chasing, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 182 (1955).

108 The practice of law by corporations or by lay individuals is prohibited by statute in many states. Note, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1114 (1931). See also Drinker, Legal Ethics 159-69 (1953); Symposium, The "Unauthorized Practice of Law" Controversy, 5 Law & Contemp. Prob. 1-174 (1938); Weihofen, "Practice of Law" by Non-Pecuniary Corporations: A Social Utility, 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 119 (1934).

109 Canon 27 of the ABA Canons of Ethics prohibits solicitation; canon 28 prohibits stirring up litigation; canon 35 prohibits the practice of law by laymen, including corporations; and canon 42 forbids a lawyer from agreeing to pay the expenses of his client's litigation.

110 See notes 107-109 supra. See also Drinker, Legal Ethics 63-68, 210-20 (1953).

111 E.g., charitable societies rendering aid to indigents are exempted from canon 35's ban on the intervention of lay intermediaries between lawyer and client.

112 Canon 4 of the ABA Canons of Ethics. See also Drinker, Legal Ethics 62-63 (1953).

113 In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467 (D. Md. 1934); Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Ass'n, 191 Ga. 366, 12 S.E.2d 602 (1940).

114 Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 3 Cow. 623, 15 Am. Dec. 308 (N.Y. Ct. of Errors 1824).

115 Robison, Organizations Promoting Civil Rights and Liberties, 275 Annals 18 (May 1951).

116 See Hildebrand v. State Bar of Cal., Cal. 225 P.2d 508 (1950). But cf. Ryan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 268 Ill. App. 364 (1932).

117 Jackson, Bar Examinations and Requirements for Admission to the Bar (1952).

118 Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides that "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . ." Although the clause was early given a restrictive interpretation in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36, 74 (1873), the Court recognized that access to the courts of justice in the several states is a privilege and immunity of national citizenship. Id. at 79.

119 The language quoted is from the preamble to chapter 37 of the 1956 laws of the Virginia General Assembly. See also id. c. 34.


120 It is probable that individuals could plead the privilege against self-incrimination to avoid identifying themselves with the NAACP (because its activities are tainted with criminality under the Virginia statute). But it seems almost unthinkable that thoughtful members of the Association would afford an investigating committee such an opportunity for damaging publicity.

121 354 U.S. 234 (1957).

122 E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).

123 Southern School News, Oct. 1956, p. 16, col. 1. The governor's forthright admission should prove useful to demonstrate the discriminatory purpose of the legislation. Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd, 336 U.S. 933 (1949). Southern political leaders are often caught in a difficult dilemma. In order to satisfy the presumed desire of their constituents for a strong anti-integration stand, it may be necessary to make public pronouncements liable to prove the constitutional undoing of the proposed program.

124 Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).


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(TENTATIVE DRAFT)

POLITICAL PRESSURES AND PLANNING

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I

The topic of this paper obviously is cosmic. To describe the task of dealing with the multitude of pressures encountered in planning and formulating public policy is to describe the bulk of the administrator's official activity. Therefore in this relatively brief treatment of the subject, it would seem to be the better part of wisdom to select a particular situation in which the impact of pressures on planning can be considered in specific terms, for any attempt to proceed on a broader basis carries with it the risk of verbalism, one of the age-old and principal deterrents to meaningful discussion.

Since a particular situation is to be chosen, the writer has a predilection for that one which he knows best on the basis of experience, i. e., the pressures arising in planning for state and community development in New Jersey. The choice can be justified, however, on grounds other than familiarity with the situation. Conditions in New Jersey are significant because the state is officially classed as the most "urbanized" in the nation and its population density per square mile is heavier than that of any other state except Rhode Island. And there are other significant factors.

Even though the state is more than ninety percent urban and even though, on the basis of area, it is one of the four smallest in the nation, the homogeneity that might be expected under the circumstances is missing --- and not merely because of income differentials. There are conspicuous regional variations with an origin in geography. Despite the predominance of manufacturing, moreover, the economic structure is anything but uniform. And flowing from these differences are differences in interests and attitudes that have always exercised an influence on planning at the state level.

What is essentially interesting about the situation, then, is this: Here is a state, with a high rate of both population growth and economic expansion, that has been presented with most, if not all, of the major problems accompanying massive urbanization. The need of better planning for over-all state development is urgent--- and on this point virtually everyone agrees. Yet effective planning is never easy and in New Jersey it must be conducted against a background of divergent interests of unusual complexity.

At the risk of belaboring the obvious, the meaning of the term planning in this context should be made as clear as possible. Every time a public official sits down at his desk and decides upon an approach to a particular problem --- regardless of its seriousness or immediacy --- he is engaged in planning. As it appears in this paper, however, the term is used in a more formal sense. The lines of demarcation among different types of planning are not hard and fast. As the reader undoubtedly has assumed, however, the principal concern here is with planning of a comprehensive type, which came into vogue in twentieth century America, prompting hundreds of municipalities to establish official planning commissions and to point to these as symbols of progress even though many have served as models of inactivity or, on the other hand, have become storm centers the minute they showed any real disposition for action. In short, interest lies in the kind of planning that is focused in a

systematic way upon all the substantive, long-range issues facing the state or community and has as its goal the coordination of arrangements for meeting present and future needs in such fields as education, water supply, housing, recreation, highway construction, aviation and rapid transit.

As a further introductory note, the aims of the writer should be clearly stated. The discussion is devoted to three general points: (1) The background and current status of planning in New Jersey. (2) The nature and importance of the pressures brought to bear on officials in charge of state planning. (3) The responsibility of the administrator in face of these pressures.

The paper consists of a limited series of observations believed to be of special significance. It is not in any sense a definitive study. A measure of diffuseness, it should be added, is unavoidable because a clear explanation of the principal conclusions requires attention to the background and tangential aspects of a number of developments.

Although the focus of discussion is upon the effect of pressures upon general state planning, the subject will be analyzed to a large extent in terms of one agency, the New Jersey Department of Conservation and Economic Development. There are two rather cogent reasons for this. First, the writer's observations must be regarded in no inconsiderable way as the product of his experience in the course of an association with this organization over the past few years. Secondly, the duty of planning for state development is assigned to the department. Its workings may be advantageous as a starting point for assessing the relationship between pressures and planning for still a third reason --- the multiplicity of its operations. Indeed, taking the nation as a whole, the Department probably is unique among units of state government insofar as the number and diversity of the functions it performs are concerned.

As to the background of the Department and the nature of its role in State Government, the essential facts are as follows: In 1947 the state adopted a new constitution, which authorized a thorough reorganization of the executive branch in the interest of integrating operations. The Legislature then proceeded to adopt a series of reorganization acts, placing all executive activities in fourteen departments. The Department of Conservation and Economic Development was the fourteenth and last to be established. It would not be accurate, as is sometimes suggested, to conclude that it was created without rhyme or reason, a many-headed monster saddled with numerous and variegated responsibilities that could not be logically assigned to any of the thirteen other departments. Actually the relationships among most of its constituent parts are clear, and the importance of these relationships becomes all the more evident as one looks beneath the surface. Nonetheless the department does have some of the characteristics of a hybrid.

As noted above, it serves as the planning arm of the state. It is also responsible for control of beach erosion, operation of state forests and parks, assistance to municipalities in community recreation, administration of the state's housing laws, regulation of aviation, management of historic sites, and study of mineral resources. It is further responsible for the various aspects of fish and game management. Meanwhile, it exercises authority over the use of water resources and more recently has become involved in efforts to formulate plans for meeting future water supply needs. Accompanying, and in many instances related, to the foregoing responsibilities is the duty to stimulate economic development and to conduct continuing programs of economic promotion. Its hybrid status is underscored by the facts that along with everything else it administers state services to veterans, and it operated the state rent control

program until this was discontinued in 1956.

The department is comprised of five major units --- the Division of Planning and Development, the Division of Water Policy and Supply, the Division of Fish and Game, the Division of Shell Fisheries, and the Division of Veterans' Services. Each of these, in turn, consists of numerous bureaus and section.

II

When the Department of Conservation and Economic Development was created in 1949 and assigned the task of state planning, it assumed responsibility for a function which has had a checkered history in most states. The report of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, as well as the President's address at the 1957 Governors' Conference, recognizes --- even if in oblique fashion --- the validity of certain complaints about the inadequacy of state government. The term inadequate, however, is too euphimistic for a description of the states' past record in the field of planning. In many cases even the pretense of action was missing. In other cases, where state planning programs were undertaken, their foundations tended to be precarious, and not infrequently they were treated as a fringe activity instead of an integral part of state operations.

To the extent that action was taken, the federal government provided the initial impetus during the thirties. It was during this period that New Jersey got its start in planning. An official state board was created in 1934, and a staff was recruited to analyze patterns of land use, trends in economic development, population growth, conservationa and development of natural resources, etc. The operation had hardly begun, however, when the urgency of international conditions and the subsequent attack on Pearl Harbor altered priorities in Washington. Naturally, the mobilization of national resources for war became the foremost consideration. In the process some of the recently established state planning commissions were abolished, and the activities of the others were sharply curtailed. New Jersey was fortunate to the extent that the state planning agency was retained even if it constituted hardly more than a holding operation. Whether or not the decision to jettison state planning for the duration was wise, it is at least understandable. What it not understandable --- or, to be more accurate, what certainly cannot be justified --- was the failure to revitalize state planning after the war. The failure was particularly unfortunate for a state like New Jersey, which already had its full share of frustrations resulting from inadequate planning in the past and which was entering a period of unprecedented population growth, economic expansion and residential development.

As recently as 1954 the state planning agency still had only a skeleton staff and was restricted to giving advice to local planning boards in a necessarily off-hand fashion, encouraging the establishment of new boards, and doing missionary work to promote greater cooperation among the different units of government. The price paid for the lack of emphasis on state planning during the first decade after the war cannot be reckoned statistically. Casual observation, however, shows that the cost was anything but negligible, and in 1954 the department took the first steps to bridge the gap.

Since then we have been able to provide over-all technical assistance to certain smaller municipalities by participating in a federal program authorized under the Housing Act of 1954. This is the first time that such a program had been conducted in New Jersey under state auspices and supervision. The interest displayed in the program, incidentally, would seem to indicate an increased awareness of the value of comprehensive planning for community development, especially among

local officials. The most reliable evidence is the fact that some of the municipalities receiving assistance have been willing to carry fifty per cent of the cost. Whether the governing bodies of most of these same municipalities would have approved a similar outlay ten or twenty years ago is doubtful, to say the least. If there has been a genuine change in attitude toward planning, it is presumably a response to the confusion and proliferation of financial problems that are the common result of haphazard development and failure to anticipate the consequences of particular actions. The reason for the change, however, is of far less moment than its apparent occurrence, for with all the pressures to be resisted or neutralized in establishing a foundation for adequate planning, nothing is more imperative than an appreciation of its practical value by opinion leaders capable of impressing their views on the larger community.

The provision of assistance to municipalities has been accompanied by new stress on state planning per se, i. e., planning for activities in areas where the state has predominant responsibility. In addition to the attention directed at strictly internal matters, this has entailed a move to give the concept of cooperative federalism the status of a working principle. The outstanding example thus far has been an effort to bring this concept of state-federal-local cooperation to bear upon the planning of a development program for the Delaware River basin, a project that might have been undertaken in years past except for the ideological cross-fire of parties quarreling over the appropriate role of the federal government in the utilization of natural resources. The current effort has borne fruit to the extent that the states having an interest in the Delaware are presently working with the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers and other federal agencies on a new survey looking toward integrated development of the basin.

The attempt to improve the caliber of state planning was undertaken with a vast amount of ground to be covered. It is only proper to note that although the objectives are clear the Department is still groping its way and probably will continue to do so for sometime to come. The goal is the creation of a planning agency, capable of serving state government as a whole, that will help coordinate improvements, insure more efficient utilization of resources, and prevent such contradictions in policy and operations as have occurred in the past. The degree of progress towards the attainment of this goal thus far is modest, partly because of lack of sufficient personnel. With respect to planning for general departmental activities, on the other hand, the gains have been more substantial. The planning agency is playing a considerably enlarged role in integrating the activities of all units and reconciling long-range development plans in order to promote maximum possible use of the physical assets entrusted to the department. The significance of this may be judged by the fact that the agency administers most state-pwned land and is trustee of New Jersey's water resources, with authority to regulate their existing use and future developments.

III

It is obvious that the first requirement for effective state planning is the attachment of importance to the function by the leadership of state government, which will, in turn, provide a suitable framework for its performance. It is also obvious that once such a framework has been provided, the interplay of pressures around the planning process will demand increased attention.

The pressures should not be dismissed as a blight on the life of the administrator, for they have the self-evident value of bringing him into closer communication with existing social forces. Planning differs from other governmental operations in the sense that many of the decisions taken are lacking

in finality and do not have to win immediate acceptance. This condition has a subtle influence that cannot be overlooked. It carries with it the temptation to approach long-range problems with the unconscious attitude that the most satisfactory solution is what would seem to be the ideal solution. The failure to be aware of this temptation more strongly may be one of the reasons that so many of the plans prepared for state and community development in the past have been academic blueprints, which after once being aired were filed and forgotten.

The administrator may have full respect for the art of the possible. He may be completely conscious of the necessity of understanding the social anatomy and physiology of his constituency. Like all men, however, he must operate in a restricted setting, and even though he may enjoy the guidance of an exceptionally competent staff he needs a medium that will bring him into direct communication with all groups likely to be affected by his decisions. Through the manifestion of various pressures he can gain a deeper insight into the psychology of forces with which he must reckon in formulating realistic proposals. Many of the pressures will be unreasonable. Many will have to be resisted. By coming face to face with them, however, he has a more adequate opportunity to weigh group demands and to distinguish between those that are legitimate and those that are unwarranted. The plans submitted thus rest on a stronger foundation and have a better chance of standing the test of time.

As has been implied, the foregoing observations should not be construed as an endorsement of the objectives of all, or even most, of the groups formed for the purpose of exerting pressure. Indeed, the problem of the organized minority promoting its interest at the expense of the unorganized majority perhaps is more serious in planning than in other fields of governmental activity. This is true in part because government, when engaged in the act of planning, is usually looking down the corridor of time, seeking to assert its mastery over the future. The work of a planning agency is devoted partially, of course, to unravelling some of the intolerable problems belonging to the current state of affairs, and from time to time its findings and recommendations can stir broad public reaction. If it is assumed, however, that the leading function of a planning agency is to anticipate problems before they arise and to discover the best way of obviating them, it only follows that the agency will be dealing with many issues of little immediate concern to the typical citizen, living in a work-a-day world and wrestling with his own personal difficulties.

There are other reasons for the apathy, of which the reader is well aware. Apart from its technical characteristics, planning of necessity is complex, for it involves taking a large number of diverse factors and bringing them together in the projection of an integrated plan. Social conditions within a particular state also may complicate the task of raising the level of interest in planning and explaining particular proposals to the satisfaction of the public. In New Jersey, for example, the proportion of transient residents is higher than average; the migration of population within the state is heavy and continuous; inter-state commuting is a notable phenomenon, with thousands of persons employed in the state maintaining their residence in other states and with thousands of others who reside in New Jersey leaving each day to earn their living elsewhere. Beyond this, countless men and women dwell in the semi-isolation so characteristic of urban society, and the story of the person unable to recall the name of his closest neighbor is becoming ever more familiar. These are imponderables, to be sure. It would be surprising, however, if they did not serve in their way to aggravate the difficulty of making issues meaningful to the public.

At all events we have not yet reached the point where planning for state development proceeds against the background of an aroused public, and with the majority unorganized and inarticulate, the classic situation obtains. Organized minorities not only are in a more powerful position to push their claims. They do not even find it too hard to confuse matters in such a way that their interests become widely accepted as being identical with the public interest.

It is all very well to remind ourselves that the problem of the organized minority and the unorganized majority is as ancient as democratic government itself. But the dangers it presents for the long-term welfare of the community are rising with current development trends. No realistic official would expect to win acceptance of a development plan in the absence of a favorable climate of opinion, and although usually such a climate will eventually emerge, this will happen only gradually. In the more distant past the official who understood this could wait without any loss of composure. The tempo of growth was not rapid, and irrevocable blunders usually would not be committed before the larger public became hospitable to new and more suitable lines of action. In many sections today, however, is doubtful whether such a period of grace still exists. In densely populated, highly industrialized areas like New Jersey, the pace of development has been greatly intensified over the past ten or fifteen years, and the entire human environment is undergoing radical change. Planning no longer is merely a desideratum. It is a paramount necessity if the intensified rate of change is not to leave scores of communities in disarray.

Thus the administrator wrestles with a new dilemma. He recognizes, on the one hand, that effective planning demands a certain kind of atmosphere -- the atmosphere that exists when an ample majority understands the need for measures to insure orderly growth and to meet the future needs of the community. He cannot but be disturbed, on the other hand, by his knowledge that the margin of time for creating this atmosphere has become very narrow and that a whole series of irrevocable mistakes may be committed before the majority is aroused and the power of minorities is diluted.

To be specific, one of the leading issues in New Jersey today is the shortage of water supply, chiefly a result of past failures to provide new water supply facilities despite the rapidly ascending public and industrial consumption of water over the past decade. For more than three years now the State Administration has been engaged in a movement to formulate an integrated plan to meet the present and future water requirements of all areas and to devise means of implementing it. The movement has not been without success. It should be noted, however, that even though the problem and its inherent perils are as obvious as a gathering storm, the obstacles that loom at every turn in working out a satisfactory solution remind one of the well-documented trials of cutting canals across Suez and Panama.

New Jersey, it should be pointed out, enjoys an abundance of precipitation and presumably ought to have water to spare if more of the rainfall emptied on the state each year were captured and stored instead of being permitted to flow out to sea. But the problem of storage is not simple. As population has increased and industry has expanded, the number of suitable water reservoir sites available in this state with a total land area of only 8204 square miles has become seriously limited. The unfortunate fact is that we have reached a stage where it is virtually impossible to construct a reservoir on any site without minor dislocations.

That the victims of any such dislocation should be displeased and feel a sense of resentment is to be expected. It is also understandable that they should exercise whatever power they command to stave off what they deem an unfair treatment of their interests. It is not surprising, therefore, that every proposal submitted thus far for the acquisition of reservoir sites to help relieve the water supply deficiency has met with vigorous opposition from small groups of persons who own property on the sitesand have no dispesition to sell their holdings. If none of this is unusual, however, their effectiveness in forestalling action has been remarkable. Thus are we presented with a situation in which a few hundred individuals hostile to a particular project are capable of holding up measures which promise to solve a problem affecting hundreds of thousands.

With a sufficient concentration of publicity on the urgency of the problem, the minuscule forces of resistance, no doubt, will tend to lose ground and eventually will be stripped of their power to veto majority action. The crucial question, however, is whether these minorities will be disarmed and the construction of new water supply facilities will be started far enough in advance to prevent the water shortage from assuming the proportions of a widespread crisis.

The danger of delay in resolving this question is acute in that any protracted failure to resolve it could only have a devastating effect on the stability of the state's economy and the welfare of a substantial segment of the public. But the danger exists in other areas, and one of the most serious challenges posed for the administrator today is to find means of reducing the time lag in the growth of public consciousness of the hazards bound up in delay.

The interplay of pressures around the planning process naturally entails more than the activities of groups formed for the explicit purpose of applying pressure. The character of state government itself may tend, for example, to generate additional pressures.

The Constitution adopted by the voters of New Jersey in 1947 is widely regarded as a model instrument. In addition to laying the ground for one of the most efficient state judicial systems, it placed all responsibility for and authority over executive operations in the hands of the Governor and vested him with the power to appoint officers of the executive branch and members of the judiciary. What the authors of the new Constitution did not do -- indeed, were forbidden even to consider under the statute providing for the constitutional convention -- was to change in any way the basis of representation in the New Jersey Legislature. The Legislature today is constituted along essentially the same lines that existed prior to the turn of the century and the beginning of large-scale urbanization. The result, of course, is a pronounced over-representation of smaller, semi-rural areas, a condition which is not peculiar to New Jersey. As a matter of fact rural over-representation in the legislature is a common complaint in America.

To point up the extent of over-representation, it might be noted that while seventy-five percent or more of New Jersey's population lives in five or six of the state's twenty-one counties, every county holds one -- and only one -- seat in the Senate. Under this arrangement the Legislature, if not actually frozen in its political configuration, is so well insulated from currents of change that although during the period 1900-57 Republicans and Democrats were equally matched in the struggle for control of executive branch, the Democrats have had a majority in the Senate only once, on the occasion of Woodrow Wilson's election as Governor some forty-eight years ago.

No unusual imagination is necessary to recognize that such a disposition of political power is full of implications for state planning.

Attitudes in the executive branch can be expected to clash with those of the Legislature because the very survival of a state administration depends upon its ability to satisfy the wishes of a broader constitutency. The problems considered by the executive to be most critical may not be so regarded by the Legislative majority. Long-range plans proposed by the executive to meet state-wide needs may run counter to the desires of those served by the more influential elements in the Legislature. Even though the two branches of government necessarily look at the world from different angles, it is forever a question as to how far the executive can afford to go in challenging legislative attitudes, for it goes without saying that there must be a measure of accommodation to prevent stalemate. Thus while state planning may not be directly dominated by the Legislature, the necessity of achieving accommodation surely has its effect on the nature and direction of planning.

The effect is subtle on a day-to-day basis. There have been occasions, on the other hand, when the Legislature has embarked directly upon state planning. The most noteworthy example of this in the past few years occurred when the Senate and the General Assembly first withheld approval of a key proposal by Governor Robert B. Meyner to solve the water problem -- acquisition of a large natural water reservoir site known as Round Valley--and employed a private engineering firm to study the question. This led to the formation of an alternative plan by the Legislature, which failed to carry in a general referendum. Subsequently, the Legislature authorized purchase of the site recommended by the Governor, stipulating, however, that it was not to be used for the storage of waters diverted from sources within the state. Round Valley in other words, is to be filled only by tapping the Delaware River, a requirement preventing early utilization of the site because the Delaware is an interstate stream under jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court. It is now likely that the Legislature will reconsider this restriction and permit water available within the state to be diverted to the site as Governor Meyner has urged from the beginning. This case is worth pondering not merely because it casts in bold relief the conflicting approaches of the executive and the Legislature. It demonstrates what can happen when the responsibility for planning is wrested from the hands of the executive. For the principal result in this instance has been the delay of action in an area where New Jersey can ill afford any delay for reasons already described.

Another characteristic of New Jersey, which in itself is a form of pressure, is the pattern of regional variations alluded to early in the discussion. There is the northeastern area, with its concentration of industry and population and with its numerous urban problems, such as water supply, housing, traffic congestion, inadequate recreational facilities, etc. There is, next, the coastal region, depending in the main on the resort tourist trade and standing in almost complete contrast to the northeastern metropolitan complex. There is also south Jersey, with its long stretches of wilderness -- an area consisting on the whole of numerous smaller communities and devoted primarily to agriculture up until recent years when such factors as highway improvements set the stage for an actual industrial revolution, only beginning to run its course. Finally, there is the northwestern sector of the state, comparatively low in population density, which is widely known for its lakes and which has attracted quite a number of industries of medium size while retaining numerous farms.

This breakdown of regional differences contains oversimplifications and could be very easily extended. It should serve, however, to illustrate the diversity of the state, and it would be unusual if such diversity failed to have a marked impact on state planning. In the first place, uniform reaction to a particular program over the state is an exception rather than the rule. To take an example, it was pointed out above that the Department of Conservation and Economic Development has given the projection of an integrated plan for development of the Delaware River basin high priority. Such a plan would provide, among other things, for flood control, development of the

basin as a source of water supply, stream flow regulations and pollution abatement. The coastal region, as might be expected, tends to view this program as lying outside its orbit of interest. The men and women who live beside the Delaware are interested chiefly because of the prospects for flood control, a very understandable interest in light of the destruction caused by flood waters in 1955. The northeastern metropolitan area, relatively far removed from the basin, has still another approach because it looks upon the development as an answer to its long-term water requirements.

These differences of reason for interest in the program are perfectly normal. The fact remains, however, that there are few issues which all areas treat with the same concern, and the consequent lack of unity does not make it easy to plan for the state as a whole.

In any state or territory with a democratic system, there will be dissimilarities in outlook and interest that must be reckoned with in public administration. The regional dissimiliarities in New Jersey are not essentially unique. But the difficulty for state planning created by these cleavages probably goes somewhat deeper than is usually the case. The lack of a common set of needs and the tendency of each region to view its interests in a different light frequently produce formidable obstacles to the achievement of the degree of statewide consensus necessary for inaugurating imperative programs. This condition also serves at times as the breeding ground for suspicion and generates some measure of disharmony among regions. When, for instance, the state undertakes a program because it is vital to the well-being of many thousands of persons living in a particular area, irresponsible critics may succeed in raising in the minds of residents of other areas a question as to whether they are not being compelled to pay for a program that the people in the region benefiting from the state action have no right to receive and should have undertaken with their own resources.

Whether the administrator clears the sundry hurdles that have been left strewn in his path depends partially upon the degree of his own sense of responsibility as well as the drive he brings to the struggle for attainment of his objectives. It depends also, however, upon his success in enlisting the support of many individuals and groups, and this support, in turn, can prove to be the wellspring of pressure of another variety. It would be cynical to suggest that most of those who become active in pressing for the adoption of an important proposal have ulterior motives. Their assistance usually is prompted solely by honest conviction that the proposal is necessary and should be adopted for the good of the community. Nevertheless, the quid pro quo is as old as organized society itself. Thus it is only normal to find some individuals and groups expecting the administrator, in view of their backing of program A, to become more receptive to certain policies that they strongly advocate even though he may consider these impractical or out of line with the public interest.

In addition to what might have been implied in the discussion up to this point, there is a miscellany of factors in the administrative setting constituting very definite pressures. These could not be analyzed without exceeding space limitations. It seems worthwhile, however, to list at least a few of the factors as they manifest themselves in the situation with which this paper deals and to indicate their significance.

(1) The breadth of the operations of the Department of Conservation and Economic Development is a source of pressure for the elementary reason that the administrator is as much subject to the rotation of the earth on its axis as anyone and to the phenomenon of the twenty-four hour day. To devote equal attention to all activities of the department is difficult if not impossible. The situation,

in fact, confronts the administrator with the temptation to concentrate the majority of his time and energy on the one or two issues most pressing at the moment. This would not be disturbing if it could be assumed that other issues were not especially insistent and could be left in the charge of subordinate personnel. The rub is that no such assumption is valid. The formulation of plans to relieve the water shortage and the expansion of recreational facilities have been given much emphasis in the last three or four years, but the department is under pressure to come to terms with a long series of other issues, which certainly must be described as major.

The question naturally arises as to whether such a department should be broken up into two or three separate departments. Here, however, we enter the realm of the conundrum. For whatever defects it may have, the existing organization of the department offers the best prospects of integrating planning for state development and the utilization of natural resources. To break it up would probably be a severe blow to the fulfillment of this objective.

(2) The system of choosing heads of the major departmental units, the divisions, also adds to the problems of administrator of the department regardless of whether or not the system is sound in principle. These officials are appointed by the Governor and must be confirmed by the State Senate. As a result, recruitment of divisional directors is influenced by the knowledge that the nominees must receive the blessings of a legislative chamber far from representative of the whole public. Within the limits of his authority, the official so chosen tends to set the pattern of divisional activities throughout the period of the Administration's tenure --- a pattern that may or may not be fully consistent with objectives of the administrator of the department. The scope of the Civil Service System in New Jersey is a related factor that acts to narrow the administrator's range of choice in the selection of key personnel.

(3) Linked to each of the divisions is a citizens council, whose powers are chiefly advisory. These groups have made valuable contributions through their suggestions and support of departmental programs, and in the unlikely event that should be dissolved the department would suffer a genuine loss. It is only factual, however, to point out that the responsibility of meeting regularly with the councils to receive and review their recommendations is a further complication in the life of the administrator.

(4) It is fitting to end this section by observing that along with outside pressures, the administrator also must contend with the numerous and changing pressures that he comes across in the executive branch itself. This is especially true, of course, with respect to the budget, embodying, as it does, the Administration's plans for state development. Much of his time therefore must be spent "working through channels" to make certain that the merits of programs recommended by the department are satisfactorily presented and receive adequate consideration.

IV

This paper should not be concluded without a short note on the general position of the administrator involved in planning or without a few comments regarding the broad course that seemingly should be pursued in response to the pressures singled out here.

Actually little need be added with respect to the administrator's general position, for this has been touched upon at frequent intervals. What,

perhaps, should be stressed is that the place he occupies is rather a lonely one. If he is normally conscientious and has mastered the details of the issues facing him, he is certain to feel a strong obligation to defend the interests of the unorganized majority when these interests are threatened by minorities. He is handicapped, however, by the fact that the attitudes of the majority often have not crystallized and it remains inarticulate, while the media of communication are left to the active minority with its carefully presented claims and sometimes skillful use of the half-truth. He also is handicapped by the impact of the varied set of other pressures on his time, which means, in effect, that he must wage multi-front war, unable on occasions to give every front the attention it deserves.

The reader does not have to be reminded that these conditions attaching themselves to the administrator's environment always will be present on a larger or smaller scale. In considering the course he should follow, then, the question is not one of how to eliminate all such problems but, instead, how he can serve the public most effectively, given the environment in which he must work.

The first requirement would appear to be self-evident --- clear insight into the political process and all its underlying factors. The administrator, in other words, must understand the whole community, which in this context happens to be the state. He must possess complete knowledge of its values as well as gradations in the intensity to which those values are clung by different areas or different population groups. He must have a first-hand acquaintance with the goals and inner workings of the clientele organizations that figure prominently in the life of government.

In so heterogeneous state as New Jersey, furthermore, his office has to serve the function of a balance wheel. The administrator must employ his talents to resolve differences among regions, as much as they can be resolved, and to promote the reconciliation of groups with clashing objectives.

It might be said that the situation calls for a political approach--- but not a political approach in any narrow, partisan sense. What is required is sufficient comprehension of the values and predilections of the various forces operating in the state and sufficient heeding of these in deciding upon plans of action to make the plans workable.

While the administrator must deal successfully with the realities of the social order to clear the way for action, obviously his constant and overriding responsibility is to the general public. He should never permit his role to be reduced merely to that of a grand umpire. If he is compelled to seek the common denominator in a highly diversified society, he should seek it always at the highest possible level. It is in so doing that has the best opportunity of discharging his responsibility to the citizen at large.

POLITICAL THEORY AND THE STUDY OF COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

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I was asked to present in this short paper some of the reasons for which political theory is "useful" to the study of political science and more particularly to the study of comparative government. The notion of "utility" is to be directly related to the teaching of political science and of comparative government both to graduates and undergraduates. Such a notion is not easily amenable to a clear-cut definition. If one were to be given it would not meet with the approval of the members of the profession. Besides I do not intend to give one since I do not believe that it is necessary to indulge in time-wasting definitional quarrels involving limits, boundaries and relationships between the various fields of political science and the various disciplines. The fertile mind will seek relationships wherever he can find them and will draw inspiration from where he can to study political behavior and discover regularities. At the same time it is the obligation of a political scientist to remember that the search for regularities, of laws if you wish, is only a part of his job. The other part remains the constant search for the good life and the effort to study institutions and means for the attainment of commonly sought goals. For each sophist that preferred to find a single law rather than become the King of Persia there is always the political philosopher for whom the Platonic quest of a just law and of justice is just as much of an overriding intellectual commitment.

The utility of teaching political theory and comparative government therefore is not to be measured in terms of a behavioral definition of political science. David Easton's indictment of political theory, with McIlwain and Sabine as his most favorite targets, impresses me as being too one-sided. Nor I am particularly impressed with the growing school of converts to the behavioral sciences in which every term used, every concept developed and every relationship suggested must always be made "operational" i.e. subject to quantification and verification in accordance with the canons of natural science. The proponents of this school tend to squeeze every meaning out of some of the most important concepts of politics (freedom, equality, responsibility, civil obligation, rights, law, constitutionalism) and substitute for them other terms simply because they are amenable to quantification and can be easily delivered to the tender care of the IBM machines. Needless to say the new operational terms require lengthy definitions before the untutored political scientist sees the ambiguity of his terms and espouses the new ones.

The utility of political theory is to be assessed not only in terms of theory construction that spells out general propositions amenable to verification but also

in terms of its capacity to relate morals to politics, to undertake a critical examination of values, relate means to goals and deal constantly in the realm of ought.

My task here, however, is a little more difficult because I was asked to discuss the relationship between political theory and comparative politics by taking political theory as it is being traditionally taught in the various Universities of the country - namely as the history of political ideas, from Plato to A.D. Lindsay! Now this does not mean that we are exactly in agreement as to what the history of political ideas exactly entails and as to how it is being taught. McIlwain (Mr. Easton's target) comes to our minds as one of the foremost living historians of political ideas and his works are indeed primarily historical.: How an idea originated? Where? Who influenced whom? What is the relationship of one idea to another?-(Bodin's sovereignty and its relationship to private property rights). But within this historical context he has done some very fine analytical writing: the notion of distributive justice in Aristotle; the study of constitutionalism and of the feudal origins of some of the concepts associated with it. As a student of his I learned more about constitutionalism by taking his course on 17th century British political ideas than in any other course. One by one the basic Anglo-Saxon liberties were unfolded before the student, their relationships clearly spelled out until one had a picture of the whole capable of being lifted from its historical context. This is simply to say that the history of political ideas is more than history. Perhaps then I should make it clear at the outset what I think the history of political ideas courses entail as they are being "traditionally" taught.

1. The study of the great concepts of politics THROUGH the great writings. The concepts of the state; the role and the limits of state action; the idea of representation and equality; the meaning of freedom, justice and consent; the notion of rights and freedom. The historical context is almost completely abandoned here. We use the great writings simply to illuminate and understand better basic concepts with which we are preoccupied today as political scientists. Is it necessary to justify this preoccupation and to show its "utility"? How can we prepare the student of politics to cope with problems of citizenship and how can we train future political scientists unless we expose them to these terms? And is there a better way to deal with them than take the students through the writings of those who thought keenly about them? Take for example the problem of the nature of law. We may for the sake of simplicity wish to define law as a command. This is very neat and the student who has learned this definition will go through the law school with an intellectual horizon permanently limited to the intepretation of the

Acts of Congress and the decisions of the Supreme Court. But the writing of Thomas Aquinas, Suarez, Grotius, the Early Christian Fathers - that is to say the study of nature law - will open up new horizons and will lead him to think not in terms of law as a command but of law in terms of justice.

2. The study of political theory as it is being taught involves often a historical approach. But this is more apparent than real. Nobody who is teaching political theory attempts to establish a neat chronological sequence in the development of political ideas. Nobody seriously attempts to indulge in what is known as the "geneology of ideas". The historical context happens to be simply a convenience. Ancient Greece, Rome, the Middle Ages; The Reformation; the emergence of the Nation State; Liberalism and the Socialist Critique are nothing else but convenient handles. Each period has its peculiarities; Each period merges into the other. All periods taken together have fashioned some common characteristics that represent, whether we like it or not, what is known as our Western civilization. What better way is there, again, to teach the political ideas, the "operative ideas" of this civilization, as A. D. Lindsay put it, than by taking the student through these periods? But again you will note that our concern is not historical but rather analytical. The historical periods are just convenient landmarks. Our preoccupation is not exactly with the precise influence of Socrates upon Plato in the early years of the latter's life and the emancipation of Plato after the death of his teacher. Nor are we particularly interested in knowing whether the framers had read Locke and were writing his philosophy into the constitution. We are concerned in each case and for each period with one study of what the authors we know contributed to the fashioning of certain important ideas.

3. There are occasions when the historical categories become more than landmarks or convenient handles. Political history and the history of political ideas in this case does assume a direct historical character. But it is limited to the study of a specific political phenomena. The French Revolution, let us say. This would involve an intensive study of the particular ideas that developed in order to replace the political system of the Ancien Regime. Who were the most important authors? What particular effect did their writings have upon the wielders of political power at the time. What effect did they have upon the new social and economic classes that were striving to get a share of political power? Can we ascertain this effect? What was ultimately the impact of these ideas upon other parts of the world and upon other elites? The study appears to be historical but I submit that few historians are trained to do it. I know very few historians who have read Rousseau and who can understand Rousseau. Yet, if you pardon this parenthesis, the present problems facing France can not be understood without knowing Rousseau. The rule of legislative supremacy as a substitute to the general

and the notion of a unitary state are two phenomena that are of crucial importance to the understanding of the development of the parliamentary system of France and to an understanding of the inability of the French to experiment with institutions of self-government in their colonies. Perhaps I am touching here upon one of the aspects that relate political theory to the study of comparative government.

4. Finally, to please the behaviorists, the study of the great writings in politics are full of "theories" (not theories about what is just or unjust or about what ought and ought not, but theories as interrelated propositions that can lead to empirical study.) To toss them aside simply because they are old is the counsel of despair and ignorance. I have heard many of my behaviorists friends argue a most untenable proposition. Their argument can be summed up in that since all great writers have not "got us anywhere" we might as well set them aside. I am not quite sure what the expression "got us anywhere" exactly means. But if it means that political science has not developed as yet hard and clear propositions that are amenable to verification and quantification in the manner of natural sciences it begs the question of whether political science is or can ever become an exact science and use the methods of natural sciences. If on the other hand it means that the great writers have not developed propositions in terms of which human behavior and political behavior can be studied then the argument is fallacious. I submit to you that there are a number of theories derived from Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli that can and should be used for empirical observation. Was not Aristotle the first to develop a theory that spells out the relationship between political and economic power - that has proven to be one of the most illuminating and useful theories in studying political behavior? The theory of roles so much in vogue today can be found in Plato especially when he discusses the "virtue" of the ruling class and the successive stages that lead to the degradation of virtue...; the various categories that Lasswell gives us as constituting happiness (health, wealth etc.) are both implicit and explicit in Bentham's hedonistic calculus. And does not Machiavelli remain the foremost analyst of power? So much is being said today about the "scientific" approach to politics that it is not unwarranted to remind

you that it was followed long before Ford produced the T-Model and established the Ford Foundation. If one takes the trouble to read Isaiah Berlin's little volume on Historical Inevitability he will also learn of some of the efforts made to derive laws that explain human behavior and predict developmental patterns and of why the author rejects them as sterile. But irrespective of this, I have never been able to understand why the proponents of the scientific approach do not take the trouble to examine the various theories that have attempted to reduce human behavior and social conduct to predictable regularities. May I conclude therefore that our new political scientists may have a great deal to learn from reading some of their predecessors -- that is, reading some of the "great writers", that is, taking a good course in the history of political ideas?

To summarize - the teaching of the history of political ideas has a great "utility" for the study of politics and the education of the undergraduate and graduate for four reasons: 1. An understanding of the major concepts of politics 2. The study of the most significant periods that cumulatively constitute our Western Civilization. 3. The study of some phenomena of capital importance in the development of certain political concepts and ideas, i.e. Reformation or the French Revolution. 4. The search for "theories" that can be used for "scientific" orientation to politics.

The utility of political theory for the study of comparative government stems directly from the above propositions. To show this I must again state briefly what I consider comparative government to be:

1. Comparative government requires at least at the undergraduate and graduate levels a sound grasp of the political institutions and their functioning in various individual countries. I am the one who has argued against the "country by country" approach without meaning, however, to underestimate its importance especially at the undergraduate level. The student must know after all that the Crown is irresponsible and should have a good understanding of the principles of parliamentary supremacy in Great Britain; he should know the ideological and programmatic

differences between the Conservative and the Labor parties; he should have a good grasp of the configuration of political parties in France and of the peculiarities of multi-partism in this country and an equally good understanding of the institutionalization of a unitary and highly centralized state there. The examples I am giving are adequate to show that parallel comparisons are impossible unless one has basic information and knowledge on the political institutions of individual countries.

The role of the study of political ideas is too obvious in the above case, however, to merit detailed eleboration. I am referring you to an article published by Professor Robert McCloskey in the March 1957 issue of the American Political Science Review in which he argues that American political thought or rather its most important claim to be studied is the direct influence it has had upon the operating institutions of the country. It is not addressed to the study of the good life and the discovery of moral imperatives. More than the political thought of any other country it is addressed to the institutions of the American political system. It has helped shape them and has been in the nature of a running commentary upon their functioning. But what applies to the United States applies also to all countries. Political speculation has shaped the minds of many elites; has influenced the development of institutions and their operation so much so that political institutions can not be understood out of the context of the political ideas. I mentioned earlier the influence of Rousseau on the development of a unitary state and on the fiction of the supremacy of the legislature. Does not the same apply to the study of 17th century British constitutionalism? Of the religious wars that gave rise to toleration? Of the attitude of the Catholics to republican institutions in the latter part of the 19th century? Of the writings of Karl Marx in connection with the most potent political movements of the 19th and the 20th centuries - socialism and communism? Need I give more illustrations?

2. The second contribution of the study of political ideas to the teaching of comparative government is perhaps only an extension of the first. It is well illustrated in a recent book by Professor Robert Scalapino on the development of political parties in Japan in which he studies the problem of the development of Liberalism in that country. It becomes apparent, however, that the Japanese in adopting Liberalism gave it a meaning very different from the meaning of the term as understood in the West. In other words a given ideology takes different forms and colors as soon as it is transplanted in different cultural and institutional contexts from the ones where it originated. Isn't this the case with Marxism as understood and applied in the Soviet Union? So that no parallel comparisons are possible without a good grasp by the student of the particular meaning that different peoples give to the same ideological labels. The study of political thought therefore and of its various manifestations and expressions when certain ideologies become "acculturated" or assimilated by various systems is of paramount importance to the parallel comparison of governmental and political institutions.

3. Finally comparative government requires the development of generalizations that are broad enough to lead to empirical testing that includes many political systems. The transformation of elites; the conditions of revolution and change; the problem of democratic consensus and the conditions under which consensus breaks down are problems that can not be studied without the prior elaboration of general theoretical propositions that lead to comparative analysis. Here again the study of political thought is suggestive, to say the least, for the development of such generalizations as I have argued earlier.

To summarize then the usefulness of the study of political ideas for comparative government derives from the following: a. it helps us understand the character and the operation of political institutions of individual countries. b. it makes it possible for us to study the peculiarities of various institutions of different countries by studying the different interpretation given to common ideological labels c. it makes it possible for us to develop general theoretical propositions

in terms of which parallel comparisons among political system can be undertaken.

Perhaps this is the proper point at which I ought to rest my case for discussion and I hope that I have stated my position strongly enough to provoke a discussion. I might, however, add that I do not want to convey the impression here that what I envisage to be the history of political ideas and comparative government is necessarily the manner in which they are taught in the various Departments in the country. Nor do I want to give the impression that there is no room for improvement. A lot of work has to be done to bring the political theorist to inquire more closely into the manner in which ideologies develop; how ideologies are diffused; how they are transformed into patterns of action and institutions. It might also be a good thing for our political theorists to undertake careful study of the various new behavioral approaches to political science, examine their utility, especially for the study of comparative government, and subject them to a critical review. It is true that many teachers of political theory follow too closely a historical approach and lose from sight the main developmental trends, the broader concepts of political science. The argument that there has been very little constructive and original political speculation in this country, and that the political theorist and philosopher has failed to play his role as the over-all critic and censor of the discipline is valid. It is equally true that the student and teacher of comparative government have often lost sight of the forest for the trees and have insisted upon the study of institutional minutiae in various systems without any effort to attempt parallel comparisons. Too much emphasis upon what is particular and unique has tended to undermine the very function of comparison which is to seek for uniformities in the light of which uniquenesses can be identified and explained. But it is my that the relationship between political theory and comparative government I have very briefly spelled out here is and will continue to be an enduring source of inspiration and approach for the study of comparative government.

One last remark is perhaps in order since it is the most controversial of all. The problem of value judgements by the teacher of political theory and comparative government. No teacher it seems to me can afford merely to describe institutions, put them into their ideological context and compare them simple for the purpose of "verifying" generalizations and establishing patterns of regularity in human behavior. The functioning of a political system should be tested in terms of the values it attempts to further or the values it purports to destroy. This is not simply to make evaluations in terms of "good" or "bad" but rather to show to the students how certain patterns of behavior, certain practices, certain institutional developments even when their regularity has been proven beyond dispute (i.e. the wielders of political power tend to use power to their advantage) are prejudicial to certain basic values i.e. the equality of all before the law or the provision of free and equal opportunities to all. In this sense political theory, as a preoccupation with moral life is extremely important and helps the student and the teacher relate institutional practices to the standards of law, morality and freedom. The study of man as a political animal should entail some effort to study the nature of man not only in terms of is but also in terms of ought. This observation, controversial as it may appear to be to most of you, relates to my previous observation about the voluntaristic aspects of human behavior and the ability of man to shape his environment instead of submitting to it. The effort to construct institutions that reflect best certain values is the very essence of the study of politics and as a result of political theory and comparative government. By the same token the identification of institutional practices that are prejudicial to such values is equally important. To pay lipservice to Max Weber's distinction between "fact" and "value" is to condemn political science to perpetual adolescence.

In the same connection may I say that I am tired of those who hide behind the very facile distinction of roles and who claim that as a teacher one should not make value judgements but as a citizen one can. .....I can not very well see how the

same man can profess absolute neutrality in the name of "science" can pronounce himself as a citizen against Nazism, McCarthyism or Societ Communism. The subtlety of the distinction escapes me and I find the analogy with some of the natural sciences very unconvincing. The physicist is not expected to pass value judgement on the speed at which light travels simply because their is no moral content in the observation. But for the political scientist every observation made, every regularity established, every institutional practice identified impinges directly upon certain values and the examination of the bearing such regularities have upon these values is the task of the political scientist as a political scientist and a teacher and not as one of the many millions of voters who express an opinion. Opinion, belief and knowledge are to be distinguished, as they were long ago by Plato. The citizen speaks in terms of the first; the political scientist in terms of the latter.....and my study of the history of political ideas is indispensible in the development of knowledge!


NECESSITY AND PRINCIPLE ACCORDING TO WOODROW WILSON

L. W. Martin

The acute controversy which Woodrow Wilson continues to arouse among those who debate the problem of ethics and foreign policy indicates, perhaps, that at the very least he addressed himself to important and enduring questions. But discussions of Wilson's thought must begin by recalling that it was as a statesman, not as a political philosopher, that he made his mark in the world. Every day he was compelled to perform those limitless calculations of policy-making which most political thinkers merely analyse from afar. Moreover, Wilson was a statesman who relied heavily on his public pronouncements to achieve his objectives. Very many of these speeches were extemporaneous and all were delivered by a man who believed that great issues had to be simplified and dramatized if they were to strike home to the public. This undoubtedly accounts for much that is contradictory and ambiguous in the writings which Wilson has left and greatly complicates the task of evaluating his arguments.

The words "Necessity and Principle" present an opportunity to become entangled in a protracted philosophical wrangle. Principles may be moral or practical, generous or vicious. The juxtaposition of Meinecke and Wilson in this context, however, suggests an antithesis between ethical demands for amicable cooperation between states and a compulsion to adopt antagonistic policies in order to survive in the rough and tumble of international politics.

Were Wilson sufficiently revived to take part in this discussion, he would unquestionably align himself on the side of "Principle." He made incessant use of the word, tirelessly avowing the need for enduring and stable moral standards as a basis for action. "Do not think," he warned, "that the questions of our day are mere questions of policy and


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diplomacy. They are shot through with the principles of life. We dare not turn from the principle that morality. . . and not expediency is the thing that must guide us." "Principle," he declared, "is one of the simple things in a complicated world."[1]

When Mr. Eisenhower recently described Mr. Dulles as a dedicated man, a British commentator remarked that "unfortunately the President did not explain to what."[2] Similarly, in the present case it is easier to recognize that Wilson favored strict adherence to principle than to discover what his principles were and how their adoption affected his course of action. On the broadest interpretation, Wilson's foreign policy may be viewed as a bold attempt to develop a principle of national conduct which would resolve the dilemma of necessity. Constituted as he was, he looked no further than the Bible for his answer, believing that conduct guided by Christian goodwill would ensure the most genuine and permanent success in this world as well as the next. Over the years Wilson bestowed the title of principle on a host of precepts and rules for foreign policy, ranging from justice, liberty, security and equality to open discussion and the freedom of the seas. But the center piece was always a conviction that nations were under exactly the same obligation as individuals to act in ways conducive to the welfare of their neighbors.

A nation should not only seek "nothing that can be had only at the cost of another people," but also try to perform whatever positive services it could render; "to serve and not subdue the world."[3] This formed part of the background for Wilson's "missionary diplomacy"[4] in Latin America, for his overtures to Colombia and his concessions on Panama Tolls. He developed this concept of national duty while giving

his first cursory attention to foreign affairs, before his political career began. At that time he seems to have thought of the positive obligations as largely confined to an ill-defined share of the white man's burden, aimed at the ultimate spread of democracy. But the idea of a national obligation to undertake "the tasks and duties of neighborhood"[5] persisted even after the world war made Wilson a leading prophet of America's total involvement in international politics.

The duty of refraining from policies detrimental to other nations was a moral duty which Wilson derived from religion and his firm belief that men could in no way dilute or submerge their moral responsibility by membership in a group.[6] A nation following such a principle might find itself obliged to subordinate real national interests if they proved incompatible with the general welfare of mankind. The reward would be a sense of duty well done. But Wilson obviously did not believe that real sacrifices would often be required. "The disinterested course," he said, "is always the biggest course to pursue, not only, but it is in the long run the most profitable course to pursue."[7] Apparently he believed that the objectives which would have to be abandoned were illusory and would be more than outweighed by the opposition they would provoke and the effort they would consume. Giving up such ambitions would earn goodwill and release corresponding energy for more worthwhile pursuits.

Wilson did not confine his hopes to the establishment of an ethican American foreign policy. Assuming that the fundamental interests of people everywhere were similar -- which he equated with compatible -- he was confident that the rapid and irresistible spread of domocracy was creating the conditions for a virtually universal readiness to adjust

differences by peaceful means according to principles of mutual benefit, or, as Wilson often said, of right and justice. He realized that this called for drastic changes of attitude but he saw no reason why growing appreciation of the long term compatibility of national interests should not produce what he termed "a new international psychology." "National purposes," he rejoiced, during the war, "have fallen more and more into the background and the common purpose of enlightened mankind has taken their place." [8] Such controversies as remained could be handled by methods akin to those employed in domestic society. Thus the League of Nations, to which Wilson devoted his final energies, was to embody his long cherished concept of mutual accommodation: "a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit and by which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the parties directly concerned shall be sanctioned."[9] The obligations of membership would be handsomely offset by relief from the anxieties and costs of the old anarchy.

The new world order was therefore intended to mitigate the conflict between national self-assertion, duty toward neighbors and the prosperity of citizens. This did not answer the question of how far a single nation could safely fulfill its duty to others before enlightenment became general. It must be admitted at once that Wilson never explicitly devoted any rigorous attention to this problem. This is perhaps partly because almost as soon as he abandoned the idea of a limited American involvement in foreign affairs he took up the scheme for world organization. In his few references to the problem Wilson conceded that under prevailing conditions effective foreign policy would require certain deviations

from the pattern of behaviour acceptable from individuals. He confessed that America had first call upon his own concern and that the general benevolence which he believed all Americans felt toward other nations was intimately associated with America's great prosperity and capacity to defend herself. There is no indication that Wilson contemplated any great sacrifice of these blessings. He was, in fact, quite clearly ready to defend what he regarded as American rights -- largely territorial integrity and opportunity for economic enterprise abroad -- against any "influences intruded from without," even at the cost of using force or resorting to full scale war.[10]

Wilson further acknowledged that the nations of Europe, lacking America's geographical good fortune, were a great deal more troubled by "influences from without" and were therefore compelled to take correspondingly more drastic steps to meet them. He recognized that the European belligerents, including Germany, sincerely believed that they were fighting for the "lives and honor of their nations."[11] The war had arisen from an atmosphere of mutual fear. As a result France, for example, had not unreasonable felt herself in "immediate peril" and "constant dread" which placed her under a genuine "pressing necessity of preparation."[12] This tension would survive the fighting if nations did not reform their relationships and the war had convinced Wilson that the United States would have to join in the process of arming heavily against the contingency of foreign dangers.[13]

Threats to a nation's security might arise, then, which could only be met by the mobilization of power and use of force. According to Wilson, of course, this condition might be remedied by the spread of

goodwill leading to a re-definition of interests. But, given all possible goodwill, to what extent was the human intellect capable of devising generally acceptable solutions to international issues which would blend each nation's aspirations relatively painlessly with those of others? Again, it must be said that, while Wilson's optimism was formidable, he was by no means so unaware of the moral and practical problems presented by the complexity of diplomatic questions as is frequently assumed.

In this instance evaluation of Wilson's statements is rendered particularly difficult by his role as politician, a class of men not widely noted for expounding the objections to their own propositions. At the beginning of his political career he paid at least lip service to his awareness of the complexity of political affairs and the effect this must have on moral judgement. Dealing with the trust problem, Wilson, eager as always to hold men individually responsible, nevertheless admitted that in the ramifications of modern business men might perform socially undesirable actions unwittingly. Before entering politics he confessed that "moral judgments have never been simple: they have always been complicated by a thousand circumstances which puzzle the will; but they have never been so difficult and complicated as they are now."[14]

Although he thus early perceived the problem posed by the "net of complicated circumstance,"[15] Wilson was slow to indicate what conclusions he would draw for the conduct of international relations. In the years of his inexperience, foreign affairs may well have seemed simpler because more remote. For two or three years after war broke out in Europe Wilson refused to interest himself in the details of the dispute among the belligerents. Partly the natural caution of a neutral, this was also the result of such engrossment with the idea of a new spirit that he neglected

to consider how he might embody the spirit in precise arrangments. This conduct persisted for some time after America entered the war but, as the climax approached, the President began to pay attention to particular issues, setting up the Inquiry and issuing his Fourteen Points and similar declarations. As he did so he revealed a healthy respect for the difficulties involved and a recognition of the need for precision. "We ought not to consider remedies merely because they have a sonorous sound," he suggested; "Practical questions can be settled only by practical means."[16]

By the time he went to the Peace Conference, though he could still say, "Tell me what is right and I'll fight for it,"[17] Wilson's remarks suggested growing appreciation of perplexities ahead. "We have used great words . . . and now," he acknowledged, "we are to prove whether or not we understand those words and how they are to be applied to the particular settlements which must conclude this war."[18] It was this caution, this belief that many of the questions were "not susceptible of confident judgments at present" that led him to advance his well known theory that "we can set up permanent processes. We may not be able to set up permanet decisions."[19] The League of Nations, therefore, assumed greater importance as the permanent process of adjustment, of applying the essential principle in a world of partial arrangements.

After Versailles -- "the Paris education of Woodrow Wilson," as Mr. Charles Seymour has recently and aptly called it[20] -- Wilson can be seen fully chastened by the impact of circumstances on principles. It was "not easy," he explained, "to graft the new order of ideas on the old, and some of the fruits of the grafting may, I fear, for a time be bitter." "The work of the conference squares, as a whole, with the principles agreed upon as well as with the practical possibilities of the

international situation which had to be faced and dealt with as facts.[21]

Having admitted in so many instances the impracticability of applying principles perfectly or of relying implicitly upon the goodwill of other nations, there was clearly an onus on Wilson to explain whether the necessary compromises frustrated the principles and proved the impossibility of principled action. Wilson's answer was that compromise was justifiable so long as its general tendency was to approach and not recede from the ultimate objective. Compromise was in fact "the true gospel of politics." "But," he insisted, "it depends almost altogether on how you conceive and define compromise . . . all growth is a process of compromise, a compromise of the vital forces within the organism with the physical forces without, which constitute its environment. Yet, growth is not dishonest. Neither need compromise in politics be dishonest if only it be progressive."[22] It was then, a matter of prudence, of using sense and judgment to maintain an advance. "The question is not of pace," said Wilson, ". . . That is not a matter of principle. Where the individual should be indomitable is in the choice of direction."[23]

Wilson's personal attempt to meet a great world crisis with a foreign policy based on this philosophy has brought upon him vehement accusations of naivete or hypocrisy. To deserve respect, any assessment of these charges must rest upon a careful examination of the record. Detailed studies of the ways in which statesmen's principles have actually emanated in policy, and with what result, would seem to be worthy of more attention as a means of bringing discussions of ethics and foreign policy down to earth. For the present it is only possible to suggest one approach to perhaps the most serious and provocative of the charges: that

Wilson's presuppositions led him to wage a self-righteous crusade which injected an unnecessary rancor into the war and subsequent settlement, contributing directly to the disastrous aftermath of the Versailles Treaty.

There is no gainsaying that Wilson's devotion to the notion of principle, combined with his temperamental need to be widely acknowledged as right on issues which he chose to raise to the rarified level of principle, impelled him to adopt a highly dogmatic and sententious attitude on a number of important questions. The task of giving the nation a strong lead in war-time doubtless reinforced this tendency. However useful in this respect, the characteristic had several very undesirable consequences. For example, it disposed Wilson to elevate the chosen means of the moment into the sacred realm of principle. Thus neutrality, neutral nights, freedom of the seas and later war and force temporarily seemed to become beyond criticism. As a result Wilson became slow to abandon unsuccesful policies, neglected to prepare alternative courses of action and delayed in adopting them.

Once in the war Wilson lent his formidable eloquence to depicting the war as a crusade, the enemy as wholly evil, his own side as entirely justified. Forgetting or choosing to overlook the tortuous path by which the war had come to America, he presented the nation's cause as simon -- pure. America was to be "an instrument in the hand of God."[24] The coming peace necessarily took on the appearance of a millenium. In this connection Wilson used expressions which no sound statesman and, indeed, no true Christian could properly adopt. He promised "peace by the overcoming of evil, by the defeat <u>once for all</u> of the sinister forces that interrupt peace and render it impossible."[25] The fighting over, Wilson pronounced that "wrong has been defeated."[26] Whether or not sentiments of this kind

were unavoidable for a war-time leader, they unquestionably did much to unleash passions beyond Wilson's control which contributed greatly to the defeat of his own aspirations.

For Wilson did not lose his own bearings as much as some of his utterances and a number of historical accounts suggest. This is a point at which the Wilsonian legend is in particular need of revision. Throughout the war years, Wilson clung with a good deal of consistency to the idea that American foreign policy should be aimed at a settlement which would be "no mere peace of shreds and patches,"[27] but a comprehensive readjustment of interests designed to realize his principle of a harmonious world order based on mutual benefit. Wilson decided very early that this would be the only basis for a lasting peace. The true task of peacemaking was, he observed, that of "removing the chief provocations to war."[28]

In pursuit of his goal the President tried, as a neutral, to secure an opportunity for mediation, directed toward achieving a negotiated peace before either side gained sufficient ascendancy to impose its will unchecked. This idea that the settlement should be a rational compromise of the points in dispute preceded the famous "peace without victory" speech by many months. One of the motives -- though not, of course, the chief -- for Wilson's desperate efforts to keep America out of the war was to retain an opportunity to dissuade either belligerent from making immoderate demands on the other. The restraint envisaged by this policy was not dissimilar from that which might have been urged in the name of the balance of power, but Wilson's concern was not so much for the future distribution of power as for the tensions and dissatisfactions which would be created by a settlement made in the interests of only a few nations.

It is true that Wilson failed in his efforts at mediation and found himself going to war under such confusing conditions that the American people never had any very mature understanding of why they were fighting. Wilson had his own grave doubts as to the wisdom of joining the struggle, precisely because it would mean depriving the world of its one remaining neutral influence of any consequence. This would greatly increase the danger of total victory and an unmitigated humiliation of the Central Powers. But Wilson believed he had reached one of those junctures where principle must be served by imperfect means. "It is," he mourned, "just a choice of evils."[29]

These misgivings contrast sharply with Wilson's subsequent public addresses. It is largely on the basis of these utterances that Wilson has been branded as the father of "unconditional surrender" and accused of endowing the war with the ruthless ideological character which wreaked great material and intellectual damage from which we still suffer.[30] His conduct, it is said, represents a complete abandonment of the principles on which he had based his policy as a neutral. A little reflection suggests that this charge is poorly supported by the evidence.

The war had become ideological and unrelenting long before April 1917. Liberals performed the feat, but they were European not American. It was H. G. Wells who canonized the struggle as a war to end war and he did it before August 1914 was out.[31] Governments seized on the device of a crusade to justify their unprecendented efforts. Wilson may have been unwise to endorse the idea so eloquently, but he certainly did not invent it.

As for a negotiated peace, there is now general agreement that if ever there was an opportunity it was in 1916 when the campaigns were at a stalemate and Russia had not yet collapsed. But Wilson has as good a

claim as anyone to have recognized this. In that year he made not one but two major efforts to bring an end to the war. He sponsored the exchanges which culminated in the House-Grey memorandum and he published his own ill-fated overtures to the belligerents. By the time he went to war Germany had clearly shown, and the archives now confirm, that whether or not the Allies would offer peace without victory, she would not accept a compromise without defeat.

Moreover, there is much to prove that as a belligerent Wilson did not abandon his attachment to a peace of reconciliation designed in accordance with his principle of mutual accommodation. Although he had given up hope of reaching such an agreement with the existing German Government, his Fourteen Points and other manifestos were not tantamount to unconditional surrender nor were they treated as such when the moment of surrender came. Wilson realized that once America was at war and he had accepted the need for a decisive defeat of the Central Powers, a reasonable settlement would depend upon restaint exercised from within the camp of their enemies. This, he acknowledged, would require a "purity of motive and disinterestedness of object which the world has never witnessed before in the councils of nations,"[32] but he was determined to do his best to compel such an attitude. He retained a profound conviction that the many of his Allies' ambitions were incompatible with the new pattern of world politics which he hoped to establish and he devoted constant efforts to curbing them. It is usually forgotten that the Inquiry was set up in order to prepare for resistance against unreasonable demands made by the Allies upon the enemy. Wilson persisted

in this endeavor to the end and the pre-Armistice agreement was a spirited attempt to commit the victors to the principle, and a great many of the details, of a just peace.

Nor did Wilson omit to continue his public exposition of the need for the peace of mutual benefit which he had espoused as a neutral. Even his most pugnacious orations made reference to the importance of self-control in those who incongruously sought "to make conquest of peace by arms." The price of a stable peace, he warned repeatedly, was "full of impartial justice -- justice done at every point and to every nation that the final settlement must affect, our enemies as well as our friends."[33] The enthusiasm which Wilson's sentiments aroused among liberal elements everywhere made them into a powerful political force which no government was able to ignore.

Wilson carried the fight to Versailles and the most convincing studies of the conference indicate that his achievement was not inconsiderable. Though the Treaty lacked the obvious spirit of generous reconciliation which he had desired, the President's efforts moderated the terms in many particulars, while plebiscites, mandates and all the historical apparatus of the conference at least acknowledged an obligation to serve the overall welfare of the peoples affected. Many of the Treaty's gravest defects were those of later execution. But if Wilson had kept his direction, the pace fell sadly short of his followers' inflated expectations and they were quick to accuse him of betrayal. As a final quirk of fate, the compulsions of Wilson's character ensured that the very devotion to principle which had steadied his purpose at Versailles

played the foremost part in depriving the League of American membership.

Woodrow Wilson's failures were obvious but his impression on the thought of the world has endured. The United Nations is one of many monuments to the continuing influence of his belief that war was an increasingly absurd method of satisfying national aspirations. Wilson's solution was to approach the balance of power from behind and to seek a balance of satisfaction: "If we truly intend peace we must truly intend contentment."[34] For this to be possible would require a wholesale revision of interests amounting, as he admitted, to a conversion. Today we may not match Wilson's faith that this will come to pass but it may nevertheless be ilson's most pregnant contribution to the present discussion. For he was implying that necessity depends on the principles by which it is judged. Revise your principles and you may govern your necessities.

1. Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd eds., The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, (6 vols., New York, 1925-7) I, 69, 145.

2. "Comment," Blackwoods, CCLXXXI, April 1957.

3. Public Papers, V, 3; I, 442.

4. The phrase is taken from Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era (NewYork, 1954) p. 82

5. Public Papers, I, 412.

6. Cf. August Heckscher, The Politics of Woodrow Wilson (New York, 1956) xvi; Public Papers, II, 178ff.

7. Ibid., III, 196.

8. Ibid., V, 363 259.

9. Ibid., p. 234

10. Ibid., III, 42, 49, 157-8.

11. Ibid., IV, 48; V, 132-3.

12. Ibid., p. 406.

13. Ibid., p. 65.

14. Heckscher, op. cit., 87.

15. Public Papers, II, 208.

16. Ibid., V, 50-1.

17. Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (4 vols., Boston, 1926-8) IV, 283.

18. Public Papers, V, 337-8.

19. Ibid., pp. 395-6.

20. "The Paris Education of Woodrow Wilson," Virginia Quarterly, XXXII, Fall, 1956.

21. Public Papers, V. 541, 549.

22. Heckscher, op. cit., p . 74-5.

23. Public Papers, I, 184-5.

24. Ibid., V, 55.

25. Ibid., p. 129. Italics inserted.

26. Ibid., p. 429

27. Ibid., p. 179.

28. Public Papers, V, 161.

29. John L. Heaton, Cobb of "The World" (New York, 1924) p. 268-70.


30. See for example George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago 1951) Chs, IV, VI.

31. In a series of articles later published as The War to End War (London, 1914).

32. Public Papers, V, 363.

33. Ibid., pp. 129-30.

34. Ibid., p. 307.


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BUREAUCRACY: LEGISLATIVE CONTROL AND ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIVENESS

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I

The title chosed for the topic of this session makes it our task to examine the interplay of legislative control and administrative responsiveness in the operations of the machinery of government. Such an examination, obviously, transcends the realm of constitutional law. It must deal not only with the mechanics of institutional arrangements but also with the group conduct of human beings, with the behavior of the bureaucracy. Carried out on a comparative basis, it may furnish us some guidance in determining whether the key to accountable performance in the administrative system is legislative control or administrative self-discipline. Of course, the matter may not reduce itself to this alternative. It may be found that neither the external nor the internal influence dominates the other in shaping the pattern of administrative conduct. Then the problem comes down to the relative importance of each of the two influences as they converge upon individual points of administrative action.

In seeking answers to these questions we come face to face with one of the critical issues of modern government. The advent of contemporary industrial society has ushered in the era

of the "administrative state," with its vast array of continuing activities. The day-by-day performance of today's diverse and large-scale governmental functions is necessarily entrusted to a permanent officialdom, the merit bureaucracy. Its fitness for this task lies in its principal characteristics. A trained body, the merit bureaucracy is a source of rationality in the administrative process. It subordinates itself readily to the system of public responsibility, which indicates who has the last word in setting the government's course. Thus the merit bureaucracy supports the political leadership by serving as the prime instrument of governmental action. Combining experience and competence, it provides continuity in the planning as well as the execution of policies and programs, without blocking politically directed change. All of this, however, presupposes a close intermeshing of control and responsiveness. On the one side, the merit bureaucracy cannot be allowed either to succumb to inertia or to elevate itself to the role of a managerial elite, knowing no master above it. On the other side, the hand of legislative control must not rest so heavily upon the administrative system or fidget with it so frequently as to jeopardize its effectiveness.

These opening remarks must suffice to introduce the subject. They should also make clear that its significance is far from universal. Only government on the Western model permits us to link the idea of control over the bureaucracy with the responsibilities of the legislative branch. Political systems in which power is corralled by a small ruling group will at the

same time concentrate in it control over the officialdom. In this respect it makes no difference whether such political systems function by the myth of personal leadership or under a more or less formal directorate. In either case the legislature usually is nothing but an ornamental symbolism. Its existence is mainly justified by the desirability of providing the regime with a welcome amplifying effect in the nominal confirmation of decisions made without benefit of legislative deliberation. Most of mankind lives under types of government in which the legislature is not a real center of political power. An astute citizen, compelled to put up with these circumstances, may well regard it as intolerable irony to speak of legislative control. He is likely to doubt whether there is <u>any</u> effective control over those in possession of administrative power. It may be more plausible to him to assume that the ruling oligarchy uses them as its servile cohort, holding their loyalty precisely by leaving them generally to their rough and ready ways.

In addition, another matter deserves mention. We should be aware of a certain parochial mustiness in the implication that control over the bureaucracy is either a primary function of the legislature or legislative in character. This is a point of view which seems natural to those steeped in the ways of congressional-presidential government in the United States. But to British eyes, for example, the perspective would look distorted. Parliament, indeed, claims ultimate control over the administrative system, but the reins of direction are held by the cabinet as the acting arm of the parliamentary majority, and still more specifi-

cally by the individual ministers as the political heads of the executive departments. Both the cabinet and the individual minister will acknowledge a constitutional accountability to the parliamentary majority, which normally is the party with the largest number of seats in the House of Commons. Yet this is quite different from the American habit of thinking of control over administration as legislative business. Others, more familiar with parliamentary systems of government, will ordinarily speak of such control as political rather than legislative, and in the sense of policy guidance rather than in the sense of partisan interest. Although here no further attention will be paid to this distinction, the discussion that follows is based on a reasonably broad interpretation of the concept of legislative control. We shall include in that concept the general direction of the administrative system by politically responsible executive officers, regardless of whether these be agents of the legislative majority or spokesmen of policy in their own right or that of the chief executive.

II

It is of little benefit to describe and appraise the means employed in the exercise of legislative control over the administrative system as if those controlling and those being controlled were of one mind. That is true, after all, only with respect to broad generalities. Both legislators and administrators can be trusted to acknowledge the guiding authority of the public interest. Both will accept the principle that their mandate in

pursuit of the general interest stems ultimately from the people. Both will subscribe to certain elementary maxims in the use of governmental power--respect for law, respect for right, respect for fairness in dealing with different groups and different individuals. But such broad generalities are not readily converted into concrete answers to questions presented by specific situations, and least of all into answers equally persuasive to the legislative mind and the administrative mind. Indeed, these two may be very far apart. Even when the gulf between them is not widened by other factors, they are kept apart by important institutional influences which work upon them constantly.

Three such influences require special attention. First, legislators win their tenure in a public contest for the favor of the voters, whereas civil servants enter their positions by what is in essence a system of professional cooption, dominated ordinarily by objective examinations. Second, in the nature of things, the conduct of business in the legislature is quite different from the conduct of business in government departments. And third, largely for the same reasons lawmakers and career men tend to show considerable differences in background, working approach, and outlook. Moreover, the effect of these distinctions may be multiplied by certain characteristics of the political system. One must think of such matters as the degree of institutional unity manifest in it, the structure of the party system, and the relative stature of the legislative branch and the executive branch as measured against each other. All of these factors play a consequential role when it comes to putting together the

balance sheet of legislative control over the administrative system. It would be pointless to evaluate particular means relied upon in such control without first paying adequate attention to the circumstances that furnish the general setting for its operation.

It is easy to see that the basis of the lawmaker's tenure has much to do with the sense of purpose underneath legislative control, the direction which it follows in specific instances. In the institutional perspective of the legislature, the disciplinary power of the electorate and the periodicity of the disciplinary test, election upon election, produce a keen concern with the immediate and the acceptable. By contrast, the professional point of view typical of a merit bureaucracy brings in focus longer-range needs and unpopular remedies. In a way, we encounter here a fundamental issue of political dynamics. On the one hand, it is asserted that popular rule fares best when it serves primarily as a conductor of impulses from the mass to those governing in its name. On the other hand, as Walter Lippmann has urged recently in his Essays on the Public Philosophy, it may be better for government to act as the prompter of the right choices, within the scope of what it deems to be its popular mandate.

This divergency in legislative and administrative predispositions--here the immediate and the acceptable, there the longer-range and the controversial--is greatly magnified when the first is allied with the claims of locality and the second with the claims of specialization. Whether the legislator feels tied principally to the dominant interests of his local constituency;

whether he usually rises from the ranks of the local party organization; whether that organization is a small cluster of stalwarts, intent upon keeping out the general citizen; or whether, on the contrary, the representative of the people regards himself first and foremost as a partner in a larger cause, that of his party--these are matters which profoundly affect the nature of legislative control as it puts its imprint upon the activities of administrative agencies. A preoccupation with local matters creates a climate favorable to the formation of regional solidarities. Both detract from a proper consideration of the general interest in national terms.

But the resulting loss is not only one of reduced legislative capacity for translating national needs into public policy. In relation to the administrative system, an equally severe deficiency arises from the limited ability of the legislature to confront the functional drives that continuously break forth in the departmental structure with a broader point of view, with a mind skilled in coordination. Administrative organizations are bound to identify themselves with their jurisdictional assignments. They look upon the outside world through the eyes of specialized staffs. This identification with their functions draws them toward particular clienteles, toward parts of the public, whose advocates they become in the councils of government. Unless the legislature is so constituted as to speak for the larger public, the only countervailing force that can be hoped for must originate with the chief executive. But when the legislature itself surrenders to the fragmentation of

"pressure politics," when its standing committees come to feel a kinship with the corresponding executive departments and the interest groups linked to them, when the collision or the collusion of special interests provides the boundaries for the general interest--under these conditions the needed counterpressure is bound to exceed by far the political resources of the chief executive. Then the lawmaker fails to supply the political "generalist's" corrective to the planning of the administrative specialist. Instead of telling the career man what the public at large would not stand for, the practitioner of politics merely brings his particular public to bear upon the administrator's public.

Generally speaking, to the degree that a party system is weighted toward local concerns it fails to operate in breadth. It then falls short of serving as a practically consequential reflection of the public as a whole. And in exact proportion to that failure, the party system invites upon the legislature the plague of "pressure politics." For it is clear that local orientation of the elected representative does not merely mean a narrowing of the focus of action. It means a corresponding inability of the legislative body to meet centrally organized pressure. There is but one effective way of coping with centrally managed interest pressures--by forcing these pressures to seek a publicly acknowledged basis of coexistence and of broader balance among themselves. That can be done only within the concrete program with which each party aims to win the voter's endorsement.

When the legislative response to interest pressure is

governed by the recognition the particular interest has found in the program of the party in control, the pressure itself will be regulated by that fact. Its momentum will be directed, in the first instance, not upon the legislature but upon the process by which the parties come to a formulation of their programs. In these circumstances, each party will strive to convert the diverse interests amenable to its appeal into a single public, being itself a "connexion," in the phrase of Edmund Burke, in whom the constitutional value of such coalescence found a "great believer," as George Trevelyan has said. But when there is lack of such connective tissue, when it is not a normal thing for the individual member of the legislature to line up behind the program of his party, then he cannot expect to persuade his local constituents or any lobby seeking his vote that he must act in terms of his party's commitments. Nor can he use these commitments as a shield against special pleaders. As a result, he is perilously exposed to pressure from organized interests. Thus it is not astonishing, but indeed quite natural, that popular assemblies with weak party "connexions" are more receptive to the articulate demands of special interests than to the amorphous preferences of the general public. Such assemblies are case-minded rather than policy-minded, concerned with the specific urgencies of the day rather than the basic needs of the future.

By comparison, administrative thinking runs in different grooves. Ordinarily, the governmental functions attended to by executive departments are not anchored in particular localities.

On the contrary, effective administration, as a general rule, requires uniformity in the conduct of field operations. Hence these functions leave little leeway, if any at all, to a differentiated treatment of individual localities. Nor is the work of a department usually identified with regional interests, although a degree of regionalization occurs not infrequently. What happens more commonly is that the functional field of vision is distinctly restricted by the self-isolation of the dpeartmental specialists. Nevertheless, each function has its characteristic continuity. Guidelines for its administrative conduct, of necessity, have dimensions which extend into both the future and the past, using precedent to deal with current business in anticipation of foreseeable developments. In consequence, each case to be handled is taken up in full subjugation to policy. Administratively, the best that can be said about the treatment of the case is that it was dealt with exactly in line with all other such cases.

Without undue exaggeration one may therefore sum up these differences in a pointed contrast of tendencies. A representative system, weak in party "connexion" and hence characterized by unmitigated interest drives, local or other, makes the lawmaker the natural protagonist of the special dispensation. His most obtrusive standard will be how things will affect the "folks back home," influential constituents, and his own electoral opportunities. As far as possible, he will keep himself free from the general rule, from all "policy," because widely inclusive guidelines cut off the flexibility needed for "special deals."

The opposite is true of an administrative system motivated by the professional attitudes of career men. For them, the general rule, especially in the form of established policy, is the safest road to travel. Departures immediately raise questions.

The principle-minded civil servant is likely to regard the general rule as the strongest safeguard of justice, or at least as a bulwark in the defense of equality before the law. Should he be able to perceive a legitimate exception to the general rule, his first concern will be to impute the exception to the general rule. By giving the exception the status of a category expressly related to the general rule, he gets his feet on firm ground again. But even when this is not a matter of principle, and rather the effect of inertia, the results are about the same. Following the rule involves no argument in the context of operations. It requires no justification. After all, the rule is there to be followed. Breaking away from the rule makes it necessary to look for "cover," for a showing of authorization. The alternative would be to have a persuasive explanation in terms of the particular circumstances encountered, and to be sure that the explanation will survive challenge. In the bureaucratic setting, such additional burdens are not taken on with enthusiasm. Indeed, "sticking out one's neck" brings upon it discomforts or even disadvantages when the superior emphatically deigns not to agree.

Much of the divergence between legislative thinking and administrative thinking is potential rather than actual. It is

true the legislative mind is oriented toward public responses, whereas the administrative mind is committed to institutional continuity, operating simplicity, ease of internal control, and avoidance of sudden jumps this way and that. But the larger potentiality of this divergence disappears behind its lesser actuality insofar as the legislature is capable of assimilating the spectral range of public concerns. This can only be done, not segment by segment, without an integrating formula, but in an interlinking of public concerns so as to gain the electorate's support for a party's platform in the contest of politics. When the political parties make it their business to provide themselves with programs for governing, the legislature is in fact a projection of the whole public, or at least of competing concepts of the whole public. Such a legislative body will have little difficulty in outlining in its policy decisions a frame of reference for administrative planning. Conversely, when the legislature works primarily as if it were an assortment of independent political entreprenours, it cannot be expected to be a match to the policy needs of the administrative system.

It is evident that with these considerations our discussion has shifted beyond the discrepancies in motivation arising from the difference between popular election and merit appointment. We have in part moved over to a review of another difference which further contributes to keeping the legislative mind and the administrative mind in separate compartments. This is the difference in working method. The legislative process is still in the main forensic. Debate is addressed to an audience, if

one that refuses to be captive. Effectiveness of persuasion is largely dependent on the use of the spoken word. Achievement of practical results is often controlled by skillful manipulation of preclusive devices, especially the mastery of parliamentary procedure. Although some of the shrewdest maneuvers come off best when carried on in the dark, for the most part the actors move before the public eye, as the verdict of public opinion has much to do with the eventual legislative decision.

In legislative battles, superior performance requires experience in the manly art of fighting while on one's feet. To say so does not minimize the burden of patient committee work, which calls for analytical sense and dogged pursuit of complex issues. Yet, however painstaking their search for pertinent facts, few lawmakers rise to prominence without demonstrating ability to use these facts in argumentative discourse, to confound opponents, and to sway the mind of the assembly. Moreover, compared with administrative operations, legislative decisions do not move by conveyer belt, with closely stacked deadlines. They usually come forth in a slowly mounting climax of procedural moves, with ample time for oratorical feats and alert attention to the galleries.

Still more important is the fact that ordinarily the legislature is not the principal originator of its business. Rarely does it set out to determine independently what matters warrant its consideration, and why. Legislative business is mostly the product of the special publics, each in pursuit of its particular concerns, or of the government, acting on behalf of the

functional interests of individual departments rather than for the executive branch as a whole. These unrelenting petitioners push before the representative body, session upon session, an inexhaustible docket of legislative proposals. As a result, the specific terms in which matters are presented to the legislature are generally formulated outside its halls. For these reasons, the operating methods of lawmakers have considerable resemblance to judicial techniques. Decisions are made on the basis of the pleas entered and the evidences introduced, with the parties to the issue anxiously watching each move. To be sure, in the exercise of its power of inquiry the legislature has ample opportunity for bringing hidden facts and obscure connections into the open. But normally the frame of reference which governs legislative determinations comes about in the disputes, aspirations, and probings of groups which line up for or against. The weight of reason on either side is measured by the lawmaker in reference to what is "politically feasible."

The working method most congenial to the administrative process, on the other hand, borrows from scientific analysis rather than from adjudicative procedure. It is dominated by criteria of desirability and standards of coherence centered upon a conglomerate of interrelated activities called "program." In least ambiguous terms, a program is based on the statutory description of the purposes and tasks of an executive agency. In broader sweep, the sum total of the government's political commitments is referred to as its program; and this program will rest ordinarily on the platform of the political party in control

of the government. When used in these ways, the concept of "program" carries with it a strong implication of being an expression of the public interest. Hence a department, in speaking of its program, will feel duty-bound to defend it with all its vigor, to strengthen it for the common good, and to round it out for the sake of "balance."

In all of these respects, the department's best arguments are derived from its almost monopolistic familiarity with the facts surrounding its existence--both those dealing with the conditions of the public it serves and those relating to its own operating capacity. Thus the department will talk with assurance not only of public necessity but also of administrative feasibility. Because administrative decisions are more widely open to challenge than legislative decisions, administrative thinking puts heavy emphasis on a command of facts as far as possible beyond serious challenge. The critical need is therefore not one of outwitting an opponent in the moment of combat but one of wearing him down beyond recovery by a mass of objectively marshaled facts.

But this objectivity, in good part, is directed objectivity. That is to say, it functions within the administrative setting, in the context of the facts of organizational life. One of the most consequential facts of organizational life is hierarchy. To be sure, the lines of departmental program planning emerge not only from the goals of the political leadership but also from the career man's professional judgment, from his sober diagnosis of conditions, especially those regarded by a department as with-

in its responsibility, jurisdictionally speaking. Thus the rationality of administration, to borrow Max Weber's concept, is bound time and again to burst through the crust of authority and to force upon the public agenda uncomfortable issues which the opportunism of partisan spokesmen would prefer to ignore. Still, authority shapes much of a department's sense of direction, much of the institutional thinking that is concerned with departmental "objectives." What those "higher up" have in mind has a direct impact upon these objectives.

Typically, administrative action is governed by objectives rather than by facts, by what is to be done rather than by what is. This relationship to channels of command gives the objectivity of the scientific approach in administrative planning a sharp focus and even puts it in the service of advocacy. The result is that an executive department, persuaded by its own persuasiveness, finds it quite easy to be right, to believe with missionary zeal in its own role and in the enchancement of that role for the good of the country, and to propose such enhancement with a deep sense of urgency. For a legislative assembly, the normal state is to be divided, to grope its way through the never-ending forest of pros and cons. For an executive department, the normal state is to have a "position," to know its mind, if only by relying on hierarchy to keep its internal differences from public view. From the vantage point of the department, lawmakers suffer from ignorance or are caught in evil motivation when they fail to see the public interest the way the department does. From

the vantage point of the legislature, civil servants know too much about things under their jurisdictional nose to be trusted with final judgment on what is or is not in the public interest.

In all of these aspects, lastly, it is of vast importance whether lawmakers and civil servants, beneath the differences thus far surveyed, eye each other as creatures of the same breed or as products of different worlds. As one illustration, one may think of the attitude of the House of Commons in Great Britain toward the reformed civil service after 1870. The point of view of Parliament was greatly influenced by the common social and educational backgrounds its members shared with the university-trained Administrative Class. And mutual understanding has not become harder; for with the striking spread of the subsidized scholar in our day, the leadership group of the Labor party is likely to reflect increasingly the traditional upper-class standard of higher learning, whereas a more democratically constituted higher civil service is losing simultaneously its upper-class character. By comparison, such legislative confidence had no chance of crystallizing in France during the Third Republic. In fact, the passionately democratic Chamber of Deputies considered the ranking element of the bureaucracy a barely disguised embodiment of the <u>ancien régime</u>, nourished by the social inequalities of the educational system and the unblushing propaganda of political reaction.

A similar gulf can open up for quite other reasons. For instance, lawmakers may be drawn in disproportionate numbers from

rural or small-town backgrounds, or from the fields of small-town backgrounds, or from the fields of small-scale business, or from the cadre of tightly knit political organizations which function essentially as autonomous local formations. On the other hand, the top groups in the civil service may consist largely of academically trained specialists, coming mostly from the urban centers, and displaying a national rather than a local point of view. Then the lawmaker will feel entitled to deplore the "ivory tower" outlook of the career man, denounce his "visionary schemes" as those of one who "has never met a payroll," and recoil from the impracticality of his advice and the contagion of his "philosophy." The civil servant, in turn, will regard the legislature as the weatherman regards a hurricane--capable of disastrous effects, predictable in its course only in a very limited way, and inaccessible to reason, specifically the civil servant's reason.

In sketching the factors that keep apart the legislative mind and the administrative mind, we have had occasion to indicate repeatedly what may be called the multiplier effect of the party system. But similar consequences may stem from other characteristics of the political order. For instance, when the functional division of labor between the legislative and the executive branches is translated into a sharp separation of powers which reserves executive authority for a constitutional officer, as in the United States, antagonism between the two branches becomes a constitutional virtue. Whatever may be said in theory in favor of such radical separation for freedom's sake, the

inevitable result will be an administratively painful dualism. For the legislature, control over administration then is not a secure possession but an ambition that has to be fought for every day, and perhaps even plotted for by devious means. If the two hostile camps are not brought into concert by a sufficiently strong party system, the outcome is bound to be not only ambiguity about who is the master over the administrative system, but also a squandering of political energy owing to the excessive dispersal of power. Moreover, when the separation of powers is carried too far, the legislature occupies the anamolous position of partial direction and partial censor of the executive branch without ever being compelled to meet the responsibilities of management. By comparison, criticism of the government by the opposition in Great Britain is tempered by the fact that the leaders of the opposition may be the ministers of tomorrow, compelled to live up to the requirements implied in their criticism.

Indeed, although to some degree all group action is plural, a strong case can be made in support of the proposition that control over the administrative system defeats itself when it lacks essential unity. Control becomes contradictory and hazardous when it is splintered up between co-equal branches of government, and even between individual committees and subcommittees of the legislature and various coordinating and planning agencies attending to the affairs of the executive branch as a whole. Under these circumstances, familiar in the United States, the life of each line department will be replete with controllers. Each department will have to cope with as many impersonations

of the legislature as it can count committees and subcommittees interested in its activities, and with as many impersonations of the chief executive as it has to put up with among the coordinating and planning agencies. The nature of the developing relationships is implicit rather than explicit. As far as the legislature is concerned, committee hearings have brought forth such comments as these, both coming from experienced members of the House of Representatives:

> ...When I say "this committee," I mean the Congress, because, after all, anything this committee recommends must pass through both Houses of Congress before it becomes law, and you will find as a rule that these subcommittees are reflecting the sentiment of the vast majority of Congress.
>
> The Department is often accused of lobbying with Congress. This is a case where Congress is lobbying with the Department in trying to work out in cooperation with the Department a better system for our star-route carriers.

One other point needs to be added. The rise of the "administrative state," referred to earlier, has shifted weight inevitably to the executive branch. It was in this branch that the expansion of governmental responsibilities became most conspicuous, even dramatic. The physical growth of government expressed itself in an unprecedented proliferation of administrative machinery. But this was not machinery humming away distantly from the engine room. Each new agency and each new function drove its roots into the seedbeds of public opinion, cultivating its protectors and seeking to win friends. Thus the executive branch became an operating empire, while the legislature seemed shut out from its share in the boom. It hardly grew at all.

A David, the legislative assembly had to take on the administrative Goliath. But Goliath was no by means all brawn. He was brains as well; and, dressed up as Santa Claus, he gained a large following. Moreover, most of his business, if it had to be done at all, had to be done by him. In the nature of things, it could not be handled by the legislative body. The volume was too large: specialized competence was needed; and the procedures germane to legislative action were thoroughly unsuitable. Even in such areas of the administrative process as rule-making and adjudication, it proved impractical to prevent the executive branch from taking charge of some of the functions usually looked upon as legislative and judicial, respectively.

Throughout the twentieth century it has therefore been popular in certain quarters to lament the "abdication" of the legislative branch or, conversely, to condemn the "usurpation" of power by the new administrative Leviathan. Little attention has been paid to the accrual in importance experienced by the legislature as a natural consequence of the larger role of government in sustaining the industrial order. To be sure, when measured in manpower employed and funds needed, the administrative system looks like a giant, compared with the dwarf-like proportions of the legislative body. But such confrontation ignores completely that legislative action, in the day of the "administrative state," has become tremendously more consequential in strength and scope of impact than it was before. This is true of the whole range of legislative business. It applies most obviously to the making of laws and to measuring out the money

support for the conduct of administrative functions. But it also applies to watching for alarming public reactions to the working of the departmental machinery, to impressing legislative preferences upon the executive branch, and to crying out about inadequacies and deficiencies in performance. Legislative statesmanship has to be of a high order today; and when it is, its shadow falls far. With all of that, however, legislatures have become very self-conscious about preserving their stature face to face with the massive edifice of the administrative system. When the lawmaker sees the legislative estate imperiled by the very size of the administrative estate, the feeling of rivalry thus engendered will burden the exercise of control with considerable subjectivity.

III

This exploration of the influences that keep the legislative mind and the administrative mind in separate compartments has now progressed far enough to allow us a realistic assessment of some of the typical means of legislative control. As each has been dealt with frequently in the literature devoted to comparative politics, we can be correspondingly briefer on this aspect of our subject.

In general, what is impressive is not the paucity but the amplitude and diversity of means of control over the administrative system available to the legislature. Perhaps the best demonstration is furnished by the example of the United States, because here the executive branch may be expected to claim cer-

tain immunities owing to the coequality of its constitutional status. Even so the Congress is in possession of a formidable assortment of instruments of control. In broad outline, these may be divided under two headings: (1) specific authorization of administrative activities, and (2) unrestricted scrutiny of the record of performance. Under the first heading one would have to place, on the one hand, the steady stream of legislation circumscribing, and often selectively enlarging, the sphere of administrative action; and, on the other hand, the provision of funds, together with the even more important enforcement of basic consistency of departmental programs through the correlation of revenue measures and appropriations in a reasonably coherent fiscal policy, in the budgetary determinations of Congress. Under the second heading belong the examination of administrative reports, oral as well as written, and the conduct of inspections, including special inquiries.

In using legislation to keep an executive department at the leash, Congress may grant it only short-term authority. It may require periodic reporting of actions taken under the authority conferred, with a strong hint that it may follow up on the success of such actions. It may provide in the enabling act special supervisory machinery, such as a watchdog committee. It may tie administrative action to the consent of a standing committee, for instance, in the making of reclamation loans or the acquisition of sites for military construction, despite executive remonstrances on constitutional grounds. It may give itself the right to terminate by concurrent resolution any authority

it has granted, thus withdrawing its cancellation of authority from the reach of the President's veto. Finally, it may hobble a department by unduly detailed prescription of steps allowed and steps forbidden.

In the exercise of the power of the purse, Congress has wide leeway to bend departments to its will. It may couple the provision of funds with highly restrictive appropriation language, establishing limitations for particular objects of expenditure and attaching various conditions to the use of the money. It may confine itself to token gestures in appropriating funds. It may use some of the restrictive tricks out of its legislative bag, but weaken executive resistance by tagging them as "riders" to an appropriation act. It may apply its financial control to choke off what it regards as unwelcome administrative activities or to force specific departmental reorganizations. And it may leave it to the Appropriations Committees and their subcommittees to pass on to individual executive agencies informal instructions about how to discharge their functions.

In addition, Congress is free to lay down reporting requirements for the executive branch. Reports may be periodic, formal, or informal, written or oral. No reporting, however, is as exacting and revealing as that occurring on the numerous occasions of executive testimony before legislative committees. Such testimony may be in explanation or elaboration of legislative proposals or budgetary requests. It may center on congressional appraisal of administrative performance or analysis of economic and social conditions. It may be called for as an appro-

priate legislative means of dealing with public complaints. As a matter of fact, executive agencies may find it very convenient and beneficial to keep "their" committees currently informed of all unusual circumstances affecting their work of which they become aware. They must also be prepared to supply records upon legislative request, unless these can be claimed to be "privileged papers."

Congressional committees or subcommittees, needless to say, are entitled to make inspections and visitations to see for themselves what is going on in the administrative system. They may press inquiries upon reluctant officials and summon them for special hearings. Moreover, the legislature has wide authority to create investigating committees in order to dredge up facts pertinent to its business. All in all, a department must be very foolhardy to try keeping its administrative sins from the congressional committee in charge. And when the department has lost legislative and public confidence, the searchlight upon it may eventually destroy its spirit. The effect was well summarized by a congressional leader when he remarked to an administrative official during a committee hearing:

> You know your present lethargy in the Department of the Interior as far as the old General Land Office was concerned was the direct result of that series of investigations in the old days which created a psychology there that was anything but favorable to any change in any operation in that Department.
>
> There had been criticism of everything that had been done and you had many in your General Land Office who having gone through several of those examinations and hearings, simply were fearful of making any decision whatever and you inherited it and you have it now.

This outline of means of legislative control over the administrative system, being drawn from American experience, puts in bold relief the pervasive influence of the congressional committee system. The impulses conveyed upon the conduct of executive agencies come forth both continuously and largely informally, usually even without precise bearing upon party position. This is an enveloping kind of control, and one both lacking clearly defined general lines and comparatively personalized in terms of who speaks for the particular committee. Nor is the mind of a committee readily predictable to the administrative agency which comes before it, as is suggested by the following colloquy that took place at the end of a committee hearing:

> Witness. I think it may interest you to know...it seems funny, although we would bone and bone to answer the questions the committee would ask, our experience was--the committee never asked us those questions.
>
> Chairman. I am sorry about that.
>
> Witness. They always asked us the questions we could not answer, and we had to dig around to find the answer.

Of course, it is both necessary and desirable that legislative questions addressed to executive officials move freely across the entire field of legitimate inquiry. The lawmaker's pursuit of information cannot and should not be confined to well-worn groves, and a certain element of surprise, if fairly exploited, often adds to the yield of interrogatory technique. But it does not serve the purposes of constructive control when the controlled is caught in befuddlement because of his failure to figure out what is in the mind of the controller--indeed, who

is the controller.

Parliamentary systems cannot boast of much that would closely compare with the character of committee questioning on the American model--its quick lunges and feints, its unnerving persistence, its frequent personal overtones, its fondness for detail, its loose discipline, and its spotty productivity. Perhaps the nearest parallel is the annual series of sessions which parliamentary budget committees conduct in many countries to probe into the executive expenditure proposals. Another parallel, and one not limited to matters of finance, is the question period in the practice of the House of Commons in Great Britain. Clement Attlee has declared it

> . . . one of the finest examples of real democracy. One questioner may ask about world-shaking events, while another will ask why Mrs. Smith of 5 Slum Alley, Coketown, was refused public assistance, or why the Post Office at Little Pedlington was closed last Friday. The effect of questions to the Minister, and still more questions asked publically in the House, is to keep the whole of the Civil Service on their toes.

How does the question period work? In brief, members of the House of Commons have the right for an hour to ask questions of ministers on four days each week during the parliamentary session. Such questions may be oral or written, with a day's notice. When related to general policy, they are answered by the Prime Minister himself or his deputy. Each member is free to ask up to three questions for oral answer and any number for written answer. The daily total of oral questions may run to 100 and more. Each answer may bring upon itself a maximum of three supplementary questions, often to test the minister on

the spot, stripped of the desk resources of his civil servants.

As in committee questioning in the United States, the questions may expose official bungling. But the full House of Commons is a national stage of exceptional eminence. Each minister knows the threat to his reputation and the importance of being given good marks by the House and the public. He may get discreet advice from one of his civil servants keeping himself nearby, but how well the minister does on a supplementary question is mainly up to him. If he slips, a debate or even a formal inquiry may follow later. As in the United States, the civil servants suffer equal torture in the ordeal, for the minister's performance may profoundly affect the legislative and public standing of the whole department.

Such questions illuminate conditions and plans, but they are equally significant as preventive medicine. Inefficiency and aimlessness are held in check and can find timely correction. The minister can shift part of his political responsibility to the House, now that it knows what he has to say. And he will have a better case in seeking fuller coordination when duplication or confusion have come to light. But whereas congressional committees feel entirely free to ferret out the most obscure aspects of any administrative instrumentality, including government corporations, it has proved harder to determine how far questions may be pushed with respect to the operations of Britain's nationalized industries. On the one hand, it is difficult to draw lines to the right of asking questions. On the other hand, it may be argued--as the government did in 1947--that the

internal administration of these corporations ought to be left untouched in the interest of venturesome management.

A more eventful method of pursuing a question of larger moment is by full-dress debate and challenge to the government. In parliamentary practice abroad the means to this end is usually known as the interpellation. Here the minister's reply is made the object of debate. In France, for instance, the debate ends with a resolution by the National Assembly for or against the government's position as expressed in the reply and during the debate. During the Third Republic, the interpellation was used frequently as a poisoned dart against the cabinet.

A single deputy can set the machinery in motion, but he must manage to get the interpellation on the agenda. Moreover, when his request has the support of 50 deputies, the Assembly may set a date right away. Different parliamentary groups may join in an interpellation so worded as to serve their respective interests. The interpellator's is the right of first reply, but other deputies may also take the floor. The debate may end with nothing but ominous sounds. But it may also tear a gash into the government, causing it to sink. Or it may force the cabinet to take steps wanted by the Assembly. Under the Fourth Republic, however, the interpellation has lost ground as an instrument of censure or policy change. Of the scores of interpellations demanded each year, only a handful come to debate. Thus the threat of the interpellation, although real, is more potential than actual. Indeed, it is too heavy a piece of artillery to be fired normally at administrative sparrows.

But it would be wrong to assume that the French, with their use of the interpellation, are tough, whereas the British, employing the question hour, are soft. Something like the interpellation exists in British parliamentary practice in what is known as "the adjournment of the House on a matter of definite and urgent public importance." This occurs when a member of the House, backed by 40 others, so moves and the Speaker, surrounded by the firm tradition of fastidious impartiality, accepts the motion on the strength of his judgment. To be sure, matters truly "of definite and urgent public importance" are relatively rare, and in fact such motions are accepted no more frequently than once or twice a year. No one would doubt, however, that the chance of this type of motion, like the interpellation in other countries, exerts a purifying influence by reinforcing the responsibility of the executive branch. It acts as a spur to the government so to govern and so to administer as to be able at all times to render full and good account of itself in the sharp light of publicity.

All of these means of achieving legislative control over administrative action are focused on information--not simply to know but to act upon, and usually to share the knowledge with a presumably agitated public. But lawmakers are also able to accumulate knowledge in their day-by-day activities. In some respects, they build up a store of precious information in very much the same way as do administrative agencies--that is, by attending to their duties. Committee service, especially when it continues for a longer time, turns many a member of the legis-

lature into an expert in his own right. Usually, however, lawmakers find it difficult to provide themselves with the kind of automatic reference operation which in executive departments is carried on by planning and management staffs on the one hand and by library and record services on the other. Above all, there is the relentless pressure of time. Administrative officials meet that pressure primarily by learning to absorb incessant snatches of briefings by subordinates, who are touched by the flow of departmental intelligence. Lawmakers ordinarily do not have at their disposal a comparable institutional briefing service, and they are often not brought up to use such limited staff assistance as may be available to them.

In the United States, however, organized staff work on the legislative level has made steady progress, especially since the passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. The Legislative Reference Service in the Library of Congress has earned a high reputation as an able body of specialists in different subject-matter fields. Committee staffs and personal staff assistance to individual legislators have raised the professional level of legislative analysis and drafting. As a result, Congress is not at a loss today to appraise independently the proposals advanced by interest groups and lobbies, on the one hand, and the views of the executive branch as set forth in messages, reports, and testimony, on the other.

One incidental but important advantage of better congressional staffing is the marked increase in informal contacts be-

tween the legislative and the executive branches. A member of Congress, especially if he does not belong to the party of the President, may often find it inopportune to prevail upon an administrative agency for information he needs. A staff specialist in his office, talking to a professional colleague in the agency, is less inconvenienced by political distance. He may periodically meet his counterpart on the administrative side in the activities of professional associations to which both are likely to belong. These are beneficial cross-connections, even though professional staff members, on either side of the constitutional fence, will appreciate the delicacies of an informal exchange of information.

Despite that fence, then, administrative agencies need not be told that the sin of trying to fool Congress does not pay. The House or the Senate Appropriations Committee may inflict drastic penalty upon an agency it finds unworthy of its confidence. Legislative proposals in which the agency is vitally interested may get nowhere if the committee in charge thinks little of the agency's habits, policies, or accomplishments. In the Federal Government, the emphasis in the conduct of administrative business is definitely on the side of being on the best of terms with Congress, especially the committees closest to the agency's concerns, including key members and even committee clerks. This becomes conspicuous when the President, acting on his sense of the needs of the nation, feels it necessary to fling a challenge at the legislative body. Except for those departments that cannot get out of the way, the most likely reaction

of administrative agencies is to cringe at the thought of battle, for fear that their own long-range programs might suffer from congressional reprisals.

On the other hand, the influence of the President with Congress and the general public may temporarily carry great weight in the exercise of legislative control, and even in the conduct of formal investigations. When there is exceptional accord between Congress and the President, he may not encounter insurmountable obstacles in bringing about an unacknowledged coordination of the investigative actions of the legislature with the goals of his political program. The findings of a legislative inquiry can not only tear asunder the finely spun plans of a department but also help to build up public sentiment in support of governmental action favored by the President. Correspondingly, when a high degree of accord exists between a congressional committee, on the one side, and a particular agency or even a faction within an agency, on the other, it is quite possible for the investigative power to come forth as the shield of friends and the scourge of foes. Agencies adept at being "good" may earn more than ordinary rewards from the controlling committee by their submissiveness and devotion.

This would be different if Congress had machinery for asserting its own institutional position in its internal operations except in a very indirect and sporadic way. There is no committee on the legislative program. The nearest approximation is the Joint Economic Committee, product of the Employment Act of 1946 and directed to consider the President's economic reports

and to make recommendations on economic policy. But the relationships between the Joint Committee and other committees have naturally been rather tenuous, for each committee tends to be its own boss. Some approximation of a committee on the legislative program might be seen in the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, as they must act on the government's annual work plan submitted in the form of the President's budget proposal. But it is precisely as sources of general legislative policy that the Appropriations Committees have made their least conspicuous contribution, and again for obvious reasons.

The acute deficiency in internal congressional authority, result of a feeble two-party system, severely hampers the legislative body in holding its committees to the pursuit of goals that can rightly be called those of Congress. Administrators as well as civil servants who set out to live by the word of Congress are bound to discover to their dismay that the word of Congress is in fact many words, with little synchronization of voices. As a result, when administrative officials do right by some of these voices they are likely to do quite wrong by others. Thus the meaning of legislative control becomes elusive. The effects of legislative control on administrative conduct are problematical when they spring from a loose congregation of lawmakers whose agreements are informal, more instinctive than rational, and more a matter of outlook than of position on particular issues. Administrators who would like to look upon Congress as a board of directors are bound to find out sooner or later that they should rather think of a stockholders' meeting.

In turn, as we saw earlier, the legislator is often profoundly puzzled by the technical intricacies of the administrative process, by the stuff-necked insistence on procedural regularity, and by the complexities of large-scale operations.

Exasperation can hardly be avoided for lawmakers, administrators, and civil servants as they stand confounded by the differences in their points of view and in their yardsticks of measurement in trying to reach common judgments in detail about what an agency ought to do and what not, and how it ought to do it and how not. The gulf between different occupational worlds looms wide; and the farther matters lose themlseves in particulars, the greater will be the temptation for those on the administrative side to reduce any dispute to the obvious difference between the backseat driver and the one who faces the traffic behind the steering wheel.

IV

Having considered the relative usefulness of various means of legislative control over administrative action, we should now turn our attention to the principal factors that control administrative responsiveness in the merit bureaucracy. Both the training and the operating experience of the career man create within him a predisposition to organize the day-by-day activities along well-defined lines. The rationality of the professional approach cries out for clear premises and specified goals. The most natural occupational concern of civil servants is, not

to amass and employ power for power's sake, but to manage functions for the common benefit. The merit bureaucracy, under ordinary circumstances, wants to do the job laid out for it, taking credit for resourcefulness and efficiency, and to get on with that job without undue interference.

As part of his day's work, the career man understands the need for control as an operating necessity, as the life-line that holds together a large-scale organization and keeps it in working condition. Performing his tasks in the context of representative government, he would be a rare bird if he failed to appreciate equally the need for linking administrative control to political control. Typically, he looks eagerly for a precise expression of "what is wanted," for an unmistakable indication of policy to guide him, for final approval of basic operating plans, for an explicit indication of the desired direction. To him, these are matters of vital importance. After all, no one else is as painfully familiar with the stresses and strains that inevitably accompany consecutive shifts in the general course to be followed by a large-scale organization. From this angle, then, it becomes plain that it is the career man himself who is most conscious of his stake in the effectiveness of legislative control. He needs it as a secure base for his own operations, for knowing his frame of reference, and for limiting his personal responsibility.

It is therefore little short of calamity for the civil servant when legislative control fails to ring out in a distinct voice, when it gets entangled in contradictions, when the public

relinquishes its role as the master. Under these circumstances, the career man is the first to suffer from the obstruction he encounters in his quest for political stewardship. He cannot himself seek the endorsement of the public. He cannot transfer part of his administrative responsibility by inviting interest groups to share it. Confronted with the dilemma posed by inadequate political control, he is bound to succumb helplessly to the pathological tendencies that have a hospitable breeding ground in bureaucratic behavior.

In their less dangerous form, these tendencies contribute to administrative stagnation. They cause the civil servant to make it a habit to stall and temporize, to occupy his hours with loving cultivation of empty routines, to get submerged in "busy business." The more perilous form of administrative pathology leads him to see himself eventually as the savior out of perennial political crises. Is he not the nonpartisan director of public affairs best qualified to be in unchallengeable control? Is he not the man who knows, the "expert"? On all the evidence available, it can hardly be doubted that a merit bureaucracy will reach for political power only either when it is permitted to think of itself as the legitimate custodian of its own class interests, when it functions as a caste bureaucracy, or when political control has deteriorated to the point where the administrative system grinds to a dismal halt.

Even the most purposeful and constructive kind of legislative control, however, cannot be expected to yield satisfactory

results if it operates simply as a source of commands. Legislative control neither is self-enforcing nor can it reach deep down into administrative activities. It works best when it confines itself to setting out goals, to establishing general lines of approach, and to judging performance with an informed mind. To deserve its name, the merit bureaucracy must itself pick up at this point. It must develop its own sensitivity to legislative control, out of its own professional resources. It must crystallize a readily understandable service doctrine and make it its cherished possession. It must elaborate coherent maxims of administrative neutrality, to enable it to be continuously receptive to the implications as well as the effects of policy change, above all such change as comes about upon alternation in political power as the result of elections. A permanent officialdom lacks both moral and constitutional justification for seizing so firmly upon particular policies and programs as to become incapacitated for unfaltering service after even the sharpest turns of the political rudder. It is a constitutional necessity that each lawful government have the faithful support of the civil service as its instrument of administration.

Expressed differently, both legislative control and administrative responsiveness need to be conditioned to each other consciously. This is a task as important of achievement on the legislative level as on the administrative level. The heart of the problem is perhaps best described by saying that the political leadership, in the legislature and at the helm of the administrative system, must be provided with a keener sense of how to

use--and how not to use--the merit bureaucracy, while simultaneously the mind of the career man must be opened to a deeper understanding of the political process under popular rule. Certainly, modern government, broadly speaking, has not yet brought itself to an adequate grasp of the operating intricacies of joining political representation and public management. In turn, the productivity of public management has often suffered from lack of political maturity on the part of the career man, especially the top cadre of civil servants. This twin problem has in no way received the attention it deserves.

But it should be realistically recognized at the same time that legislative control and administrative responsiveness are separate things. To bring them into smooth intermeshing requires effort and care. For this reason the presence of intermediary devices, of special transformers, has great significance. Historically, perhaps one of the best examples of this kind of transformer is the British Treasury. In the first place, as Stephen B. Baxter shows in his account of the development from 1660 to 1702 (1957), the Treasury gained early prominence as a central arm of administration by being a repository of experience in the handling of everybody else's business as well as of its own. With the rise of parliamentary government, the Treasury, as a "know-it all," naturally assumed an intercessory role between the legislature and the departments.

One thing made clear by Samuel H. Beer's study of the contemporary role of the Treasury (1956) is that an administrative mechanism cannot be expected to succeed as a transformer of

legislative control unless it combines two elements. It is not enough that such an agency proves to have its hand upon the entire executive machinery. In addition, it must so conduct itself as to leave little doubt that it seeks to cfficiate in meticulous understanding of the point of view prevailing in the legislative body. Parliament as well as the civil service have greatly benefited from the relative ease of their relationship brought about by the Treasury in its combined roles as manager of the bureaucracy and as executive agent of the House of Commons. Neither the Council of State in France nor the Bureau of the Budget in the United States has been able to equal this achievement. In France democratic politics viewed administration as too reactionary. In the United States, the sharp-edged separation of powers kept the Bureau of the Budget at the periphery of legislative confidence precisely because of its status as a staff arm of the President.

We must come to a close. One way of summarizing the drift of our surmises or hypotheses is to ask a few questions and to venture tentative answers to each. The questions are not intended to reconstruct the preceding discussion either in any degree of detail or in its actual sequence, but they may serve the purpose of markers on the road.

(1) What are the structural requirements of legislative control to be of reasonable effectiveness in relation to the career establishment? -- To stress the basic point, control does not emanate from heterogeneity of purposes, nor does it accom-

plish its aims if it proceeds by jerks and jumps. It must allow an easy translation into the rationality of professionalized administration. Ineffectual legislative control not only falls short of reaching its ends, but also generates "bureaucratic" behavior and even puts in jeopardy the system of public responsibility derived from the constitutional order.

(2) What is the contributing effect of institutional arrangements, on the one side, and of civil service doctrine, on the other, upon responsible and responsive administration? -- Institutional arrangements, in the form of suitable instrumentalities and procedures, are clearly important, in the same way as dams and levees guard against the untamed power of the stream. The more deeply such arrangements are embedded in the public consciousness, the firmer is the foundation of responsive as well as responsible administration. But in the day-in, day-out conduct of administration the professional spirit of the merit bureaucracy, bolstered by its constitutional sense, is a motivating factor as significant as the flow of the stream. Both institutional arrangements and mental and emotional dispositions are ultimately merged in the images predominant in each political system about the "state" and the role of its "organs."

(3) What happens when such images differ significantly between political agents and career men? -- The more these images differ, the greater is the likelihood of political schizophrenia, with eventual disintegration of the entire system of public responsibility. From such an angle, it becomes evident how much the "practical realities" of the governmental process are overshadowed by political theory.

CHANGING PATTERNS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM:

FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

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Paper Prepared for Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, September 5, 1957

This year the National Government is in the midst of an important development in the history of our federal system. In conjunction with a representative group of State governors, National officials are taking a fresh look at some of the intricate problems of National-State-local relations.

A National budget officer participating in such an undertaking should be pardoned if he pauses to reflect a bit in the process. First, he thinks about the current budget and its $5.5 billions of National grants and other kinds of aid for upwards of one hundred programs. He might be tempted to call this his summation of the changing pattern of American federalism (particularly when he contrasts this sum with the $1.6 billion in grants just 10 years ago). He might also be tempted to categorize the varied areas into which these many grants fall:

1. Highway construction.
2. Flood control and prevention.
3. Improvement of rivers, harbors, and waterways.
4. Water-pollution control.
5. Control of communicable diseases, including tuberculosis and venereal.
6. Services to crippled children.
7. Health centers and clinics.
8. Disaster relief.
9. Civil defense.
10. Housing, slum clearance, and urban redevelopment.

11. School-lunch program.

12. Special problems of federally-impacted areas.

13. Airports and air terminals.

14. Old age and survivors' insurance for local government employees.

15. Hospital planning and construction.

16. Suppression of crime.

17. General welfare assistance.

18. Categorical assistance under the Social Security Act.

19. Vocational education.

20. Vocational rehabilitation.

21. Employment security.

The budget officer might also reflect on the fairly steady flow of official visitors to his office from all parts of our land and from every governmental level, many of whom are looking for help--usually fiscal--from the National Government. And he certainly would pause to think about the budgetary headaches which the many categorical grants cause budget officers at all levels. He asks himself if the stimulative grants have really stimulated, and if grants have really been distributed according to need or if they ever can be with our particular form of representation. And he is sure to remember that at every budget review session he must ask himself just what criteria he really should apply to departmental recommendations for new grants or other aids to State and local governments.

These few random thoughts perhaps illustrate at least a part of the dilemma of an operating official in his day-to-day wrestling with the specifics of an ever-changing federal system. But they do not blur

(or at least they should not) his perspective in looking at recent developments in the continually-changing kaleidoscope which we call the American federal system.

Lest there be any doubt, I would hasten to add that this budget officer does have moments when he thinks about a broader perspective than the figures daily in front of him. In that broader context, my first observation is that I am continually amazed at the ability of the American federal system (so far) to respond and adjust to the most incredible series of changes and evolutions in the history of mankind. I am even more amazed when I pause to remember that there has been superimposed on a structure originally designed for an agricultural economy with only 4,000,000 people in it, a gigantic superstructure with 1,000,000 elected officials, over 7,000,000 government employees serving 100,000 governments which will spend well over $120 billions this year, all serving over 170,000,000 people the majority of whom live in crowded urban areas. That a handful of men were able to frame a governmental structure sufficiently flexible that it is still operating nearly 200 years later is in itself a major miracle.

But, of course, there is still not exact agreement among all students of the problem that what we now have resembles in any way what the Founding Fathers contemplated. In fact, there are still some who fondly dream of the day when an omnipotent force will come along and neatly separate and sort out all the governmental functions and tax sources, handing one carefully wrapped package to the States and their subdivisions and the other to the National Government. This, I hasten to add, is not my understanding of the role of the current Federal-State task force. In fact, to simplify this


discussion, I would gladly agree to stipulate one point: namely, that it is a waste of time to debate interminably the question of what a perfect separation of governmental responsibilities might have been. What we now have in large measure is here to stay, and all the papers or discussion in the world will not turn back the clock of history. Rather I would hope that all of us could devote our energies to analyzing the ways to make what we have work. All levels of American government are so intermingled and intertwined in their operations that a precise division and allocation of functions is no longer possible, even if it were desired.

The most important recent contribution to better understanding of intergovernmental relations, of course, was the report of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. In transmitting to the Congress the proposed legislation to create the Commission, the President commented as follows:

> ...there is need to review and assess, with prudence and foresight, the proper roles of the Federal, State, and local governments. In many cases, especially within the past 20 years, the Federal Government has entered fields which, under our Constitution, are the primary responsibilities of State and local governments. This has tended to blur the responsibilities of local government. It has led to duplication and waste....

The Commission's report highlighted a number of pertinent points:

> .... It laid to rest the argument that there ever could be a complete separation of National from State and local functions;


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.... It gathered material which clearly delineated the present and emerging problems of federalism;

.... It spotlighted weaknesses of State and local governments which, in part at least, have contributed to the trend toward Washington;

.... It has brought about a re-assessment of the role of the National Executive in meeting problems of intergovernmental relations.

It is to this last point that I should like to direct particular attention. When our various officials were analyzing the Kestnbaum report, one question continually came up: What was the National Government to do about the report? Certainly, for example, it could not and should not take action on revision of State constitutions. Most definitely it was not the province of the National Government to suggest improvements in State legislative procedures. Clearly, it was not the place of National officials to suggest that the States and local governments enact new taxes. Quite obviously all of these areas are State and local responsibilities.

However, the National Government can assess its own programs and organizational capability to deal with those intergovernmental problems which come within its sphere. Out of this conviction came an important decision last year by President Eisenhower and his Cabinet. For the first time in our country's existence a focal point for continued Presidential concern with intergovernmental relations was established and is now in operation. Former Governor Howard Pyle of the White House staff was designated as the Deputy Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Relations.

Specifically, Governor Pyle was directed to maintain liaison with organizations of officials in the field of Government; to establish ad hoc working committees from among Federal officials; to grapple with problems concerning State and local governments; with the assistance of Mr. Kestnbaum, to follow through on the findings and recommendations of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations; to explore the feasibility of establishing regional boards of intergovernmental relations; to develop periodic reports on the National Government's relations with, and proposed actions involving, State and local governments, and to make such special studies as may be required. The Bureau of the Budget was given the responsibility of assisting Governor Pyle in these activities, and my office was designated to work with Governor Pyle in this regard.

The administration's guiding philosophy was summarized in the following statement of policy:

> It is the goal of the administration, in the interest of public, legislative, and State-local relations, to demonstrate its active concern with improving the relations of the National Government with State and local authorities.

These combined focal-point activities of White House and Bureau of the Budget have resulted in a number of developments of potential importance in emerging intergovernmental problems. Our combined operation oversees the National Government's activities with respect to interstate compacts; to us come problems in which the National Government's interest must be expressed in light of a conscious desire to really make federalism work.

The beginnings have been small, but the future significance great. For example, when a group of States wanting to develop a compact to study problems of the Great Lakes found themselves blocked by negative reports from several Federal departments, they were able to come to us for help. We were able to resolve the problem by substituting a policy of cooperation for a parochial negativism based solely on the departmental view. When a Governor wanted to strengthen his tax-collection procedures by making reciprocal arrangements with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, we were again able to substitute a conscious policy of help for a narrower view that there wasn't much in it for the Federal Government. When a water problem involving another interstate compact was stalled because of legal objections, we were able to find a middle ground between abandonment of National rights and frustration of State interests.

The Bureau of the Budget has now issued standing instructions to its own staff directing that all problems potentially involving intergovernmental relations be referred to my office for analysis and comment. And for the first time the Budget Bureau's orientation course for new examiners will include a session on the National Government's attitude toward intergovernmental problems.

The executive branch is slowly evolving the concept that intergovernmental relations no longer should be dealt with on a functional, piecemeal basis. We are in the developmental stages of a policy which will apply to the Federal departments in their intergovernmental relations the same kind of direction and guidance that came with passage of the Budget and Accounting Act. Before adoption of that Act in 1921, each department submitted its own

budget directly to the Congress without any systematic Presidential review. Legislation was submitted on the same basis. The result was no executive policy, no executive budget, no effective Presidential control.

This is not to suggest that the President or the Executive Office of the President could or should impose rigid supervision over functional departmental relationships with State and local governments. Quite obviously, basic responsibility for administrative action must rest with the duly appointed departmental and agency officials. But it does mean that we now have the beginnings of a mechanism that can apply to those operations a conscious national policy of trying to do everything possible to insure that every national official is aware of the fact that his decisions and program operations have an effect on our intergovernmental relations in their broader sense.

Regardless of future decisions concerning the return of some of those functions to States and local governments, or contrary decisions to engage in new activities, it is imperative that the Executive Branch of the National Government, at all times, be aware of its tremendous responsibility to make a federal system really work. To this end we are now firmly directed.

More recently, the President reiterated his basic philosophy with respect to the federal system in a major address at Williamsburg before the Governors' Conference. There he proposed the establishment of a Joint Federal-State task force composed of Governors and high ranking National officials with three specific duties:

One--To designate functions which the States are ready and willing to assume and finance that are now performed or financed wholly or in part by the Federal Government;

Two--To recommend the Federal and State revenue adjustments required to enable the States to assume such functions; and

Three--To identify functions and responsibilities likely to require State or Federal attention in the future and to recommend the level of State effort, or Federal effort, or both, that will be needed to assure effective action.

This joint task force has been appointed and includes three Federal department heads, three Presidential assistants, and the Budget Director, plus the Governors of ten States. Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson and Governor Dwinell of New Hampshire are co-chairmen of this joint committee.

On August 9 and 10, an initial meeting was held in Hershey, Pennsylvania, at which time it was decided that the following functions and taxes would be suitable for consideration and possible action at a subsequent meeting in the near future:

1. The School-lunch Program.
2. Vocational Education.
3. Natural Disaster relief.
4. Waste Treatment Facilities Construction.
5. Local Telephone Service Taxes.
6. Admissions and a number of other Excise and Licensing Taxes which are part of the normal policing powers of the States.

The joint task force is endeavoring to do something that has never been attempted before. This is the first time that the President of the United States has invited the States to indicate which functions and which tax

sources should be returned to them. It is the first time that a group of the highest National and State officers have met together for this official purpose.

It was evident from the very first meeting that the basic question of federalism will be a constant factor in the deliberations and negotiations in which this committee is engaged. While it is still too early to make any prognostication of the success of this endeavor, I am hopeful that a common understanding will arise from these meetings which will be acceptable to both National and State governments and which will become a positive contribution to the future development of our federal system.

From the executive branch point of view, it is obvious that the National Government will necessarily give up some supervisory and fiscal powers, but this will not be a net loss since the executive branch of the States, or perhaps local governments, will be strengthened. This in itself is an example of the genius of our system in that services are not lost but find their expression in the totality of government within the United States.

The members of this joint Federal-State task force, I am sure, realize that the transfer of several nationally operated programs and nationally collected taxes back to the States represents only a beginning step, but hope that it will focus attention on the importance of assessing every new proposal for national intervention. The committee plans also, and perhaps more importantly, to analyze some of the emerging problems of Federal-State relations. Two areas stand out in this regard: problems of water utilization and conservation and problems of the ever-growing urban complexes.

One then comes to the tough questions. What should be the role of the National Government in each of these areas? How can needed national programs be geared into State, regional, and local plans? Who pays for the things that need doing? How does one reconcile the desire for local autonomy with the need for interstate action? What criteria can be developed for determining what really is a national problem? And how can one measure the effectiveness of national stimulation and prodding of State and local governments? How does the "need factor" enter into the picture?

The answer will differ in each case, but I personally believe we have only scratched the surface in the search for new answers and techniques to provide the proper yardstick. I would hope that you, the scholars, will help us, the operators, in this search even more than has been the case in the past. Of one thing I am sure: the answer does not lie in the easy use of phrases and slogans such as "States' rights." States' rights has become too pat a word, now used as a cover for too many things. To some it may mean that they don't want government to involve itself in certain areas. There are others who sometimes tend to cloak themselves with this slogan as a cover for their attitudes on social problems. On rare occasions the phrase "States' rights" is used as a rallying point to hide inefficiency, at best, and corruption, at worst.

But States' rights in its very highest meaning can be an expression of a strong American desire for nonconformity, of a will to preserve personalness in government, and a recognition of the danger of bigness and monopoly. The problem is how to strike the proper balance in a world in which distance has become almost meaningless and where everything now seems to interact on everything else.

It is in this latter sense that the present National Administration would say it supports States' rights. As President Eisenhower said so forcefully at Williamsburg:

> I believe deeply in States' rights. I believe that the preservation of our States as vigorous, powerful governmental units is essential to permanent individual freedom and the growth of our national strength. But it is idle to champion States' rights without upholding States' responsibilities as well.

In the past several years for the first time in several decades our country has not been subject to the dual crises of depression or war. It was inevitable that during the crisis years there should be a strong and marked trend to utilize the vast machinery and taxing ability of the National Government to solve the many pressing problems with which we were confronted. It is just as inevitable that such a process tends to sap the vitality of a federal system.

It is now the responsibility of all of us to develop the will and knowledge necessary to apply common sense in the further extension of the National Government. Anyone who works in Washington with his eyes open must conclude, I believe, that bigness and remoteness are real dangers to our way of doing things. The Federal Government is remarkably well-run for the behemoth it has become. But it sometimes reminds me of a huge tank lumbering down the road; one can nudge it and budge it with a tremendous effort, but just try to stop it quickly and turn it around!

It is the fervent hope of the President and this administration that a continuing emphasis on the true partnership nature of our federal system will

encourage all our citizens everywhere to realize that our ancestors deliberately established the federal system as a means to prevent both overconcentration of power on the one hand and confederated chaos on the other.

A pattern is made up of a series of individual actions on sometimes seemingly unrelated matters. The future pattern of the American federal system will be shaped by our ability to remember this fact. I hope and pray that our heritage of individual initiative and responsibility will give us the will and the wisdom to apply to the future in a rational way the deep belief and conviction that our federal system of divided responsibilities must be made to work well and in accordance with our constitutional tradition.

HEADQUARTERS - FIELD RELATIONSHIPS IN

THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS

Assessment of the Experience of the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance

The Expanded Program of Technical Assistance was established seven years ago to assist in the economic development of the less-developed countries of the world. The Program attempts to extend the inter-change of technical knowledge, principally by sending experts to less-developed areas and by awarding fellowships to nationals of those areas to study in universities, institutes, government offices, laboratories, and factories, in countries other than their own. The Program does not provide capital aid. In some cases, equipment and supplies are provided but only in connection with technical assistance projects and in limited amounts. At present assistance is provided to 56 independent countries and 47 dependent territories. Last year some 2,346 experts were recruited from 67 countries for service in the assisted areas. Fellowships were awarded to 2,128 nationals of 99 different countries and territories, and were sent for training to a total of 88 countries and territories. The value of the equipment and supplies provided during the year amounted to $3.3 million.

Financing of the Program is on the basis of voluntary contributions by governments. The level of contributions is equivalent to about $31 million and is provided by a total of 82 nations. Their contributions are frequently made in their national currencies, the number of different currencies reaching 62 this year. In addition, recipient governments meet part of the living costs of experts and for this purpose will be providing in their own currencies approximately $2.6 million in 1957.

Organization of the Program

The Expanded Program was created by action of the Economic and Social Council, confirmed by the General Assembly. Legislative supervision is currently exercised by the Technical Assistance Committee of the Economic and Social Council. The Technical Assistance Committee is composed of representatives of 24 governments. As the Program is carried out through eight international organizations, the portion of the Program falling within each of these organizations is likewise subject to the scrutiny of the legislative body of each organization.

Actual administration of the Program is in the hands of each of the eight participating organizations, which make the technical judgments on projects in their sphere; recruit, assign and direct experts; award fellowships and arrange for the placement and supervision of the fellows; and procure equipment in appropriate cases.

The internal organization of each of the agencies varies considerably. Initially, some of these organizations, particularly those which had not previously conducted field activities of a technical assistance character, kept the new technical assistance functions quite distinct from the other activities of the organizations. In the course of the past seven years, there has been a definite trend to integrate activities under the technical assistance program with other related functions. For the greater part, activities under the Expanded Program are now being administered by each of the agencies as integral parts of their total work programs.

Nevertheless, considerable differences in organization persist, including marked differences in patterns of headquarters - field relationships. Some organizations have adopted a regional plan of organization and have decentralized many functions of planning and supervision to the regional level. The World Health Organization is perhaps the most notable example; although the Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Labor Organization have also used regional offices to some extent. In the United Nations a good deal of work in the field of economic study and research has been conducted through the regional economic commissions and their secretariats. Until recently the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration has operated from the New York headquarters, with a personnel recruitment office in Paris and a liaison office in Geneva. Recently UNTAA has been experimenting with the decentralization of programming activities in the Latin American area, but this development is regarded as being still in the experimental stage. The International Civil Aviation Organization and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization have kept the control of their technical assistance activities largely centralized in the headquarters offices. The two remaining organizations, the International Telecommunication Union and the World Meteorological Organization likewise, control their technical assistance activities from their headquarters, but have arranged for the UNTAA to conduct routine administrative, personnel, and accounting functions on their behalf.

Before considering the Technical Assistance Board and its field staff, there are several other groups of programs and organizations outside this international framework which should be noted because they significantly affect the conduct of Expanded Program activities by the international agencies. Among these may be mentioned the international organizations which conduct similar or related activities, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations Children's Fund, the International Finance Corporation, and the Organization of American States with its program of technical cooperation. National programs conducted by the United States, as well as those by a number of other countries, are also of great significance. In some cases, these national activities are joined together in some common framework, such as the Colombo Plan for Southeast Asia. Activities of foundations, churches and other non-governmental organizations, likewise, bear upon the Program at a number of points.

A number of the contributing countries actively share in the conduct of the Program by nominating persons for expert assignments and by finding facilities and making arrangements for the placement of fellows. Some contributing countries have organized special technical assistance committees or other machinery to assist in these functions and to provide coordination among the governmental departments concerned.

The role of the recipient countries themselves is extremely important and perhaps cannot be overemphasized. From the beginning one of the principles of the Program has been that assistance shall be rendered only in agreement with the governments concerned and on the basis of requests received from them. This principle was developed and given additional meaning by the establishment in 1954 of "country programing," which was fully accomplished for the first time only for the 1956 Program. The essential idea of country programing is that each recipient country is advised of the amount of the funds expected to be made available for its assistance. Within this total the country is free to request a program which it wants. In order to carry out this role and to coordinate requests from the Expanded Program with assistance being provided from other resources, most of the recipient countries have established coordinating machinery as part of their governmental structure. It should also be recalled that many recipient governments are also members of the Technical Assistance Committee, and almost all are represented in the General Assembly which annually reviews the technical assistance activities.

Technical Assistance Board

The need for administrative coordination at a high level between the organizations administering the Program was foreseen at the outset, and provision was made for the creation of a Technical Assistance Board, composed of representatives of the eight international agencies. Early experience indicated the desirability of somewhat stronger central coordination, which resulted in the addition to the Technical Assistance Board of an independent Executive Chairman. At headquarters, the Executive Chairman has a small staff, which assists him in receiving and reviewing annual program requests from governments and preparing them for agency examination and Board consideration; considering and acting on requests for urgent projects received after the approval of the annual program; preparing financial plans for the program and arranging for the earmarking and remittance of funds, currency management, and other financial aspects of the program; studying various problems arising in the conduct of the program and presenting them for the Board's consideration; coordinating activities of the program with other governmental and non-governmental activities in the field of economic development; presenting the annual program and reports on performance, as well as reports on special problems to the Technical Assistance Committee and to the Second Committee of the General Assembly.

The field establishments of the Technical Assistance Board consist of 30 field offices, covering 49 countries and territories. In most cases, the offices are manned by an international staff composed of a Resident Representative and an assistant or deputy, plus three or four local staff members. Generally, the Resident Representative is responsible for operations of the Expanded Program in a single country; although in a few cases, the office covers other countries in the region. The area covered by this system of field offices accounts for about 95% of the monetary value of the Program.

The principal function of the TAB field offices is coordination. The Resident Representative maintains contact with the recipient government through its coordinating authority at all stages of program planning and implementation. During the period when the annual program is being prepared, the Resident Representative consults with officials of the government and representatives of the participating organizations, endeavoring to coordinate these discussions so that a well-considered and balanced program can emerge. He is the channel through which requests of the recipient governments are submitted, not only for the annual

program, but also for supplementary requests which arise in the course of the operational year.

The Resident Representative meets regularly with field representatives of the participating organizations. Being required to assist the government in planning the over-all program and in evaluating performance under it, he is expected to keep himself informed on the work of the experts assigned to that government and to visit projects periodically. Copies of reports to the government on the work of experts are provided to him.

He maintains records on persons to whom fellowships and scholarships are awarded, and when requested, assists in the administration of such awards. In addition to coordinating the activities of the organizations operating under the Expanded Program, he is also responsible for maintaining cooperative arrangements with other programs of technical assistance in the country.

The Resident Representative keeps watch on the progress and implementation of the approved program and reports quarterly on developments in his country related to the Expanded Program. The Resident Representative takes part in the evaluation of performance and results achieved, and his responsibility in this regard is becoming increasingly important.

In addition to the "substantive" functions of coordination in program planning, implementation and appraisal, the Resident Representative negotiates agreements which concern more than one of the participating organizations, arranges for the payment of local living allowances in most cases, and assists in securing office space, secretarial assistance, transportation, housing, visas, and customs clearances on behalf of experts and their families.

Appraisal of Expanded Program Experience

During the seven years in which the Expanded Program has been functioning, the organizational arrangements have not remained constant, and the relationships between the international agencies and the recipient countries have been evolving. Even though the Program has not operated for any considerable period under identical circumstances, it does seem possible to draw some conclusions from the experience of the Expanded Program with regard to headquarters and field establishments.

The most basic conclusion perhaps is that a coordinating field staff is essential for an activity of this kind. This need has increased with the shifting of additional responsibility for the program determinations to the countries being assisted.

The pattern of organizational relationships in the Expanded Program is unusually complex and includes (a) the TAB headquarters with the TAB field staff; (b) TAB headquarters in relation to the several agency headquarters and each of these in relation to the others; (c) agency headquarters in relation to their respective field establishments; and (d) the TAB field staff in relation to agency headquarters and to agency staffs in the field.

The first group of relationships, between TAB headquarters and TAB field staff, has given rise only to the problems occurring in most field organizations. The number of persons involved is relatively small, making it possible to apply, on a relatively simple and informal basis, the experience of other headquarters - field administrations. As might be expected, TAB has learned, as others have before, the importance of people, and the need for the greatest care in the selection of personnel, the importance of adequate compensation and good personnel practices, and the value of preparation and briefing before assigning staff to field posts. The need to keep field staff well informed appears to be particularly important in this case, and efforts have been made to provide from headquarters relevant information about technical assistance and economic development and the activities of the United Nations and other international organizations generally. The TAB headquarters sends to each of its field offices monthly about 60 documents, including some produced by the Technical Assistance Board itself, documents of the Technical Assistance Committee, and studies, surveys, and public information material of the United Nations and the other organizations. It has seemed desirable also that Resident Representatives should visit both TAB and agency headquarters before traveling to a field post, and, if possible, re-visit these headquarters at intervals of not less than two years (usually arranged in connection with home leave travel). Present experience suggests that assignments at a given post should be for periods of not less than two years and, generally, not more than four. Efforts have been made to arrange for the rotation of staff between headquarters and field assignments, and this exchange of experience seems to have been of mutual benefit.

Despite deliberate efforts to provide adequate "back stopping" to the field staff and to keep field problems in mind at headquarters, divergent attitudes between headquarters and field staffs have occurred from time to time. The need to try to understand and respond to needs and attitudes of staff in the field is one of the most important responsibilities of the headquarters administration.

Centralization of relationships with the field through a single office in headquarters is a helpful device, but some care is needed, even in a small headquarters such as TAB, to see that communication moves freely between the proper points, and to insure that headquarters officers make use of all the resources of the field establishment, and give all the support they can to it. Regular, planned visits of senior headquarters officers to the field have proven their worth. Regional meetings of Resident Representative held in connection with a visit from headquarters have also been found to be profitable.

Concerning the relationships between agency headquarters and their own field staff, the various organizations have established quite different organizational patterns and are using different practices of field administration. A comparison of the experience of the international organizations in this respect might prove of great interest. Pending a comprehensive study of the question, casual observation does not indicate that any particular organizational scheme or set of practices has yet emerged as definitely superior to the others.

The experience which is most unique in the Expanded Program comprises the relationships between the TAB field offices on the one hand and headquarters and field personnel of the various organizations on the other. The situation is somewhat analogous to an embassy in relation to the various functional departments in the government at home and to the personnel working in corresponding functional areas in the field. In the case of the Expanded Program, however, the agencies concerned are autonomous bodies, and there is no supreme administrative authority to which an appeal could be taken. The Resident Representative is administratively responsible to the Executive Chairman of the Technical Assistance Board. With regard to the Resident Representative's main substantive function -- coordination -- he has no administrative authority in relation to the other agencies nor their representatives in the country in which he is working. One of the most noteworthy results of Expanded Program experience is that a very considerable degree of coordination can be accomplished without resort to authoritative command. Competent personnel, properly prepared and currently well-informed, have demonstrated that coordination can be achieved by cooperative means.

It must be acknowledged that there are contributing factors which have helped in producing this result: Of first importance is the exceptional agreement among all persons concerned on the mission to be performed, and on the value of the technical assistance program and its potentialities for benefiting the

people of the less-developed areas of the world. This unanimity of opinion is evidenced in the discussions of governments in the legislative organs of the United Nations and other agencies. It is also evident among staff engaged in the Program, who at times exhibit an almost missionary devotion to their work.

Coordination among the international organizations is also aided by the coordinating activities of the recipient governments themselves. Coordinating machinery within these governments has increased appreciably in the last few years, and the national officials concerned have worked to a considerable extent with the Resident Representatives. The very complexity of the structure of the Expanded Program and of the international organizations has tended to strengthen the position of the Resident Representative. Governmental officials, perplexed by the numerous international bodies, have tended to turn to the officer who seems best able to speak for all of them. The Resident Representative's position as coordinator gains some further support from the legislative bodies involved in the Program and in particular the Technical Assistance Committee and the General Assembly.

In administrating the TAB field offices, the Executive Chairman has considered it essential that all possible efforts be made to gain and maintain the confidence of the participating organizations, both at their headquarters and in the field. Before making field assignments, the Executive Chairman consults with other members of the Technical Assistance Board on the selection of personnel and the posts to which they should be assigned. He makes an effort to recruit some of the field staff from the participating organizations, so that the experience and attitudes of these agencies can be brought into the TAB field service. In the temporary absence of a Resident Representative from the country, the Executive Chairman arranges with one of the organizations to designate one of its staff as the Acting Resident Representative of the Board. Similarly, in a few countries where the size of the program does not warrant expenditure for a Resident Representative's office, arrangements are made for a staff member of one of the agencies to serve as a TAB correspondent.

Before taking up their field assignments, Resident Representatives are sent to agency headquarters for thorough briefing in the agencies' programs and their projects and plans in the country concerned.

Beyond this point, it is up to the Resident Representative himself to use his resources of information, personal relationships, negotiating skill, and

his own persuasive powers to achieve the degree of coordination which is essential to the success of the Program. This coordination extends, of course, not only to the organizations operating within the Program, but also to the many other governmental and non-governmental groups which may be operating in the same country. For the greater part, it appears that a very satisfactory, even remarkable, degree of success has been attained.

Laurence Michelmore
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LOBBYISTS AND CAMPAIGN POLITICS

by

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A paper prepared for the 53rd annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 5-7, 1957, panel #14, "Trends in Campaign Management"

Lobbyists and Campaign Politics

It is an avowed purpose of most so-called lobby groups that they wish to have some influence on public issues, especially those issues affecting their group. It can be assumed that these groups will use any and every appropriate and available means to increase their influence over policy. Influencing the outcome of elections is generally believed to be one way of gaining some influence over policy. Do lobby groups, then, become involved in campaign politics as a means of influencing policy, and, if so, to what extent and in what kinds of ways? The purpose of this paper is to attempt an answer to this question.

The vantage point from which the writer views this question is his study of the characteristics and policy roles of Washington lobbyists conducted while he was a Research Fellow at The Brookings Institution. The study focused on the lobbyist as a member of an important political skill group and had as its purpose an effort to describe and evaluate the role of the lobbyist in the governmental process.

Primary data for the study were gathered in two-hour structured interviews with 100 lobbyists selected randomly from the official registration list. These interviews were supplemented by interviews with 38 people in Congress concerning their experiences as recipients of lobbying. The lobbyist interviews covered a broad range of questions relating to the career pattern of the lobbyist, his personal characteristics, his relations to his employer and the government, and the techniques of lobbying. Included in the interview was a fairly detailed series of questions about the political

party experience of the respondent and the ways that partisan activity might be used to further the purposes of their group.

The lobby process is fundamentally a communication process. Pressure groups have specific policy positions that they wish government decision makers to adopt. Their problem is to figure out ways to get their point of view across to the decision makers. What kinds of communications will convince the decision maker that he should adopt their point of view? The basic method of communication, which all pressure groups follow, is to inform the government official of the facts and arguments which support the group's policy position. This method looks simple on the surface but there are several barriers confronting such communications. For every point of view there is at least one, if not several, competing points of view---all demanding attention. The governmental environment seems saturated with noise, talking, and writing. As one lobbyist put it, "The people in Congress are operating in a vacuum filled with noise." Every decision maker seems terribly rushed for time as hundreds of people compete for his attention. In such an environment it is crucial that the group's facts and arguments gain access to the official when he is in a receptive frame of mind and that they be presented in their most favorable light. It is little wonder that most groups have discovered that they must hire a personal envoy, who is skilled in communication and negotiation, to represent them before the government if they wish to compete adequately with all the other points of view seeking adoption.

The practice of hiring personal envoys at the seat of government has become so universal that a group still cannot feel assured that its point of view will receive favorable attention; thus, they seek alternative ways

of making a governmental decision maker receptive to their communication. Perhaps one of the most obvious is to offer the official some value or good that he desires. According to the popular stereotype of lobbying this would take the form of some favor or material reward. Actually bribes and other kinds of favors are rather dangerous for both donor and recipient and, consequently, they are seldom offered and even less seldom accepted.

For elected officials, however, the gift of election or re-election is highly prized; and where this prize is sufficiently elusive a candidate will be very grateful for any assistance he receives in attaining his prize. The incentive, then, for a special interest group to become involved in politics, is to be able to deliver or withhold this prize from the prospective candidate. In other words, they want to be able to communicate their power when they confer with a legislator.

The influence of the lobby group can be exerted at either the nomination or election stage of the political process, or at both stages. Influence at the nomination stage is generally purposely obscured and therefore somewhat difficult to describe. Lobby groups have been known to inspire primary opposition against a candidate whom they didn't like or actually feared. _/ Quite

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_/ Both lobbyists and members of Congress reported this in interviews with the writer.

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frequently prominent leaders in a lobby group are also prominent leaders in a state or local party organization and have considerable power in deciding who the party nominee will be. Lobby groups, or selected individuals within them, are often very significant sources of party and campaign funds, which gives them some voice in the selection of the nominee. The ability to give

or withhold votes also influences nominations. Unfortunately, my data do not enable me to give any clear indication of the extent to which these kinds of influences are used in the nominating process by lobby groups.

The influence of a lobby group on the election process is dependent on its ability to control votes. Any substantial bloc of controlled votes, whether or not it is enough to win the election, will tend to sensitize an elected official to communications coming from the group which controls the votes. If the bloc of controlled votes is large enough it can practically guarantee that a person who agrees with the policy position of the group will be elected to fill the office.

Whether or not a pressure group will try to communicate power to elected officials by attempting to influence nominations or elections depends on its ability to bring the influence to bear. Not every organization which has the potential influence is able to exert it, or feels safe in doing so. Just because a citizen is a member of a group does not mean that that group can deliver his vote. Most citizens have a variety of special interests and generally do belong to several special interest groups. The special interests of any given citizen may actually be in conflict.

Many lobby groups do not have sufficient membership or constituency to be able to deliver a sizeable bloc of votes even if the membership is very zealous in its devotion to the group's cause. Sometimes a group which has a small membership will have fairly sizeable monetary resources and can still bring some influence to bear; but many other small groups are deficient in both membership and money.

As a result of these kinds of considerations only a small proportion of special interest groups will even attempt to communicate power to elected officials by becoming involved in politics. My data do not enable me to give a precise proportion, but an informed estimate would be that no more than 25% of the special interest groups represented in Washington even attempt to influence the outcome of elections, and that perhaps no more than 10% have the resources to do an effective job of influencing. This is not the same thing as saying pressure groups have no way of influencing public policy, rather the point here is that very few groups are in a position to adopt the technique of influencing elections.

What resources should a group possess if it wishes to become involved in campaigns and try to deliver votes? The most powerful resource would be a sizeable indoctrinated membership which would vote as the leadership wished. A large group which votes as a bloc can not only determine the party nominee but can steam-roller the opposition and elect their man. It is rare, however, for a lobby group to have this much power, even in selected Congressional districts. Failing a large cohesive membership, a group should have monetary resources and/or party and campaign workers to contribute to a campaign. A corps of party workers will be very influential in the selection of a nominee and will be invaluable in a primary or general election. Although monetary contributions are not generally as highly prized by a candidate as contributions of work, they are still very important. A group which cannot deliver any of these resources must turn its attention to other than political avenues of influence. The mere possession of some of these resources does not mean they will be used in elections; a group might reason that the anticipated results are not worth the expenditure and decide to use its resources elsewhere.

Labor unions are perhaps the best example of a type of group that has decided to become involved in elections. Their most valuable resource is a large membership which sometimes is also well indoctrinated. In addition, they are generally in a position to set up special committees to supply workers and money to a party organization or campaign committee. So serious is their interest in elections that many of the major labor organizations have a separately staffed section which devotes exclusive attention to elections. The old AFL "League for Political Education" and the CIO "Political Action Committee" have been combined in the united AFL-CIO as the "Committee on Political Education" (COPE). The setting up of a separate section like COPE was partially dictated by the provision of the Taft-Hartley law which forbids unions as such from making political contributions; but perhaps a more important reason was the realization that the influencing of elections is a big job and that specialized staff should be hired to devote full time to it.

Labor is sufficiently strong in certain districts to get avowed labor supporters elected to Congress. But, even where labor does not get its man elected, it may still possess enough votes to swing the election and therefore can profoundly influence the outlook and frame of reference of a legislator. Labor's sensing of its political muscles tends to affect the behavior of labor lobbyists in Washington. People on Capitol Hill fairly frequently complained that labor lobbyists were pushy and demanding, sometimes threatening retribution at the next election if the legislator did not accede to their demands. Such tactics are considered bad form by most legislators and in some cases they produced the opposite of the intended result.

While various labor unions seem able to work together on many policy issues, business organizations tend to be more fragmented and diverse in their policy interests. A policy that may be advantageous for one segment of business may hurt another segment. A policy issue that may generate a great deal of interest in one type of business may leave another type completely indifferent. Because of these kinds of reasons it is difficult for some of the over-all business organizations such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce or the National Association of Manufacturers, to speak with a united voice on policy, let alone evolve any commanding leadership for business interests to become involved in campaigns. Because of their much more limited membership, business groups are more restricted in their ability to deliver a sizeable bloc of votes, or even to supply many party and campaign workers. They do, however, have substantial amounts of money, and they do not let the legal prohibitions against corporate contributions to campaigns prevent them from utilizing this resource to influence the outcome of elections.

Partially in response to labor's political action, the business community seems to be taking increased interest in campaign politics. _/ Business leaders

_/ See Nation's Business, February, June, July, and August, 1956.

exhort their colleagues to become active in the party organization and have some voice in the decisions of the party, especially decisions on party nominees. They also urge them to support selected candidates favorable to the business point of view with contributions of time and money. Perhaps the easiest way for a harried businessman to influence a nomination or an election is to contribute money to the campaign. The business community has over the years been the

most important source of political funds. Informal networks of politically interested solicitors and contributors criss-cross the business world. Many of these networks are completely separate from the party structure, and constitute a flexible and potent means by which businessmen can focus their resources on those campaigns where they believe they can do the most good for their cause. Frequently these networks are based on a history of informal co-operation on many different types of problems.

Most lobby organizations either are officially forbidden to or prudently refrain from using the formal organizational machinery of the group to raise political funds. But this does little to inhibit the informal passing of the word among old friends that certain candidates should either be supported or defeated; the implication is clear that a monetary contribution is a good weapon in that battle. The executive secretary or president of the organization may on his own send out a few hundred letters to people in the organization whom he knows would be likely to take his tip to make a contribution. Such an informal drive may result from an agreement between a legislator and a lobby group representative; or it may be adopted by the group's leaders without the knowledge of the legislator or his staff.

One Washington Representative for a specialized manufacturing industry used a device which he called "political seed money." He would confer with the inner leadership of his group and present the problem of getting funds to support their friends. This inner group would put up his seed money which he would send out, $100 at a time, to selected people. The check would be accompanied by a letter requesting the recipient to use it as a nucleus for a fund raising campaign. The letter exhorted him to try and get small

contributions from a broad base of the population because this would commit more people to support of the candidate. The seed money had the effect of getting a potential campaign off dead center because the recipient would feel that he had to do something with the check. Generally the $100 check would be good for raising from $800 to $1,000.

Farm groups also realize that they have resources of membership, workers, and money that might be used in political campaigns; however, they have not been as militant as either labor or business groups in utilizing these resources. Although the proportion of the population engaged in farming is steadily declining, there are still many members of Congress who are sensitive to the farm vote. On the other hand, there is little evidence that they are sensitive because the farm organizations have harnessed the vote. Most members of Congress realize that the farm organizations ineffectively control their membership and therefore are limited in their use of this resource to influence elections. The farm groups have an even poorer showing in terms of raising campaign funds or supplying party and campaign workers; the study showed no action at all along this line by farm groups.

There was some evidence, however, that some of the farm group leaders recognized the importance of political action. For example, the co-ordinator of the legislative services division of the National Farmers Union, in his report to the March 1956 national convention of the group, had spoken for some minutes describing how the organization got messages flowing into Congress whenever the "legislative alert" was sounded by the leadership. He went on to say,

. . . But in my mature and considered opinion the total effect of these 279 days of furious activity upon legislation is somewhat less important than what happens on just one day each two years—election day.

Sometimes, and too often for us to afford to be complacent, the full impact of our legislative action program is not nearly enough to make a silk purse out of a sow's tail who was lucky enough to get elected.

There is simply no substitute for electing the right folks and defeating the wrong folks. . . .

Your Washington office . . . particularly [makes] a special effort to give you completely accurate immediate reports of recorded congressional votes on all issues important to the Farmers Union program. . . .

You take it from there. Your success as individual members in precinct meetings, in primary and general election campaigns and in party caucuses in getting Farmers Union points of view incorporated in party and candidate platforms and in the selection of right guys rather than wrong guys as candidates are [sic] vital to Farmers Union legislative success.

Your hard work for right candidates are [sic] essential. Even if the wrong guy is elected he will be thoughtful and careful—a better man than he might otherwise have been.

If the right man is elected, you've got it made.

Don't sit back and say: "They'll do whatever they want to anyway." Farmers Union members can take a big part in deciding who "they" are, either by action or inaction. By effective political action, you can elect the right ones, and <u>you</u> can mighty well make them consider what <u>you</u> want.

This quotation illustrates several important facets of the approach of large membership pressure groups to political action. First of all, there is the recognition that the group must communicate power as well as facts and arguments to members of Congress if it wants to get its point across. Secondly, the decision as to whether a candidate is a "right" or "wrong guy" basically depends on whether or not his votes supported the group's legislative program. There is no hint that the candidate's party affiliation bears any weight in this decision. Thirdly, there is the exhortation to work for and support the "right guy" and oppose the "wrong guy" at both the nomination and election stages of

the process. Even if the "wrong guy" should get elected he will be more careful. Fourthly, there is the recognition that election of enough of the "right guys" will practically enable them to dictate their program. By the way, the Farmers Union followed closely and reported very carefully on the platform proceedings of both national party conventions in 1956. They proudly proclaimed that they had more members and supporters on the Democratic platform committee than any other group.

Groups of citizens not only coalasce around common economic interests, but also around many kinds of social factors such as race, national origin, veteran's tatus, special policies like home rule for the District of Columbia or support for the U. N., and so forth. Some of these citizen groups have a fairly large membership base and in some instances it is sufficiently cohesive to be an important political force. The latter seems to be especially true of minority groups of common race or nationality. One nationality group, which is strong on the west coast, concentrates on Congressional races because, "That's where we get our favors. Our real forte is the House of Representatives--we can swing the election in some of the districts." The Washington representative for this group said,

. . . It is important that our community learn to develop political consciousness. I estimate that a fair percentage of our people, five to ten per cent, contribute to specific candidates, not generally to the party. We encourage individuals to contribute directly to the member of Congress or to the candidate for Congress. We make contributions for some of our people who don't want to be recorded as contributing. I give about $1,000 in small contributions of $5, $10, and $25 in each campaign for other people. All of our contributions are made as individuals, not as an organization; our organization is non-partisan and non-political. I write personal letters on behalf of friendly candidates, asking our people to hustle some in their behalf. I generally send out about 100 letters. . . . My personal contributions go to candidates in both parties.

One can pull out these generalizations from this rather sketchy review of the ways lobby groups become involved in elections. The major consideration determining whether or not a group will become involved in political campaigns is the presence or absence of sufficient resources of membership, workers, and money to have a significant impact on an election. Only a small proportion of lobby groups have sufficient resources and ever attempt to become involved. A group may possess some of the resources and still decide that it is too risky to become involved. When a group does attempt to influence elections it is generally careful not to get too closely identified with either of the political parties. Most leaders of these groups reason that they are more likely to generate support for their policies among elected officials if they are selective in supporting only individual candidates whom they know to be in accord with their views, irrespective of the party label which the candidate bears. In thinking about relationships between political parties and pressure groups one should keep in mind that political action is only a means to the end of realizing the purposes and policies of the pressure group. The group is very rarely viewed by its leaders as a means to the end of putting a particular party in power. The conduct of political campaigns, as such, has very little effect in attracting support or opposition from lobby groups. They generally base their decision on actual voting in Congress, or commitments on specific policies, rather than on vague platform pronouncements. They have learned that a man's general performance in the past is a better guide to his future behavior than a verbal statement made in the heat of a campaign.

Up to this point we have been discussing the participation of lobby groups in campaign politics, now we shall turn our attention to individual participation in politics by Washington lobbyists. Prior to beginning the field work on this study I had hypothesized that lobbyists would be very active in politics and that they would be attempting to promote the objectives of their organization by their activity. I had reasoned that the persons within the organization who were closest to the legislative situation would call the tune on political action by the group and would themselves be deeply involved in the inner circles of politics. The empirical data, however, did not confirm the hypothesis; lobbyists are not very active politically and they are not participants in the inner circles of politics.

The hypothesis was in error I later discovered because it was based on a misconception of the role of the Washington lobbyist. To put it simply a lobbyist is a hired hand or an agent and is not a boss. He is a channel of communication and not the originator of communications or policy. He does gather information and he does advise, which gives him an indirect role in politics; but basic decisions are generally in other hands and it so happens that the direct political participation of the group is also in other hands. To put it another way, the lobbyist is an expert who is hired to merchandise ideas and points of view, but he is not the policy maker or the executive. As merchandiser he might advise that certain kinds of political action be taken by the group in order to make their product a little more attractive, but he will not himself be a significant participant in that action.

For purposes of this paper a Washington lobbyist is defined as a person with a Washington address who registered or filed a report as a lobbyist with the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate in the first two quarters of 1956 (the latest available reports prior to beginning the study). From the universe of 614 individuals who met these criteria a sample of 114 names was drawn, 100 of whom were actually interviewed. The Regulation of Lobbying Act, which is Title III of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, is very ambiguous in its definition of the persons who must register and file reports. Some people may register who do not have to and some people who should register do not do so. Thus, the registration list should not be considered a complete and definitive list of Congressional lobbyists. Despite these shortcomings, the list is the most complete universe of lobbyists that one can obtain without going to a great deal of expense and effort. One can feel fairly confident that most persons who might be considered lobbyists do register in compliance with the act and, therefore, that the sample is representative of Washington lobbyists.

Table I shows in some detail the frequency with which the 100 lobbyists engaged in various types of political activities. It is clear from the table that lobbyists are not very active politically. Almost half of the lobbyists had never been active in a political party and 28% of those who had been active at one time had withdrawn from activity. This abstinence or withdrawal from political activity is even more pronounced when one looks at more specific political actions such as holding public or party office, running as a candidate, campaigning, and so forth. On the other hand, it should also be noted that a small but significant proportion of lobbyists did engage in political

activities, which raises the question: why were some of these people active and most of them not?

TABLE I

Frequency Distributions on Political Activity of Lobbyists

Party Choice				
Democratic leanings			46	
Strong Democrat	17			
Weak Democrat	22			Strong partisan - 32
Independent Democrat	7			Weak partisan - 68
Independent - no leaning			7	100
Independent Republican	12			
Weak Republican	18			
Strong Republican	15			
Presidential Republican	2			
Republican leanings			47	
			100	
Political Party Activity				
Never active			44	
Active once, not now			28	
Active now			28	
Local and state level	12			
Federal level	1			
Two or more levels	15			
			100	
Position in the Party				
Never held party office			77	
Party office once, not now			17	
Local and state level	13			Local or state position - 16
Federal level	1			Federal position - 3
Two or more levels	3			Position on two or
Party office now			6	more levels - 4
Local and state level	3			23
Federal level	2			
Two or more levels	1			
			100	

Public Office

Never held public office	69	
*Held appointive public office	23	
Local and state level	6	Local or state office - 9
Federal level	12	Federal office - 13
Two or more levels	5	Office at two or more levels - 9
		31
*Held elective public office	3	
Local and state level	1	
Federal level	1	
Two or more levels	1	
*Held both elective and appointive office	5	
Local and state level	2	
Federal level	0	
Two or more levels	3	
	100	

* None hold public office at present.

Candidate for Public Office

Never been a candidate	87
Candidate local or state level	10
Candidate federal level	2
Candidate two or more levels	1
	100

Political Campaigning

Never campaigned	43	
Generally less than 25 hours per campaign	16	
Local or state level	11	Local or state campaigns - 22
Federal level	4	Federal campaigns - 13
Two or more levels	1	Campaigns on two or more levels - 22
		57
Generally from 25 to 100 hours per campaign	26	
Local or state level	11	
Federal level	4	
Two or more levels	11	
Generally over 100 hours per campaign	15	
Local or state level	0	
Federal level	5	
Two or more levels	10	
	100	

Attending Party Meetings

Never attend party meetings		36	
Seldom (less than one per year)		27	
Local and state level	17		Local and state meetings - 25
Federal Level	2		Federal meetings - 8
Two or more levels	8		Meetings at two or more levels - 31
			64
Occasionally (1 to 3 per year)		27	
Local and state level	5		
Federal level	4		
Two or more levels	18		
Regularly (4 or more per year)		10	
Local and state level	3		
Federal level	2		
Two or more levels	5		
		100	

Strategy Meetings and Caucuses

Never attend caucuses		70	
Attended once, but not now		11	
Occasionally attend		16	
Local and state level	6		Local and state caucuses - 6
Federal level	5		Federal caucuses - 6
Two or more levels	5		Caucuses at two or more levels - 7
			19
Regularly attend		3	
Local and state level	0		
Federal level	1		
Two or more levels	2		
		100	

Monetary Political Contributions Over Past Five Years

None at all	28
1 to 4 individual contributions	34
5 to 10 " "	28
Over 10 " "	10
	100

Average Size

Less than $25	19
$25 - $49	14
$50 - $99	13
$100 - $400	22
$500 and up	3
No response	1
	72

Political Level of Contribution

Local and state campaign	10
Congressional campaign	10
National campaign	17
Campaigns at two or more levels	28
Organizations own political fund	6
No response	1
	72

Assisting in Raising Political Funds			
Never raised political funds		58	
Worked on political finance committee		22	(includes solicitation)
Local and state level	4		
Federal level	10		
Two or more levels	8		
Personal solicitation of funds from others		9	
Personal friends	8		
Door to door	1		
Raising Funds through own pressure group		11	
		100	

The foregoing analysis of the behavior of lobby groups in politics disclosed that the organization's membership characteristic was a crucial variable differentiating politically active groups from inactive groups. This led to the hypothesis that lobbyists from groups with a large membership base would be more likely to be active politically than those representing groups with a small membership base. A cross tabulation of party activity with the nature of the organization the lobbyist represented produced these two tables:

TABLE II

	Large Membership Base	Small Membership Base
Never active	9	35
Active once, not now	12	16
Active now	9	19

TABLE III

	Labor	Farm	Business	Citizen Groups
Never active	3	3	33	5
Active once, not now	6	2	16	4
Active now	7	0	19	2

The slight differences shown were not statistically significant; the hypothesis had to be rejected for much the same reason the earlier one was rejected. Detailed study of the interview data suggests that there

is no substantial connection between playing the role of a lobbyist and becoming personally active in politics. Lobbyists are no different from the general population in terms of the factors that draw them into politics.

The conclusion just stated is not the same as saying that lobbyists are no more active politically than the general population. The study of the 1952 election by the Survey Research Center showed that 4% of the general population had made a political contribution that year / yet 72% of

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/ A. Campbell, G. Gurin, and W. Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Co., 1954) p. 30

Washington lobbyists had made at least one contribution in the past five years. Only 7% of the general population went to political meetings in 1952, yet 37% of lobbyists went to party meetings at least once a year. About 57% of lobbyists had done some campaigning, but only 3% of the general population did any work for a candidate or party in 1952. The point should be clear from these rough comparisons that lobbyists do have a higher participation rate than the general population. However, it is not correct to infer that the higher participation rate is due to their role as lobbyists; it is perhaps more correct to say that the higher participation rate is typical of the socio-economic strata from which a person might be selected to become a lobbyist.

Nearly all the lobbyists could be classified as upper middle class. About three-fourths of them had been trained in the law, although only 26% were actually practicing law. A little over half of them had, at one time or another, worked for the federal government. Some of them had held

an elective office or high appointive office, but more frequently they had held some kind of staff position either with the executive or legislative branch. Staff experience in the legislative branch was generally favored in the selection of persons to be lobbyists. Political action is a normal way of getting ingress to a high executive or legislative staff position, and quite frequently campaign activity is considered part of the staff job. Organizations or corporations, who select lobbyist representatives with this kind of background, prize the lobbyist's political experience as highly as his administrative and legislative experience. It is important that a lobbyist understand the political process and be able to work with politicians; however, it is not considered important that the lobbyist continue to be personally active in politics to be able to carry out his job.

There are a few exceptions to the point just made. A few of these people, in their role as lobbyists, are expected to act as liaison man or strategist for the political action that the group as a whole will engage in. Eleven of them reported that they had been active in raising political funds through their own pressure group. The percentage (72%) who had made political contributions also seems to be higher than one would expect, even from this strata of the population, and the difference may be attributed to their role as lobbyists. Some reported that they very carefully make their personal political contributions to candidates who support the point of view of their group. Some also reported that they acted as official or public donor for contributors in their group who did not want their contributing publicly known. Some of the lobbyists were called in on campaign strategy sessions or were asked to actually manage campaigns, but rarely did this result from their role or experiences as a lobbyist.

Why is it that the Washington Lobbyist does not feel that personal political participation is part of his role? For one thing, most lobbyists believed that political parties as institutions had very little influence on public policy. Even in those cases where a lobbyist felt that it was important for the members of his group to get active in politics, he did not feel personally compelled to become active. In other words lobbyists didn't feel that personal political action would pay off in the kind of influence that they were seeking.

Even if a lobbyist desired to get active, or to remain active, the demands of his job made it difficult. In our system of state parties a person with political influence in a state must be on hand most of the time if he wishes to maintain that influence. A lobby job which requires full time attention in Washington causes the lobbyist to quickly lose touch with the state organization. Most lobby jobs are so complex and time consuming that there is very little time left for political action. Big lobby organizations recognize this in their division of labor and arrange for the lobbyist to devote his time to strictly legislative activities while the political action of the group is someone else's responsibility. A good example of this division of labor is the AFL-CIO where liaison with Congress is handled by the legislative division, political action is handled by COPE, and executive relations are handled by staff members other than either of these. One member of the legislative staff who had been extremely active in politics said, "The more I get into heavy lobbying the less I stay in politics."

In contrast to the lobbyists who feel that their personal political actions have only a minor relationship to their job, there are some who

definitely fear that partisan political action will hurt them in their job. They believe that personal affiliation with one of the parties may antagonize people of the opposite political faith who would be making decisions of importance to them or with whom they might have to work. Party control of the Congress shifts frequently enough to give pause to any lobbyist, of this sort, who might contemplate putting all his eggs in one basket and becoming closely identified with one of the parties. The facts of the case are that most members of Congress are quite broad minded and fair about dealing with persons belonging to the opposite party; however, they would resent a person who might attempt to use these kinds of contacts for partisan advantage. As one lobbyist put it, "They don't resent your having a definite political faith but they do resent intense party activity."

From the lobbyist's point of view, then, most of them deliberately choose not to become active in a political party, either because they feel that they can't accomplish much of anything by doing so and could better spend their time on other things, or because they actually fear that they will defeat their purposes if they become politically active. Those who do participate in politics generally do so on grounds other than the requirements of their job.

As we have noted before, the lobbyist is a merchandizer and not an executive or a member of the power structure. In selling his product he may find it advantageous to communicate the power that his group has at election time to the legislative customer. To accomplish this he may urge the members of his group to take political action in every way they can effectively

do so. Generally he would feel that this stimulation, or indirect participation, would be sufficient for his purposes and would not feel that it would be important for him as merchandizer to participate directly. This, then, is the rather distant and indirect role of the lobbyist in campaign politics.

Job # 815

53rd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association

ALLIANCES: 1957

by

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I. A Theory of Alliances

II. The Atlantic Alliance

III. The Western Alliances outside Europe

IV. The Communist Alliances

V. The Future of the Alliances

I.

Alliances are a necessary function of the balance of power operating within a multiple state system. Nations A and B, competing with each other, have three choices in order to maintain and improve their relative power positions. They can increase their own power, they can add to their own power the power of other nations, or they can withhold the power of other nations from the adversary. When they make the first choice they embark upon an armaments race. When they choose the second and third alternatives, they pursue a policy of alliances.

Whether or not a nation shall pursue a policy of alliances is, then, not a matter of principle but of expediency. A nation will shun alliances if it believes that it is strong enough to hold its own unaided or that the burden of the commitments resulting from the alliance is likely to outweigh the advantages to be expected. It is for one or the other or both of these reasons that throughout the better part of their history, Great Britain and the United States have refrained from entering into alliances with other nations.

Yet Great Britain and the United States have also refrained from concluding an alliance with each other even though, from the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 to the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, they have acted, at least in relation to the other European nations, as if they were allied. Their relationship during that period provides another instance of a situation in which nations dispense with an alliance. It occurs when their interests so obviously call for concerted policies and actions that an explicit formulation

of these interests, policies, and actions in the form of a treaty of alliance appears to be redundant.

Both Great Britain and the United States have had with regard to the continent of Europe one interest in common: the preservation of the European balance of power. In consequence of this identity of interests, they have found themselves by virtual necessity in the camp opposed to the nation which happened to threaten that balance. And when Great Britain went to war in 1914 and 1939 in order to protect the European balance of power, the United States first supported Great Britain with a conspicuous lack of that impartiality befitting a neutral and then joined her on the battlefield. Had in 1914 and 1939 the United States been tied to Great Britain by a formal treaty of alliance it might have declared war earlier, but its general policies and concrete actions would not have been materially different than they actually were.

Not every community of interests, calling for common policies and actions, also calls for legal codification in an explicit alliance. Yet, on the other hand, an alliance requires of necessity a community of interests for its foundation. Thucydides said that "identity of interest is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals," and in the nineteenth century Lord Salisbury put the same thought in the negative by stating that "the only bond of union that endures" among nations is "the absence of clashing interests." Under what conditions, then, does an existing community of interests require the explicit formulation of an alliance? What is it that an alliance adds to the existing community of interests?

An alliance adds precision, especially in the form of limitation, to an existing community of interests and to the general policies and concrete measures serving them.[1] The interests nations have in common are not typically so precise and limited as to geographic region, objective, and appropriate policies as has been the American and British interest in the preservation of the European balance of power. Nor are they so incapable of precision and limitation as concerns the prospective common enemy. For while a typical alliance is directed against a specific nation or group of nations, the enemy of the Anglo-American community of interests could in the nature of things not be specified beforehand, since whoever threatens the European balance of power is the enemy. As Jefferson shifted his sympathies back and forth between Napoleon and Great Britain according to who seemed to threaten the balance of power at the time, so during the century following the Napoleonic Wars Great Britain and the United States had to decide in the light of circumstances ever liable to change who was at the moment the greatest threat to the balance of power. This blanket character of the enemy, determined not individually but by the function he performs, brings to mind a similar characteristic of collective security, which is directed against the abstractly designed aggressor, whoever he may be.

The typical interests which unite two nations against a third are both more definite as concerns the determination of the enemy and

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[1]Glancing through the treaties of alliance of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, one is struck by the meticulous precision with which obligations to furnish troops, equipment, logistic support, food, money, and the like, were defined.

less precise as concerns the objectives to be sought and the policies to be pursued. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, France was opposed to Germany, and Russia was opposed to Austria, while Austria was allied with Germany against France and Russia. How could the interests of France and Russia be brought upon a common denominator, determining policy and guiding action? How could, in other words, the casus foederis be defined so that both friend and foe would know what to expect in certain contingencies affecting their respective interests? It was for the treaty of alliance of 1894 to perform these functions. Had the objectives and policies of the Franco-Russian alliance of 1894 been as clear as are the objectives and policies of Anglo-American cooperation in Europe, no alliance treaty would have been necessary. Had the enemy been as indeterminate as in the latter case, no alliance treaty would have been feasible.

Not every community of interests calling for cooperation between two or more nations, then, requires that the terms of this cooperation be specified through the legal stipulations of a treaty of alliance. It is only when the common interests are inchoate in terms of policy and action that a treaty of alliance is required to make them explicit and operative. These interests, as well as the alliances expressing them and the policies serving them, can be distinguished in five different ways: according to their intrinsic nature and relationship, the distribution of benefits and power, their coverage in relation to the total interests of the nations concerned, their coverage in terms of time, and their effectiveness in terms of common policies and actions. In consequence, we can distinguish alliances serving

identical, complementary, and ideological interests and policies. We can further distinguish mutual and one-sided, general and limited, temporary and permanent, operative and inoperative alliances.

The Anglo-American alliance with regard to Europe provides the classic example of an alliance serving identical interests; the objective of one partner, the preservation of the balance of power in Europe, is also the objective of the other. The alliance between the United States and Pakistan is one of many contemporary instances of an alliance serving complementary interests. For the United States it serves the primary purpose of expanding the scope of the policy of containment; for Pakistan it serves primarily the purpose of increasing her political, military, and economic potential vis-à-vis her neighbors.

The pure type of an ideological alliance is presented by the Treaty of the Holy Alliance of 1815 and the Atlantic Charter of 1941. Both documents laid down general moral principles to which the signatories pledged their adherance, and general objectives whose realization they pledged themselves to seek. The Treaty of the Arab League of 1945 provides a contemporary example of an alliance expressing, since the war against Israel of 1948, primarily ideological solidarity.

Much more typical is the addition of ideological commitments to material ones in one and the same treaty of alliance.[2] Thus the Three Emperors League of 1873 provided for military assistance among Austria,

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[2] It ought to be pointed out that both the Holy Alliance and the Atlantic Charter actually supplement material commitments contained in separate legal instruments.

Germany, and Russia in case of attack on any of them and at the same time emphasized the solidarity of the three monarchies against republican subversion. In our times, the ideological commitment against Communist subversion, inserted in treaties of alliance, performs a similar function. The ideological factor also manifests itself in the official interpretation of an alliance, based upon material interests, in terms of an ideological solidarity transcending the limitations of material interests. The conception of the Anglo-American alliance, common before the British invasion of Egypt in 1956, as all-inclusive and world-embracing, based upon common culture, political institutions, and ideals, is a case in point.

As concerns the political effect of this ideological factor upon an alliance, three possibilities must be distinguished. An alliance that is purely ideological by being limited to an ideological commitment, regardless of material interests, cannot but be stillborn; it is unable to determine policies and guide actions and misleads by giving the appearance of political solidarity where there is none. The ideological factor, when it is superimposed upon an actual community of interests, can lend strength to the alliance by marshalling moral convictions and emotional preferences to its support. It can also weaken it by obscuring the nature and limits of the common interests which the alliance was supposed to make precise and by raising expectations, bound to be disappointed, for the extent of concerted policies and actions. For both these possibilities, the Anglo-American alliance can again serve as an example.

The distribution of benefits within an alliance should ideally be one of complete mutuality; here the services performed by the parties for each other are commensurate with the benefits received. This ideal is most likely to be approximated in an alliance concluded among equals in power and serving identical interests; here the equal resources of all, responding to equal incentives, serve one single interest. The other extreme in the distribution of benefits is one-sidedness, a societas leonina in which one party receives the lion's share of benefits while the other bears the main bulk of burdens. Complementary interests lend themselves most easily to this kind of disproportion since they are by definition different in substance and their comparative assessment is likely to be distorted by subjective interpretation. A marked superiority in power is bound to add weight to such interpretations.

The distribution of benefits is thus likely to reflect the distribution of power within an alliance, as does the determination of policies. A great power has a good chance to have its way with a weak ally as concerns benefits and policies, and it is for this reason that Machiavelli warned weak nations against making alliances with strong ones except by necessity.[3] The relationship between the United States, on the one hand, Formosa and North Korea, on the other, exemplifies this situation.

However, this correlation between benefits, policies, and power is by no means inevitable. A weak nation may well possess an asset which is of such great value for its strong ally as to be irreplaceable.

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[3] The Prince, Chapter 21.

Here the unique benefit the former is able to grant or withhold may give it within the alliance a status completely out of keeping with the actual distribution of material power. The relationships between the United States and Iceland with regard to bases and between Great Britain and Iraq with regard to oil come to mind.

The misinterpretation of the Anglo-American alliance, mentioned before, is also a case in point for the confusion between limited and general alliances. In the age of total war, wartime alliances tend to be general in that they comprise the total interests of the contracting parties both with regard to the waging of the war and the peace settlement. On the other hand, peace-time alliances tend to be limited to a fraction of the total interests and objectives of the signatories. A nation will conclude a multitude of alliances with different nations which may overlap and contradict each other on specific points.

A typical alliance attempts to transform a small fraction of the total interests of the contracting parties into common policies and measures. Some of these interests are irrelevant to the purposes of the alliance, others support them, others diverge from them, and others still are incompatible with them. Thus a typical alliance is imbedded in a dynamic field of diverse interests and purposes. Whether and for how long it will be operative depends upon the strength of the interests underlying it as over against the strength of the other interests of the nations concerned. The value and the chances of an alliance, however limited in scope, must be considered within the context of the over-all policies within which it is expected to operate.

General alliances are typically of temporary duration; for the overriding common interest in winning the war and securing through the peace settlement the interests for which the war was waged is bound to yield, once victory is won and the peace treaties are signed, to the traditionally separate and frequently incompatible interests of the individual nations. On the other hand, there exists a correlation between the permanency of an alliance and the limited character of the interests it serves; for only such a specific, limited interest is likely to last long enough to provide the foundation for a durable alliance.[4] The alliance between Great Britain and Portugal, concluded in 1703, has survived the centuries because Portugal's interest in the protection of her ports by the British fleet has endured. Yet it can be stated as a general historical observation that while alliance treaties have frequently assumed permanent validity by being concluded "in perpetuity" or for periods of ten or twenty years, they could not have been more durable than the generally precarious and fleeting configurations of common interests which they were intended to serve. As a rule, they have been short-lived.

The dependence of alliances upon the underlying community of interests also accounts for the distinction between operative and inoperative alliances. For an alliance to be operative, that is, to be able to coordinate the general policies and concrete measures of its

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[4] This correlation, however, cannot be reversed. Especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, limited alliances were frequently concluded ad hoc, that is, to counter an attack, to engage in one, or to embark upon a particular expedition. With the passing of the specific occasion in view of which the alliance was concluded, the alliance itself lost its object and came to an end.

members, the latter must agree not only on general objectives but on policies and measures as well. Many alliances have remained scraps of paper because no such agreement was forthcoming, and it was not forthcoming because the community of interests did not extend beyond general objectives to concrete policies and measures. The Franco-Russian alliances of 1935 and 1944 and the Anglo-Russian alliance of 1942 ~~1949~~ are cases in point. The legal validity of a treaty of alliance and its propagandistic invocation can easily deceive the observer about its actual operational value. The correct assessment of this value requires the examination of the concrete policies and measures which the contracting parties have taken in implementation of the alliance.

The examination of the contemporary alliances in the light of these categories will be divided into three parts: the Atlantic Alliance, the Western alliances outside Europe, the Communist alliances.

II.

The vital interest of the United States in the protection of the nations of Western Europe against Russian domination is identical with the interest of these nations in preserving their national independence. Yet this foundation of the Atlantic Alliance has undergone a both subtle and drastic change. The Atlantic Alliance is beset by a crisis which the events of November 1956 have made obvious but not created. The beginnings of that crisis antedate the autumn of 1956 by several years; for the conditions which created the Atlantic Alliance during the Second World War and maintained it during

the first decade following it have changed.

Seen from the perspective of the nations of Western Europe, three factors sustained the Atlantic Alliance in the decade following the Second World War: the atomic monopoly of the United States, the economic weakness of the nations of Western Europe, and the intransigence of Stalinist policies. The conjunction of these factors confronted the nations of Western Europe with the choice between suicide and the acceptance of the political, economic, and military support of the United States. In other words, the Atlantic Alliance was for the nations of Western Europe a prerequisite of national survival.

This connection between national survival and the Atlantic Alliance is no longer as close nor as obvious as it used to be. The atomic monopoly of the United States provided the nations of Western Europe with absolute protection against Russian conquest. With the Soviet Union having become for all practical purposes an atomic power equal to the United States, the Atlantic Alliance is no longer for the nations of Western Europe solely a protection, but has become also a liability. The atomic stalemate threatens not only the two superpowers, but also their allies, with total destruction. Paradoxical as it may seem, the drastically increased threat of Soviet power has drastically weakened the Western alliance. The Soviet Union has not been slow to point out, and the man in the street in Western Europe has not been slow to understand, that if there is a chance for the nations of Western Europe to survive in an atomic war it may lie in not being too closely identified, or perhaps not being identified at all, with the United States. Thus a latent neutralism has had a slowly corrosive

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influence upon the Western Alliance. The rise of this neutralism in Western Europe as a popular mass movement is not primarily the result of Communist propaganda, or of faintness of heart, or political decadence, but of the new objective conditions under which the nations of Western Europe must live in the age of the atomic stalemate.

Secondly, the distribution of power in the world has greatly changed since the beginning of the fifties. The weak nations have grown stronger and the nations defeated in World War II are in the process of growing very strong indeed. Ten years ago, the nations of Western Europe had either to join the United States or go bankrupt economically and disintegrate socially. The economic recovery of the nations of Western Europe has greatly diminished their dependence upon the United States. The Coal and Steel Community, Euratom, the Common Market, and the development of the East-West trade are likely to decrease it still more. Thus while the nations of Western Europe are still in need of American economic aid, that aid is no longer a question of life and death as it was ten years ago. Today, they have, or at least have evidence that they soon will have, an alternative. They can stand on their own feet again and look beyond the wall of containment for new outlets for their energies and products.

These factors affect with particular intensity West Germany's attitude to the Atlantic Alliance. Their effect is strengthened by the political issue which has the widest, and is likely to have a lasting and ever deepening, emotional appeal: unification. The Western alliance has been presented to West Germany, both by American and German official spokesmen, as the instrument through which

unification would be achieved. While this view was from the outset open to serious doubts on analytical grounds, the historic experience of its failure has lead to a crisis of confidence which is likely to deepen as time goes on without, despite German membership in the Atlantic alliance, bringing unification closer. The Atlantic alliance, far from being supported as the instrument of unification, is ever more loudly and widely blamed as the main hindrance to unification.

The Soviet Union has been eager to use these new political, military, and economic conditions under which the nations of Western Europe live for the purpose of weakening and ultimately destroying the Atlantic Alliance. What has been called the "new look" of Soviet foreign policy is essentially a new flexibility which has taken the place of the monotony of the Stalinist threats. In the face of these threats, no nation which wanted to survive as a nation had any choice; thus Stalin was really the architect of the Western alliance. The new Soviet foreign policy alternately threatens and tempts, as the occasion seems to require, but always seeks to hold before the eyes of Western Europe an acceptable or even preferable alternative to the Atlantic Alliance. In consequence, the Atlantic Alliance has lost much of its urgency and even vitality. The nations of Western Europe no longer feel that they have to subordinate their separate national interests to the common defense against the Soviet Union, and they have begun, in different degrees, to pursue those interests regardless, and sometimes at the expense, of the common interests of the alliance. The rise of Germany to a position of political, military, and economic eminence, with all the fears and expectations this rise must cause in

both Western and Eastern Europe, cannot help but add to the opportunities of the new Soviet foreign policy.

As viewed from the vantage point of the United States, the Atlantic Alliance is also in the process of undergoing a subtle change, which in the end is bound to be a drastic one. For the United States, the Atlantic Alliance is the political and military implementation of its perennial interest in the maintenance of the European balance of power. However, the military implementation of this interest is likely to change under the impact of a new technology of warfare. As long as the main deterrent to Russian aggression remains the atomic bomb delivered by plane, the military strategy of the United States is in need of military installations in Western Europe; and the nations of Western Europe have a corresponding interest in providing them. To the extent that the intercontinental guided missile will replace airplanes as a means of delivering the atomic bomb, the interest in American military installations in Western Europe will diminish on both sides of the Atlantic. This interest will decrease still further when some of the nations of Western Europe will have atomic installations of their own. When this day comes, the Atlantic Alliance will take on a new complexion, probably losing some of its specific military aspects and tending to revert to that implicit community of interests which has tied the United States to Great Britain from 1823 to 1941. It is to this contingency that the British Minister of Defense, Mr. Duncan Sandys, appears to have been referring when he justified in April 1957, in the House of Commons, the British emphasis on atomic armaments by asking: "When the United States has

developed the five thousand-mile intercontinental ballistic rocket can we really be sure that every American administration will go on looking at things in the same way?"

However, the interests of the United States and the nations of Western Europe are not limited to that continent. Those of the United States and Great Britain are world-wide, and France is engaged in Africa. While the interests of the United States and of the nations of Western Europe indeed coincide in the preservation of the independence of the latter, they do not necessarily coincide elsewhere. The coincidence or divergence of these non-European interests has had, as it was bound to have, a strengthening or debilitating effect upon the Atlantic Alliance itself; and the vital interest of all concerned in this alliance has, in turn, limited their freedom of action outside Europe.

The United States, in particular, dealing with the colonial revolutions which are directed primarily against Great Britain and France, has been continuously confronted with a painful and inherently insoluble dilemma. The horns of that dilemma are the interest of the United States in the continuing strength of Great Britain and France as her principal allies and the American interest in preventing the colonial revolutions from falling under the sway of Communism. If the United States underwrites the colonial position of Great Britain or France, as it did in Indochina, it may strengthen, at best, temporarily its principal European allies, but will impair its standing with the anticolonial peoples of Asia and Africa. If the United States sides unreservedly with the Afro-Asian bloc, as it did in the United Nations

on the occasion of the Suez Canal crisis of autumn 1956, it weakens Great Britain and France and, in consequence, the Atlantic Alliance itself.

Faced with this dilemma which can only be solved at the price of impairing the vital interests of the United States in one or the other respect, the United States has been inevitably reduced to straddling the fence by supporting halfheartedly on one occasion one side and on another occasion the other side, or else keeping hands off altogether. Algeria and Cyprus exemplify at present the dilemma and its evasion. In such situations, then, the Atlantic Alliance does not operate at all; for there are no common interests which could support its operation.

This has always been obviously true of Western policies toward Communist China. The policy of the United States has been one of implacable hostility, while Great Britain has sought accomodation. The Atlantic Alliance is here not only not operating, but the policies of its two principal members have been consistently at cross-purposes. The success of one would of necessity mean the failure of the other.

That such divergencies of interest and policy have not imposed greater stresses upon the Atlantic Alliance and have left it essentially unimpaired testifies to its inherent strength. But that strength cannot be taken for granted. The common interests underlying the Atlantic Alliance have thus far prevailed over the divergent ones only because of the conviction of the members of the alliance that they have a greater stake in their common than in their divergent interests. The paramountcy of the common interests has thus far kept the divergent

ones in check. But in recent years the latter have grown stronger and the former, weaker. If this trend should continue unchecked it would indeed put in jeopardy the very survival of the Atlantic Alliance.

Common interests are the rock on which all alliances are built. Yet upon this rock all kinds of structures may be erected, some solid and spacious, others crumbling and confining. In order words, there are good and bad alliances, some which work smoothly and are enthusiastically supported, others which are cumbersome and are grudgingly accepted as a lesser evil. While the existence of the alliance depends upon a community of interests, the quality of the alliance is determined by the manner in which common interests are translated into concrete policies and day-by-day measures.

It is in this latter respect that the Atlantic Alliance must cause concern. Here, too, the crisis of November 1956, has made obvious defects which antedate that crisis. Three such defects have, continuously and to an ever increasing degree, impaired the operation of the Atlantic Alliance: its organizational structure; the policies, domestic and international, of its leading members; and the prestige enjoyed by some of its leading statesmen.

The common interest of the members of the Atlantic Alliance in the military protection of their independence has found its organizational expression in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The strategic conception which underlies NATO is the assumption that the European members of the Atlantic Alliance are able to defend themselves through a co-operative effort against a military attack by the Soveit Union.

This is not the place to examine the soundness of this conception. It must suffice to point out that NATO has never developed a convincing philosophy of its purpose. All members of NATO are agreed upon one objective: to defend their independence without having to fight for it. But how is this purpose to be achieved? Is primary reliance to be placed upon atomic retaliation with the local forces of NATO performing the function of the "plate glass" or "trip wire," or is a prospective aggressor to be deterred by the inherent military strength of local forces? The members of NATO have not seen eye to eye on this fundamental question, and NATO itself, in its official proclamations and policies, has not seemed to be of one mind either.

More particularly, the declared purposes of NATO have been consistently at variance with the measures requested of its members for implementation of these purposes, and the measures requested, in turn, have been invariably at variance with the measures actually taken. Furthermore, declared purposes, requested measures, and the measures actually taken have been subjected to a number of drastic and confusing changes which cannot be explained exclusively by the revolutionary transformation which military technology is in the process of undergoing.

This confusion in policy, in itself conducive to political disunity and friction in day-by-day operations, has been magnified by the elaborate organizational superstructure which is intended to put the policies of NATO into practice. This superstructure, encompassing a plethora of committees in charge of coordinating a variety of political, military, and economic policies of the member states, must, even under the best of circumstances, make for friction and inefficiency.

It magnifies these defects because it is much too ambitious in purpose and elaborate in operation for the agreed purpose of NATO to support it. In the absence of agreement on philosophy and basic policy, the elaborate organizational superstructure can be a source of weakness rather than of strength for the Atlantic Alliance.

An alliance, in its day-by-day operations, rests in good measure upon the mutual confidence in the willingness and ability of its members to co-operate effectively in achieving the common purpose. That confidence, in turn, rests upon the quality of the over-all policies pursued by the members of the Alliance and upon the character and ability of its leading statesmen. In both respects, the Atlantic Alliance has shown itself to be deficient.

There can be no doubt that in both respects the prestige of the United States as the leader and backbone of the Atlantic Alliance has drastically declined. It is irrelevant for the purposes of this analysis whether this decline is rooted in objective facts or whether it is but the result of subjective preconceptions and emotions. Rightly or wrongly, the United States is no longer looked upon by its allies, as it was during the period immediately following World War II, as the leader whose strength and resolution, if not wisdom, can be relied upon to keep the Atlantic Alliance on an even course. In the sphere of policies, three factors are in the main responsible for that crisis of confidence.

In foreign policy it is sometimes, but by no means always, useful to keep the enemy guessing. But to keep your allies guessing, most of the time and on matters vital to them, about what you intend to do is

bound to erode the foundations of confidence upon which the alliance in its day-by-day operations must rest. The allies of the United States have noted the discrepancies between the policy pronouncements of our leaders and the actual policies pursued, which appear to them to have evolved into a consistent pattern of unreliability. Liberation, the unleashing of Chiang Kai-shek, agonizing reappraisal, the "new look," intervention in Indochina, the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, the internationalization of the Suez Canal, the protection of the rights of Israel have been proclaimed as objectives of American foreign policy. Yet, in most instances, the foreign policy of the United States appears to our allies to have been completely at variance with these pronouncements or, at the very least, their implementation remains in doubt.

This slow accumulation of loss of confidence reached a critical stage in the Suez Canal crisis; for here unreliability in policy appeared to be joined by indifference, if not hostility, to the vital interests of America's principal allies. For the vital interests of the United States and her allies to coincide in Europe and diverge elsewhere is one thing; for the vital interests of her principal allies elsewhere to be actively opposed and gleefully destroyed by the United States is quite another thing. To the former, the allies of the United States could reconcile themselves with relative equanimity; the latter could not help but raise for our allies the crucial question as to whether the Atlantic Alliance was worth so high a price. That they answered the question in the affirmative testifies to the vitality of the alliance. Their resentment was kindled by the actual demonstration

of their inability to pursue active foreign policies of their own without the support and against the opposition of one or the other of the super-powers. Thus under the dramatic impact of the experience which saw their interests and power destroyed in a region vital to themselves, with the approval and active participation of the United States, the Atlantic Alliance has tended to transform itself for our allies from an association of like-minded nations into a burden grudgingly borne.

That like-mindedness has in the past been the result not only of a community of interests, but also of a common dedication to the ideals of freedom. When in the aftermath of World War II Communist totalitarianism threatened to engulf Western Europe, the United States was looked upon by its European allies as the symbol and the incarnation of that dedication. That image of the United States has been tarnished throughout the world by the recent temporary decline of freedom within its borders. Some of our European friends have gone to the extreme of asking whether there was much to choose, in terms of freedom, between the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet while this cynicism has subsided under the impact of the revival of the traditions of American freedom, there has remained a latent skepticism and general malaise, which cast their shadow over the Atlantic Alliance.

As far as long-range policies are concerned, the relations among nations must indeed be conceived in terms of interests. As concerns their day-by-day relations, we must also think in terms of personalities. We say that the United States and Great Britain have agreed on a certain policy, but tend to forget that Great Britain and the United

States are abstractions and that in actuality the President and Secretary of State of the United States and the Prime Minister and Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, speaking in the name of their respective nations, have agreed with each other. The smooth and effective operation of an alliance, then, depends in good measure upon the relations of trust and respect among its principal statesmen. There is no gainsaying the fact that the absence of such relations has become a great handicap in the day-by-day operations of the Atlantic Alliance. Regardless of the objective merits of the case, there can be no doubt that the leaders of our European allies have no longer the same confidence in the judgment and the authority of the President of the United States they had in times past and that they dislike and mistrust the Secretary of State of the United States with varying intensity but virtual unanimity. These reactions have increased the strains under which the Atlantic Alliance operates at present.

Our reactions, similarly negative, cannot help but add to the strain. The instability of French governments, the collapse of the Eden cabinet, the seeming futility of British and French policies in Cyprus and Algeria, the failure of their intervention in Egypt, all have made us doubt both the power of our principal allies and the wisdom of their leadership.

The traditional political rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic has tended to gloss over all these stresses and strains and has made it appear as though the Atlantic Alliance were something broader and smoother and also something more diffuse than it actually is. It is indeed built upon a rock of common interests, but the rock is of limited dimensions and its surfaces are sometimes rough. In spite of the

great damage which the crisis of November 1956, has done to the Western alliance, it has been useful in circumscribing more closely its limits and demonstrating, for all to see, its still considerable strength.

III.

While the Atlantic Alliance reposes upon the firm foundation of identical interests, no such general and reassuring statement can be made about the Western alliances outside Europe. Considering Asia and the Middle East, it can be said only of the American alliances with Formosa, South Korea, South Vietnam, and Japan that they are based upon identical interests. These nations, with the exception of Japan, owe their very existence as nations to the interests and power of the United States. Their survival as nations is inextricably tied to the interests and power of the United States. Yet only their complete dependence upon the United States has prevented some, if not all, of these nations from pursuing policies a variance with those of the United States. Thus the stability of these alliances rests both upon identical interests and extreme discrepancy of power.

Our alliance with Japan, like that with Germany, was during the first decade following the Second World War likewise based upon the dual foundation of identical interests and overwhelming American power. Yet neither foundation can be any longer taken for granted. Three factors have cooperated in restoring Japan's freedom of choice. First, Japan has again become the strongest power in Asia, leaving even China a considerable distance behind. If the wartime memories of Japan's imperialism were not still alive in the rest of Asia, Japan would be

the favorite candidate for taking over the economic and political leadership of Asia. Second, the atomic stalemate has had the same psychological effect on Japan as it had on Western Europe; the American alliance has become for Japan a mixed blessing if not a liability, increased by identification with American policies. Finally, in the measure that the aggressiveness of of Stalinist and Chinese Korean-War policies is replaced by a new flexibility which stresses the complementary character of Russian, Chinese, and Japanese interests, Japan may find a practical alternative to its identification with, and dependence upon, the United States.

The other Asian alliances, of which SEATO and the Bagdad Pact provide the outstanding examples, are of an entirely different type. They have three characteristics in common; complementary interests tending toward transformation into incompatible ones, a radically unequal distribution of benefits, and ideological emphasis.

These alliances, on the face of them, were conceived in terms of common action on behalf of common interests. However, in view of the remoteness of the apparent casus foederis, that is, Communist attack upon a member, and of the virtual impossibility, in case of such an attack, for most members to act in common, commitment to common action has receded into the background and been distilled into an anti-Communist ideological commitment. Of the Asian members, this commitment requires nothing more than membership in the alliance; it requires no common objective, policy, and action--beyond anti-Communism at home and abroad. Yet of the Western members, especially the United States, it requires specific policies and actions on behalf of the Asian members.

The Asian members are interested in these alliances primarily because of the economic, military, and political support they receive from the United States. Many of them consider their membership in the alliance to constitute a special claim upon the American Treasury, American weapons, and American political support for their special national aspirations. In other words, this support is the price the United States pays for having the receiving nations as allies. However valuable it judges this membership to be, in terms of actual policies and measures the United States bears a unilateral burden because of the alliance. The United States is under continuous pressure to act as an ally while the Asian allies, once they have signed the treaty of alliance, preserve virtually complete freedom of action. Their foreign policies, for instance vis-à-vis China, could hardly be different if they were not members of the alliance. In order to show the irrelevance of the alliance in terms of common objectives, policies, and actions, the Prime Minister of an Asian nation has indeed gone so far as to equate his country's membership in SEATO with membership in the United Nations.

Insofar as all the West wants is the maximum number of Asian allies and all the Asian allies want is the maximum amount of Western support for their own specific national objectives, the two interests can be said to complement each other, provided these objectives are compatible with those of the other allies. In view of the Western emphasis upon the ideological character of the alliance and the concomitant neglect of concrete interests and policies, this compatibility will exist only by accident and not by design and, in view of the nature of the

interests involved, is bound to be precarious. It is bound to disintegrate whenever a latent conflict of interests between two allies or an ally and another nation becomes acute. The conflicts between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, between Great Britain and Greece, and Turkey and Greece, over Cyprus, between Iraq and Israel are cases in point. It is only because these alliances stipulate a commitment to common action only in the very unlikely event of Communist aggression that they have survived such incompatibilities. The United States, in particular, is frequently forced into the uncomfortable position of having either to straddle the fence, as between Great Britain and Greece, or else to sacrifice its interests to its alliance, as between India and Pakistan.

Nothing needs apparently to be said about the alliances among the nations of the Western hemisphere, except that their frictionless operation does not raise a problem. Appearances are, however, deceptive. As long as the supremacy of the United States within the Western hemisphere provided unchallengeable protection for the independence of the American nations, these alliances could indeed to taken for granted. For the United States, these alliances provided complete safety since, in view of its supremacy unchallengeable from within the hemisphere and of the protection of two oceans, its security could be endangered only by a non-American nation acting in concert with an American one. For the other American nations, these alliances provided complete security from great-power domination since the United States would use its superior power only for the protection and not for the subversion of their national independence.

This identity of interests and the ability of the United States to implement it has from the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine to this day provided the rationale and life-blood of the American state system. The impending actuality of the intercontinental guided missile confronts this system with a challenge never before experienced. For the supremacy of the United States within the Western hemisphere, as unchallengeable as ever from within, is of no avail as protection against these novel weapons of tomorrow. The United States can no more protect its American allies against these weapons than itself. The American allies of the United States will then view the alliance with the same misgivings with which the European allies and Japan view it already. They may no longer regard their interests to be identical with those of the United States and may conclude that safety lies not in closeness to, but rather in distance from, the United States.

While these considerations are admittedly speculative from the vantage point of 1957, they may well reflect the actuality of 1960.

IV.

The Communist alliances present three different types which must be sharply distinguished: the alliances between the Soviet Union and China, on the one hand, North Korea and North Vietnam, on the other; the alliances between the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe; the alliances between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, China, Egypt, Syria, and probably Yemen, on the other.

The position of North Korea and North Vietnam within the Communist alliances is identical in the particulars which interest us here with the position of South Korea and South Vietnam within their alliances with the United States. They are marked by complete identity of interests and extreme disparity of power.

The alliances between the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe, codified in the Warsaw Pact of 1955, are in a class by themselves. They are not true alliances in that they do not transform into legal obligations a pre-existing community of interests. It is their distinctive quality that a community of interests is irrelevant for their existence and operation and that they are founded on nothing but unchallengeable superiority of power. Power is here not superimposed upon common interests, as in a genuine alliance, but becomes a substitute for them. Thus the nation possessing such unchallengeable power makes the other contracting party subservient to its interests, regardless, and in spite of the divergence, of the latter's interests. Such so-called treaties of alliance are in truth in the nature of treaties establishing, in the legal form of alliances, relationships that are a modern version of protectorates or suzerainty, and the nations subjected to them are correctly called satellites rather than allies.

The relations between the Soviet Union and the satellites have undergone in recent years a transformation similar to that which has affected the Atlantic Alliance, and for similar reasons. The emergence of an atomic stalemate between the United States and the Soviet Union has loosened the ties of the satellite relationship.

As long as the military contest between East and West pitted American atomic bombs against the Red Army, the latter could be regarded as the indispensable guardian of the Russian empire within and without. With the growth of Russian atomic power, the importance of the Red Army declined. The threat of mutual atomic destruction stimulated both the desire for self-preservation in the form of neutralism and the aspirations for national independence which had lain dormant under the yoke of the Red Army.

These latent tendencies were brought to the fore by the "new look" of Russian policy following the death of Stalin. In response to it, the spirit of national independence started to push against the lid of Russian oppression, and the Russian pro-consuls yielded to the pressure. They rehabilitated most of the national leaders who had tried to combine Communism and at least a measure of national independence and relaxed the authoritarian controls over the economic and intellectual life. Yet popular reaction went beyond domestic reforms to embrace national independence, that is, the end of the satellite relationship itself. At this point, the Soviet Union called a halt, reasserting the paramountcy of its interests supported by the supremacy of its power.

The events which occured in the fall of 1956 in Hungary and Poland have clearly demonstrated in different ways the nature of the satellite relationship in contrast to a genuine alliance. Both countries, through their revolts against Russian rule, sought essentially to reassert their distinct national interests against those of the Soviet Union. In the process they were bound to put

into question, and Hungary did openly challenge, the satellite status from which derived, in terms of law and power, their subservience to the Soviet Union. Yet while the Soviet Union could afford to make political, economic, and even military concessions, it could not risk the disintegration of its predominance over Eastern Europe by allowing the satellite system itself to be challenged. It was at this point that it brought its superior power to bear upon Hungary and forestalled, through this pointed example, a similarly open challenge on the part of Poland and other satellites.

In contrast, the alliances between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, China, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen, on the other, are genuine alliances, based as they are upon a community of interests upon which the preponderant power of the Soviet Union is merely superimposed. The exact nature of the community of interests between the Soviet Union and China is a matter for speculation. Russian and Chinese interests appear to be identical insofar as their common objective is the strengthening and expansion of the Communist and the weakening and retraction of the anti-Communist camp. They appear to be complementary insofar as the alliance serves the Chinese interest in economic and military development and the Russian interest in keeping the United States militarily engaged and politically handicapped in the Far East.

The alliances between the Soviet Union and the Middle Eastern nations serve clearly complementary interests. The Middle Eastern nations allied with the Soviet Union are enabled by the military support they receive to pursue actively their specific interest,

all with regard to Israel, some with regard to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the remaining British possessions and spheres of influence. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has no stake in these specific interests except insofar as their active pursuit serves to maintain a state of tension which keeps the Western nations engaged and handicapped in still another region and threatens them with economic distress.

V.

Considering the overall picture of the alliances as it emerges from the piecemeal analysis of the preceding pages, one is impressed by the similarity of the changes which have occured in the structure of the European alliances east and west of the Iron Curtain. The seemingly irreversible trend toward a two-bloc system which marked the immediate post-war era has been arrested, if not reversed. The uncommitted nations not only want to remain uncommitted but have, with a few exceptions, also shown the ability to do so. On the other hand, many of the European nations which are committed as allies of one or the other of the super-powers want to join the uncommitted nations but have, with the exception of Yugoslavia, been unable to do so. They have at best been able to move to the outer confines of the blocs to which they belong, but had to stop there. In consequence, the two-bloc system is in the process of loosening up but not of breaking up.

The satellites may become even more unwilling and unreliable partners of the Soviet Union than they are already. Short of outside intervention, they cannot move out of the Soviet orbit as long as

Russian interest and power keep them there. However, the interest of Russia in the domination of Eastern Europe has been perennial, regardless of drastic changes in the personnel, philosophy, and structure of government. The weakening of that interest cannot be forseen short of a military revolution which would make the control of outlying territory irrelevant. The power of the Soviet Union to keep the satellites under control cannot be challenged from within and is not likely to be challenged from without.

The fate that may be in store for the Atlantic Alliance is similarly not its formal dissolution but rather its slow erosion to the point of becoming inoperative. The common fear of Communism, either as subversion from within or aggression from without, and the common dedication to the values of Western Civilization are likely to remain stronger than the disruptive tendencies of divergent and incompatible interests and thus keep the common framework of the Atlantic Alliance intact. The demonstrated inability of even Great Britain and France to pursue positive foreign policies against the opposition of the United States adds to this outward stability of the Atlantic Alliance. The real danger lies in this common framework becoming an empty shell, drained of its vitality. History abounds with legal compacts, constitutional devices, and institutional forms which have, sometimes--as in the case of the Holy Roman Empire--for centuries, survived as ritualistic observances without any longer being capable of directing the interests of men into the channels of common policies and actions. The Atlantic Alliance is indeed in danger of becoming just such a ritual to which nations continue

to pay lip-service, whose procedures they still observe, and whose institutional forms they maintain, while planning and acting as though it did not exist.

The danger that threatens the Atlantic Alliance from Germany is, however, more serious than that. The tension between the German commitment to the Atlantic Alliance and the national goal of unification, to be achieved only on Russian terms, poses inevitably in German minds the question of whether that commitment and this objective are truly compatible and whether the former must not be sacrificed in order to achieve the latter. The logic of the argument implicit in this question can be prevented from becoming the actual policy of Germany only by the intransigence of Russian and the wisdom of American policies. The danger of German defection from the Atlantic Alliance, then, raises in specific terms the general issue of the merits of our alliance policy and of our response to the structural changes which the alliances have undergone in recent times.

Our alliance policy partakes of the doctrinaire, legalistic, and mechanical character of much of American foreign policy. These perennial vices reappear in it in a new setting. Instead of recognizing that there are useful, harmful, and superfluous alliances according to circumstances and discriminating among them in view of the interests to be served and the policies to be pursued, we have followed what might be called the collector's approach to alliances: the more alliances, the better. Or to put it more elaborately: the more nations sign a legal document declaring their support for your policies, the better. While once we were, on principle, against all "entangling

alliances," now we are, again on principle, in favor of all alliances.

This tendency to see intrinsic merit in any alliance, regardless of the interests to be served, the benefits to be expected, and the liabilities to be met, has been most pronounced in Asia. SEATO, originating in the indiscriminate invitation by the United States to join is indeed the classic example of such a misconceived alliance. Its membership was determined not by the United States in view of its interests but by the other members in view of theirs and is in consequence haphazard in view of the interests of America. Nor has the issue of the mutuality of benefits and liabilities been ever squarely faced. More particularly, the alliance has never been correlated to our overall Asian interests which--except for Formosa, South Korea, and South Vietnam--are political rather than military.

SEATO is for the United States a useless alliance from the military point of view and a harmful one politically and economically in that it alienates the broad masses of Asians and imposes economic burdens without benefits. NATO, on the other hand, especially in view of its elaborate organizational superstructure but also in its very existence, may well prove to be a superfluous alliance--a view held by a minority within and outside the government when NATO was created in 1949. It may well be asked again--as it was then--whether the obvious identity of interests between the United States and the nations of Western Europe could not have been adequately served by a unilateral guarantee on the part of the United States, fashioned after the model of the Monroe Doctrine. While the very existence of NATO has made

this question obviously academic, the rationale underlying it could still be put into practice by dismantling what is useless and harmful in NATO and strengthening what is useful, essential, and lasting.

These speculations culminate in the observation that the problem of alliances must be considered in the context of the overall character of world politics. If the task facing a nation is primarily military, not to be mastered by its isolated strength alone, a policy of alliances is the answer; and this answer is still the correct one in Europe and in certain exposed regions of Asia. Insofar as the task is political, requiring a variety of means applied with subtlety, discrimination, and imagination, a policy of alliances will be useless, if not harmful; and this is indeed the situation which confronts the United States in most of the world where the issue is political allegiance and not military defense. A policy of alliances, in its doctrinaire insistence upon joining the club, in its legalistic concern with signatures and stipulations, in its mechanical counting of heads, then, serves as a substitute for political creativeness whose lack it may temporarily conceal. What it can neither conceal nor stave off is failure which attends upon wrong policies as punishment follows the crime.

THE ULTIMATE VALIDITY AND THE IDEOLOGICAL DISTORTIONS OF MORAL CONCEPTS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS.

Niebuhr

The problem of the validity and the ideological corruptions of moral concepts in politics, particularly in international politics, can be briefly stated. The ideological distortions are obvious. Furthermore the grounds upon which the idea of the moral good was based in Western thought are so dubious to the generations which became conscious of the distinction between historical and natural reality, that one is surprised that philosophical sceptics were so tardy in arriving at the plausible, though I think, dubious conclusion that moral judgements are merely "emotive".

A moral judgement obviously asserts something about a policy or action, which refers, not to the preference or desires of the agent, but to its rightness, in a fairly consistent scheme of values, transcending the desires of the agent. The ideological distortion arises from the fact that the agent is bound to view this scheme from the standpoint of his particular interests, individual or collective. Nevertheless it is a significant fact, which probably refutes all simple hedonistic interpretations of the moral problem, that even the most consistently self-seeking man can not pursue his own interests, without pretending to himself and to others, that his good is a part of a consistent total scheme of value. This fact reveals something about the very structure of human nature. It proves that a mature intelligence is always conscious of the system of value greater than his own interest, and he can not gain the consent of his conscience for his own interests without pretending, at first to himself and than to others (mostly for the purpose of supporting his own self-deception) that his own interest can be fitted into, or may even dominate, the whole system of value. Napoleon was a fairly consistent egotist, but he never tired of assuring himself that his ambitions were in the service of the revolution or of the honor of France.

It is very significant that the obvious ideological corruptions upon moral judgements, due to parochial perspectives and the pressure of interest upon the reason of the agent, which are now taken for granted in any mature political science and which have long been at least in the implied assumption of the historians, did not play a conscious role in the analysis of human behavior until Adam Smith accepted the role of self-interest in the moral and economic judgements of men; and laid the foundations of economic liberalism by his confidence that the "hidden hand", a kind of secularized providence, would assure, that competing parochial interests would be automatically balanced and checked in the community, either national or international. The word "ideology" was explicitly introduced into our language by Marx (though Napoleon had spoken contemptuously of "the ideologues", meaning mere theoreticians); and Marx immediately used the idea of ideology as a class weapon, accusing the bourgeoisie of the taint of interest upon the political opinions and assuming that the proletariate, as a disinherited class, was free of idological corruption because without interest, that is without property, the only source of interest.

The tardiness of the explicit discovery of the ideological distortion of moral judgements in general, and of political judgements in particular, seems to be due to defects in the two theories of morals which have dominated Western culture since classical rationalism, which were preserved in medieval Christianity and survived in the Renaissance and Enlightenment, despite the almost complete destruction of the classical and medieval world pictures. The theories are by no means exclusive or contradictory. The one is the theory of "natural law" drawn from Stoic and Aristotelian sources, according to which the rightness of an act is determined by conformity to the essential structure of man and of the community. The good, in short, is the realization of essential nature. The theory is based upon the classical presupposition, that there are fixed and ideal forms to which actual and historical reality must correspond. This presupposition includes the assumption that historical reality

is not essentially different from nature; for both history and nature describe a cycle of "coming to be and withering away" within the essential form. Aristotle recognized the difference between historical reality and nature more than Stoic rationalism. Standards in history were "by convention" rather than by nature. But even in history, declared Aristotle, "Some things are marked by nature as the best." This classical conception of historical reality obscures the endless complexities of history, though Aristotle gives provisional recognition of historical contingency by asserting that the statesman, as distinguished from the philosopher, must be governed by "practical wisdom" or PHRONESIS, rather than by NOUS or reason. If history were governed by these ideal forms, which could be discerned by the philosopher or scientist, every ideological distortion could of course be corrected in the way that natural scientists correct mistakes by repeated examinations under "controlled conditions" until the truth is known.

The other dominant thesis about moral judgements is also derived from classical thought. It defines the criterion of the good in terms of the "common good". Aristotle begins his "Politics" with the assertion, "Every state is a community of some kind and every community is established with the view of some good; for mankind always acts in order to obtain what they think good." The good of the community is of course the common good. Aristotle did not, as many political theorists of later Western history, define the common good in terms of order. He defined it in terms of justice. He could do this because he believed that "Justice exists only between men whose mutual relations are governed by law". (Ethics, Bk. V, Ch. 6)

The business of statecraft was to establish law which would imitate the cosmic order. That is why there was no real distinction in classical thought between the definition of the good as the realization of essential being, and the good as realization of the common good. But it will be noted that there were no compunctions that men might have different loyalties and therefore different conceptions of the common

good. For Aristotle the common good was simply the social harmony, achieved by obedience to the laws of the Greek city-state. Stoicism was, from the beginning, more universal and defined the common good in terms of the universal community or the community of mankind, though significantly the Roman Stoics identified the universal community with the Roman Empire. "Rome is a city composed of all the nations", declared Cicero. In the case of Alexander the Great there was a more significant ideological distortion of Stoic universalism, for the universalism permitted him to overcome the differences between Greeks and Persians within the Macedonian Empire. From that day to this, it might be claimed that almost every imperial community existed partly by the ideological prestige of the claim that it was in fact the universal community. This is true not only of the Medieval empire in which church and Empire supported, and competed with, each other with rival claims of universality. But it was also true of the Islamic Empire in which the universal claims of Islam supported the political ambitions first of the Arabic and then of the Ottoman rulers. The whole history of the West, not to speak of universal history, proves that the definition of the common good depends very much on what community the judge chooses as the most significant community of loyalty. Naturally there will be many ideological differences in these choices, particularly in the modern period. Since the disintegration of the Medieval Church-Empire quasi-universal community and the rise of the modern politically autonomous nation, the definition of the common good in terms of the significant community of loyalty has been solved in political theory by the simple assumption of both royalist and democratic nationalists that the "national interest" was the final criterion of value. But this did not take account of the necessary alliances in which these integral nations were bound to correlate their activities. These alliances did not create an integral community which could compete with the interests of the highly integrated nations. But the relative cohesion and harmony of the international alliances raised ideological questions which could not be solved simply by appeal to the national interest.

Furthermore, the universal community, in the moral consciousness of mankind since the days of Stoicism, became a reality through the ever more pervasive means of communication and of economic interdependence in the very epoch in which it became clear that this community could probably never be politically integrated in the fashion which the quasi-universal empires of classical and medieval ages had claimed to integrate it; and the 18th and 19th century idealists hoped to integrate it at a future date. In our own day the universal community manifests itself as a community of the common fate of the fear of mutual annihilation, even under the condition of the rigorous division of the world into two power blocs. The survival of mankind becomes a common good transcending the desire of one bloc to preserve liberty against despotism and the desire of the other bloc to place all mankind under the dominion of its utopian creed. It is a very minimal, but also very universal, definition of the common good, which the nationalists of the 16th to 19th centuries could not have anticipated; and the internationalists would have despised.

Despite the effort of Dante, in his DE MONARCHIA, to restate the principles of classical and medieval universalism, freed of the odium of papal absolutism - resistance to which had been building up for centuries the preference of the modern period for national particularism was so general, that no one was conscious of ideological tensions and variations. Bodin in the 16th century used the principles of natural law to justify royal absolutism, and Hobbes in the 17th century built his absolutism on the basis of the social contract theory. There were of course idealists in the 19th century, notably Fichte and Mazzini, who were conscious of the tension between the two definitions of the common good and tried, rather futilely, to be, at the same time, internationalists and nationalists.

The more important differences in ideological viewpoints appeared in the definition of the nature, rather, than the locus, of the common good. These differences were most clearly expressed among the thinkers who made a rigorous distinction between nature and historical reality through the myth of the "social

contract". Hobbes used the myth to justify royal absolutism; Rousseau used it to vindicate totalitarian democracy, and only Locke expressed the rising interest in discriminate justice. The thesis that governments have their authority through the consent of the governed was the most telling expression of the new interest in justice, rather than order, as the definition of the common good. This idea was an ideological weapon in the hands of the rising middle classes, which did not obviate the truth value of the thesis. It endowed all men with the power of the vote, the most potent instrument for the attainment of justice. Justice rather than order became the ideological preference of the modern age, in defining the common good, which means that the fear of anarchy had been overcome, with the end of the religious wars and it was possible to consider the quality of the social harmony, which everyone recognized as the common good.

The Lockean political theory, which endowed all citizens with equal political power, and the theory of Adam Smith, which recognized the legitimacy of self-interest in the complex harmony of the modern nation and removed economic power and activity from the jealous surveillance of political power, were the twin pillars of modern liberal society. The liberal society was based upon middle class ideology, but its principles were valid beyond middle class interests.

Insofar as they were not; and the new liberties were not as fruitful of equal justice as the bourgeois idealists assumed, a new ideology took root in the classes which were the chief victims of the injustices of early industrialism. This ideology emphasized equality rather than liberty, and security rather than private initiative. It believed in the primacy of economic rather than political, power; and it made an even more uncritical identification between nature and historical reality than Stoicism and bourgeois theory. Its identification of the complex causations of history with the "laws of motion" was in fact drawn from the most uncritical theories, romantic and rationalist, of the French Revolution. Naturally it produced

the same fanaticism in the name of "Marxist-Leninist science" which the French Revolution generated in the name of "reason". In both instances there was no recognition of the inevitability of an ideological taint because both had a too simple definition of "nature" and a too simple confidence in "reason".

This fanaticism threatened the whole Western civilization with a civil war between the middle and the industrial classes. But it is significant that in the healthiest of Western democracies this civil strife either never became overt, or having become overt, it has now been resolved. A healthy democratic society was able to draw the fangs of this ideological fanaticism, and to draw a fanatic creed within the scope of the "limited warfare" of parliamentary democracy. It was able to do this by gradually developing insights, which are instructive for our whole problem of the ultimate validity and the ideological corruptions of moral concepts in politics. These insights include, 1) the recognition of the validity of a viewpoint despite the ideological distortion, furnished by the interests of its chief proponents; 2) the recognition of the possibility of winnowing truth from error in various ideological positions; and 3) the admission that it is not possible, finally to eliminate certain ideological preferences of classes and nations. They must be accepted as the inevitable fruit of the finiteness of man's intelligence and the intimate association between reason and interest in human affairs.

1) The emphasis on liberty in the bourgeois viewpoint is valid beyond the prejudices of the middle classes who propounded it. Liberty corrects a defect in the classical view of the nature of man, for it corresponds to man's capacity to transcend every social and political situation, and to envisage ends and purposes which are not immediately relevant to any collective purpose. This emphasis on liberty in this context was contributed, not so much by bourgeois class interests, as by the Judeo-Christian view of human selfhood. Sectarian Christianity, and later Calvinism, made this idea relevant to political theory. The relevance is classically expressed in John Milton's thesis, "Give unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the

things that are God's. My conscience I have from God and I can not give it to Caesar". Liberty as an economic doctrine, the theory of "free enterprise" is more clearly a bourgeois ideology, but it corrects a defect in the classical conception of the community, because it emphasizes that harmony and justice are achieved not so much by conformity to an ideal structure of law as by the free play of the various vitalities and interests in the community. In short, the ideal harmony of the community requires freedom.

2) The possibility of winnowing truth from error in the various ideological positions is perfectly illustrated by the history of the free societies which have allowed various ideological positions to be stated without hindrance. This has made for a correction of the extreme libertarian position which guaranteed justice as an inevitable fruit of freedom. Modern democracies have placed economic freedom under sufficient political control to guarantee minimal standards of justice and social security which the free market did not guarantee, and they have used political power to guarantee a better equilibrium of economic power than was possible by purely automotic processes. Thus some of the creed of the Marxist rebels against bourgeois ideology was incorporated in the synthetic creed of modern democracy.

3) The experience of modern free societies has also proved that it is not possible to eliminate ideological preferences entirely, but that it is possible to mitigate ideological warfare by recognizing that each ideological preference has its own legitimacy and contributes to the wisdom of the whole. It is also possible to appreciate that this or that class is a natural bearer of the particular ideological preference. It is natural, for instance, for an aristocracy to prefer the organic and traditional hierarchies of community and to be complacent toward the excessive inequalities of such hierarchies. It is natural for the bourgeois classes to prefer the freedom of initiative to the security of a managed economy, because they have their own security in either their property or their skill. It is equally natural

for the industrial worker to prefer security to liberty, because he lacks unique skill and is most seriously exposed to the crises and maladjustments of an unregulated economy.

It is certainly significant that in our own nation, practically untouched by Marxist dogma, the same ideological preferences should divide the middle and industrial classes as in all western European states.

But even if the experiences of democratic states should give us the insights about standards and their ideological distortions, the question is whether there are significantanalogies in international politics, which might give us some light in the ideological international struggle in which our own nation has become the protagonist of the bourgeois creed; Russia has become the holy land of the prolectarian creed, and these two nations are the hegemonous nations in the two power blocs which divide the world. Their ideological struggle is carried on across the expanses of the two dark continents in which nations are coming to birth, which have a strong preference for the Marxist utopian creed despite our abhorrence of it as the bearer of despotism. We can learn something from the analogies of our domestic politics, in this struggle, provided we recognize that no historical analogies are exact. The Russian ideology is not subject to the softening influences of an integral and free society. There is therefore no prospect of drawing the fangs of its fanaticism, particularly since the illusions in the communist creed have become the weapons of an international, rather than a class struggle. On the other hand, it may be a handicap of the free world that the peculiar conditions of American life, the wealth of the nation and the lack of a feudal past in the background of the history of our bourgeois paradise has given the American version of the bourgeois creed a strongly libertarian flavor, which accords neither with our contempory experience or with the necessities of the new nations of the dark continents.

For these and other reasons we must expect an ideological struggle rather than an ideological exchange, in international politics, and we must recognize that the ideological advantages are with our foes, rather than with us, despite the refutation in experience of the utopian creed, which has established a monopoly of power for a small oligarchy, ostensibly acting as surrogates for a messianic class; and despite the immunity to that creed among the very industrial classes of the capitalistic nations for which it was designed, with the possible exception of the less healthy Western nations, such as France and Italy, in which social conditions approximate the catastrophic situation which the original apocalypse envisaged for the whole of civilization.

Our disadvantages can be defined in terms which deal with both the internal organization of the various nations and with their national interests. Our democratic creed is, despite its obvious virtues of conformity to both the essential structure of human existence and to the most plausible definition of the common good, at a disadvantage in both domestic and foreign policy.

In foreign policy we are at a disadvantage because the communist creed combines a bogus universalism, with an appeal to the national aspirations of the budding nations of the dark continents. The bogus universalism makes the communist political power the only real empire of the modern day. Its imperial prestige, not unlike that of the ancient and medieval empires in which the pretension of the universal community sustained the imperial community. While Russian national interests have not been successfully veiled by this pseudo-universalism in Europe, as events in Poland and Hungary testify, they have not been particularly apparent on the dark continents, where Russia successfully exploits the residual and real resentments of the new nations against the former exploitative or imperialistic relation of the European nations to the non-technical nations. Our ideological handicap is increased by the fact that the newly emancipated nations have the same attitudes toward the

responsibilities and the power of the hegemonous nation, which characterized the simple equalitarianism and libertarianism of the French Enlightenment. They regard liberty and equality as simple possibilities rather than as regulative principles of justice. In this illusion they are supported by the Marxist utopian creed, which gives no place in its theory for the necessities of political integration, through the gradation of authority and the centralization of power, in either the national or the international community. Every national community, whatever its ideological illusions, manages to yield a certain tolerance toward the "rulers", as necessary instruments of its order, even though the power and the privilege claimed by the rulers is a threat to an ideal justice. But in the international community, the hegemonous nation lacks the panoply of majesty and the traditional aura of authority which the monarchs and rulers of nations enjoy.

This ideological handicap of hegemonous nations is aggravated by the further fact that the Marxist creed corresponds more nearly to the social and political facts in disintegrating feudal and tribal systems than to the social realities of a nicely balanced technical society. The inequalities are greater in these agrarian societies; and the technical nations have proved only recently that their freedom is compatible with both justice and order. The new nations are therefore tempted to regard the social and political freedom of the advanced Western societies as either a fraud or as a virtue beyond their attainment. We easily forget that it required four centuries for Western civilization to prove that the common good need not be reduced to the minimum of order but that the order could be enriched by standards of freedom and justice without being endangered.

In addition we must realize that the emphasis upon the dignity of the individual and upon his right to a political freedom, compatible with his essential freedom, which has been the fruit of the influence of the Judeo-Christian tradition upon the West, is not shared by the cultures of Asia and Africa, whether primitive

or advanced. For even the advanced cultures may subordinate the individual to the family as in Confucianism, or regard individuality as a fate from which redemption is sought, as in the mystic religions of the Orient.

It may be a significant fact that in the very day that our philosophers are inclined to deny cognitive value to moral judgements and to reduce their content to merely "emotive" significance, our whole culture is inclined to obscure the endless cultural and ideological relativities in the political judgements of the nations. We are inclined to become simple Aristotelians and Stoics and to regard the social and political standards of the Western world as so clearly in accord with a universally valid conception of human nature or of the common good, that we can summon little understanding for the ideological preferences of the new nations of the dark continents. We are particularly baffled if these preferences should lead to neutralist or even to pro-communist political policies, particularly since we have realized so clearly that the communist monopoly of power is in violation of the essential prerequisite of justice, which demands a multiplicity of centers of power and a tolerable equilibrium between them; and that communist collectivism clearly violates the essential dignity of man by subordinating him to a social and political process.

We would be politically more astute if we were able to recognize that our social and political standards, guaranteeing both freedom and justice are on the one hand clearly in conformity to the essential nature of man, and on the other hand they have to be validated as being something more than luxuries which only a technically advanced civilization with long experience in balancing the various interest of the community and in softening the fanatic tendencies in ideological preferences, can afford.

It would not be unfair to assert that we are more baffled and confused than need be because our essentially valid moral approach to the political order is still too much under the influence of the theories of the Enlightenment to do justice to

the fact that rational analyses of the human and social situation are bound to be subject to various ideological distortions by reason of the influence of interest, passion and particular perspectives upon the rational process. We are certainly not reasonable in our complete trust in the rational process. One of the consequences of this failure to gauge the effect of interest and ideology is the corresponding failure to acknowledge the place of power in the organization of both the national and the international community. There is of course a "realistic" tradition in Western history, which is supposed to have Machiavelli and Hobbes for its fathers; but the tradition is suspect because its uncritical devotion to the order, which preponderant power creates, neglects the standards of justice and liberty, which are the more adequate criteria of the common good in the democratic tradition. British thought has managed to achieve a synthesis between the realistic and the liberal approach to life. But in America we seem destined to deny in theory what we affirm in common sense and practice. This is unfortunate because we are thus fated to counter the illusions of the hard utopianism of communism (which veils the power realities by its utopian creed) with the illusions of the soft utopianism of our liberalism, which denies the power realities of the international community while it is called upon to assume the responsibilities of the most powerful of the nations in the alliance of free nations.

It would be unjust to judge Woodrow Wilson too severely for initiating us into world responsibilities through liberal slogans in which the principle of "the self-determination of nations" obscured the ever increasing interdependence of nations; and the idea of "collective security" failed to do justice to the necessity of integrating an alliance of nations through the responsibile use of hegemonous power. It would be unfair because neither Wilson nor the nation could have surmised the future in which the isolationist and infant nation, would emerge out of the Second World War, incomparably the most powerful of the free nations.

We were vaulted into this position of hegemony with incredible rapidity and have adjusted ourselves to our burdens and responsibilities with tolerable grace. But we still are oriented by liberal theories which obscure the realities of power and the gradations of authority which manifest themselves in any community, national or international.

We no longer emphasize the liberal principle of the self-determination of nations unduly, though we have a proper sympathy for the problems of the many new nations which the disintegration of the empires has brought to birth in the two World Wars. But we are inclined to legitimatize our power by appealing to a rather abstract universalism and by making ourselves the servant of the ad hoc majorities of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Our policy must work in the framework of this world organization; but it must also have a due appreciation of the continuing responsibilities of the hegemonous nations. The Constitution of the United Nations does not reveal the fact which history attests, namely, that a stable alliance of the two most stable democratic governments must furnish the core of hegemonous power for the free world.

Our failure to recognize the significance of this non-constitutional but historically important fact drove Britain into its desperate and futile venture in the Suez crisis. Her animus against us was sharpened by Secretary Dulles' gratuitous observation that we were not a "colonial power". We were, in fact, an ex-colonial power; and we tried to divert the resentments of the non-technical nations against the technical ones because of the original exploitative and imperialistic contact of the West with Asia and Africa, by calling attention to our innocency of the imperialistic taint upon the West. But in the process we forgot the responsibilities of our hegemony. Our gambit served to disassociate ourselves from the evils of French imperialism, aggravated by the fact that France was unable, either to hold or to liquidate its Empire.

But our policy had the disadvantage of weakening the Anglo-Saxon alliance and of obscuring the moral and political prestige of the nation which is destined to share the hegemony of the free world with us and which had the remarkable political feat of transmuting an Empire into a commonwealth of nations in which white and colored nations enjoyed equality and liberty. Our failure to appreciate the historically created congeries of power and prestige is matched by our inclination, not to make policy in the United Nations but to have the United Nations make policy for us. This is tantamount to the abdication of our hegemonous responsibility, which is no less real for the lack of a constitutional framework.

These political judgements are hazardous and may obscure, rather than illumine the basic thesis. This thesis is that there is a sound reason for the moral preference for a democratic society, but that the validations of this preference are too simple. They do not do justice to the endless complexity of historical, as distinguished from, natural reality. They do not appreciate the ideological perspectives and viewpoints which may be taken of the historical common good, prompted by varying interests. And they do not make room for the inevitable use of power and prestige in the organization of any community, national or international. Since every mature political science takes interest, ideology and power for granted, one can only conclude that the popular moral concepts about political reality are determined by forms of rationalism and naturalism, which have not benefitted from the more precise analyses of modern political science. They are embodied in popular viewpoints, which we have inherited from Aristotelian and Stoic rationalism, and given new life in the Enlightenment. They give a valid account of the moral element in political judgement insofar as these classical forms of thought are valid. They are revealed as defective whenever they fail to come to terms with the complexity of historical reality, the varied interests and vitalities which must be harmonized in any community, and the varied types of power, prestige and authority which must be used as harmonizing agents.

In regard to the popular attitudes toward political reality in a great nation, vaulted very rapidly to its eminence in the world community, the simplicities of our early life and the dogmas of a previous century are momentarily more potent than the considered convictions of those whose business it is to study political affairs.

Perhaps it is a consolation that a rather too simple and moralistic attitude toward politics in general and world politics in particular, which tends on the one hand to be baffled by ideological preferences other than our own, tends on the other hand to give moral preference to the resentments of the weak nations against the powerful, rather than to the responsibilities of the powerful and hegemonous nations. This gives our nation a singular ethos of innocency and persuades our President to take time off periodically from the leadership of the alliance of free nations, to act as umpire between East and West.

But our allies are not impressed by this innocency, The London Economist wrily remarks that we have not made up our mind whether to be "the pillars of society or the vanguard of the revolution." We would not be subject to such a charge if we clarified our mind on the difference between the basic moral justification of a free society and the endless relativities in the political applications of the basic moral principles.

Reinhold Niebuhr

ARE SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS DIFFERENT? AN APPLICATION OF SCALE ANALYSIS TO SENATE VOTING PATTERNS

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Introduction.

In any given period a discipline possesses certain resources of knowledge, experience, and imagination. These resources are sufficient to deal with some problems, but not with others. An eminent mathematician puts the matter this way:

> Imagine farmers living in a country where no other tool was available except the wooden plough. Of necessity, the farms would have to be in those places where the earth was soft enough to be cultivated with a wooden implement. If the population grew sufficiently to occupy every suitable spot, the farms would become a map of the soft earth regions. If anyone ventured beyond this region, he would perish and leave no trace. It is much the same with mathematical research....[1]

And, one might add, with the social sciences. The map of our reliable knowledge--as distinguished from idle speculation or mere hunches--does come to resemble the map of those problems which can be handled by our existing tools and techniques. Other problems may be raised, and be of great importance, but without appropriate research tools they cannot be answered in any adequate manner.

Among the more fascinating problems for the student of internal party processes is the question of "who votes with whom, and on what" in the Congress. Unfortunately, few tools for readily tackling this problem have been available, hence it has remained pretty much off the map of our reliable knowledge. In fact, over the past 25 years--since the pioneering studies of Stuart Rice and Hermann Beyle--there has been a surprising lack of innovation in quantitative techniques for the study of the legislative process. This paper seeks to explore the research implications of a relatively new technique, Louis Guttman's scale analysis, which the author has applied in a more general study of Senate voting patterns over the period 1949-1956.[2] In this paper particular emphasis is placed upon problems of intra-party adjustment, using Southern and non-Southern Senate Democrats as an example.

This paper, like Gaul in Caesar's time, is divided into three parts. In part I three major alternative approaches to the systematic analysis of roll call votes are contrasted, and some limitations on the usefulness of each are indicated. In Part II the methodology of scaling is very

briefly explained, and its relation to Professor Beyle's attribute-cluster-bloc analysis explained. In Part III, finally, some substantive (though not necessarily substantial) results of the application of scaling to Senate voting are presented.

Part I

No statistical analysis can rise to greater significance than the data on which it is based. Now there are certain obvious limitations on the value of roll call votes as basic data. Certainly a simple "yea" or "nay" vote cannot express differing degrees of intensity of feeling, doubts about different parts of a complex measure, and may conceal the fact that the same response may come from two legislators for contradictory reasons (as in the not too frequent situation where two extremes join to defeat a compromise proposal). Further, there is considerable evidence that a legislator's own personal opinion or the position he takes within committee may well differ from the stand he takes on a record vote. One even hears rumors that on occasion votes are more or less traded, as when some Western Democrats vote with the Southerners on civil rights in return for needed Southern support for a high federal dam in Hell's Canyon. Despite these limitations roll call votes are of great importance in the legislative struggle and, properly used, are a very valuable source of data.

In addition to the worth of the basic data the value of any quantitative study is also limited by the validity of the techniques by which the data is handled. This second sort of problem, involving the logical analysis of the quantification process, has not been the subject of much attention among political scientists.[3] Most quantitative roll call studies can be said to follow one or another of three general approaches which correspond rather closely to the three classic positions on the age-old philosophical question of the existence of universals (Plato's "ideas," the abstract entities of the Middle Ages, and abstract classes in general). The differing assumptions of these three positions, which are summarized in Table 1 below, are of direct relevance for this study and will be briefly contrasted.

Table 1

CHARACTERISTICS OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO STATISTICAL ROLL CALL ANALYSIS

Type of Approach	Level of Analysis	Ontological Commitment	Type of Measurement Used
Research Neoplatonism	Ideologies or other broad "isms"	Universals exist in Nature	In cardinal numbers (eg, "60% liberal")
Research Conceptualism	Middle-range policy attitudes	Universals are mind-made categories	In ordinal rankings
Research Nominalism	Individual roll calls on specific issues	Avoids any use Universals	Usually none, though similar instances may be counted

1) Research Nominalism. Taking the last-named approach of Table 1 first, the research nominalist steers clear of numerical indexes of such abstract entities as "liberalism" or "isolationism." Refusing to deal with such abstractions the nominalist will usually regard each roll call vote as a unique irreducible event. He may count the number of different instances in which a given proportion of Southern Democrats vote with the Republican majority, but he will never, never--or at least hardly ever--try to combine these votes into some high-level composite variable. This cautious approach, embodying the minimum ontological commitments and giving the maximum regard to the integrity of the basic data, characterizes much of the work of such outstanding students as V. O. Key and Julius Turner. Needless to say, this approach has much to commend it though it may require an unusual talent for generalizing to be able to draw any simple conclusions from its mass of data.

2) Research Neoplatonism. This position is at the opposite extreme. And as Moliere's M. Jourdain went through life speaking "prose" without ever realizing it, so some researchers are perhaps equally unwitting users of the Neoplatonic doctrine that universals or abstractions (such as "liberalism" and "isolationism") do exist in nature. Most researchers do not trouble themselves with this implicit assumption, but set right out to measure these abstract variables, and to measure them by cardinal numbers.[4] Given some multi-syllable "ism," the research Neoplatonist will collect a batch of roll call votes which might conceivably be said to have some relation to the broad topic and compute each individual senator's arithmetic percentage of support. The resulting index scores are then analyzed in terms of supposed cardinal values measured from a supposed zero point along the supposed dimension. This, needless to say, involves a lot of supposition!

Now the research nominalist may be open to some criticism for sticking too closely to the data and not exploiting those further regularities which might be found, but the research Neoplatonist must be criticized for allowing imagination to run beserk. Both the identification of a single variable and the development of a quantitative metric are complex tasks. The ordinary numerical index number of legislative attitudes, however, is usually put together in such a manner that it violates some of the most basic rules of logic and mathematics (though perhaps not necessarily those of common sense, since the results may be of some rough value in pointing up gross differences).

The basic objection to the research Neoplatonist's type of "measurement" is that it puts the cart (of quantification in cardinal values) before determining if there is a horse (a cumulative rank order along which a measurement might be made). Now a quantitative measurement of a variable implies the prior existence of a specific cumulative rank order.[5] Our number system by its very definition is cumulative and implies the existence of a rank order. Hence any variable to which numbers are meaningfully applied must also be cumulative. And if cardinal numbers are applied then that variable must have a given zero point and a basic unit of measure in which all differences of degree can be expressed.

The fallacy of most shortcuts to the cardinal measurement of legislators' attitudes lies in the failure to test whether the various individual votes in an index can be shown to relate to a single possible variable and to a cumulative rank order. Contrast the concepts of "height" and "liberalism" for example. Every senator who is at least as tall as the 6' mark in height is also at least as tall as the 5' 11" mark, the 5' 10" mark, and every other lesser mark. But if he is "80 per cent liberal" on the basis of a ten-vote index can we guarantee that he voted for at least every included bill for which a "60 per cent liberal" voted? Generally we cannot. In fact, we may even find that "50 per cent liberal" Jones voted liberal on issues 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 while "50 per cent liberal" Smith voted liberal on issues 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10.

But this is surely incredible. Two individuals with supposedly identical degrees of the attribute under study might be opposed on all of the issues included in the index. Now one never finds two five-inch long pencils such that each reaches five of the inch-markers on a ten-inch ruler, but one reaches only the odd-numbered markers while the other reaches only the even ones! It is not enough to merely reach any five markers--if we are to genuinely measure a single variable then they must be the first five markers in an ordered series, and they must include all those markers reached by any object of lesser length and be included in those reached by any object of greater length. And so it is--or should be--with votes used in an index. If they are to genuinely measure a single variable then they must constitute a cumulative series of more and more stringent tests of the variable, thus dividing the population under study into cumulative groups.[6]

3) Research Conceptualism. Fortunately there is a middle position which sympathizes with the nominalists' respect for the integrity of the data, but which also shares the Neoplatonists' urge for more general categories of analysis. Conceptualism differs from the Neoplatonists' position in that it denies that there are universals or abstract entities in nature waiting to be discovered, holding rather that such concepts are more or less useful man-made "inventions." At a more down to earth level the conceptual approach differs by attempting to construct such concepts in accord with the rules of logic and mathematics. Research conceptualism should be a popular as well as a respectable position since, as Harvard's W. V. Quine points out, "the tired nominalist can lapse into conceptualism and still allay his puritanic conscience that he has not quite taken to eating lotus with the platonists."[7]

In roll call analysis the research conceptualist seeks to combine individual votes in such a manner that the existence of various more general underlying variables (or dimensions) can be suggested as a logical possibility (though not a certainty) and so that individual legislators can be compared in an ordinal (that is, rank order) manner in regard to such hypothetical variables. Thus the conceptualist seeks to go beyond the rather strict limits of research nominalism, but without being forced to embrace the illogic of research Neoplatonism. One technique for doing this is by use of Louis Guttman's scale analysis. In the course of the

past seven years a huge literature has developed on the subject of scaling,[8] but the basic concept and its particular importance for roll call analysis are briefly summarized in the following section.

Part II

There is nothing mysterious or complicated about the Guttman scale. It is simply a series of criteria which result in cumulative divisions of the population under study.[9] Thus if a man from Mars wanted to compare New York City buildings in terms of their height but lacked any quantitative concepts such as the foot or meter he could still pick out a series of buildings and use them to define a rank order of qualitative classes. He could, for example, classify all buildings on Manhattan as to whether they were at least as tall as the following:

(X = Yes)

Building Classes	As tall as: RCA Building	Henry Hudson Hotel	Metro-politan Museum	Not as tall as: RCA Building	Henry Hudson Hotel	Metro-politan Museum
Type I	X	X	X			
Type II		X	X	X		
Type III			X	X	X	
Type IV				X	X	X

Now if our Martian visitor remained on Manhattan long enough he would discover that <u>all</u> of the thousands of buildings in the area would fall exactly into one of the above four cumulative categories, and that no where--on earth or on Mars--is there a building which is not as high as the Metropolitan Museum, not as high as the Henry Hudson Hotel, but which towers over the RCA Building in Rockefeller Center. Hence we have a perfect cumulative Guttman-type scale based on a series of qualitative distinctions. The result is a rank order of buildings which are more or less tall than others, but without any connotations of cardinal measurement.

Simple as this approach may seem, it was not until the decade of the 1940's that a procedure was worked out for systematically applying it to social science data (most of which is not quantitative in the sense of being subject to cardinal measurement). This was finally done by Louis Guttman, a social psychologist working in the War Department's attitude measurement project during World War II. Opinion researchers had long been aware that the specific wording of a question often has a violent effect on the percentage of positive responses. To get greater reliability a number of questions might be asked to evoke varying degrees of agreement about what appeared to be a single broad topic. But this introduced the danger, as yet largely unrecognized by devotees of the index number, that some of the questions might relate to some dimension or variable other than the one supposedly being measured.


Guttman's solution to this problem of determining the uni-dimensionality of a series of questions was simply to define a preliminary universe of questions which seemed to be directly related to the basic attitude, then submit a series of questions from this collection to a group of respondents. If the questions do constitute cumulative criteria relating to a single attitude dimension among the various respondents then the answers to the questions will divide the respondents into a series of strictly cumulative groups.[10] Now the problem of whether the questions do in some purely objective sense relate to a single dimension is not at stake, nor does even a perfectly cumulative pattern of responses prove that the questions are even in a subjective sense related to a single dimension. The cumulative pattern among respondents is a necessary but not sufficient condition for establishing that the questions themselves are cumulative criteria along a single dimension.

The attitude dimension, be it noted, is purely a hypothetical construct, something that cannot be directly observed but only inferred as the basis for observed consistencies in overt behavior.[11] In those cases where the Senate takes a series of votes on differing percentage cuts in a given program, or on differing dollar amounts of appropriations for a given function, or on requiring a different number of senators to invoke cloture the result is generally a series of perfectly cumulative divisions. Of course, if this were the only value of scaling it would indeed be open to the oft-heard criticism of "proving the obvious." Fortunately, it turns out that many of the major areas of policy difference, such as labor-management relations, rent control, public housing, economic controls, foreign aid, reciprocal trade, and so forth often involve similar cumulative divisions of attitude along what appears to be a series of dimensions.

A very simple geometric metaphor will indicate the difference between a scaleable series of votes and the hodgepodge of measures often lumped together into numerical indexes. The oft-cited but little understood Arthur F. Bentley is the source of this suggestion--he wrote:

> If we take all the men of our society, say all the citizens of the United States, and look upon them as a spherical mass, we can pass an unlimited number of planes through the center of the sphere, each plane representing some principle of classification....Assuming perhaps hundreds, perhaps thousands, of planes passed through the sphere, we get a great confusion of the groups. No one set of groups, that is no set distinguished on the basis of any one plane, will be an adequate grouping of the whole mass.[12]

It is this "great confusion of the groups" which intrigues those who study pressure groups. But it is the great merit of scale analysis that it orders this apparent confusion into sets of cumulative groups which can be distinguished along various dimensions. In doing so scaling provides the sine qua non for measurement.


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Now if we let Bentley's sphere represent the total membership of the Senate and the planes represent the division on each roll call vote we find one of two types of situations. In Figure 1-A below the planes do not intersect, that is, there is no criss-crossing and hence the votes can be said to be criteria potentially relating to a single dimension (and thus defining a single variable). If, however, the result is a confusion of criss-crossing, overlapping classifications--as in Figure 1-B below--then by no stretch of the imagination can they be said to relate to any single dimension.



Figure 1-A: Cumulative Scale of Groupings Along a Single Dimension.



Figure 1-B: A Confusion of Groups Based on Criteria from Several Different Dimensions.

At this point it may be well to turn from general discussion to the examination of how a sample scale is constructed. For this purpose I have chosen a subject with which everyone is familiar--the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. Table 2 ranks the 95 senators (Bilbo had not been seated) into 12 ordinal groupings running from those most favorable to organized labor to those most unfavorable. The rankings are based on responses to 11 roll call votes (all those taken on the subject except for a preliminary procedural vote and the vote on passage of the conference report, which adds no new distinctions). The 11 issues, the responses considered pro-labor, and the margins on the roll calls are as follows:

1) Murray: substitute "liberal" version for the whole bill (Yea vote is scored as pro-labor), roll call was 19-73.
2) Taft: table Kilgore motion to postpone consideration for 10 days (Nay), 59-17.
3) Passage of Senate version of bill (Nay), 68-24.
4) Vote to override Truman's veto (Nay), 68-25.
5) Taft: permit suits for damages for jurisdictional strikes or secondary boycotts (Nay), 65-26.
6) Ball: prohibit union coercion of employees as well as of employers (Nay), 60-28.

7) Ball: require individualauthorization for check-off, and joint administration of union welfare funds (Nay), 48-40.
8) Ball: limit industry-wide collective bargaining (Nay), 43-44.
9) Aiken: permit injunctions where unions hold up perishable farm produce (Nay), 36-54.
10) Ball and Byrd: prohibit union shop (Nay), 21-57.
11) Ball: permit injunctions and suits where union has jurisdictional strike or secondary boycott (Nay), 28-62.

In Table 2, pages 9-10, pro-labor responses are indicated on the left-hand side of the center dividing line and anti-labor responses on the right-hand side. The most pro-labor senators are listed at the top of the scale, and those progressively less pro-labor are then listed in order down to the most anti-labor, who are at the very bottom of the second page. The senators' individual stands on the 11 issues are taken from the 1947 Congressional Quarterly (pages 301-303 and 308). Record votes are indicated by an "X" in the appropriate pro-labor or anti-labor column for each issue; pairs or announced stands are indicated by a "/". Where a senator gave no indication at all of his stand a zero is entered in both the pro and anti columns for that vote.

Of the 1,019 responses included in the scale in Table 2 all but 28 fall within the perfect scale patterns (an additional 26 responses are unknown, and are scored neither for nor against the scale pattern). Thus if we were to try and reproduce each senator's complete voting record on the 11 issues knowing only his rank position on this scale (and his missed votes) we would be correct 97.4 per cent of the time (that is, on all but 28 of the 1,019 responses). Guttman has christened this percentage the "coefficient of reproducibility" and uses it as a basic test of the extent to which a series of items may be said to relate to a single dimension. For a perfect cumulative pattern the figure is 100 per cent. At the opposite extreme random guesses as to yes-no responses will result in about 50 per cent reproducibility. Although several other scoring formulas have been suggested, a discussion of their merits would lead us too far afield. For most social science data reproducibility of at least 90 and preferably 95 per cent is regarded as the minimum for a scale to be acceptable.

Now of the 2,048 possible combinations of positive or negative responses on 11 votes (2^n where n = the number of votes) there are only 12 (that is, n + 1) perfect scale patterns. In Table 2 no less than 70 of the 95 senators fall into one of these 12 perfect scale patterns. Thus over 70 per cent of the individuals classified fall within the predicted response patterns although these patterns are less than one per cent of the total available patterns.

The remaining non-scale types (the 25 senators not fitting one of the 12 perfect scale patterns) must be assigned to one of the perfect patterns if they are to be included in the ranking. This has been done by assigning each of them to that scale pattern which he most closely resembles. Thus

Table 2

SCALE ANALYSIS OF ELEVEN RECORD VOTES ON TAFT-HARTLEY ACT IN THE SENATE, 1947

Senators	Party	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Hayden	D	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X											
Sparkman	D	X	/		X	X	X	X	X	X	/	X			X								
McFarland	D	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X											
Downey	D	X	/	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X											
Johnson (Colo)	D	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X					X						
Pepper	D	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X											
Taylor	D	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X											
Murray	D	X	/	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X									X		
Chavez	D	X	X	X	X	/	X	X	X	O	X	X									O		
Thomas (Okla)	D	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	/	X	O	X		O								O	
Myers	D	X	/	X	X	X	/	X	X	X	X	X											
Green	D	X	X	X	X	X	X	/	X	X	X	X											
McGrath	D	X	/	X	X	X	X	X	/	X	X	X											
Johnston	D	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X											
Thomas (Utah)	D	/	X	/	/	X	X	X	X	X	/	X											
Magnuson	D	X	/	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X											
Kilgore	D	X	X	X	X	X	/	X	X	X	X	X											
O'Mahoney	D	X	X	X	X	/	X	X	X	O	/	/									O		
Hill	D		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X										
McMahon	D		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X										
Barkley	D		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	X								O		
McCarran	D		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X										
Wagner	D		/	X	/	X	X	X	/	X	/	X	X										
Morse	R			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X									
Malone	R			X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X					
Langer	R			X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X							X		
Lucas	D	X			X		X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X		X					
Ellender	D					X	X	X	X	X	/	X	X	X	X	X	X						
Hatch	D			X			X	X	/	X	X	X	X			X	X						
Connally	D			X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X						
Aiken	R						X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X				X		
Maybank	D	X	O				/	X	X		X	X			O	X	X	X					
Revercomb	R								X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		
Knowland	R								X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Cooper	R								X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Lodge	R								X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Saltonstall	R								X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Ecton	R								X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		
Tobey	R	O					O	/	X	O	O	O	O	/	/	X	/	O			O	O	O
Ives	R								X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Young	R								X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		
Flanders	R								X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Capehart	R			O						O	X	X	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	O			
Umstead	D									X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Baldwin	R								O	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O				
O'Conor	D									X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		
Tydings	D									X	X	O		X	X	X	X	X	X			O	X
Thye	R									X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		

Table 2 (Continued)

Senators	Party	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Millikin	R									X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Brooks	R									X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Jenner	R		O							X	X	/	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Brewster	R									X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Ferguson	R									X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Vandenberg	R									X	/	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Bridges	R									X	O	X	X	/	X	X	X	X	X	X		O	
Smith (N.J.)	R									X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Hoey	D									X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Taft	R									X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Watkins	R									X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Cain	R									X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	/			
Fulbright	D										X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Holland	D										X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	/	X	X		
Russell	D										X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Dworshak	R										X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Cordon	R										X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		. X
McCarthy	R										X	X	X	/	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Martin	R										X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Overton	D									X		X	/	X	/	X	X	X	X	X		X	
Butler	R								O			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	
Williams	R												X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
McClellan	D												X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Buck	R									X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
George	D										O		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	/	X	O	X
Hickenlooper	R												X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Wilson	R								X				X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
Capper	R										O		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	X
Reed	R										O		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	X
White	R		O							O	O		X	O	X	X	/	/	/	/	O	O	/
Ball	R												X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Eastland	D												X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Donnell	R									X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Kem	R												X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Wherry	R												X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Hawkes	R									X			X	/	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Bricker	R												X	X	X	X	X	/	X	X	X	X	X
Moore	R									X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Bushfield	R										O		X	/	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	X
Gurney	R									X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
McKellar	D												X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Stewart	D												X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
O'Daniel	D		O										X	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Byrd	D												X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	/	X
Robertson (Va)	D												X	/	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	/	X
Wiley	R												X	X	X	X	X	X	/	X	X	X	X
Robertson (Wyo)	R												X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Omitted:																							
Bilbo	D		(not seated)																				

Senator Sparkman, for example, is assigned to pattern I, from which he differs in his response on issue number 3. If he were assigned to any other pattern, however, he would differ on more than one response (thus if he were assigned to pattern XII, the bottom one, he would differ on 10 of the 11 issues).

Further details of scaling methodology could be pursued at some length, but for the purposes of this paper we are more concerned with the result than with the technique. What, for example, does the scale indicate about differences between the parties, or between Southern and non-Southern Democrats? For greater convenience in handling this question the 12 scale categories--some of which are quite small--have been telescoped into just four "quartiles" (the cut-off points between categories are such that not exactly one-fourth of the senators can be included in each). In terms of party the breakdown of the scale rankings is as follows:

	Scale Categories:				
	I-III	IV-VIII	IX-XI	XII	Total #
# Dems	23	8	5	8	44
# Reps	3	14	16	18	51

Within the Democratic Party the Southern and non-Southern senators (Bilbo is still omitted) compare on the same basis as follows:

# S Dems	4	4	5	8	21
# non-S Dems	19	4	0	0	23

In this particular scale ranking the difference between Southern and non-Southern Democratic senators is even more striking than that between members of the major parties.

It is also clear from this scale, however, that neither of the two major parties as a whole nor even the Southern Democrats display any very great cohesion. The non-Southern Democrats, however, are generally united in voting pro-labor on most of the issues. Now at this point we can turn from the problem of ranking attitudes along a hypothetical dimension to the slightly different question of "who votes with whom."

In approaching this problem Stuart Rice, and later Hermann Beyle, suggested that the number of times each possible pair of legislators voted together on the prevailing side on a series of issues be counted. These dyadic relations should then be entered in a square table large enough to list every legislator across the top of the page and down the side. Beyle suggests the names then be arranged, as nearly as possible, in such an order that those agreeing most often are in the upper-left corner. In the perfect case the number of agreements, on the prevailing side of each issue, between this bloc and the other legislators shades off gradually down to those at the bottom-right corner of the page, who voted opposite the majority bloc on every issue.[13]

This technique, generally known as attribute-cluster-bloc analysis, is obviously closely related to scale analysis. The difficulty with it, other than that it requires almost double the amount of clerical work necessary if one defines a dimension, is that on the prevailing side it is absolutely limited to cases where one bloc includes at least one-half of the total membership (a fairly rare occurrence). This is obvious since in a perfect bloc arrangement the prevailing bloc can "prevail" only if it includes at least one-half of the membership. In practice smaller blocs may seem to exist, but only due to the affects of absences or of irregularities in the pattern. In the case of other than perfectly cumulative blocs the assignment of individuals who do not exactly "fit" the bloc pattern is exactly analogous to the assigning of non-scale types within a scale pattern. In cases of missed votes, however, bloc analysis automatically lowers the absent legislators total number of agreements, and hence his classification whereas scaling provides a rationale for assigning him in accord with the way we would expect him to have voted had he followed the scale pattern.

The attribute-cluster-bloc approach thus compares the records of each possible pairing of legislators, whereas scaling compares each legislator's record against the perfect scale pattern. Now as a matter of logic--a subject which I feel has been unduly neglected by political scientists--if the records of two individuals are related to a given standard in a known manner it should be possible to deduce from this how they are related to each other. If this can be done then scaling has not just one but <u>two</u> possible interpretations: not only as a technique for ordinal measurement of legislative attitudes, but as a means for showing the existence of legislative blocs.

Now in a perfect scale we know, without performing any sort of cluster analysis, that each individual in each given scale type voted with all other individuals in the same type on <u>every</u> issue considered. We know, further, that all the individuals in a given scale type voted identically as all the individuals in an adjoining scale type (above or below them) <u>except on one</u> issue, and we know which issue this is (something not evident from a cluster bloc analysis). In fact, the scale pattern tells us how many times individuals in <u>any</u> given scale type voted together with the individuals in <u>any other</u> type, and on which issues they agreed and on which they differed. The two extreme scale types, for example, vote opposite on <u>all</u> of the issues in the scale.

Every perfect scale pattern thus constitutes, by definition, a perfect attribute-cluster-bloc analysis, and vice-versa. The only difference is that to properly bring out the cluster-blocs it is necessary to arrange the legislators so that the maximum numbers (of agreements between pairs of legislators) are concentrated, as in matrix algebra, along the main diagonal rather than in a corner. The lesser values then shade off symmetrically to both sides of the diagonal, reaching zero in the upper-right and lower-left corners (thus indicating the total disagreement existing between the extreme scale types. Had Professor Beyle only

arranged his data in this form he should have arrived at the basic concept of a cumulative scale a full 25 years ahead of the sociologists!

Although a cluster-bloc analysis of voting on the Taft-Hartley Act would not add anything to what is already evident in Table 2, it does suggest the possibility of using scaling to carry out a two-dimensional cluster-bloc analysis. That is, prepare a cross-tabulation with as many horizontal rows as there are different scale rankings on one scale and as many vertical columns as there are rankings on a second scale. Then each legislator can be entered in the unique cell which identifies his voting pattern on both dimensions. Assuming that both scales are perfect then all senators in a given row will have voted identically on all issues included in scale 1, all senators in a given column will have voted identically on all issues in scale 2, and thus all senators in a given cell of the table will have voted identically on all issues in both scales. In such a cross-tabulation the extent of voting agreement or disagreement between any individual legislators or groups of legislators in regard to two different dimensions is evident at a glance.

Table 3 on page 14 presents an actual two-dimensional cluster-bloc analysis of Senate voting on two 1949 attitude scales. Rankings on the labor-management relations scale are indicated along the vertical axis while rankings on the reciprocal trade act extension scale are indicated along the horizontal axis. Space limitations preclude presenting the two complete scales, but the cross-tabulation alone makes it quite evident that although almost all of the Southern Democrats were in accord with their northern brethern in supporting reciprocal trade (something which has changed since 1949) about two-thirds of the Southerners were at opposite extremes on the subject of labor-management relations (something which has not changed much subsequently).

Although there may be some slight correlation between support of the "liberal" position on reciprocal trade and on labor-management relations, Table 3 clearly points up the necessity for considering these as separate policy dimensions. If all the votes on both scales were included in a single numerical index, for example, the result would be a very poor guide to the real distribution of attitudes. The Southern Democrats in the lower-left corner, for example, would come out about "50 per cent liberal" on the combined trade and labor index when they actually were all-out supporters of the "liberal" trade position but all-out opponents of the "liberal" labor-management policy.

From such two-dimensional attribute-cluster bloc studies the analysis can, with the aid of some glass shelves or a good imagination, be extended to include three policy dimensions (with the third being ranked perpendicularly to the plane including the first two). But rather than attempt to describe such Rube Goldberg machinery it seems preferable to move on to a more detailed application of the basic technique of scaling to some selected aspects of Senate voting in the period 1949-1956.

Table 3

TWO DIMENSIONAL ATTRIBUTE-CLUSTER-BLOC ANALYSIS OF 1949 SENATE VOTING

1949 Labor Relations Rankings	Rankings on 1949 Reciprocal Trade Act Scale							
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	Unknown
I	McMahon PEPPER Taylor Humphrey Murray Thomas Magnuson	Kilgore Neely Chavez		Langer		Thomas (Okla)		Morse
II	HILL GRAHAM KEFAUVER McKELLAR Hayden Frear Douglas Lucas Myers Green	LONG Withers	Tobey Aiken	Johnson (Colo)				
III	SPARKMAN JOHNSTON Downey	McFarland Gillette Anderson Kerr	O'Mahoney					McCarran (McGrath) Hunt
IV	Miller			Ives	Thye		Malone	(Wagner)
V	O'Conor Tydings							Lodge
VI			Smith (Me)					
VII		Chapman CONNALLY	Smith (NJ)		Saltonstall Bridges Flanders		Capehart McCarthy	Baldwin
VIII				Ferguson Vanden-berg	Knowland Donnell Kem	Hendrick-son Taft	Young Millikin Martin Watkins Cain	Wiley Brewster
IX	HOLLAND GEORGE RUSSELL EASTLAND STENNIS MAYBANK BYRD ROBERTSON HOEY	FULBRIGHT ELLENDER JOHNSON (Tex)		McCLELLAN	Reed Schoeppel Cordon	Williams Hicken-looper	Jenner Butler Wherry Bricker Gurney Mundt	
Unknown	(Leahy)						Ecton	(Dulles)


Part III

After this rather long excursion into problems of method we turn more directly to the theme of internal party differences in the Senate. For the period 1949 through 1956 a total of 56 acceptable scales of Senate voting patterns were constructed. These scales cover most, though by no means all, of the major controversial issues of the period on which there were a number of roll call votes. For each scale a breakdown by major party was prepared, and then intra-party breakdowns were run to compare Southern and non-Southern Democrats (taking the 11 ex-Confederate states as "the South"), as well as Northeastern Republicans (from states north of the Potomac and east of Ohio) and other Republicans. Rather than treat each scale separately, as a research nominalist might, or try to cover all 56 by a single description, as a Neoplatonist might, I have sought to group the scales into a few conceptual categories based on differences in relative extent of party cohesion.

The first of my four categories is one designed to indicate scale areas of relatively "high" cohesion, and hence relatively sharp party difference. This pattern, which approaches the ideal of the "responsible parties" proponents, may be the result of a situation where constituency interests largely parallel party divisions, or of a strictly partisan party issue, or of extraordinarily successful maneuvering by the party leadership. The defining characteristic for this category is that there be a cut-off point in the scale ranking such that at least 80 per cent of the Democrats will be on one side and at least 80 per cent of the Republicans on the other. This pattern can perhaps be made somewhat clearer by a simple figure in which the successive scale rankings on the subject are indicated on the horizontal axis--for greater simplicity I have combined the rankings into four of as nearly equal size as possible, with the more "liberal-internationalist" position on the left. The <u>number</u> of senators in each ranking is indicated, separately by party, on the vertical axis. Figure 2, page 16, presents the party profile in a typical Type I case: the Reciprocal Trade Act Extension scale for 1949 (which we have already met in different form in Table 3).

Now in scale dimensions in which the parties as a whole differ as sharply as this, intra-party sectional differences are obviously at a minimum. Where almost all Democrats oppose almost all Republicans there can be no basic distinction between Southern and non-Southern Democrats. But how often is the difference between the parties this sharp? Of the 56 scales used in this study 15 fall within the category of relatively sharp party disagreement (as defined above). These 15 scale areas and the year in which they occurred are as follows:

Reciprocal Trade Act Extension, 1949
Confirmation of "Liberal" Appointees, 1949
Cut Funds for Army Engineers, 1949
Economic Controls (Defense Production Act), 1950
Universal Military Training, 1951
Increase Postal Rates, 1951


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


Figure 2. Party Profile in Area of Relatively Sharp Party Difference.




Figure 3. Party Profile in Area of Moderate Party Difference.




Figure 4. Party Profile in Area of Slight Party Difference, with "Ordinary" Distribution.




Figure 5. Party Profile in Area of Slight Party Difference, with "Bi-modal" Distribution.

Extend Rent Control, 1952
Cut Funds for Army Engineers, 1952
Cut Funds for Federal Road Aid, 1952
Economic Controls (Defense Production Act), 1953
Rubber Plant Disposal, 1953
Amend Atomic Energy Act, 1954
Amend Revenue Code, 1954
Control of Subversion, 1954
Postal Pay Increase, 1955

In 21 of the remaining scale areas there is a cut-off point such that at least two-thirds of the Democrats are on one side and at least two-thirds of the Republicans on the other, but in which one or both parties fail to meet the more strict requirement set for category I. These 21 dimensions have been designated as policy areas of "moderate" party difference. Figure 3, page 16, showing the distribution by party on the 1951 foreign aid scale, illustrates the increased overlap of attitudes found in these scales. Although the differences between the parties is still quite noticeable, sectional intra-party breakdowns also begin to reveal some interesting differences. On this particular scale, for example, the distribution of Southern and non-Southern Democratic senators is as follows:

	(Lib)			(Cons)		
	Rank I	II	III	IV	Unknown	Total
# S Dems	6	6	7	3	0	22
# non-S Dems	18	4	3	0	3	28

The two more "liberal" categories of this scale ranking thus include 22 of the 25 classified non-Southern Democrats but only 12 of the 22 Southerners.

Although it might be of some interest to analyze the extent of sectional differences in all the category II scales, it seems preferable to concentrate our analysis on the remaining 20 scale areas of "low" party cohesion. In these cases, where one or both parties are so badly split as to be unable to muster even a two to one majority on either half of the scale, some variable other than party is obviously exerting powerful influence. The graphic patterns for the scale areas of low cohesion are extremely varied, in fact, so much so that I have sub-divided them into two general categories. The first and by far most frequent is what I have termed the ordinary pattern of low cohesion. This includes those cases where the parties are still at least somewhat skewed in opposite directions or are almost identically distributed. There is, however, a very striking pattern which occasionally develops in which one party will predominate at the two polar extremes (thus presenting a bi-modal distribution) while the other party is concentrated in the middle two categories of the scale (thus resembling a normal curve). Because of its explosive implications for internal party adjustment I have regarded this rather rare situation as worthy of a separate classification of its own.

The difference between the "ordinary" pattern of low cohesion and the "bi-modal" pattern can be seen by comparing the foreign aid scales of 1953 and 1954. In the former year, shown in Figure 4 on page 16, the two parties were rather similarly spread through all four classifications (those in Rank I were the strongest supporters, those in Rank IV the strongest opponents). This was a temporary phenomenon resulting from somewhat decreased Democratic support for the aid program under a Republican administration and an even more noticeable increase in Republican senatorial support for the program. By 1954, an election year in which Eisenhower stressed his concern for the foreign aid program, the situation had changed to that indicated in Figure 5 on page 16. The Republicans by 1954 were by and large to be found either among the most enthusiastic supporters or among the most bitter opponents of the aid program. The Democrats, however, were concentrated largely in the middle categories. Comparison of Figures 3, 4, and 5 on page 16 dramatically illustrates the changing party line-up on the question of foreign aid.

The bi-modal pattern occurs for the Republicans on the foreign aid scales of 1954 and 1956. For the Democrats the 1949 cloture rule fight presents the clearest bi-modal pattern, although the Displaced Persons Act of 1950 also meets the minimum requirements for inclusion. Senate Democrats also closely approached the bi-modal pattern in the 1949 labor relations scale (see Table 3, page 14) and 1950 Revenue Act scale. In all six of these scales, including the last two marginal cases, the bi-modal pattern occurs in the ranks of the party in control of the White House. In each instance sectional cleavages within the bi-modally divided party are quite pronounced. One might conclude that the political necessities involved in winning the Presidency (as in the case of civil rights and the Democrats) or of carrying out absolutely necessary national policy (as in the case of foreign aid under the Republicans) require the party in power to push programs which threaten to split the party along sectional lines in the Senate.

Of the 20 scales of relatively slight party difference there are 11 in which both parties are sharply divided. In four additional scales only the Democrats are so split, and in five additional ones only the Republicans are so split. Table 4, page 19, presents the customary four-rank breakdown between Southern and non-Southern Democrats on the 15 scales in which the Democrats as a whole were sharply divided. The scales are arranged in a rough order to indicate the decreasing importance of the sectional division as a possible explanation for the party disarray. Thus the first-listed scale, involving the 1949 attempt to modify the Senate's cloture rule and thus facilitate passage of FEPC legislation, presents an extremely sharp division. On the other hand, the last-listed scale, on continuing aid to Tito in 1956, indicates almost identical divisions within the Southern and non-Southern Democratic ranks. On most of the scales, however, there is a fairly clear difference between what might be termed the center of gravity among the Southern Democrats as compared to that of the non-Southern Democrats.

Table 4

COMPARISON OF SOUTHERN AND NON-SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS' RANKINGS IN FIFTEEN SCALE AREAS OF LOW PARTY COHESION IN SENATE VOTING, 1949-1956

Scale Subject and Year	Type Democrat	Number of Senators in Each "Quartile" Rank				Total Classified
		I	II	III	IV	
Change Cloture Rule (FEPC), 1949	S	1	1	0	19	21
	non-S	17	4	6	5	32
Electoral College "Reform," 1956	S	1	1	1	18	21
	non-S	14	4	3	6	27
Economic Controls (DPA), 1951	S	3	3	13	0	19
	non-S	15	8	1	1	25
Displaced Persons Act, 1950	S	6	1	6	7	20
	non-S	24	3	0	2	29
Reorganize Regulatory Commissions, 1950	S	3	4	10	3	20
	non-S	17	4	3	2	26
Foreign Aid, 1954	S	3	3	11	3	20
	non-S	7	11	3	3	24
Excise Tax Cuts, 1954	S	4	6	7	4	21
	non-S	17	4	4	1	26
Foreign Aid, 1955	S	7	4	6	4	21
	non-S	18	6	3	0	27
Use of Treaty Power, 1953	S	7	3	4	4	18
	non-S	16	3	3	2	24
Foreign Aid, 1953	S	9	3	4	6	22
	non-S	15	4	3	2	24
Revenue Act, 1951	S	4	7	1	10	22
	non-S	16	5	3	3	27
Revenue Act, 1950	S	6	4	4	6	20
	non-S	14	4	0	7	25
Natural Gas Act, 1956	S	4	5	0	13	22
	non-S	15	2	2	8	27
Foreign Aid, 1956	S	5	5	7	5	22
	non-S	14	4	5	4	27
Continue Aid to Tito, 1956	S	8	2	5	7	22
	non-S	10	3	3	10	26

From this extremely brief summary of some aspects of one possible application of scale analysis one can draw additional evidence for a number of familiar generalizations. A detailed examination of all 56 scales leaves one with the impression that in most of these attitude areas the centers of gravity of the two major parties differed significantly. In almost one-third of the areas the division between the parties was quite sharp, although in another one-third the differences between them must be regarded as rather slight. Very low cohesion within one party was generally accompanied by low cohesion within the other, although in a few crucial areas one party would be bi-modally split while the other party was massed in a moderate position between the opposing wings of the former party.

To speak of "the" Southern Democrats as a monolithic bloc voting the same way on most issues during this period would be to make a very serious error of analysis. On only two of the 56 scales (1949 cloture fight and 1956 electoral college reform) did the Southern Democrats even approach unanimity (and even here Pepper and Kefauver deviated on the former and Long, Gore, and Ellender deviated--with Kefauver absent campaigning--on the latter).[14]

On a considerable number of scales, however, the center of gravity of the Southern Democrats is obviously more to the conservative and--in recent years--isolationist end of the policy spectrum. That is, both Southern and non-Southern Democrats are split within their own ranks, but two out of three Southerners support the "conservative-isolationist" view on labor-management policy, displaced persons, taxation and revenue policy, use of the treaty power, public housing, rent control, and some other economic issues, while two out of three non-Southern Democrats will support the "liberal-internationalist" viewpoint. And there still remain a good many areas in which the two sectional wings of the Democratic Party are more or less united in opposition to the Republicans or in which both wings are about equally split.

Thus we reach the melancholy conclusion that the difference in Senate voting patterns between Southern and non-Southern Democrats is a complex matter of many varying shades of gray, plus occasional spots of black and white. It would be misleading to describe the general situation in terms of some selected instance of black and white contrast, or of total lack of difference between the two. On the other hand, it seems to me of very slight value to attempt to reduce the situation to some hypothetical "average" situation (which may not correspond to a single real instance) without paying any attention to the very considerable dispersion around this central tendency. If we are to be very accurate I think such a complex situation requires at least a relatively complex description.

For many purposes scale analysis does afford an important new technique for providing more accurate descriptions of many aspects of legislative <u>voting</u> behavior. This, of course, may not throw much light upon the broad range of questions involved in a detailed legislative case study. Scaling points up the need for more careful definitions of the variables we seek to measure, as well as the necessity for a more cautious approach to the

problems of cardinal measurement.[15] Scaling affords visible proof of the serious methodological weaknesses of most current indexes of legislative attitudes. It also suggests the importance of developing relational statistics, such as our ordinal rankings, which indicate structure without attempting to establish a strict quantitative metric.[16] Scaling also constitutes an important improvement on existing techniques, such as attribute-cluster-bloc analysis, for the study of who votes with whom.

Scaling, in common with other formal disciplines such as mathematics and symbolic logic, seeks to make more obvious the relationships holding between a large number of factors. As with these other disciplines absolutely nothing is added to the significance of the original data. But to admit that nothing is added to what was already implicit in the data is not to say that we--the harrassed and imperfect observers--do not see relationships that we could not have grasped from merely observing the original data. What is there and what we know about what is there are quite different matters at the methodological level as much as they are at the epistemological level.

Like mathematics and logic, scaling can tell the omniscient mind absolutely nothing new. The results of such tautological processes are already present, in somewhat less obvious form, in the raw data. If God exists and is omniscient, then He knows all possible deductions, correlations, scale patterns, and all other possible relationships without having to perform any calculations. Hence, as has often been remarked, those who feel on a par with the Diety have no need for logic or mathematics. Those of us with lesser endowments continue to find a considerable advantage in the use of such formal techniques.

Despite its many advantages scaling is by no means a research panacea. It requires a volume of data which is often unattainable. And even given the data, scale analysis can only be useful for handling certain types of questions and not others. Thus perhaps the most important question of legislative voting analysis--<u>why</u> so-and-so votes a given way--is almost completely beyond its range. The advent of the steel plow has not entirely replaced the earlier wooden version, nor has it yet made the desert or the arctic bloom. Political scientists who, like Voltaire, seek to cultivate their gardens, may find the simpler research techniques satisfactory for some purposes. For many other purposes I think scaling offers very important advantages. And for many yet different purposes I fear we must continue the search for still other new and more powerful research tools.

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NOTES

1. W. W. Sawyer, Prelude to Mathematics (Penguin Ed.), p. 64.

2. The application of scale analysis to legislative voting has previously been carried out by George Belknap on the Senate in the 80th Congress, by Charles D. Farris (on the House of Representatives), by Duncan MacRae (for a state legislature and the House of Representatives), and others. Sociologist Jesse Bernard has even applied it to Supreme Court voting on judicial decisions. This paper summarizes parts of the author's Ph.D. thesis written under the general direction of Professor V. O. Key at Harvard University. The author is endebted to the Social Science Research Council for a training fellowship which has greatly facilitated the work. Of course, neither Professor Key nor the Council are responsible for the views expressed in this paper.

3. Honorable exceptions here are the careful work done by Herbert A. Simon on the measurement of "power," by James G. March on the measurement of "influence," and by Robert A. Dahl on democratic theory.

4. The distinction between cardinal numbers (one, two, three, etc., which assert numerical values) and ordinal numbers (first, second, third, etc., which indicate only relative position) is of vital importance. It is not, as sometimes suggested by language students, something invented to make the mastery of French or German more difficult.

5. For excellent discussions of this topic see Carl G. Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol II, #7, especially pages 50-69; Gustav Bergmann and Kenneth W. Spence, "The Logic of Psychophysical Measurement," Psychological Review (1944), reprinted in Feigl and Brodbeck, Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 103-19; and S. S. Stevens, "Mathematics, Measurement, and Psychophysics," in S. S. Stevens (Ed.), Handbook of Experimental Psychology, 1-49.

6. For some purposes and under specified conditions it may be useful to develop a composite index number which deliberately involves several different dimensions. Thus the composite "cost-of-living index" may remain constant while farm prices fall and industrial goods increase in price. Such a composite is of some use because each item can be weighted in terms of a common denominator--namely, the dollar--and the prices of an identical "market-basket of goods" can be compared for different periods. Unfortunately, an index of "liberalism" is not so useful since there is no generally accepted common denominator for weighting the importance of, say, civil rights in comparison to farm legislation, nor does each year bring up a fixed number of votes in the different areas. One year there will be many votes on civil rights and perhaps none on farm policy; the next year the situation may be the reverse. An index based on a collection of goods which changed drastically in composition from year to year (all TV sets and no citrus one year, but lots of citrus and no TV sets the next), and which consisted at any given time of items which are themselves incomparable would be laughed out of court by most economists.

7. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, p. 129.

8. For some leading references see Appendix I, page 24, and Louis Guttman, "An Outline of Some New Methodology of Social Research," Public Opinion Quarterly (1954-55), 395-404.

9. Probably the most lucid introduction to scaling is Edward Suchman, "The Logic of Scale Construction," Educational and Psychological Measurement (1950), 79-93. For a more detailed explanation see Samuel A. Stouffer et al, Measurement and Prediction, especially chapters 1, 2, 3, and 6.

10. There is a basic difference between direct measurements carried out on a physical dimension and the necessarily indirect measurements of psychophysics. In the latter the researcher never operates directly in terms of observations of the dimension itself, but must depend upon the respondents' various judgments which are assumed to be indicative of the dimension. This distinction is rightly stressed by Bergmann and Spence in their excellent article on "The Logic of Psychophysical Measurement," note 5, supra.

11. For a suggestive diagram of the relation between overall ideology, less general attitudes, and specific opinions see H. J. Eysenck, The Psychology of Politics, p. 112.

12. Bentley, The Process of Government, p. 207.

13. See Hermann C. Beyle, Identification and Analysis of Attribute-Cluster-Blocs. This was published in 1931.

14. Scale analysis thus generally confirms for the 1949-1956 period most of the conclusions reached by Professor Key in his analysis of individual roll call votes of the 1933-45 period in Chapter 16 of Southern Politics. Scaling, however, may make it easier to distinguish instances of a differing center of gravity even in those situations where there is no sharp dividing line between the sections.

15. As Herbert A. Simon has aptly observed, "most of the arguments against 'quantitizing' or 'measuring' the 'qualitative' variables encountered in the social sciences stem from ignorance of how flexible the concept 'quantity' is, and how indefinite the lines between quantity and quality." Simon, "Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power," Journal of Politics (1953), pp. 506-16, at 513 (my underlining).

16. The core of mathematics is not number, as has sometimes been said, but a concern for order or structure. James R. Newman's excellent four-folume study of The World of Mathematics makes this, and many other important points quite clear in terms which even a non-mathematician can appreciate. It may be that political scientists should concern themselves a bit less with the gadgetry of applied statistics, and a bit more with the elements of symbolic logic and pure mathematics.

APPENDIX I: A SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SCALE ANALYSIS

1. Basic Explanation of Guttman Scale Technique:

Louis Guttman, "A Basis for Scaling Qualitative Data," American Sociological Review (April 1944), 139-50.

Samuel A. Stouffer, Louis Guttman, and others, Measurement and Prediction, especially pages 3-19 and 60-90.

Edward A. Suchman, "The Logic of Scale Construction," Educational and Psychological Measurement (Spring 1950), 79-93.

2. Further Developments in Scaling Technique:

S. A. Stouffer et al, "A Technique for Improving Cumulative Scales," Public Opinion Quarterly (Summer 1952), 273-91, reprinted as Ch. 17 in M. W. Riley et al, Sociological Studies in Scale Analysis (1954).

Louis Guttman, "The Israel Alpha Technique for Scale Analysis," in M. W. Riley et al, op. cit., 410-15.

Louis Guttman, "An Outline of Some New Methodology for Social Research," Public Opinion Quarterly (1954-55), 395-404.

Paul F. Lazarsfeld (Ed.), Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences (1954), especially Ch. 5 (by Guttman) and Ch. 7 (by Lazarsfeld).

3. Logical Importance of Cumulative Scales:

Carl G. Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol II, #7 (1952), especially pages 39-69.

Gustav Bergmann and Kenneth W. Spence, "The Logic of Psychophysical Measurement," Psychological Review (1944), reprinted in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck, Readings in the Philosophy of Science (1953), pages 103-19 (especially 106-108).

4. Some Selected Applications of Scaling (including non-attitude data):

S. A. Stouffer et al, The American Soldier, Vols I and II (data is processed by methods explained in Measurement and Prediction).

S. A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties (see Appendix, pages 262-69, for use of "H-technique" of "contrived" composite items).

Margaret J. Hagood and Daniel O. Price, Statistics for Sociologists (1952 Revised Ed.), pp. 145-52 and 152-54.

Norman E. Green, "Scale Analysis of Urban Structures," American Sociological Review (February 1956), pages 8-13.

Herman M. Case, "Guttman Scaling Applied to Centers' Conservatism-Radicalism Battery," American Journal of Sociology (May 1953).

POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

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Many modern theorists of political parties see the party system not only as an adjunct to democracy but as a necessary precondition of it. In an almost complete reversal of classical democracy, these theorists argue that competition between parties, preferably two, is the very life blood of democracy.[1]

In this paper we will attempt an evaluation of this thesis as applied to conditions in three counties in a southern state. We can make no claim that our conclusions can be extrapolated beyond our data, especially to national governments, but we do claim that the theory, which we shall call the organizational theory of democracy, is not in line with our data and thus can not be accepted as fully explanatory. Specifically, we submit that the theory seriously neglects the role that public discussion of current issues plays in a democracy.

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1. Cf. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942); E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1942); Committee on Political Parties, American Political Science Association, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," The American Political Science Review (Supplement to Vol. XLIV, No. 3); Alexander Heard, A Two Party South? (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1952); Anthony Downs, "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," The Journal of Political Economy (Vol. LXV, No. 2). All of these works are not equally explicit in the statement of the theory, but all in varying degrees accept it.

The Problem

The fundamental assumption of the organizational theory of democracy is that organized activity is fundamental to modern political conditions, even though organization may lead to oligarchies. The theory makes no attempt to deny oligarchy and the existence of ruling elites. Rather it focuses on the potential divisions in the elite and looks to competition for votes as the regulative principle. The words of Schumpeter are as illustrative as any.

> We now take the view that the role of the people is to produce a government, or else an intermediate body which in turn will produce a national executive or government. And we define: the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote.[2]

To accomplish this goal Schumpeter indicates that the individuals competing for votes and power will be divided among themselves into organized parties each striving to control government. In this view, the public does not directly create political organization and political policy; the public reacts to the requests for power made by the parties and chooses from the political policies presented to it. Thus the electorate no longer plays the active role of creator of governmental policy but the passive role of choosing one group of persons to perform this duty.

Since this theory is based on the connection between democracy and parties, to evaluate it we must develop some standards other than electoral competitiveness. In turn we must put these criteria into hypotheses which are implicit in the theory and which must hold in our three cases if the theory is to be accepted.

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2. Joseph Schumpeter, Op. Cit. p. 269.

A first standard for judging the theory is that the men who actually make public decisions should be men who have this privilege primarily because of their success in electoral competition. At the minimum this means that there must be a close connection between the persons who have power[3] within any area and influential persons in the political parties. At the maximum, according to the theory, it means that those who make public decisions would not have the power to do so if they had not been electorally successful. That is, party competition would be of little value if the ability to make decisions could be retained regardless of the outcome of elections.[4] Putting this criterion in terms of the requirements of the organizational theory we can establish the first of two formal hypotheses: The greater the competition between and among parties or factions, the greater will be the participation of persons dependent for this power on election in the making of important public decisions.

A second standard is that persons who make decisions should be held accountable for their actions through the electoral process. If, after a decision is reached, the persons responsible for the decision are held accountable for their actions in elections, then the electorate

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3. We take power to mean the ability of a person to move other persons, goods, and services toward a desired goal involving the change, interpretation or maintenance of policy (Policy is defined as an agreed upon means of allocating goods, services, personnel and values in a given social structure). As such, power can be viewed as a series of relations among persons and can thus be described structurally. For a concise but thorough discussion of this view of power, see Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1953).

4. Obviously we need not maintain that this requires every man of power to be a successful competitor for the vote, but it does mean that a goodly proportion of those who participate in decision making owe their participation, directly or indirectly, to the electoral process.

would be placing a control on the decision-making process. The public might not participate directly in the decisions made, but by affirming or disapproving the candidacy of men who have made the decisions the public is holding a weapon of control over the men of power. This standard can now be put as the second of our formal hypotheses. Participants in the making of important public decisions are more likely to be held electorally accountable in an area of high party competitiveness than in an area of low party competitiveness.[5]

The Setting and Method

For a thorough evaluation of the organizational theory a body of experience is necessary to set beside our derived hypotheses. To gain information on the series of topics necessary for our purposes we selected three counties in a southern state with two main criteria in mind. (1) The counties selected should be similar as possible in population size and composition, economic base, and other social and demographic measures. (2) Each county should be as different as possible in the form and the competitiveness of their political parties. With a limit of three counties, the most desirable combination would have been a two-party county, a one-party, bifactional county, and a multi-party county.

For our two-party type we selected a county which was given the

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5. A third criterion, namely governmental responsiveness, would have been desirable, but its use was rejected on two grounds. (a) Since responsiveness depends to some measure on the creative activity of the general citizenry, this would have meant that the organizational theory was being tested on a grounds not specifically germane, although it is perhaps true that responsiveness is an integral part of any proper conception of democracy. (b) A more immediate reason for rejection was that defensible indicators of responsiveness would have required considerable data on the attitudes and ideologies of the general population, and we were in no position to obtain such data.

fictitious name of Lincoln. In the last three decades each party has held office in the county at various times, the Republicans a few times more than the Democrats. Also, the strength of each party has been so consistent that only twice in that period has the winning party amassed more than 55% of the vote, and on both of those occasions the proportion was under 60%.

A second county, christened Bryan, is a fair example of the one-party, bi-factional type, although its type-correspondence is less accurate than is that of Lincoln. It is completely dominated by one party, the Democratic, the Republicans not even running candidates for local office. Republican candidates for the presidency have won a few votes, but never many. Internally, the Democratic Party is divided into two warring factions.

Since there was no multi-party county in the vacinity, the next best type would be a one-party county characterized either by many factions or by the absence of any real factional divisions, along the lines of "friends and neighbors" politics.[6] Our third selection, Jefferson County, is a moderately good example of this latter type. The Democratic Party is dominant, for no Republican has held a major county office for more than thirty years although a full Republican slate is usually offered at each general election.[7] Internally, there are no factions to compare with the two in Bryan County, and most candidates run their campaigns on an "every-man-for-himself" basis. There tend to be congeries of candidates that polarize around a town-country split, but on the crucial test of campaign

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6. Cf. V. O. Key, Jr., with the assistance of Alexander Heard. Southern Politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949. pp. 37-41.

7. The county surveyor is a Republican and has held that office for many years. The Democrats do not seem concerned about this and they hardly need to be since the position plays an inconsequential role in the determination and execution of county policies.

co-ordination the congeries are not factions.

Data on parties, factions, political personalities and election campaigns were the first category of data gathered. A second category of data concerned the power elites in each county. The discovery and description of the power elite was based largely upon questions posed to informants about the more influential men in the area. The usual question put to an informant would go something like this: "Who are the more influential men here in public affairs; that is, men who can swing the most weight and influence other people to get in behind a project?"

A third category of data was on important decisions, particularly one issue in each county which was singled out for more intensive study. The close study of a single issue not only served to bring to light many of the practices and processes of decision making and to aid in determining the degree to which political organizations participated in the process. It also served as a means of testing a static conception of the power elite against an action situation.

The selection of a single issue for study was based on several criteria. (1) Some final, or at the minimum some tentative, resolution of the decision must have been achieved. (2) It should have been as recent as possible so that man's memory would be fairly accurate. (3) It should involve some issue which would be of material importance to many people and to be widely perceived as being important. (4) Finally, before it could be resolved it should pass through some governmental agency.

The best fit of the issues selected was in Jefferson where a county bond proposal was chosen. The only criterion on which it was shaky was its lack of immediacy, since the bonds had been approved in a special election three years previous to data gathering. In Lincoln, the principal

drawback to the issue selected, another bond election, was that it concerned only one segment of the county, a school district composing approximately one-third of the population. However, in the earlier stages consideration had been given to a county-wide program but county officials had rejected the proposal. The issue studied in Bryan, an attempt to get a new bank chartered, met three of the criteria very well, but it was lacking on the fourth point. To get a bank the local government need not have been consulted although a state agency must give its approval, but as the issue progressed local officials and the county's representative to the legislature formally took an interest in the case.

The actual gathering of data was done almost completely through contacts with residents of the counties. Newspapers and other printed sources were seldom useful, except in the preliminary identification of individuals and events. The most useful data came from conversational, unstructured interviews with all forms of schedules and note-taking during the interviews kept at a minimum. This was done on the assumption that more formal means might set an inquisitorial mood and shunt aside the kind of data desired. Retrospectively, it appears that slightly more formal methods could and should have been used, but the basic stress on informality seems wholly justified.

Selection of informants was also informal. The process of selection is best described as crescive or "snowballing." Starting with persons known to be influential, the interviewer would get leads from them to others. As more names accumulated, future choices could then be made on existing judgments of influence and on the type of information that might be gained from any one man. More rigorous methods of selection might have been used, but any technique such as judges or sampling would have required a previous

knowledge of the very kind of information that we lacked and that could only be gained through some sort of less formal procedures.

The Political Dependence of Decision Makers

For our first hypothesis to hold true three things must occur. (1) Persons with electoral or political power must participate in the making of public decisions; that is, there must be a close correspondence between the electoral and the decision-making processes. (2) There must be some decision makers who owe their place in the power elite to electoral success and not to other successes. (3) The number of such electorally dependent men should increase as party competition increases and it should be greatest wherever two parties fight for every vote.

On the first point we find a confirmation of the theory's specifications. Of the combined power elites of the three counties we find that 23 of 30 men were in one way or another heavily involved in political and electoral matters. Not all of the 23 have run for elective office, but each as a candidate, as an adviser, or as a member of a faction has taken part in bread-and-butter politics.

When this is broken down by counties the conclusion holds, though not equally for each county. In Jefferson County, the non-factional type, all seven of the top men of power were participants in political activities.[8] In the other counties the proportion was slightly less; in Lincoln eight of

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8. The list of men in the power elite was founded on two sets of data: (a) direct questions to informants as to the relative power of various persons in the area, and (b) estimates by the investigator based on past actions of persons in the decision-making process. In order to make the lists as comparable as possible, no a priori number was devised. Instead the men of power were listed roughly in order of power, and the cut point was made at the most significant break in the list. Consequently, there is a different number of men in each county listed as members of the power elite.

thirteen men were involved in politics, while in Bryan there were eight of ten. It is interesting to note that although the overall connection is in line with our expectations, the variations by county run counter to the organizational theory.

Turning to the second and third points we find this counter tendency again true and to an even greater extent. In the combined total we find only thirteen men of the 30 were either primarily or partially dependent on their electoral success. On a county-by-county basis, all seven Jefferson men were dependent on political activities for their power, and only two of the thirteen in Lincoln and four of the ten in Bryan were similarly dependent electorally. This pattern is strongly at variance with the expectations of the organizational theory, since we would expect the county of greatest electoral competition, Lincoln, to show the greatest electoral dependence of the power elite and the county of least organized competition, Jefferson, the least with Bryan somewhere between.[9]

If we reverse our logic, then, according to the organizational theory, men who are known as political leaders would more likely be men of power in an area of great competition rather than in an area of less competition. Nevertheless, even in this reversed fashion, the same pattern is found. There were at least seven men in the two-party county who were widely regarded as being very successful electorally and as influential men in political affairs but who, at the same time, were not considered as top men of power. In bi-factional Bryan County we find two such men, but in

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9. Obviously no strong, air-tight conclusions can be reached on such small numbers, but if the pattern shown here is repeated in our other measures it would then be possible to accept the pattern more readily.

non-factional Jefferson all of the men who were viewed as political leaders were also viewed as men of power.[10]

No matter from what perspective the proportions inside the power elites of the three counties are seen, the same conclusion is indicated; The organizational theory of democracy has not been an adequate predictor of the data. Where we would expect political activity to pay its highest rewards of power we find the least and where we would expect the lowest rewards we find the greatest. However, we must be careful at this point not to overstate the case, for our cases are only three and the number of persons involved is small, and we have yet to see what variations we find on accountability.

Electoral Accountability

The concept of accountability in democratic institutions has to do ultimately with the degree to which decision makers are controlled by the electorate and the closeness of fit between decisions reached and decisions desired by the public. Consequently, any thorough analysis of accountability would require data on the public's knowledge of the ways of decision making and on its ability and willingness to reward or punish decision makers for their past actions. Unfortunately, such an indicator would require vast information on the thinking and actions of the general citizenry. Lacking this we must use indirect indicators.

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10. The notion of political leader excludes that category of politician who is electorally successful for administrative posts but who is not viewed as being influential in politics. There were such men in all counties and included most of the officials holding the many administrative and semi-administrative posts that characterize county government.

The first two indicators used have to do with the relation between decision making and political organization. In the first place, we can not expect the organizational theory to be true unless the political organizations involved in electoral contests are also some of the more important channels of decision making. If this is not the case, if public decisions are reached through non-political structures, then what accountability there may be will not be through those means posited by the theory. Therefore, we should expect political organizations to be more frequently the vehicles of decision making in an area of strong party competition than in an area lacking this.

On this, our data are neither thoroughly in line with the theory nor are they directly counter to it. Bryan County, the one-party, bi-factional type, showed an almost complete overlap between the organization of decision making and political organization. No major decision, and certainly the one on which we focused primary interest, has been achieved in recent years other than through one of the factions. In all cases most of the men who worked together to bring about the resolution of some public issue were the same men who worked together in politics. At the other extreme was the two-party county, Lincoln. On no important issues were the parties means of creating policy or "selling" it to the public. The parties took a posture of aloofness from decision making. Somewhere in between was Jefferson, the non-factional or multi-factional county. Its exact position is hard to determine for the very absence of any large, easily identifiable factions makes it difficult to give an accurate picture of political organizations and decision making. The patterns of organization which were apparent in the one important decision were largely ad hoc, but there were indications that past relationships established during campaigns were used. Whatever

the exact appraisal, it is clear that the connection of the two in Jefferson was neither so strong as that in Bryan nor so weak as that in Lincoln.

A second indicator of political accountability can be the concern for the possible effects of a decision on the future electoral chances of a party, faction, or candidate. If, as the organizational theory holds, there are persons who seek the vote in order to govern, it hardly seems possible they could do so without also being concerned over the potential dangers and rewards of a certain decision on future elections. If this is so, then we would expect such concern to be greatest in areas of strong party competition and weakest in areas without such competition, with the proviso that this concern must be positive, not negative. That is, if the concern is only a means of escaping a decision of any sort by shunting it aside or to some other groups, then the presence of such concern is not an indicator of accountability.

If we look only at the positive side of this concern, we get the same pattern as we did on the previous indicator. In the two-party county there was practically no attempt to use any issues other than those which had hardened through the years as expected arguments between two old friends In Bryan each of the two factions staked their pasts and futures on issues which had just been decided or were in process of resolution. In a number of important ways, the dynamism behind some of the decisions was specificall based on how it might effect future elections. The position of Jefferson is again relatively indeterminate.

When only the negative aspect of this concern is used, we find a great deal of concern in the two counties with strong political organizations and a lesser but determinable amount in Jefferson. In Bryan, this

negative concern by the two factions in the party is part of the mutually interdependent pattern of decision making, campaigns, and electoral success, but in Lincoln it appears as only one more way in which future elections are made more predictable. To escape the unknown effects in the future of an existing issue, the parties simply refrain from any position and thus absent themselves as participants in decision making. With both the positive and negative aspects of this indicator in mind we can say that the organizational theory has again failed, but that its failure is only partial since the data on the one-party, bi-factional county are much as might be expected.

A third indicator of accountability is the involvement in election campaigns of issues relative to current public decisions. If the public is holding its elected officials responsible, it hardly seems possible that some evidence of this would not show up in campaigns. This evidence can be seen in one of two ways; (1) in discussion during the campaign of important public decisions with attempts to take credit or to expose blame and (2) in a pattern of voting which would indicate that citizens who are for or against a given decision reward those candidates who follow their position and punish others. For the most clear-cut evidence of accountability, both of these should be present.

In Bryan County both are present, the former more so than the latter. From the inception of the bi-factional split, every election has reverberated with arguments over public decisions, particularly when the leaders of each faction were up for election. Also, when the factional leaders were opposed the pattern of voting followed expected lines, and when shifts occurred they could readily be matched by the shifting positions of the factions on public decisions. The major exception is that the factional pattern of voting did not occur for all races even though the two factions had opposing candidates in those contests.

In Jefferson County, public discussion of issues was slight, but it did occur. A patterned form of voting occurred with great precision in regard to the one predominate issue of the day and practically every candidate was affected by it in terms of the position which he had taken on the question.

In Lincoln, our paragon of two-party organization, there was neither any real discussion of immediate issues nor was there any pattern of voting which would reflect such interest. There was a most consistent one along party lines, but this pattern remained the same as the issues changed, and those precincts which had been strongly Republican in the 1920's were strongly Republican in the 1950's and vice versa. Year in and year out the "issues" remained the same. For the Republicans the issues were excessive spending by the Democrats, rural virtues against the sin of the city, low taxes, honesty and efficiency in government. For the Democrats the issues were state and local progress, scalawagism, low taxes, honesty and efficiency in government. The almost total lack of issues is perhaps best illustrated by the absence in one election of any discussion, pro or con, of a recently approved outlay for one million dollars for school construction. In the words of one respondent, that matter "had been a matter of public concern and politics just did not have anything to do with it."

No matter which of the three indicators of electoral accountability is used, the organizational theory of democracy is found wanting. In every case the county which according to the theory should have shown the most is found to have had the least. This indicates that strong reservations must be held about the validity of the theory. When the results on both dependence and accountability are joined, then the lack of the expected phenomena in the two-party county becomes undeniable. With Lincoln County consistently

low on all counts, it is hard to escape the conclusion that a two-party system is no assurance of democratic governance.

Conclusion

Our evaluation of the organizational theory of democracy can be summarized in one statement: A competitive electoral process can contribute to democratic practices in decision making, but it is no assurance that it will. Because of the consistently low position of our two-party county on the various indicators, the conclusion that the kind of political organization specified by the theory is no assurance of democratic practices is justified. Such organization may contribute to democratic practices, as in the case of the bi-factional Bryan in comparison to the non-factional Jefferson, but any contention that the type of party competition is the sole or even the main factor is unwarranted. One could just as well assert, and perhaps with even greater justification, that the sole or at least the main factor is the presence of present-day issues in electoral contests. Certainly on the basis of our data, this latter proposition is more defensible than the proposition of the organizational theory.

The lack of importance attached to the involvement of issues in elections is probably the most serious weakness of the theory. By placing so much emphasis on organization, the theory loses sight of the original objective of classical democracy--that some means be found whereby the general public can choose among policy alternatives and thus have some control over the making of decisions. The importance of issues was not so much denied by the theory as it was neglected. Schumpeter put it this way:

> For all parties will of course, at any given time, provide themselves with a stock of principles or planks and these principles or planks may be as characteristic of the party that adopts them and as important for its success as the brands of goods a department store sells are

> characteristic of it and important for its success. But the department store cannot be defined in terms of its brands and a party cannot be defined in terms of its principles.[11]

Schumpeter is right in saying that a party cannot be defined by the issues it espouses, but he is wrong in assuming that parties are always concerned with purveying "principled goods." All parties may adopt some principles, but the question is not so much whether they adopt any but whether those they do adopt are actually related to the policy issues of the day. To continue his metaphor, parties may adopt goods that were once useful and then never change regardless of the changed policy conditions just as there are many general stores in rural areas still selling the goods of the past while the super-markets in the town get the trade. Republicans and Democrats in Lincoln are hucksters for the principles of yesteryear; the top men of power are the super-markets of today concerned with issues containing the breath of life.

For politics to escape ossification, it must be directed toward the live issues of the present. It cannot retreat into a game of precinct tabulation and playful innings in public office if it is to be a vital part of the decision-making process. When political parties by their own choice refuse to commit themselves to current questions or when the decision makers feel righteous in their efforts to keep their decision out of or above politics, the formal institutions for insuring political democracy become hollow shells. How widespread this is in this country is a moot issue itself, but that it can and does occur is richly demonstrated by Lincoln County.

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11. Op. Cit., p. 283.

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

International Relations Panel

North Africa in Transition: The Internal and External Consequences of The Nationalist Revolution

Paper prepared by

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The nationalist revolt of colonial peoples which contributed significantly to the change in the political configuration of Asia in the wake of World War II, has now reached a climax in French North Africa -- the Maghreb (west) as this area comprising Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia is called in Arabic. Following a decade of steadily mounting nationalist dissidence that culminated in the outbreak of violence, Morocco and Tunisia became independent in 1956, and were admitted to the United Nations the same year. Algeria, the third and largest of the Maghreb countries, is in the throes of a bitter guerrilla war that is now in the second half of its third year. At this writing, the ultimate outcome in Algeria is not known. Since a return to the status quo ante hardly seems possible, fundamental changes in Algeria's status and in its social structure are imminent. These changes, together with those taking place in Morocco and Tunisia are of vital significance not only to the future of the Maghreb itself but also to the world at large. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the nature of the internal problems confronting the Maghreb, so as to establish a basis for a discussion of the Maghreb's place in the configuration of contemporary world politics.

I

In 1956, when Morocco and Tunisia became fully sovereign independent states, political authority passed from the hands of the officials of the French protectorates to those of the militant nationalists who had waged the successful revolution against the French. In Morocco, power was restored to Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef (also referred to as Mohammed V), who only a little more than two years before had been deposed from his throne and sent into exile because of this strongly pro-nationalist tendencies. Although an absolute monarch in theory, in practice the

Sultan shares effective political power with the mobilizing forces of the nationalist revolution in Morocco, the Istiqlal Party, vestiges of the Army of Liberation, and the trade union movement. Similarly in Tunisia, French authority has gone over to the architect and executors of the revolution, the militant nationalist leader Habib Bourguiba, his Neo-Destour Party and the Neo-Destour dominated labor unions.

This transfer of political authority has opened up a new era in the history of the Maghreb. As yet, it is too early to see clearly what the future holds in store for the Maghreb. The area is in a period of transition, but signs of emerging problems are already evident even at this early stage. As a result of the changes that have been set into motion, the area can be expected to play a new role in international affairs. One has but to look at the consequences of the nationalist revolutions in Asia that preceded those in North Africa, to recognize that the victory of a militant nationalist movement in the Maghreb has created a new situation from an international viewpoint. The maps of Asia and Africa today are no longer dominated by the pink, blue and green of the British, French and Dutch empires, but rather show a multiplicity of colors and shadings of the newly independent states that have risen in their stead. Within the context of world politics, this change of colors has not taken place merely on the map. It is in point of fact revealing of the new factors in world politics (the fifteen-odd newly independent states of Asia and Africa) that have emerged as a consequence of these nationalist revolutions. Although it is evident that the Maghreb is going to play a new role in world politics, it is not clear as to what this role is going to be. A number of possibilities come to mind: a continued close relationship with France; a greater role for the United States in the area; a close relationship with the Nasser bloc of the Arab world, and indirectly a closer relationship with the Soviet Union; a closer relationship with the anti-Nasser bloc of the Arab world; membership in an Afro-Asian bloc of neutral states; membership in a western Mediterranean bloc including Spain, France and Italy; membership in an association of African independent states, etc.

Despite the obscurities over the future the new role of the Maghreb in

international affairs will be determined in large part by the manner in which the internal situation develops in the area. The crisis of nationalism in the area is not the relatively simple problem of the revolt of an indigenous population against a colonial regime. Actually, it is a much more complex situation that is reflected in the internal problems of the area because of the presence of some 2,000,000 French and European settlers in the three Maghreb countries.

II

When analyzing the internal problems of the Maghreb today, distinction has to be made between the situation in Morocco and Tunisia, where the nationalist revolution has been successful, and that in Algeria where the outcome is still to be decided. Let us first consider the situation in Morocco and Tunisia.

In the broadest sense, the problems of Morocco and Tunisia are not unique to the Maghreb. Insofar as they are concerned with the aftermath of a nationalist struggle for independence - the challenging problem of maintaining or establishing economic viability, planning for economic development and leading so-called "backward" peoples into the twentieth century - these are the familiar problems that have been faced throughout the erstwhile colonial world in which nationalist revolutions have replaced colonial regimes with newly independent states. The following statement of Abderrahman Bouabid, Morocco's Minister of National Economy, applies not only to his country but also to Tunisia, as well as to all other states recently emerged from colonial status:

> The first step of our battle for independence is achieved. It is now necessary to tackle and win the economic battle. On the result of this battle depends the strengthening of our independence and the raising of the standard of living of workers and farmers. On the result of this battle depends the grandeur and prosperity of our country. The admirable qualities of courage, initiative and organization which the entire nation demonstrated during the course of the dark years must be utilized in the interests of the economic and social transformation of the country.[1]

To the nationalists, a major purpose of independence is to alleviate the

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[1]Speech delivered to the National Consultative Assembly on December 3, 1956. Text in Al-Istiqlal, No. 36, 7 December 1956.

widespread misery and economic backwardness of the native populations which they attribute to the adverse effects of colonialism. But, except for some vague notions about "economic development," "industrialization," "agrarian reform," "technical assistance," etc., the Tunisian and Moroccan nationalists were hardly prepared to do so with concrete plans and programs. The fundamental problem confronting Morocco and Tunisia since their independence has been the working out of ways and means of winning an "economic battle" that has to be waged on two fronts: a holding operation to prevent the deterioration of the economic progress that had taken place under the protectorates; and a long range program of economic development. From the very outset, it was recognized that a certain slowdown in the economic sphere - i.e. a falling off of European (primarily French) capital investment, departure of a number of French settlers and administrators who could not adjust to the new conditions, and even a closing of a certain number of private French business enterprises -- was to be expected as a consequence of independence. The problem was to keep this deterioration of the Moroccan and Tunisian economies to a minimum. In view of the importance of the French population and of French investments in Morocco and Tunisia, the key to the holding operation was the establishment of good relationships with France while instilling confidence in the new regimes among the local French populations. It was essential not to lose large numbers of these Frenchmen for if they left, not only would the dominant sector of the economy be adversely affected, but in turn a snowballing effect would be touched off on other sectors of the economy. In addition, many essential public and private services and functions would be hampered by a loss of trained personnel, very difficult to replace. Thus, in November 1955, on his triumphant return to Morocco, Sultan Mohammed V declared:

> It is essential not to forget that Morocco has among its inhabitants a substantial number of French citizens who have contributed to its general development and more particularly to its economic prosperity. We have noted with satisfaction the understanding which most of them have shown for our people's aspiration to liberty and independence. We want them all to be reassured as to their future. We are ever ready to safeguard their interests, their rights and their personal status with due respect to Moroccan sovereignty. Our wish is to see Moroccans and Frenchmen working together for the prosperity

> of Morocco and the welfare of all with a view to consolidating their relations and safeguarding the friendship of our two countries.[2]

Similar expressions were made by Habib Bourguiba speaking in the name of the Tunisian government and by practically every Moroccan and Tunisian nationalist leader.

The independence agreements between France and Tunisia and Morocco respectively recognized the crucial role of France and the local French populations in the future well-being of Morocco and Tunisia. They sought to deal with this question through a formula of "interdependence" under which France's position and that of her nationals in Tunisia and Morocco would be protected. According to this formula, further agreements were to be concluded in which the sovereign parties would "organize their cooperation on the basis of liberty and equality, notably in matters of defense, external relations, economy and culture" and which will guarantee the rights and freedom of the French settlers.[3] Despite understandable misgivings about qualifying their hard-fought-for independence even in the slightest, the nationalists were realists enough to recognize that they needed France and their French populations to make a success of independence. As for the French, the formula of "interdependence" meant salvaging something in North Africa, for not only would it protect the position of the French nationals in Morocco and Tunisia but it would also endow France with an important priority position in economic and cultural matters.

In reality, the concept of "interdependence" was no more than a recognition of the facts of life in Morocco and Tunisia, i.e.: that Morocco and Tunisia were closely tied to France's economy; that the French settlers occupied a crucial and important position in the former protectorates; that the influences of modern

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[2]Speech from the throne, delivered November 18, 1955. English text in "Documentary Background on Recent Political Events in Morocco," French Embassy, Press and Information Service (New York), Moroccan Affairs, No. 10.

[3]The wording is from the Franco-Moroccan agreement of March 2, 1956. For Tunisia "interdependence" is provided for in the original internal autonomy conventions of June 1955 as amended in the independence agreement of March 20, 1956.

western civilization and culture present in Morocco and Tunisia were largely French influences; and that the French language was under the circumstances an indispensible vehicle for technical advancement of the two countries. From practically every viewpoint it seemed that because of existing ties between France and Morocco and Tunisia, "interdependence" would be a most reasonable means of assuring this continuity. As part of the concept of "interdependence," it was understood that France would provide most of the technical assistance and financial help to Morocco and Tunisia in their programs for economic development, although aid from elsewhere was not ruled out.

Thus it can be said that while the 1956 agreements recognized the political independence of Morocco and Tunisia, France was by no means eliminated from the scene. Despite the fact that many of the so-called "colonial" ties between the former portectorates and France were continued, independence for Morocco and Tunisia was not a sham. In effect, it meant that the Tunisians and Moroccans had reasserted the sovereign right of shaping their own destinies for it eliminated the stranglehold which the local French population, French economic interests, and the protectorate fontionaires held on policy formulation. Instead of an administration dedicated to the enhancement of the privileged position of the European populations, there was to be a limited joint undertaking between sovereign equals. On the one side, there was to be a more technically advanced nation, and on the other, two underdeveloped countries; plans and policies were henceforth not to be imposed upon the latter, but freely agreed to by them.

However agreement on a policy of "interdepe ndence" did not make it happen. Could the French remember that they were no longer dealing with "colonial subjects" but with "political equals"? Could the Moroccans and Tunisians accept and trust the French? Could the French in the Maghreb feel secure under a Moslem government? Answer to these questions could only be given after the passage of time. With the passions of the last years of the protectorates, it would take exceptional men of good-will and good-sense on both sides of make "interdepe ndence" work. Despite

these serious drawbacks, the concept of "interdependence" if successfully implemented, represented the best hope for stability, order and progress in North Africa. As has been noted, the formula could prove beneficial to all concerned. Without outside help, Morocco and Tunisia could make little progress in fulfilling the economic and social aims of their revolutions. Because of the already existing ties, France was and remains the natural country to furnish this aid. Moreover, for the Tunisians and Moroccans such arrangements with France, despite all the handicaps, had the important advantage of familiarity in customs and language. On the other hand, for the French, having heavy capital and human investments in North Africa, the nction of working cooperatively with the Tunisians and Moroccans, even on the new basis of equality, had the attraction of providing a means of safeguarding French interests in the area.

III

Unfortunately, it has not proven simple to live up to these expectations because of the extremely difficult road "interdependence" has had to traverse since Moroccan and Tunisian independence. Instead of a slow rapprochement between Morocco and Tunisia and France, a steadily widening breech has set in. On the formal side, the working out of the necessary agreements envisaged to provide the framework for "interdependence" has proceeded at a snail's pace. At various times during the past year and a half, there have been no French ambassadors in Rabat and Tunis, nor Moroccan and Tunisian ambassadors in Paris. Negotiations on such vital questions as economic aid and technical assistance have been on a sporadic "on-again - off-again" basis. What is perhaps more significant is that on the scene in Morocco and Tunisia, these strained relations with France have been accompanied by increasingly strained relations between Moslems and Europeans. There has been a growing feeling of insecurity among the latter; more and more Frenchmen have pulled up stakes; and a creeping paralysis of economic activity has set it.

The holding operation of the "economic battle" is experiencing difficulties even though independence did not bring with it a sudden breakdown of the Tunisian

and Moroccan economies. In both countries, sufficient momentum had been built up in the economy to carry it along for some time. To a certain extent, flight of capital took place even before independence. Since most of the capital (which is in the form of land, factories, stores, workshops, etc.) could not be easily made liquid, most of the Europeans adopted a cautious wait and see attitude. In the meantime, no new capital was coming in and the flight of capital was continuing. In effect, a slowing down of economic activity was taking place. Particularly hard hit was the construction and its allied industries. It soon became clear that Morocco and Tunisia were facing a serious unemployment problem. By the end of the first year of independence, Morocco's unemployed was estimated at between 300,000 and 400,000 while in Tunisia, whose population is one third that of Morocco, the figure was estimated as high as 500,000. What has brought this dangerous situation to pass? Part of it of course is attributable to the usual difficulties accompanying a change of the proportions that has taken place in Tunisia and Morocco. Not only was there the to be expected economic slowdown, but the lack of experience of the Moroccan and Tunisian nationalist leaders, whose major preoccupation in the past had been revolutionary activity rather than the discharge of responsible governmental functions, made them less effective. In the wake of the recriminations, passions and violence of the last years of the protectorates, the atmosphere was charged with mistrust and suspicion between the Moslems and Frenchmen. Such conditions in themselves could hardly be considered favorable to a peaceful and orderly transition. But in large part, this dangerous situation has been brought about by the destruction of mutual confidence between the Moslems and the French over the Algerian question, thus preventing cooler heads from prevailing and putting the "interdependence" formula to work.

The fact that the Moroccan and Tunisian nationalists are sympathetic with the cause of Algerian nationalism has long been no secret. Often in the past, the nationalists of all three Maghrebi territories had worked together in exile in the struggle against French domination. Shortly after achieving their own independence,

Moroccan and Tunisian leaders sought to play the role of intermediary between France and the Algerian nationalists, hoping in this way to pave the way for Algerian independence. From their viewpoint, there could be no peace and progress in their countries until Algeria had achieved independence. Premier Bourguiba of Tunisia underscored this situation in his first address to the Tunisian Constituent Assembly on April 17, 1956 , when he spoke of the bonds of fraternity and solidarity that tied Tunisia to its brother North African countries, Algeria and Morocco. He asked: "Must I recall that independent Tunisia suffers from the cruel war imposed upon our brother people, Algeria? The government declares that it will spare no effort in search of peaceful solutions which return to the Algerian people its national rights so that peace will reign throughout the North African countries and that the last obstacle to a complete harmony in the relations between the Tunisian and French people disappear."

During the summer and fall of 1956, as the United Nations General Assembly session, at which the Algerian question was to be considered, loomed ahead, efforts were made by Morocco and Tunisia to bring about a settlement in Algeria. Both the Sultan of Morocco and Premier Bourguiba hoped to be able to apply friendly pressure on France in favor of such a settlement. But all these hopes went up in smoke on October 23, 1956 when the French crew of a Moroccan commercial place, flying over the international waters of the Mediterranean and carrying five leaders of the Algerian Front for National Liberation from Morocco to Tunis for a meeting with the Sultan and Bourguiba, obeyed French military orders and landed at Algiers. There the Algerian nationalists were arrested.

The immediate result of this act was a rupture in the diplomatic relations between Morocco and Tunisia and France. Of more profound effect was the reaction of a Moroccan mob in Meknes, which got out of control and turned to violence, killing some fifty Frenchmen and destroying their farms and homes. The effect of the Meknes events upon the non-Moslem populations of Morocco and Tunisia was to shake their confidence in the new governments of Morocco and Tunisia. Since October the

exodus of Frenchmen, particularly from Morocco, has increased. The review Confluent, published in French in Morocco by a group of liberal Frenchmen and Moroccans and dedicated to the rapprochement of the Moroccan and French populations, drew attention to the growing fears among the French population in a survey it conducted last spring. In their conclusions, the editors reported: "Unfortunately, the killings of Meknes of October 23 and 24 have put everything in question and since that time doubt has entered into the minds (of the French) and confidence has not been renewed."[4] Last spring upwards of 30,000 Frenchmen had left Morocco and among the remaining 300,000 to 400,000 there was growing apprehension about their future.[5]

Most of the French inhabitants of Morocco and Tunisia would prefer to remain, for they know no other home but these countries and the fruits of their entire life's work are there; but without a feeling of security more and more of them are preparing their departure. Thus far, the largest group of repatriates to France has been the fonctionnaires - technicians, teachers, administrators - who are able to start life again with a new assignment in France. Although some of these fonctionnaires were asked to leave by the new authorities, neither Tunisia and much less Morocco, could afford to lose this entire group. Consequently both have made efforts to retain French technicians, administrators, and instructors necessary to the efficient functioning of their governments. But they have encountered difficulties in keeping these people despite the fact that both Morocco and Tunisia have entered into agreements with France providing for the continued employment of French personnel. As part of the plan to create an atmosphere conducive to the continued presence of the French populations of Tunisia and Morocco, judicial and cultural conventions designed to guarantee the rights of the French population have also been

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[4] Confluent, No. 11, April 1957, p. 142.

[5] The exact figure of the number of Frenchmen who have left Morocco and Tunisia is difficult to pin down. Le Monde on June 18, 1957 reported: "The number of French who have already left North Africa is difficult to evaluate. It varies according to the sources: 80,000 according to official figures and 100,000 according to other estimates which appears to be more probable."

agreed upon. Nevertheless, the atmosphere in Morocco and Tunisia, insofar as the French populations are concerned, has been increasingly troubled as relations between France and Morocco and Tunisia have been deteriorating during the past year over the Algerian question.

Since the arrest of the F.L.N. leaders in October, the major points of friction have been the stepped up material and moral aid given by the Moroccans and Tunisians to the Algerian rebels (which has infuriated the French); and on the other side, the presence of French troops in Morocco and Tunisia, which has infuriated the Moroccans and Tunisians. The stationing of French troops in Morocco and Tunisia was continued after independence on an ad hoc basis until the matter was to be settled in the subsequent "interdependence" agreements. The French had hoped and still hope to continue to have primary responsibility for the defense of Morocco and Tunisia and maintain troops in these countries under defense "interdependence" agreements. The Moroccans and Tunisians, however, resent the continued presence of French troops on their territory considering it an infringement of their sovereignty and newly won independence and a use of their territory against their brother Algerians. The question of defense "interdependence" would have been one of the thorniest issues to resolve even under the best of circumstances. It has now become that much more difficult because of the passions that have been aroused by the Algerian war. During the past year, Moroccan dockers have refused to unload French military supplies in Casablanca and other Moroccan ports, and at various times road blocks have been established to prevent movement of French troops and supplies. One of the last acts of the Guy Mollet government was to cut off economic aid to Tunisia on the grounds that Tunisia was actively supporting the Algerian rebels by harboring fellagha bands in Tunisian territory and by supplying them with military equipment. Shortly thereafter, Tunisian militia units clashed with French troops near the Algerian border and in southern Tunisia, causing casualities on both sides. Following these incidents, Premier Bourguiba announced that his government did not recognize the right of the French troops to move about freely in Tunisia and ordered

them confined to their camps. He has let it be known that he will press for the complete removal of all French troops from Tunisia to the Bizerte area, which he has indicated could remain a French military base. The question of French troops in Morocco presents an even more complicated picture. In the southern and southeastern areas of Morocco, along the ill-defined and often non-existent frontiers between Morocco and the Algerian Sahara, elements of the Moroccan Army of Liberation are still fighting the French troops in support of the Algerian rebels and in support of Moroccan "irridentist" claims to Sahara and Mauretania. Most Moroccan officials feel that their independence will be insecure so long as there are French troops on their territory. The incident of Tafilalet, in southern Morocco last January, when the local governor started an abortive revolt during the Sultan's visit to Italy, is looked upon by Moroccans as having been provoked by French military officials in the area. Moreover, the Moroccans have at no time indicated that they are prepared to permit the continued presence of a French military base of the order of Bizerte within their territory.

Complicating the question of French bases in Morocco even more is the existence of the American air-bases. In recent months there have been reports that U.S. - Moroccan discussions on the bases issue were making satisfactory progress. The question of the American bases has presented the Moroccan government with a painful dilemma. Technically, the bases are French and the United States continues to operate them as part of the ad hoc arrangement for French bases in Morocco. The Moroccans are agreeable, some are even anxious, to permit the American bases to remain. The bases employ a large Moroccan labor force and give the Moroccan government an important bargaining position with the United States on matters of economic aid and technical assistance. But if the Moroccans allow the American bases while prohibiting French bases, a severe strain will be put on Franco-Moroccan relations, and incidentally on Franco-American relations, should the United States be party to such an agreement.

IV

The foregoing picture of the breakdown of the principle of "interdependence" and the deterioration of Franco-Moroccan and Franco-Tunisian relations as a result of the Algerian war hardly portrays conditions conducive to an orderly transition to full independence, or to winning the "economic battle." From the viewpoint of the Moroccan and Tunisian nationalists, it has made the difficult transition period to independence more challenging. With the formula of "interdependence" bogging down, they are seeking other ways and means of fulfilling the mission of their independence. From the very outset, they were not overly enthusiastic about "interdependence" with France but they recognized the practical necessities involved and were prepared to live with it. But under existing conditions, they are not content to sit back and wait for the house to cave in, no matter how advantageous "interdependence" may appear to be in the abstract. As proud nationalists, they would prefer to lift themselves by their own bootstraps, but they have not lost sight of the fact that they do not have the means for large-scale economic development, nor the necessary trained personnel. Instead of relying largely on French help, they are determined to seek more and more help "elsewhere." Since a disengagement from complete dependence upon France has been one of their aims from the outset, the deterioration in Franco-Tunisian and Franco-Moroccan relations has, in this sense, not been without its advantages. But it is no simple task to find necessary help "elsewhere." The United Nations specialized agencies are already involved in rendering help in the form of moderate technical assistance programs. While these are extremely important, in themselves they do not provide an answer to the "economic battle" that has to be waged. From the viewpoint of the nationalists, the most logical place from which they can get economic help is the United States and perhaps other countries in Western Europe. But help is nor forthcoming so easily from these sources, partly because France has put up a "no trespassing" sign on North Africa.

Thus, when Vice President Richard Nixon came to Morocco in March 1957, he let it be known that any economic aid to Morocco and Tunisia will be only supplementary

to that which these countries already receive from other countries, notably France and that accordingly, Morocco and Tunisia should first and foremost address their requests for economic aid to France. Approximately a year earlier, in June 1956 when the United States decided to send wheat to Tunisia as an emergency relief measure, the matter was first cleared with the French. The Moroccans and Tunisians have greatly resented the predicament they have been put into by the American attitude.

After months of negotiations, agreements were reached under which Morocco would receive some $20,000,000 and Tunisia some $5,000,000 in economic aid. When, as a result of the Richards' Mission on the Eisenhower Doctrine, the amount of aid for Tunisia was increased by only $3,000,000 while that of neighboring Libya was increased $7,000,000, thus giving Libya a total of $23,000,000 in aid from the U.S., Premier Bourguiba voiced his resentment of the solicitude shown by the United States for French sensibilities by continuing to regard Tunisia and Morocco as a French sphere of influence. The feelings expressed by Bourguiba are shared by nearly all Moroccan and Tunisian leaders. Because of this forced dependence upon France despite their strong desires to disengage themselves from France, the Moroccan and Tunisian leaders are careful not to break completely with France. When the Mollet government suspended economic aid to Tunisia, Bourguiba's initial reaction was an angry one:

> We are decided to liberate ourselves from an economic tutelage inherited from seventy-five years of a colonial regime.... Now that we are free of the bondage of the economic convention we are going to be able to look elsewhere for the things which we need. President Eisenhower has said... that the menace to liberty comes not from cannons but from poverty and misery. When a country [i.e. France] has condemned us to asphyxiation, to misery and unemployment, all the peoples of the free world must consider themselves as collectively responsible for the consequences that may ensue. Whatever may be the desire of the United States to spare the feelings of France, it is impossible to admit that it could resign itself to the asphyxiation of a country.[6]

In contrast to this outburst is Bourguiba's address delivered a few days

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[6] Le Monde, 25 Mai 1957.

later to the Tunisian Constituent Assembly. After reiterating that "we wish to purify our relations with France of all traces of dependence," Bourguiba added with marked restraint:

> For us the problem of credits has become secondary. We can halt the projects in operation or search elsewhere for means of financing them. But what is essential to our eyes, is to revise the very basis of our economic ties with France. We wish that these lines be defined in the future in relationship to our true interests and that they be based upon sincere, friendly, and economically mutually profitable cooperation, in which there will be no place for considerations of prestige and the will to dominate.[7]

Here, in this subtle shift in emphasis from Bourguiba's initial reaction to his subsequent statement, lies one of the basic dilemmas confronting both the Morroccan and Tunisian leaders. No matter how piqued they are at the French nor how anxious they are to become fully independent of France, they always come back to the stark realization that despite everything else, France is of key importance to them in their struggle to progress towards a happier future.

V

In must not be assumed that because Morocco and Tunisia share common problems that their internal conditions are identical. On the contrary, local conditions create particular problems and even give distinct character to their common problems. For example, while the major problem for both countries is the "economic battle," its dimensions differ in Morocco and Tunisia. The former is endowed with much greater natural wealth than the latter, and therefore potentially has a more encouraging economic future. On the other hand, Tunisia's population is more advanced technically and more solidly organized socially. It is therefore able to make a relatively stronger effort in meeting most problems. Thus, the pinch of losing trained personnel is felt less in Tunisia than in Morocco. Moreover, Morocco faces the perplexing problems of integrating a vast area that has been under three separate political and economic regimes (French, Spanish and the International Zone of Tangier), and of forging national unity out of a more socially heterogeneous and

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[7] Le Monde, 29 Mai 1957.

a more geographically dispersed population.

The major differences, however, between Morocco and Tunisia are in their internal political and social pictures. Possessing a more advanced population with greater numbers of trained people, Tunisia is moving along more rapidly in the area of social and political change, and is beset by fewer difficulties in this area. The dominant nationalist force in Tunisia is the modern, western and secularly oriented Neo-Destour Party: as a result the government has been able to modernize the Islamic personal (civil) code, prohibit polygamy, grant equal rights to women in marriage and divorce. The significance of these reforms of the civil code is perhaps greater in its demonstration of the will and ability of new Tunisia to undertake such basic reform than in their immediate effect upon Tunisian society. The government has also secularized the judicial code, thoroughly revised the administrative structure of the country, and has held elections for a National Constituent Assembly and for municipal councils. It has also created a small national army and a militia, into which many of the fellaghas who fought against the French have been incorporated. No fellagha units remain outside the organized armed forces.

The National Constituent Assembly was elected on March 25, 1956 and began shortly thereafter to draft a constitution for the country. By February 1957 the task was about completed, but since then, despite repeated reports that the constitution was about to be adopted in its final form, no action along this line has been taken.[8] One of the factors delaying the adoption of the constitution is the question of continuing the monarchy. There is a strong republican sentiment in the Neo-Destour. Since independence the Bey's emoluments have been sharply reduced and members of the royal family have been stripped of immunity. Despite these anti-

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[8]Information available in June 1957 indicated that the new constitution may not be adopted until the end of 1957. An unofficial but informed summary of the draft constitution appeared in the 6 February 1957 issue of the Tunisian newspaper Le Petit Matin, which is the unofficial organ of the Neo-Destour Party and the Tunisian government. According to this draft, Tunisia is to be a constitutional monarchy with a unicameral legislature to which the prime minister will be responsible.

monarchical feeling there has been a reluctance to move against the present Bey, Lamine. Although Lamine never played a role identical to that of Morocco's Sultan during the struggle against the French, he can not be considered as having been merely a French puppet. On the contrary, at some very crucial moments during the nationalists' struggle, he gave them valuable support. It is generally assumed that Lamine, who is 76 years old, will be Tunisia's last Bey. The question at the moment is whether to have the Bey abdicate now. Since independence, the Bey has been completely eclipsed by Premier Bourguiba, even on ceremonial occasions. Once the Bey goes, it is assumed that Bourguiba would become president of the Tunisian republic.

Since the draft constitution is supposed to contain a provision permitting an easy termination of the monarchy and its replacement by a republic, it can be safely assumed that there are other factors delaying the final adoption of the constitution. It would seem that the present Tunisian government, believing its task uncompleted, is not prepared to yield power. Ruling by decree under the authority of the Bey's absolute power, the government exercises plenary powers; it has thus been able to carry out its reformist policies (such as the revision of the Islamic personal code) with a minimum of opposition. To yield power prematurely to an elected group may jeapordize the reforms and impede the introduction of additional ones. At present, the Tunisian government is controlled by the Neo-Destour Party and dominated by the forceful personality of its leader Premier Bourguiba. Around him, Bourguiba has a well-knit team of younger men headed by Bahi Ladgham, Secretary-General of the Neo-Destour who is also Deputy Premier, and the other key figure in the administration. Whereas Bourguiba is the epitome of the charismatic leader -- magnetic, dramatic, fiery, impulsive, extremely popular -- and the symbol of the Tunisian revolution, Ladgham is the reserved, methodical, efficient, behind-the-scenes coordinator and administrator. For a while, Bourguiba's leadership was challenged by Salah Ben Youssef, former Secretary-General of the Neo-Destour and for many years the "number two" man in the nationalist movement. Ben Youssef accused Bourguiba of being too

pro-French, but Bourguiba withstood the challenge, retained control of the Neo-Destour and Ben Youssef escaped to Egypt just as he was about to be arrested. On January 24, 1957, following a trial in absentia, he was condemned to death for leading a subversive movement. Since the Youssefist opposition was squashed the political scene in Tunisia has been that of a one-party system, dominated by Bourguiba's strong personality. For a government which professes strong dedication to democratic principles and a vital concern to improve the lot of the average Tunisian, this one-party system is anomolous.

In Morocco, administrative reorganization and social reform are moving more slowly. Unlike Tunisia, its population has had little or no experience with any sort of elective process, nor is its population capable of accepting easily reform of such things as the Islamic personal code. A reorganization of the country's administrative set-up was made after independence but it suffers from a dearth of trained Moroccan personnel to carry it out. A report on the post-independence situation in Morocco in the French liberal Catholic review Esprit states that

> Of the 425 posts of caid provided for in the budget, only 220 have been able to be filled. In a province as sensative as Marrakech, 33 (French) Controleurs Civils and Assistant Controleurs have been replaced by 16 caids, of whom a good half are clearly inept.[9]

It is a disturbing fact that Morocco is having great difficulty in staffing posts in the interior of the country. The few trained Moroccans prefer to remain in the capital or close by in positions of prestige that afford a greater opportunity for advancement. Attention to this state of affairs was recently drawn by Mehdi Ben Barka, one of the key leaders of the Istiqlal Party and President of the Moroccan Consultative Assembly. In addressing the middle and lower echelon leaders of his party he warned that

> access to public service must not be considered as a distinction but as a formidable mission... Independence is not a good or a booty to be divided but a heavy responsibility to complete a task that is far from being accomplished.[10]

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[9]Jean Lacouture, "Le Maroc à la Conquête de lue-même," Esprit, Juin 1957, p. 971.

[10]Al-Istiqlal, 1 Juin, 1957.

A first step towards an eventual legislative body in Morocco was taken in November 1956 when the Sultan created the Moroccan Consultative Assembly, consisting of 74 appointed members. The role of the Consultative Assembly was defined as: 1) the strengthening of contact between the sovereign and his people; and 2) the control of the executive by written questions and interpellations addressed to various ministers. The members of the Assembly were appointed as representatives of political parties, economic organizations, professions, cultural organizations, youth groups, religious groups and independents. Although only 10 out of the 74 members are specifically designated as its representatives, the Istiqlal Party dominates the Consultative Assembly.[11]

The scene in Morocco is one of less political cohesion than in Tunisia. The two major forces in the country are the Sultan and the Istiqlal Party. The country can be said to be governed by a coalition of these two forces. The political diffusion is not only the result of this sharing of effective power, but of the differences within Istiqlal itself, as well as the existence of an opposition party, the Parti Democrate de l'Independence (P.D.I.). Istiqlal is less monolithic than the Neo-Destour in Tunisia. It includes within it various tendencies, ranging from moderates to extremists; and there is no single dominating personality. Also, Moslem traditionalism plays a stronger role in Istiqlal than it does in the Neo-Destour. Theoretically, the Sultan is an absolute monarch. He is also extremely popular. But at the same time, so is Istiqlal which, moreover, has a higly organized mass following.

The Sultan and Istiqlal are dependent upon each other for it would be difficult for either to rule without the other. Istiqlal is essential to the Sultan because the very nature of his office makes it impossible for him to assume the role

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[11]The composition of the Moroccan Constituent Assembly is an follows: Istiqlal - 10, Parti Democrate de l'Independence (PDI) - 6, Independents - 6, Labor Unions - 10, agriculturalists - 18, merchants and industralists - 9, lawyers - 2, medical profession - 3, engineers - 2, Oulemas (Moslem religious authorities) - 4, Cultural Institutions - 2, Hebrew Law - 1, Youth - 3.

of an active political leader Bourguiba is in Tunisia. On the other hand, Istiqlal needs the Sultan, because in this very traditional country the prestige and influence of the Sultan throughout the country is second to none. The Sultan's significance stems not so much from the absolute power he possesses as from Mohammed ben Youssef's personality. He has the combined virtues of being the personification of Morocco's struggle for independence (as a result of his dethronement and exile by the French) and the Chief Imam of his people -- i.e. leader of the faithful. The Sultan has on several occasions committed himself to the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, but he is hesitant to give up power too quickly lest it fall into irresponsible hands. The Sultan has been building up his eldest son, Moulay Hassan, as a political figure. He has given him the title of Crown Prince (although traditionally no such office exists in Morocco, it being the prerogative of the Oulemas of Fez to name a new Sultan). Thus far no one has challenged this act of the Sultan and it is an interesting example of how the Sultan, who is the personification of tradition in Morocco, is able to flaunt tradition. In addition to the title of Crown Prince, Moulay Hassan occupies the position of Chief of Staff of the Royal Army and is a close confidant of his father.

The Istiqlal Party owes its position of strength to the leadership it exercised in the struggle for independence. Created in 1944 as an outgrowth of the earlier National Party, it has been the leading Moroccan nationalist party ever since. During the latter days of the struggle against the French it mobilized the Moroccan people. Important elements within the party formed the Army of Liberation and the Union Maroccaine Travailliste (U,M.T.). Today its strength lies in its widespread organization and in the U.M.T. Elements of the Army of Liberation have continued to exist independently of the Royal Army, which was formed out of Moroccan units in the French army. The operation of the Army of Liberation along the Algerian and Sahara frontiers have already been alluded to; it is believed that these elements are directed from within the Istiqlal Party. Within Istiqlal the forces controlling the Army of Liberation units are believed to be the more militant

members of the party leadership. Chief exponent of Morocco's claims in Sahara and Mauretania is Istiqlal's titular leader Allal el-Fassi, who has endowed this fighting with the quality of a jihad, holy war. The Army of Liberation's activities in the Sahara and Mauretania seem directed towards the dual purpose of (1) increasing Morocco's aid to the Algerian rebels and (2) laying a basis for Morocco's sharing potentially in any Saharan riches. It should be noted that this Saharan and Mauretanian campaign has received official government support, but only after it was launched by a wing of Istiqlal and a considerable amount of popular support had been built up for it.

Elements of Istiqlal working through the Army of Liberation have prodded the Moroccan government in another direction, that of accelerating programs for social and economic reform. The arrest of the five sons of El Glaoui, the late pro-French Pasha of Marrakesh, is attributed to these forces. The action is considered to be a warning of the growing discontent within Istiqlal over the lack of tangible evidence on the grass-roots level of the amelioration of the misery and poverty of the Moroccan masses. The manner in which the five Glaouis were apprehended has raised some question as to the effectiveness of the central government's authority in the more remote areas of the country. In an ex post facto action, the central authorities made an official governmental act of the arrest, but it appears that the original action was taken without their knowledge as a means of prodding them into action.[12]

Unlike Tunisia, Morocco has an opposition party -- the P.D.I. This party held four ministries in the first Moroccan government after independence. Istiqlal has always insisted that P.D.I. has little following in the country and that its

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[12]The Istiqlal in its official organ claims that such is not the case and that this interpretation is part of a campaign of disparagement conducted by certain Parisian newspapers against the independent state of Morocco. In a statement on the arrest, Al-Istiqlal (11, Mai 1957) says in part: "There is no hidden force able and willing to act outside government orders... Contrary to all the legends which the Parisian press has attempted to spread, the sons of El Glaoui are in the hands of the Minister of Interior." It should be noted that no outright claim is made that the Ministry of Interior or the Surété Nationale had anything to do with the arrest.

inclusion in the first independent government was forced by the French. Istiqlal began a campaign against P.D.I. membership in the government in the summer of 1956 but the Sultan would not be pressured at the time. Following the arrest of the five Algerian leaders in October, the Sultan yielded to the Istiqlal demands and reorganized the government, dropping the four P.D.I. ministers. Since its elimination from the government, the P.D.I. has accused Istiqlal of seeking to establish a totalitarian one-party regime in the country. It has coupled this with charges that Istiqlal, with the compliance of the police, has conducted a reign of terror against P.D.I. members. It has also claimed that the composition of the present Moroccan government has not gained the confidence of foreign investors and is thereby blocking the influx of sorely needed capital. Originally considered a party of moderation, the P.D.I. in recent months seems to have shifted to a more extreme line in an effort to gain popular support.[13] In turn the Istiqlal party has accused P.D.I. of impeding the efforts of the government and of undermining public confidence. A resolution adopted by the Moroccan Consultative Assembly on 12 June 1957 warning against insidious propaganda aimed at provoking confusion and retarding the consolidation of Moroccan independence seems directed against the P.D.I. It could be a forewarning of governmental action against the opposition.

Despite local differences in Morocco and Tunisia, the two countries fundamentally face similar political and social problems. Since independence the Moroccans and Tunisians have begun revamping the political and administrative structure inherited from the protectorates with the aim of identifying the people more closely with the government. The new governments have found that despite the great enthusiasm generated for the nationalist revolution, progress towards "Tunisification"

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[13]For example, where it first criticized Allal el-Fassi's campaign over Sahara and Mauretania, it recently came out for the very same claims. Another example is to be found in P.D.I.'s organ Democratie which in its 3 Juin 1957 issue carried an editorial "Neither Paris, Nor Washington - (But) Rabat!" which among other things charged that the Franco-Moroccan cultural convention showed little respect for Moroccan sovereignty and inferred that there was something nefarious about the aid the Moroccan development budget was receiving from the United States.

and "Moroccanization" of the administrations can only be made as fast as the people are prepared to accept responsibility. The foremost political problem confronting Morocco and Tunisia is the preparation of the Moroccan and Tunisian peoples to exercise their new found liberty. Much of Tunisian and Moroccan nationalist thinking is the product of western democratic thought; most of the Moroccan and Tunisian leaders are in principle dedicated to political and social democracy as the goal of their revolutions. But they are finding it no simple task to introduce democratic institutions among people who are used to being told what to do, and who, by habit, would respect an appointed official more than an elected one. They are finding it increasingly difficult to talk about political rights and democracy when they are faced with challenging economic social problems that require a high degree of social discipline. Many of them are coming to the realization that merely adopting the accoutrements of political democracy may achieve very little and indeed may lead to very dangerous consequences. They are therefore moving slowly and cautiously lest they be caught in the pitfalls that other Moslem states have fallen into having adopted all the trappings of western democracy without a solid social base for it. This, then, is another of the challenging problems that confront the leaders of independent Morocco and Tunisia -- how to build a socially progressive and politically democratic society out of the traditional society of the Maghreb.

VI

There remains the question of Algeria. The repercussions of the Algerian revolution on the situation in Morocco and Tunisia noted previously makes it quite obvious that no evaluation of the role of the Maghreb in world affairs is possible without taking Algeria into account. It is no overstatement to say that for the past year every issue in the Maghreb has been dominated and colored by the Algerian question. It is impossible at this time to foresee the exact nature of the settlement of the Algerian question. French policy, as developed by Resident-Minister Robert Lacoste in the Mollet and Bourgès-Maunoury governments, has rejected the notion of negotiations, pursuing instead a policy of forceful repression of the

rebellion and imposed social and economic reforms. On the other side, the F.L.N. continues to demand independence and direct negotiations, while continuing the guerrilla war in the country. Thus at the moment no negotiations are taking place and under present conditions, a military victory for eigher side seems unlikely.

The settlement of the Algerian question entails a radical revision of the status quo. It therefore lies less in Algeria than it does in Paris, for the opposition of the one million-odd French settlers to any sort of liberal change dates back many many years. In fact, the preservation of their privileges and of the inferior status of the Moslem population can be said to be the cardinal points of their thinking. In this way, they have fought every liberalizing proposal made -- from the Projet Violette in the middle thirties, to the Statute of Algeria in the middle forties, and even to the meager commune reforms introduced by Lacoste in 1956 and 1957. If the Algerian solution is to await their acceptance of a policy according equal rights and opportunities to the Moslem population, it will never come. This is not to say that there are no French in Algeria, as there were in Morocco and Tunisia, who recognize the basis and legitimacy of the Moslem grievances and who are prepared to adjust to a new situation. But such persons are in a distinct minority. The Algerian question has become a violently emotional issue both in Algeria and in France. French thinking on Algeria has been a prisoner of clichés and slogans ("Algeria, a part of France," "La Présence Francaise," "Recognize 'Algerian Personality' but not 'Algerian Nationality'", etc.) that have served to arouse passion and confuse issues rather than contribute to a rational understanding of the problem. Professor R. Aron has significantly closed his recent book appealing to French reason on the Algerian question with this quotation from Renan: "Ce qui nous manque, ce n'est pas le coeur, c'est la tête."[14]

France must apply cool-headed reasoning to the Algerian question but the experience of the last sixteen months of the Mollet government, which started out

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[14] Raymond Aron, La Tragédie Algérienne, Librairie Plon, Paris, 1957, p. 72.

promisingly in search for a solution, has made the task all the more difficult. The Mollet-Lacoste policy of pacification, i.e. combatting the rebellion with increasingly ruthless force, has inflamed passion on both sides; acts of terror and counter-terror have become more heinous every day. The gulf between Moslems and French in Algeria has been widened dangerously, and France's position in Morocco and Tunisia has been seriously jeapordized. Great efforts must be made if French public opinion and the French National Assembly are to overcome these passions and to think clearly about the future of North Africa. The sources of the passion are not only the plight of the one million Frenchmen in Algeria and the fears of further loss of French prestige in the world, but also the discovery of oil in the Sahara.

The discovery of oil, and perhaps other mineral riches, in the Sahara has tantalized the French imagination. Here, it is thought, is the answer to France's economic woes. No longer will France be at the mercy of the Arabs of the Middle East for oil; no longer will it be dependent upon others for mineral resources. No doubt, a good part of the claims of the Sahara's wealth are wishful thinking and exaggerations, for the truth is that while oil has been discovered, the extent of the fields is by no means certain. But what is certain is that getting the oil out of the desert to French and European industry is almost impossible while guerrilla warfare continues in Algeria and relations with Morocco and Tunisia remain strained. Until now, French policy has been predicated on the assumption that only by squashing the Algerian revolt, ignoring the Algerian nationalist demands and retaining full control over Algeria can the riches of the Sahara be exploited. Actually, the prerequisite to the exploitation of the Sahara is peace and stability in North Africa, something which this very French policy is jeapordizing. Another complication in the Sahara problem is that Morocco and Tunisia have claimed rights in the Sahara. Of course some of these can be thought of as tactics in the campaign of pressure on France, but it must be remembered that the Moroccan-Algerian and Tunisian-Algerian borders have never been firmly established. Aside from whatever nuisance value these claims may have, they serve notice that the states bordering

on the Sahara wish to share in its riches notwithstanding the outcome of the Algerian issue. It seems clear that only by coming to terms with the nationalists of the entire Maghreb can France expect to put to effective use the oil of the Sahara. It is one thing to discover oil in the Sahara; it is yet another to get it out.

Recognition of Algerian independence and adoption of a plan (such as the North African-French federation proposed by Bourguiba) by which France and the Maghreb states work together in exploiting the Sahara, does not mean France will automatically insure its position in the future of the Sahara or protect the legitimate rights and interests of the French inhabitants of Morocco and Tunisia as well as Algeria. However, since the situation in the Maghreb is growing worse for the French the longer the Algerian situation remains unresolved, it may be appreciably improved if France decided to come to terms with Algerian nationalism as it did with Moroccan and Tunisian nationalism. There seems to be no way out but to face facts in Algeria, which translated into action means a radical reversal of the present Lacoste policy and a recognition of the right of the Algerians to self-determination and, if need be, to independence.

Conclusion

The preceding discussion on conditions in the Maghreb point up the transitory character of the present stage of their development. In Morocco and Tunisia, the economic programs introduced thus far are little more than stop-gap measures designed to meet an emergency situation. Little progress has been made in attacking fundamental social and economic problems and in laying the groundwork for economic development. Success or failure of independence hinges on progress in these fields. Consequently the "economic battle" is going to serve as the focus of the internal and external politics of Morocco and Tunisia. When and if a settlement is reached in Algeria, the same will be true there. In the "economic battle" of the Maghreb, there are two essential elements that must be borne in mind: 1) that the Maghreb is very much dependent upon outside help and upon its European population in coping

with its economic problems since in themselves the Moslems are unable to provide the necessary capital, technical knowledge or skilled personnel; and 2) the traditional culture of the Maghreb presents considerable obstacles in the way of achieving rapid social change. These two points are certainly interrelated for the task of bringing Maghrebi society into the twentieth century can be made simpler if progress is made in winning the "economic battle." But so long as misery and poverty exist, so long will ignorance and stagnation prevail in the Maghreb, and the greater will be the risk of disorder and for demagogy to take hold.

The key problem in the immediate future is the struggle to achieve economic stability and social progress. Because of France's crucial position in the Maghreb, the direction this problem takes depends largely on the role France is going to be able to play in the area. This in turn depends upon the settlement of the Algerian question. Only then can relations between France and the area be regularized. The impact that the Algerian question has had on neighboring Tunisia and Morocco emphasizes the impossibility of dealing with the Maghreb countries individually. It would appear that stability and progress can be attained only with some kind of overall settlement between France and the Maghreb.

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S RULINGS IN THE SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASES

A paper scheduled for delivery at the American Political Science Association meetings, New York, N. Y., September 6, 1957.

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I take "effectiveness" or "efficacy" to mean a decisive effect or outcome stemming from a named cause. The named cause in this instance--the Supreme Court's ruling in the Brown case that the "separate but equal" doctrine is unconstitutional as applied to public education--has had a series of effects; and it would probably be helpful at the outset of this discussion to list the categories of effects with which I plan to deal. The question, in other words, is: effective vis a vis what or whom? The categories: effective in achieving racial integration in the public schools? effective in enlisting support from the coordinate branches of the national government? effective in obtaining cooperation from the lower courts in the judicial hierarchy? effective in stimulating community cooperation through moral exhortation as distinguished from legal compulsion?

Effectiveness in achieving racial integration in the public schools.

The major category is, of course, the first: effectiveness in achieving racial integration in the public schools. Three and a third years have passed since the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, and the status of school integration may be described as "progress: gradual." This is a strange term to use about implementation of a judicial decision. Ordinarily one does not accede gradually over a five-year period to a court order. Harry Truman might well have wished such a doctrine existed when he had to surrender to the steel industry in 1952, but prior to the school segregation order the possibility of compliance "when the spirit moves you" was limited largely to divestiture proceedings in anti-trust cases.

Let's examine briefly the content of the "progress: gradual" report on desegregation. According to the education editor of the New York Times, a record

total of 350,000 Negroes will attend classes under "integrated situations" in public schools in the South this year. Mr. Fine reports that only five hard-core states remain untouched by either school or college integration. These are South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi. In Virginia and Louisiana there are mixed classes on the college level but not in public schools. The highlights of progress for the current year are embodied in integration programs scheduled for Charlotte, Greensboro and Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Nashville, Tennessee; and perhaps Little Rock, Arkansas.

The New York Times study of 17 southern states and the District of Columbia reveals that integration is spreading rapidly in the border states (Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, Arkansas, and Oklahoma); the District of Columbia has integrated completely; and some 7 million white pupils and 2,450,000 Negroes remain in 'segregated situations.' Even in leading northern cities paying lip service to racial equality--cities like Philadelphia, Chicago and New York--segregation on a de facto basis still exists in many districts.

Why is it that forty months after a court ruling, the best we can say in reporting on its implementation is "progress: gradual"?

I believe the answer is to be found in analysis of the other categories enumerated at the outset of this discussion. The Supreme Court's rulings may be the law of the land but the Supreme Court is but one of the three coordinate segments of the national government. It functions within a framework of separation of powers and has no enforcement machinery of its own. Without support from at least one of the two other branches, it can function only as a source of moral exhortation in this type of case.

Effectiveness in enlisting support from the coordinate branches of the national government.

Since legislative stalemate on the race issue had encouraged, if not accounted for, judicial action, Congress in the past was in no position to do anything more than argue over the court's ruling. The President could have used both his power and influence to obtain support for the Court's decision but chose not to.

Following John Marshall's decision in Worcester v. Georgia, Andrew Jackson was reported to have said, "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it." It has always interested me that this tale should have been the principal example that historians, political scientists and lawyers could cite in which a President was

alleged to have denied executive sanction to a judicial decision. President Eisenhower, without formally disputing the authority of the Supreme Court, has effectively impugned its powers more than Jackson ever could. Mr. Eisenhower appears to regard the Court as an advisory body that offers gratuitous suggestions about how one might proceed in constitutional matters.

The President and the Attorney General have indicated that the Civil Rights Section in the Department of Justice cannot proceed effectively unless and until it has statutory authority. This claim was made at the same time that the Board of Immigration Appeals, which carries out voluminous functions within the Department of Justice, operates at full speed without an iota of statutory authority. The President called upon Congress to create a Commission on Civil Rights, all the while insisting that Congressional authority was necessary before such action could be taken. In the meantime, however, notwithstanding failure to submit any such proposal to Congress, the President managed to establish another commission on federal-state relations.

With legislative support a practical impossibility and executive support politely withheld, implementation of the Court's decision became the province of the lower federal courts and of organizations which could appeal for integration on non-legal grounds.

Effectiveness in obtaining cooperation from lower courts in the judicial hierarchy.

As we all know, federal judgeships are patronage appointments. At the same time, because a judge is appointed for life, he can function independently of the patronage considerations that led to his appointment initially. In view of the failure of the other two branches to support the Supreme Court's ruling in the segregation cases, it would have come as no great surprise if southern federal judges had sought to deflect from their districts and circuits the full impact of the Supreme Court's decision. On the whole, however, the lower federal courts have remained faithful to the letter and spirit of the Supreme Court's decree. Typical of the judges who have functioned in this manner is Judge Albert V. Bryan of Alexandria, Virginia. Judge Bryan had upheld segregation in Virginia as one of the three judges in the Davis-Prince Edward County School Board case that became the basis of the Supreme Court's ruling in 1954. A firm believer in segregation, Bryan had once ruled that segregation is 'one of the ways of life in Virginia.' Since the Supreme

Court's ruling, however, Judge Bryan has followed it consistently. In late July he ruled that Arlington County, Virginia, should begin integration of its schools before the constitutionality of the state's Pupil Placement Act is finally determined.

Despite the consistency of the federal judges in upholding the Supreme Court's decision, the establishment of integration by judicial decree remains a tedious and tardy process at best. Courts are designed to try cases--not national political and social issues. In trying cases there must be meticulous observation of rights of the defendant. Years may elapse before final decision in a single case. When literally thousands of cases may be undertaken pursuant to the Supreme Court's ruling, it may be another century before full integration is achieved. Let me cite but one recent example of what may happen where delays are sought.

Judge John E. Miller of the Eastern Arkansas Federal District Court last year ordered the Little Rock Board of Education to start its integration program this fall. Plans for the program were completed by Dr. Virgil Blossom, Superintendent of Schools. Integration in the high schools was to begin this year and in the elementary schools over the next seven years. A local branch of the White Citizens Council and an organization known as the Mothers League of Little Rock Central High demanded that the integration program be scrapped, and suit for an injunction was brought in the State Chancery Court. Governor Orvil Faubus appeared as a witness for the Mothers League and warned that violence would follow if integration were allowed to proceed. Chancellor Murray Reed granted the injunction, putting Superintendent Blossom and the Board of Education in the untenable position of having to obey both a federal court order to integrate and a state court order not to integrate. The following day, another federal court judge, Ronald N. Davies, voided the state injunction and ordered the integration program to proceed. Governor Faubus and the State Sovereignty Commission established by the Arkansas legislature to fight integration decided that the governor should call out the National Guard to "prevent violence" and at the same time to prevent integration when the schools opened on September 3. Judge Davies again ordered that the integration program proceed. Attorney General Brownell has been reported as "studying the situation." No mention has been made of the role played in the matter by A. B. Caldwell, former head of the Civil Rights Section and now administrative assistant to the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division. Mr. Caldwell visited Little Rock before schools opened and conferred with the governor and other officials. In all this confusion, the danger is that further time-consuming delays will halt even modest integration programs.

Effectiveness in stimulating community cooperation.

The Hyman and Sheatsley study published in the Scientific American in December made some interesting observations on attitudes toward desegregation. Although their study for the National Opinion Research Center did not present an "encouraging" picture so far as immediate acceptance of integration is concerned, they felt that the contrast between attitudes toward segregation in 1956 and 1942 did warrant optimism for the future. In 1942 fewer than one-third of persons interviewed favored school integration; today almost half endorse it. Support for school integration in the north has risen among whites from 40% in 1942 to 61% in 1956. "In the South only one white person in 50 spoke up for school integration then; today the figure is 1 in 7." Separate surveys conducted by the authors to check their findings led them to conclude that "the gains so slowly won over the last 15 years are solidly based--not easily accelerated nor easily reversed."

These changes in public opinion, coupled with the increasing role of church grous in encouraging acceptance of integration, do warrant long-range optimism. But one might well ask: should there not be, is there not a shorter road to the fulfillment of the legal right to attend a non-segregated school.

Factors that Merit Consideration in Developing a Program to Implement the Supreme Court's Decision.

A. Role of the President

In a governmental system based on separation of powers, the efficacy of a judicial decision calling for affirmative action on the part of countless other persons hinges upon support from the Chief Executive. This is in contrast to the efficacy of a decision in a case like Jencks or Service. So far as school segregation is concerned, it is, of course, not impossible that the Supreme Court's rulings could ultimately be made effective without active presidential support. Although possible, such an eventuality has more uncertainty than the safe arrival of a four-engine plane with three of the engines knocked out. Presidential support does not require use of force. It requires rather use of the prestige and influence that is so much a part of the presidential office. By calling conferences, by going personally to areas of tension, and by exercising his patronage powers judiciously, the President, even under the limitations imposed on his second term influence by the 22nd Amendment, can help to create the environment for resolution of this national problem. The President's most recent comment on the subject at his press conference on September 3rd indicates further abdication of leadership in this crucial sphere.

In response to Anthony Lewis of the New York Times, who asked whether the President would take "a personal part" in the school integration problem, Mr. Eisenhower said:

> My speaking will be always on this subject, as I have always done, urging Americans to recognize what America is, the concepts on which it is based, and to do their part so far as they possibly can to bring about the kind of America that was visualized by our forbearers.
>
> Now, it is for this reason, because I know this is a slow process, the Supreme Court in its decision of '54 pointed out the emotional difficulties that would be encountered by a Negro, even if given--or by Negroes if given--equal but separate schools, and I think probably their reasoning was correct, at least I have no quarrel with it.
>
> But there are very strong emotions on the other side, people that see a picture of a mongrelization of the race, they call it. They are very strong emotions, and we are going to whip this thing in the long run by Americans being true to themselves and not merely by law.

The President's remarks have the tragic consequence of suggesting that the Supreme Court's view of segregation in the public schools falls into the same category as demagogic fears about mongrelization. If the prestige and influence of the presidential office do not support the law of the land, the process of integration in the public schools may never be fully achieved.

B. Role of the Congress

It is perhaps premature to suggest that we have witnessed the beginning of a new trend in the legislature's role during the first session of the 85th Congress. Certainly, however, there is evidence that this Congress played an active role in policy formulation. In part this may have been due, of course, to the phenomenon of a Democratic Congress dealing with a newly elected Republican executive. On the other hand, observers in Washington sense strongly that the organization and direction of Congress at this session was geared to policy formulation and not merely to serving as a public forum and investigative body. It may well be time for political scientists to re-examine their evaluations of the policy-making role of the legislature. The curbing of the filibuster in the Senate under the ambitious and astute leadership of Lyndon Johnson made Sen. Strom Thurmond an unloved iconoclast when he staged his one-man protest against the civil rights bill. It is, of course, unrealistic to expect that Congress will pass legislation supporting the Supreme Court's decision but the taming of the dissidents from the deep south offers encouragement that the legislature will not openly embarrass those who do attempt to implement the law of the land.

C. Role of the Judiciary

It may be presumptious to suggest how judges should write their decisions but as political scientists, we must deal with the judiciary as we do with any other policy-making branch of government. The judges must, in essence, stress the law. It is unfortunate in many waysthat Chief Justice Warren allowed the dicta about the emotional impact of segregation to enter the Court's decision in the Brown case. This dictum provided the ammunition for the attack on the Court. What must be emphasized is that Brown v. Board of Education was solidly based on precedent extending back many years. The roots of Brown v. Board of Education can be found in Missouri v. Canada, Sipuel v. Oklahoma, Fisher v. Hurst, Mitchell v. U. S., Morgan v. Virginia, Bob-Lo v. Michigan, Henderson v. U. S., Sweatt v. Painter, McLaurin v. Oklahoma, and many others. Even though judges may have policy leeways available to them, it is wiser at this juncture that policy considerations be omitted from the decisionsand the legal precedents stressed.

D. Role of the Social Scientist

It is easy to moralize and temporize about basic human problems. The social scientist as both scholar and educator must seek to evaluate trends and to develop workable solutions. He must study social, political, and legal patterns on the national, state and local levels so as to devise new mechanisms to facilitate harmonious relationships between the races. I do not believe that these are overly idealistic functions. When we consider the contribution to human civilization made by such basic mechanisms as Federalism and separation of powers; when we consider the changes wrought in human responses, if not in "human nature" by the creation of such institutions as Social Security or a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; when we realize that the whole problem of human survival in this atomic age will now hinge more on the social scientist's contribution than on the physical scientist's inventions, we may have the added stimulus to find through our research and teaching and living of our own lives the way to embody the law of the land into a living social reality.

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INTENSITY, VISIBILITY, DIRECTION, AND SCOPE

By

E. E. Schattschneider

Presidential Address by E. E. Schattschneider to be delivered at the 53rd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Henry Hudson Hotel, New York City, September 5, 1957, 8:45 p. m.

NOT TO BE RELEASED BEFORE THURSDAY EVENING, SEPT. 5, 1957

I want to sketch for you a line of reasoning about politics, a way of looking at politics. Every point of view must stand on its own legs because it is not something that can be proved. Every analysis is a way of looking at something, a way of seeing something we could not see before we made the analysis. We adopt a point of view because it is suggestive and persuasive in its own inner logic.

More specifically, I want to examine politics as a strategic concept. The concept of political strategy is itself a point of view loaded with implications for the study of politics.

Strategy is the heart of politics, as it is of war.

What is the meaning of political strategy? What are the implications of the concept? Any strategy of politics assumes that there is something that we can do about politics, that we have choices, and that what we think and do and want makes a difference. It assumes that we have something to talk about and that what we think and say and do is likely to have consequences. Without these conditions there can be no political strategy.

Strategy is predicated on the notion that politics is important, important to us, for people do not take the pains to produce a strategy about anything unless they are involved in it. Somewhere along the line that extends from the trivial to the overwhelming is a point at which we abandon neutrality. We cannot help being concerned about anything provided only that it is big enough, and near enough, and moving toward us rapidly enough. If the stakes of politics are the survival of civilization, what is going to be our attitude? At the root of the idea of political strategy is the suggestion that the world has become a dangerous place in which to live. Politics, seen from this standpoint, is more than drift and more than the sum of things happening to us. It begins when we begin to fight back. This is also the point at which strategy has its origins. From the strategic point of view the meaning of politics is that it means something to us.

In a world in which we are not perfectly free, the concept of strategy implies that we are willing to attempt to discover what kind of freedom we have. Our options, it seems to me, inhere in the nature of the raw materials themselves, as demonstrated by the very inconsistency of the explanations of politics.

Political strategy consists of the search for a middle ground between two inconsistent pessimistic theories about the fluidity of opinion. At one extreme, government itself is treated as if it were propaganda figment. At the other extreme it is assumed that attitudes are so fixed by interest and the social structure that intelligence has no function in public affairs. The realm of politics lies somewhere between these extremes.

Strategy consists of the application of intelligence to the achievment of great ends. The strategy of politics is related to the meaning of politics, for if we can do nothing about politics, politics becomes a meaningless vibration. We are bound to look for the meaning of politics in the efforts of people to accomplish things because the effort to accomplish things is the essence of politics.

The word "strategy" is borrowed from the language of war; it has something to do with confliet. The exploitation of conflict in the deliberate pursuit of power places a renewed emphasis on the use of the historic democratic devices for winning power and making decisions: majority rule, elections, agitation, organization, and the formation of alternatives. I assume that it will continue to be necessary in the future to bring great decisions to a head because we are living in a crisis and the government needs the kind of support that can be won only by these processes. If I may tamper with a sentence written by General MacArthur, "In politics there is no substitute for victory in a national election."

A discussion of political strategy (as contrasted with images of politics as drift) calls for a new look at the historic institutions and procedures for making national decisions.

In dealing with the problem of strategy it might be said, perhaps, that we have a navigator's freedom. Perhaps we can justify the opinion of Gibbon that the winds and tides are always on the side of the ablest navigators. On the other hand, we are not relieved of the necessity of doing something about our future because people are sometimes stupid, for when all has been said that can be said, we can't help being prejudiced in favor of the human race.

The very fact that there are a multiplicity of interpretations of politics suggests that we may have some freedom. At least we have a choice of dogmas. This is an area in which political scientists have something to do. We need a theory of politics or a theory of political action and organization. Surely this is a legitimate academic interest. Political scientists cannot do the work of politicians, but they can provide politicians with the rationalizations involved in power and the use and functions of power, rationalizations without which politicians cannot work well.

As political scientists we are committed to the quest for meaning in politics; to commit ourselves to meaninglessness is to abandon the obligations of scholarship. Let no man boast that he has discovered chaos because chaos is the easiest thing in the world to find! It takes intelligence to make sense of politics, but it takes intelligence to make sense of anything. Political science, like Genesis, begins with chaos.

The foregoing statement about political strategy rests on the proposition that the system is dynamic, for there is little point in discussing strategy in a static system. What makes the political system dynamic? The dynamics of politics has its origin in strife. Political strategy deals therefore with the exploitation, use, and suppression of conflict. Conflict is so powerful an instrument of government that all regimes are of necessity concerned with its management. We are concerned here with the use of conflict to govern, the use of conflict as an instrument of change, growth, and unity. The grand strategy of politics deals with public policy concerning

conflict. This is the policy of policies, the sovereign policy - what to do about conflict.

All politics begins with billions of conflicts. There are billions of potential conflicts in any modern society, but only a few become significant. A democratic society is able to survive because it manages conflict, usually at the point of origin; it imposes a kind of birth control on conflict: (I have heard it said that the male alligators eat 999 of every 1000 eggs laid by the females. If this were not true there would be more alligators in the world than we could use.)

Americans hold more elections than all of the rest of the world put together, but there must be millions of issues on which we cannot vote, or can't vote on them when we want to vote on them or how we want to vote on them. One of the most conclusive ways of checking the rise of conflict is simply to provide no arena for it or to create no public agency with power to do something about it. There are an incredible number of devices for checking the development of conflict within our system. It is difficult to make an issue of the Supreme Court of the United States because it is difficult to bring the conflict to a head. It is difficult to translate the frustrations of urban life in metropolitan areas into effective governmental action because the institutions for action do not exist. Sectionalism has been an effective device for submerging some kinds of conflicts. All legislative procedure is loaded with devices for controlling the flow of explosive materials into the governmental apparatus. All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because it is the function of organization to be biased about conflict and organization is the mobilization of bias.

Perhaps it would not be inaccurate to say that there are Republican and Democratic concepts of political organization. It seems to me that the Democratic party tends to be the pro-party, while the Republican party tends to be the anti-party party. This is not evidence of the meaninglessness of party politics but of

its importance, for people do not invent competing theories of organization and antagonistic concepts of strategy about unimportant things. All I want to say is that quarrel in politics is as apt to be about the means as about the ends of politics. Why should this surprise us? Theories of political organization are identified with the things people want to accomplish, how to accomplish them, using what resources, and promoting or depressing what issues.

The government itself, the government above all else, is never fully neutral in political struggle. One major party tends to be pro-government while the other tends to be anti-government. One prominent partisan political philosopher said to me recently, "I hate government!" Do I need to tell you what his party allegiance is? We have assumed the neutrality of our institutions too easily, without regard for our history. It would be an overstatement to say that our institutions are the historic residues of conflict but it would be an overstatement of the truth.

The very fact that politics deals largely with procedure rather than substance (with power, institutions, concepts of organization, rights, and government itself, none of which are ends in themselves) demonstrates its strategic character. We get confused about the meaning of politics because we underestimate the importance of political strategy.

One difficulty scholars have experienced in interpreting American politics has always been that the grand strategy of politics has concerned itself first of all with the structure of institutions. The function of institutions is to channelize conflict, but they do not treat all forms of conflict equally, just as the football rules discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate forms of violence. This is the bias of institutions which are never neutral about all kinds of conflict.

Nobody knows what American politics would be like if we had the institutions to facilitate the development of a wider span of political competition. No matter what we do about the problem, however, it is unlikely that we shall ever become hospitable to all conflict, for the function of institutions is to discriminate among conflicts.

If politics is the management of conflict, it is necessary first to get rid of some simplistic concepts of conflict. Political conflict is not primarily or usually a matter of head-on collisions or tests of strength, for a good reason:- intelligent people prefer to avoid tests of strength unless they are sure to win.

Nor is political conflict like an intercollegiate debate in which the opponents agree in advance on a definition of the issues. The definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power; the antagonists can rarely agree on what the issues are because power is involved in the definition. He who determines what politics is about runs the country because the definition of the alternatives is the choice of conflicts.

Nor does political conflict express a one-over-one relation with economic interest or grass roots opinion. Politics is a highly strategic activity which takes account of interest and opinion but is not the same thing.

Is it possible to formulate a theory of the dynamics of politics based on more comprehensive concepts of conflict than the foregoing? The proposition I would like to have you examine with me is that American politics is in a dynamic condition (i.e. it is a proper subject of strategy) because it is sensitive to changes in the dimension and nature of conflict. More specifically the proposition is that relatively slight changes in the intensity, visibility, direction, and scope of conflict are likely to produce great consequences. Nearly all of politics can be subsumed under these four headings: intensity, visibility, direction and scope.

At the risk of seeming to imitate the schoolboy who wrote that the processes common to all living things are nutrition, digestion, exhaustion, and discretion, I want to say something about the intensity, visibility, direction, and scope of conflict and the relation of these factors to the dynamics and strategy of politics.

Political scientists have traditionally shown a strong predisposition to underestimate the future. This may be due to an historical illusion, the illusion that everything is at a standstill in the present. This is an illusion about time, but

our view of the future may be affected also by the fact that we do not know what change looks like. What makes the system dynamic? What do we look for? Simplistic concepts of conflict make the political system look stagnant because they conceal change.

There is some evidence that there has been an increase in the intensity of public involvement in politics in the past generation. Not only is the government larger and more expensive than it was a generation ago, but there has been a change in the agenda of the government. These changes are significant because (1) The assumption that the government is responsible for the economy is now well established in the public mind. (2) The cold war imposes enormous burdens on ordinary people. (3) Some important new public policies today affect large numbers of people directly and visibly. (4) Several large categories of people have been brought within the scope of public policy within recent decades:- farmers and industrial workers, for example. A third category, the Negro, is in process of being brought into the focus of politics. (5) Assumptions about the stability and survival of the social system can no longer be made as confidently as they were made fifty years ago.

Considering the extent to which the historic patterns of the political organization of the United States have been based on assumptions about public indifference, changes in intensity may have an enormous significance. A very slight change in the temperature of the mass may have important consequences at a time when the whole involvement of modern man in politics seems to be undergoing a general revision.

Changes in intensity bear none of the familiar earmarks of conflict conceived of as head-on collisions or tests of strength.

The dynamics of American politics is affected by the tendency of the system to move by indirection. The process of legislation and administration is largely the discovery of focal points at which remote controls may be applied. A few people, druggists, bankers, common carriers, public utilities magnates, importers, government

contractors, manufacturers of military supplies, farmers, food processors, financiers, and corporation lawyers are likely to be acutely conscious of the government because the government uses them to implement its policies. Most of the rest of us see the government at a distance most of the time.

Generally speaking, indirection might be expected to produce a low-grade political infection. The political consequences of public policies are likely to be highly unequal, therefore, depending on their visibility.

The place of indirection in political strategy is illustrated by the efforts of interests opposed to public housing to get local referenda on housing projects, an attempt to manipulate the visibility of the policy, or the attempt to reduce public expenditures by making taxes visible. Perhaps the government could not finance itself today if everybody who now pays taxes knew what he was doing when he paid them. The strategy of painless taxation is based on low visibility; so is private tax collection. It is by no means certain what the ultimate effects of the attempt to make the government more visible may be.

A substantial segment of the literature of political science dealing with governmental reorganization, lines of command and responsibility, simplification of procedures and structures, publicity and reporting, has a bearing on the general strategy of visibility.

In view of the tremendous use of indirection as an instrument of public policy, how close can the connection between politics and policy be? No matter how indirect the operations of the government may be it is not likely that the use of remote controls will break the connection of politics and policy. Government is only one segment of the complex with which all of us cope in all fields of human existence in a technological society. It would be a mistake to assume that the common man (and by tha that I mean all of us) is helpless in the face of these complexities. While I do not know how to make a television set and do not know what makes it work, I can evaluate the apparatus by its results. Economists describe this relation as "the

sovereignty of the consumer." Everything depends on our concept of responsibility. The difficulty here is largely a theoretical one. The casualty is not democracy but an eighteenth century concept of democracy formulated in the seventeenth century by pre-democratic philosophers who never saw a democratic political system in operation. The problem is one for the theorists. The assignment is an urgent one because we may hear next that only automotive engineers ought to be allowed to have automobiles and only obstetricians should be allowed to have babies. In spite of growing complexities the ultimate responsibility of the government to the people remains a reality for the visibility of public policy depends to a great extent on what the public is looking for, on its concept of responsibility. All I mean to say here is that it seems to me that a slight change in the visibility of government or in the public habit of seeing the government is likely to have a great impact on the outcome of conflict.

Changes in intensity and visibility have very little to do with the tug-of-war concept of politics.

Direction

The most powerful instrument for the control of conflict is conflict itself. A generation ago Professor E. A. Ross wrote:-

> "Every species of social conflict interferes with every other species in society . . . save only when lines of cleavage coincide; in which case they reinforce one another . . . . A society, therefore, which is ridden by a dozen oppositions along lines running in every direction may actually be in less danger of being torn with violence or falling to pieces than one split just along one line. For each new cleavage contributes to narrow the cross clefts, so that one might say that society is sewn together by its inner conflicts."

This is an extremely important statement and I think you recognize the implications it has had in political theory. Let us examine it. The unstated assumption made by Professor Ross is that there is a kind of equality of conflicts. If this

were really true the rise of a multitude of inconsistent conflicts would tend to weaken all of the antagonisms generated in the political system, producing a system of low-grade tensions. Is this a reasonable assumption?

Is it not much more reasonable to suppose that conflicts are of unequal intensity? What are the logical consequences of the inequality of conflicts? It seems to me that the inequality of conflicts determines the nature of the political system. If we assume that conflicts are unequal in intensity, it follows logically that the more intense conflicts are likely to displace the less intense conflicts. To revert to Professor Ross' figure, the little waves do not in fact control the big ones. What follows from the inequality of conflicts is a system of domination and subordination of conflicts. No conflict can become important unless inconsistent conflicts are subordinated. This is an essential condition of all conflict. Since this is true, every great conflict overwhelms a multitude of lesser ones. The greatest hazard in the development of any conflict is not the frontal attack by the opposition but the flank attack by bigger collateral, inconsistent and irrelevant competitors for the attention and loyalty of the public. If there are degrees of intensity of conflict, the more intense conflicts will subordinate the less intense. On the other hand, a low grade conflict is likely to find it impossible to hold its lines in competition with irrelevant high intensity conflicts. What is the result? The result is a reduction in the number of conflicts.

If I may refer once more to the ubiquitous schoolboy who described chemistry as "the study of how a thing that is busted gets together and how them that's together gets separated." The schoolboy's definition has the virtue of emphasizing combinations as well as divisions. The generalization applies equally to politics. The process is not to divide and divide and divide to infinity but to divide and unify at the same time as a part of the same process. Unification and division are parallel processes, for no conflict can develop without a tremendous consolidation of forces on both sides of the cleavage.

The most dangerous attacks that can be made on any political alignment are flank attacks which threaten to blot it out. This process is a limitation on the multiplication of conflicts. For this reason it may be said that there are great numbers of potential conflicts in the community which cannot be developed because they are subordinated to a stronger systems of antagonism. This line of reasoning is important because it has something to do with the scale and scope of conflict.

In the struggle among conflicts there is nothing sacred about our preference for big or little conflicts. All depends on what we want most. The outcome is not determined merely by what people want but by their priorities. What they want more becomes the enemy of what they want less. Politics is therefore something like choosing a wife, rather than shopping in a five and ten cent store.

I conclude that the inequality of conflicts is the decisive factor in this situation. Conflicts tend to arrange themselves in an order of domination and subordination which gives shape and form to the political system.

It now becomes proper to ask, what is the regnant form of pluralism? Perhaps it is nationalism, the greatest divisive force in the modern world. Nationalism has produced the most powerful organizations the human race has ever known.

Says Professor Hans Kohn,

> "Nationalism can claim today to be a worldwide force, the first worldwide force in history to which the peoples of all continents pay homage and loyalty."

Nationalism is the most drastic pattern of pluralism in the modern world. It follows that nationalism conditions profoundly the development of all other conflict. If this statement is accurate it ought also to dispose of the notion that organizations are powerful and intense in inverse proportion to their size, because the national state is a large organization. It is not true therefore that there is something about the political system that suggests that a modern community necessarily and inevitably breaks up into a great multitude of microscopic minorities. The scale of organization is related to what we want most and what kind of organization

is appropriate to the dominant desires or fears of people.

In the conflict of conflicts, what the conflict is about is never independent of the organization of politics. But in the very nature of things, we have some kind of choice about the sorts of things we want to make dominant. We make dominant the organizations and alignments related to what we want most.

I would be very bold, indeed, if I pretended to be able to tell you what politics is about, but the task is not as difficult as it has sometimes been made to seem. There is no more certain way to destroy the meaning of politics than to treat all issues as if they were free and equal. The inequality of issues simplifies the interpretation of politics.

The outcome of conflict is determined by changes in the direction of cleavages, and relatively slight changes of direction are likely to have great consequences.

Scope

The fourth factor in the dynamics of American politics is the scope of conflict, because the scope of conflict is likely to have a decisive affect on its outcome. In its simplest terms, the proposition is that the intervention of Harry in a conflict between Tom and Dick will change the nature of the conflict no matter what Harry does. Thereafter every addition to the number of participants changes the conflict. Any conflict is likely to be influenced decisively by changes in its scope. Political strategy deals therefore with the inclusion and exclusion of contestants because it is never true that the balance remains the same if the number is changed.

A look at the literature of American politics reveals that there is an eternal struggle between the conflicting tendencies toward the privatization and socialization of conflict. On the one hand there is a battery of ideas calculated to restrict the scope of conflict or to keep it entirely out of the public domain. Ideas concerning individualism, free private enterprise, localism, privacy, and economy are designed

to privatize conflict or to restrict its scope. The outcome of any conflict can be predetermined by confining it so narrowly that the balance of forces is known in advance. By far the most effective device is the effort to keep conflicts wholly outside of the public domain. This stratagem, if successful, makes it impossible to involve public authority in the resolution of the conflict. A tremendous fraction of all conflict is managed by this device.

On the other hand, there is another battery of ideas conducive to the socialization of conflict. Universal ideas in our civilization, ideas concerning equality, consistency, equal protection of the laws, justice, freedom of movement, freedom of speech and association tend to socialize conflict.

Governmental procedures which lend themselves to delay and structural complexities which postpone decisions tend to socialize conflict by providing occasions for the kind of agitation which is likely to increase the scope of conflict, contrary to the common opinion that the separation of powers, bicameralism and similar arrangements are antidemocratic.

The direction of political cleavages has a bearing on their scope. Sectionalism tends to restrict the scope of conflict; it tends also to suppress intrasectional conflict. This is true of all procedures tending to localize conflict. On the other hand, horizontal, national cleavages inevitably extend the scope of politics. Thus the direction and scope of cleavages are related.

Pressure politics is an important instrument for the socialization of conflict. Pressure tactics result when the losers in a private conflict find themselves in an intolerable situation and appeal to public authority for relief. The most important point about pressure politics is not that it is a conflict of private interests, but the fact that private conflicts are taken into the public domain. Pressure politics is therefore a stage in the socialization of conflict; it represents the breakdown of the attempt to privatize conflict.

The socialization of conflict shows how conflict can be used to expand the community. No group or category of people belongs to the American community until it is discovered that it is able to appeal to public authority for the redress of its grievances.

Throughout this discussion it is evident that the greatest prerequisite for the development of conflict as an instrument of public policy is an amplitude of public power. It is for this reason that the drive for privatization of conflict takes the form of an attack on government, often seen as a movement for economy. The objective is a reduction of the governmental capacity to intervene in conflict and the capacity of the community to use conflict as an instrument of public policy.

The enormous importance of the nationalization of politics becomes evident as we look at these strategies. The nationalization of politics represents both a change in the direction of political cleavage and an expansion of the scope of these clevages. It illustrates the proposition that the greatest of all civil rights is the right of freedom of movement which has played an incalculably great role in the development of the American nation. Freedom of migration has been the most effective single device in the development of a free American people. We see its significance today in the migrations of the American Negro which has nationalized the question of race relations. It is impossible to understand the role of conflict in American politics apart from the examination of the scope of conflict. I cannot help feeling that even a slight change in the direction and scope of conflict is likely to have great consequences.

From my point of view changes in the intensity, visibility, direction, and scope of conflict make the political sufficiently dynamic to sustain our interest in the study of political strategy.

PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION AS A MEANS FOR EXPRESSING PUBLIC POLICY

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I

Is the formation of public policy influenced by the operating processes of program administration? These notes upon the question represent an experiment in theory formation, an effort to project a framework of ideas within which the policy role of administration can be explored and assessed.

The effort is wholly experimental. It does not purport to supply a demonstrated or validated definition of reality. If it accomplishes its much more modest purpose, it may be, at most, a vehicle for interrelating insights, observation and experience toward more meaningful understanding of the governmental process. Neither does the effort make any claim to novelty. All of the ideas advanced here have been expressed and applied in other connections; the interrelationships among them have been at least connoted by others in the derivation of ideas from various intellectual sources. If advantage or untility remains, it results from an adjustment of intellectual focus upon the matter.

The approach used here rests upon a few working concepts that are given particularized meanings. The administrative process is viewed from the standpoint of in-group and out-group interaction. The term program context denotes the milieu within which a given combination of groups interacts toward specific action results in the society. Usually this would be an administrative agency, although in some instances the context could be confined to a constitutent part of an agency, or it could span two or more functionally related agencies. The program process refers to the life cycle that runs from the first anticipations of governmental action through the collective evaluation of the consequences realized. Public policy is identified as the values expressed through program activity, the values explicit or implicit in impacts upon the society. These concepts are chosen deliberately because they are consistent and interrelated, and above all because they fit the apparent experience of the real world.

At the outset, it is assumed that there can be no sharp separation between policy and administration. Policy is the value content of the administrative process. To elaborate somewhat upon this idea, so-called "public policy" as used here denotes the pattern of values expressed through governmental action and inherent in the societal impact of governmental activity. It should accordingly be distinguished from certain other symbols to which the policy label is often attached.

For one, the policy stated or intended by legislation may or may not be public policy in this sense. The two do not necessarily correspond. While the relationship varies too much for fixed definition, the legislative enactment seems to be largely ceremonial in many instances. Legislation usually recites a set of formal values, attributed to constitutional or other philosophical sources, but these are not inevitably the values conveyed to the society by subsequent governmental action. What the legislation does do is authorize and legitimatize a search, through administrative activity, for a set of impacts agreeable to interested groups in the society. In other words, legislation is more often a charter for undertaking policy formation than it is policy making in any conclusive sense.

Again, the policy symbol may be found in loose or premature use in the administrative activity operating under such charter. It is sometimes invoked, especially in stress situations, to explain and defend action that, from some point of view, seems to deviate from or exceed customary and established practice. Such invocations are here considered to be more often efforts to build acceptance for official action than evidence of values emerging from program activity over a period of time. They are policy materials in that they are pertinent to analysis of the values expressed in administration, but they do not in themselves necessarily embody those values. In many administrative agencies, moreover, the policy label is attached to a series of administrative releases, internal or external. Where these releases are called policy statements, they are likely to be statements of intent and purpose, as distinct from operational and procedural specifications. But the identification is no guaranty that the statements are synonymous with values expressed through actual agency operations. It would be a serious mistake to assume a direct relationship.

The idea of policy assumed in these notes needs, in addition to the limitations suggested above, an expression of the nature of the administrative process. Administration, then, is regarded as a social process of individual and group interaction, primarily the latter. (We seldom find an individual exercising much leverage in a social process, unless a strategically situated, compact group is highly responsive to his cues.) The component groups of the administrative process are all the groups in any way implicated in the program context: in-groups engaged in program performance; clientele, or out-groups in a formal sense, that share the primary impacts of in-group activity; and groups peripheral to either or both, characterized by involvement that is only superficial or sporadic. Groups and group interrelationships vary according to program context, situation and environment, and many lesser factors; there seems to be no standard or typical pattern.

In this concept of the administrative process, however, the composition of groups is of secondary significance. Of first importance is that a program effort, whatever its substance, creates a complex of groups and brings them into frictional, but interdependent, contact in the program context. Evidence preponderates that this intermeshing, inevitably set in motion by the mere fact of the program activity, thereafter dominates the program context.

In other words, the realistic model of the program context has a nucleus of capacity, a center of legal competence and special skills assembled in a formal institution adapted to their application. This institution - bureau, department, service, agency, or whatever - offers a developed capacity to instruct children, build and maintain public works, forecast the weather, or carry on some other product-directed process for which there is "public" demand. This capacity can be directed wherever demand is mobilized for its special competence, and resources will support its functioning. Interested groups in the society are drawn to interact with this nucleus because of its essentiality to accomplishment of group aims. (Groups seem to be influenced toward such interaction more by the availability of a needed capacity to administer and to produce than by goals or values shared among themselves.)

Administration is carried on, then, in this milieu: a program context consisting of an organized, special-purpose institution, itself made up of a variety of

in-groups, and a complex of more or less interested out-groups. In this program context, administration can be seen as an essentially cyclical life process, with repetitive patterns of interaction among the habitually participating groups, ranging from selection of specific production objectives to completion and delivery to the society of program products. This process merits further examination, and more will be said of it a little later. Our immediate concern is with the nature of the public policy it produces.

These notes have both stated and implied that what emerges as public policy in the real world is that which fulfills, or most nearly fulfills, satisfactions desired by the society or by certain groups in the society. The collective expression "satisfaction" is suggested here as a useful term to signify the anticipated and desired consequence of governmental program effort. Its ambiguity needs no apology; it is no more ambiguous than the motivations that influence groups to support or to resist a program effort. In any instance, of course, the satisfaction is a translation of some value held by the recipient group, but the value may be nothing more than reduction in the intensity of some anxiety, a matter of helping people to live with their fears. For example, it may be that the effectiveness of the national defense effort can be measured only in terms of the extent to which it reassures the society that the threat of successful attack is less imminent. (Unless reflection persuades the observer that the real impact desired is continuation of a substantial level of military goods procurement and the employment it supports.) Small business programs may offer another example of governmental action responsive to a need for emotional reassurance. These programs have yet to offer convincing demonstration of having made an objective difference. Nevertheless, by their mere existence, they seem to bring satisfaction in the form of solace to those smaller business competitors who feel themselves at an economic disadvantage.

In short, the groups interacting in a program context are probably seeking a variety of satisfactions that are not necessarily harmonious or consistent. Often they are in potential, if not overt, conflict. It follows that the groups are not necessarily oriented toward common goals; they may not be goal-directed at all. Their drives may be positive, seeking adjustment or continuation of a condition perceived as advantageous to the group or they may be negative, seeking defense against present or potential threat.

The concerns of the group may have a wide range. Administrative in-groups prize as satisfactions the improvement of status or broader utilization of the special skills in which they have vested competence. Out-groups may be concerned, at one extreme, with keeping public expenditure at a given level, as for highway construction, defense procurement, or welfare grants, or, at the other extreme, with keeping economic regulation within certain limits. In each program context, groups may be found with little in common save that the milieu places them in propinquity. In the larger, or government-wide, context, still broader involvements can be produced, particularly if one of several highly sensitive cues is present. Arbitrary treatment of individuals, official malfeasance, or extreme political exploitation are familiar examples of these cues.

But notwithstanding the range of concerns and the variety of satisfactions sought, interaction of groups in the program context appears to aim at a moderation of

conflict. Whatever their differentiation of interest, all groups are concerned with protecting the productivity of the program mechanism, and utilizing it for the maximum satisfaction of all. Consequently, competitions and inconsistent desires are rarely pushed to the point of check-mate. The effort is rather to balance out differences in a way that permits a combination of drives to be satisfied concurrently, with conflict not resolved, perhaps, but contained and repressed. In this way the productive strengths of the program mechanism are compounded for mutual utilization, and the interacting groups find a basis upon which a common defense can be presented against any external attack that would be damaging to all.

The result of this process of seeking moderation and at least interim balance can be regarded as an equilibrium of competing satisfactions, a maximum of satisfactions and a minimum of dissatisfactions. For so long as this equilibrium is sustained, its value content is the public policy of the program context. To be sure, it is policy consisting of a cluster of more or less disparate values rather than a neatly adjusted set of harmonious ones. The search for equilibrium, however, seeks out a way to contain destructive conflict. It is essentially a pragmatic and interim accommodation.

In summary, then, the working ideas used here regard administration as a social process of dynamic, constantly changing interaction among the in-groups, out-groups, and peripheral groups brought together in a program context. The program context centers in the availability of a pattern of program methods, capacities to produce social, economic, or other products in the society. The program process is the life process of interaction in the context, moving cyclically from the identification of production objectives to delivery of the product. Public policy is the value content of the interim equilibrium of competing satisfactions.

II

Within the framework of these working ideas, the policy formation function of the program process can be explored. Exploration necessarily begins with a brief overview of the process.

Program administration is so complex that efforts to come to grips with it in all its aspects are invariably defeating. There is an understandable tendency to lose sight of the whole in preoccupation with the more obvious parts. The extent of this tendency on the part of practitioners is exemplified in many ways: the increasing mass of agency technical, administrative and operating manuals; the preoccupation with more and more specialized techniques of planning, programming, budgeting, and methods analysis and design; the languages all their own that have grown up around personnel administration, budgetary control, and administrative accounting. The technical concerns of the program specialists are similarly absorbing. There are few fields that do not build their program mechanisms around specialized professional roles: the school teacher, the highway engineer, the construction engineer, the forester, the social worker, even the political analyst. Thoroughly difficult problems go with effective use of these technical disciplines.

They not only preoccupy the people engaged in the technical side of program administration, but tend to fend off the efforts of the non-specialized observer to analyze and understand the essence of program activity. All of this is natural, and probably inevitable. Complexity demands highly refined and disciplined treatment; refinement necessitates more intense specialization on the part of the practitioner, and with it comes a narrowing of his value perceptions.

Then too there is the point that the administrative establishment is a human organism, a macrocosm projected from the mass of human personalities that compose it. Leadership, motivation and incentive influence group behavior. Self identification, morale and internal conflict bear upon productivity. In recent years the human side of administration has won deserved attention. Studies of the internal social systems of administrative agencies contribute significantly to understanding of program administration.

Even when preoccupation with such aspects is conscientiously avoided, the multidimensional picture of the operating establishment defeats precise description. The organism has so little of the static about it that no cross section is more than an approximation. No description is as accurate or as meaningful as the "feel" of the institution, and the most important ingredients of that sense are too subtle and intangible for adequate expression. But the dominant impression is of conditioned group behavior, conditioned by a variety of managerial routines, technical operating procedures, and social mores. These conditioned behaviors seem to compound into fairly typical response patterns to recognized cues or stimuli. Response patterns, in turn, provide the basis for reliable and predictable institutional responses. Institutional response is the essence of the capacity to produce, to give satisfaction to the out-groups, perhaps as a by-product of satisfaction to the in-groups. The flux of interacting behaviors tends to be stabilized, routinized, and disciplined by the social necessities of institution self-preservation and individual role satisfaction. Autonomic behavior pervades the large institution, and is the primary source of its strength. All factors cumulate, as they must, toward the capacity of the institution to justify itself.

Whether or not the administrative institution justifies itself over a period of time depends upon how acceptably it provides program channels for the expression of group satisfactions. Satisfaction delivered is a fair price to pay for support received. A record of high productivity justifies claim to broader support. From the standpoint of the internal program operation, this means that the autonomic behavior patterns must be directed and interrelated toward producing the program products that will maximize out-group support. Among these various behaviors a kind of concurrent focus is needed that will bring the equilibrium of satisfactions to a reasonably sharp image. Attention, consequently, now turns to the ways that entrenched autonomic behavior and out-group anticipations are reconciled to provide a predictable base of production objectives. Stated in another way, this is the question of the social nature of the process of finding compatibilities among competing values.

At the outset, the dimensions of interaction should be recalled. The intermeshing groups are often complex within themselves. A professional in-group

is usually a segment of a professional group functioning in the society. Government engineers are also engineers; government physicians are part of the medical profession; government attorneys are members of the legal profession. Skill and craft employees are often unionized. People in government with such affiliations share the claims for status and satisfaction made by their group upon the society. In other words, in-groups are seldom wholly confined to the formal membership of the institution, or for that matter are they really in-groups at all. A few examples of groups without external affiliations come to mind, but these are rare. Where no direct affiliation in the external society is readily available, the tendency is to develop an axis of shared interest, such as the state education associations with the Congress of Parents and Teachers.

As for the out-groups, functional interests in the society are seldom represented by a single, compact group. More often, such an interest is responsible for a confederation of groups with definite, particularized outlooks. Agriculture breaks into several familiar affiliations, as do the various industrial and commercial groups. The appetite for positive, concrete satisfactions tends to be much stronger in the smaller, more compact group than in the larger one. There is reason to believe that the value drives of very large groups is likely to find only forensic expression; the more specific the issue, the more the large group tends to neutralize itself. For these reasons, the quest for equilibrium in the program context usually seeks to accommodate the specific satisfaction drives of the compact, articulate, more specialized groups.

The adjustment of intergroup relationships in a program content is essentially a gradual and evolutionary process. Sharp issues may be drawn when competing drives collide head-on, but the tendency is to avoid such crises, because they leave scars to be healed and animosities to be forgotten. Instead, the inclination is to seek and use recurrent occasions upon which relationships can be appropriately renegotiated. Once settlement is reached, convention requires that it be kept inviolate, unless the conditions underlying it change, until the next scheduled occasion arrives. Then all questions may be reopened. These occasions for reconsidering and renegotiating group relationships constitute a series of turning-points in policy development. There is strong evidence that the occasions are supplied by the administrative side of the program process. Planning of the future program, budget formulation, programming of operations, and personnel projections, are in many program areas the primary occasions for fashioning group adjustments. They enable the participants to put technical skills and capacities together in a set of relationships embodying an agreeable combination of production objectives. The policy function of these administrative devices warrants more detailed scrutiny.

Planning projects program activity into the future. Policy planning and program planning, for these purposes, can be viewed as parts of the same concern. Policy planning projects an impact upon the society, but tends to leave the more specific nature and interrelationship of program products to future adjustment. Program planning tends to assume the acceptability of impact; the so-called policy ingredients are implicit. Exercise of the planning function requires that both steps be taken.

The objective of planning is to anticipate future needs and to project governmental activity over some period of time in a way that will meet these needs. It may be termed a forecast of the satisfactions that will be desired at some time in the future, and a preview of the way program processes can be employed to produce these satisfactions. A time cycle is always involved, usually calculated for the accrual of a sufficient degree of satisfaction to merit an evaluation of the results produced. The planning process has important utility because it permits the orderly commitment and utilization of administrative resources so as to maximize productivity.

In the terms of this formulation, the planning process has other and possibly deeper significance. Effectively used, it becomes the means for committing out-group support over the range of the time cycle. It may even assume quasi-contractual characteristics. If support is forthcoming, certain program products will be delivered as of a future time. The out-groups are thus given assurance that continued and consistent support will bring fairly specific results. The administrative in-groups profit by greater predictability in availability of the production resources they need, and are assured of reasonably definite criteria of evaluation. The values implicit in this relationship become public policy for the period of time involved. They appear to acquire considerable tenacity; change is resisted. Stability, consistency, and predictability in effectuating the subsumed values become something of an ethic in themselves. Only a change in circumstances justifies renegotiation. The essence of planning is that adjustments are limited to known factors and to defined limits. The essential parties to the commitment are known; others are not concerned. The proportions of inter-group negotiations through the operating period are set. Altogether, the possibility of erratic influences or new group intrusions is held to a minimum. A special kind of rationality in interacting behaviors is sanctioned. In its terms, autonomic responses can be developed with propriety.

Effective policy and program planning, effective in the sense that it actually works to commit the allied groups to a set of projected working relationships, is symptomatic of tight, interdependent social structuring in the program context. The result may be regarded as a mature administrative institution. The value content of the plans to which it commits itself can be expected to be durable and highly resistant to external influences. This will be public policy for as long as the particular axis of power persists.

Speculation may turn to the reason why planning is anathema in some quarters. A suggestion is that well-executed planning produces a set of working relationships and values in a virtually closed system. Groups not original parties will probably be excluded. Even executive influence has difficulty penetrating to the inner core. The program context acquires a stubborn self-sufficiency.

Budget formulation is another occasion in program administration that can be regarded as a turning-point in policy formation. Budgeting is here conceived as the distribution of available resources among the services carried on by a given jurisdiction. In these notes, primary concern is with the policy formation implications of this process, particularly when it is viewed as a social process, and accordingly attention is focused upon the formulation of operating budgets for

rather specific program areas. The total budget process is visualized as one of combining proposals and estimates in broader and broader sets of interrelationships, as preparation, revision, and review proceed from the initiating level to ultimate authorization in the form of appropriation of funds.

Reflection upon the budget process so visualized suggests that a high point of review, and interrelationship with broader considerations, may be reached before submission of the comprehensive proposal to the legislature. These stages of the process might be identified:

1. Resource requirements of constituent activities of a program complex are prepared and justified as interdependent parts of an administrative effort, one directed at production of a given set of satisfactions.

2. The resulting proposal, or estimate, undergoes a series of reviews in which it comes into competition with other program proposals. Functional relationship among these proposals tends to diminish as review proceeds to higher levels in the executive structure. Upon completion of the chief executive's review, the budget formulation for the jurisdiction as a whole may appear to be dominated by fiscal considerations that have little meaning or value in application to any of the component program areas. The original terms of reference are lost; terms applied in their stead excite resistance from those groups that supported the several program projections.

3. This is the legislative stage. Here attention seems to revert to the program context. The questions of greatest concern to the legislative committees are the same questions that influenced agencies in the preparation of individual program estimates. The considerations that bore so significantly upon assembly of the government-wide budget are less pertinent, if not altogether forgotten.

It may be that the budget process varies significantly according to the program context from which the estimate is drawn. Estimates originating in contexts characterized by clearly-developed, long-term programs, to which in-groups and out-groups are solidly committed, may be realistically regarded as simply advance billings for commitments that none of the groups care to reconsider. This is probably often the case in such fields as highway development, land reclamation, and social welfare, among others. Observation suggests that, in such instances, the long-term program was for the most part negotiated by groups dominating the program context, with little or no external interaction. Budget review brings the first external pressure to bear upon a program thus developed, and by that time internal strengths are effectively mobilized to protect the integrity of their agreements. The likelihood is that basic policy values will be sustained and ultimately ratified, little altered, by legislative appropriation. Pressure and power are on that side; forceful countervailing power is seldom present, and if it is, probably results from an implied threat to some other strongly situated in-group.

In the reverse situation, on the other hand, where the long-term program is less tightly structured, the budget process can be seen as an effort to mobilize strengths by devising a budget proposal calculated to appeal most strongly to the

primary interacting groups. The administrative in-groups, whose concern seems to center upon the protection and, if possible, improvement of the institution, aim at a proposal that will protect internal operating integrity but at the same time command the support of the needed combination of out-groups. The value content, or public policy, of such a formulation, often seems to be less the end product than a by-product of an adroitly-designed, widely focused appeal.

On balance, the budget process can be regarded as the critical engagement in the struggle for administrative survival. The only occasion of equal importance that comes readily to mind is in the case of an agency operating under temporary legislation that must be re-enacted to prevent automatic expiration of the program. But in general, the ability to offer desired satisfactions, backed by demonstrated productive capacity, is the one best assurance of institutional continuity. From commitments so based flow the public policy patterns with the greatest tenacity and lasting effect.

When funds have been appropriated and program resources can be identified, they must be distributed among program components on the basis of functional balance, geographical distribution, relative volume, and time-phasing. For present purposes, this distribution is termed programming. It is a technique by which the current, authorized segment of program is converted into a design of operations. It is at once delegation of responsibility, authorization to produce, and expression of obligation to supporting groups.

Quite properly, effective programming is regarded as essential to sound and responsible management. It has important policy overtones as well. For one, the programming decision usually determines the level of activity at different geographical locations or projects, and this is also the level of employment and volume of productivity. For another, it is the means by which the pattern of interrelated satisfactions by the various supporting groups is compounded to maximize their shared, or competing anticipations. Then too, it sets roles and role relationships among the administrative in-groups, and this is often highly important. In short, programming decisions project the value content of the equilibrium of interests into the operations of the administrative mechanism.

This segment of program administration is relatively unexplored. Much attention is being directed to programming as a technical process, but so far there has been little probing of its policy implications. Unquestionably, supporting groups maintain their vigilance until budget allotment and work quotas are made to their satisfaction among the operations they defend. To what extent these are merely fulfillments of prior commitments is less clear. Occasionally, evidence appears to suggest that the programming function has been used to manipulate power and influence relationships. It seems apparent that such possibilities exist. It is apparent, too, that the policy values expressed in operations will be strongly influenced by the activity content of the operating program. Deeper insight awaits further exploration.

Another set of turning points manifestly influencing the values expressed in governmental action derives from the internal status system. This term, status system, refers to the pattern of self-identified groups that staff the agency,

and the typical competing drives that mark their behavior. Usually one, and sometimes several, sets of program specialists supply performance techniques. Engineers, foresters, physicists, and physicians are prominent examples. Occasionally we find subdivisions of these specialties in the same agency, as construction and electrical engineers. Under pressure, however, such subdivisions are likely to close ranks against people with different primary affiliations.

Invariably, a number of smaller, but often compact and powerful groups, as legal specialists, accountants, and economists, can and do strongly influence the way the program specialists can function. Management groups are also in the picture, exerting their own influences, which have a direct impact upon the status relationships of all other groups within the social system. Together, these groups share a common affiliation with the agency's production objectives, and its role in the governmental system, but in relationship to one another they show definite role differences, and frequently intense status rivalries.

The occasions that tend to bring these differences and rivalries to a climax are often, though not always, so-called "personnel" decisions. These are usually consequences of budgetary or program commitments that involve shifts in the role relationships of the various competing groups. Occasions of this sort are familiar. Changes in the volume of program activity require either expansion or reduction in force. Seldom are the various groups affected in identical proportions. Changes in program proportions, such as initiation of additional construction while other activities remain fixed, can alter role relationships. New areas of activity produce new power centers that force a general readjustment of power relationships. The introduction of new techniques can also have impact. The use of performance budgeting, automatic data processing, contract as distinct from force account work, can move groups into significantly different power roles.

The attitudes taken, and the pressures exerted, by the various administrative in-groups would appear to be strongly influenced by their estimates of the probable impacts of alternative courses of action upon their power, influence and status in relationship to each other. The values motivating them to settle upon one course over another would rarely be regarded as policy values. In some instances, however, a group may advance the claim that sound public policy supports a stand. For example, the decision to give the medical staff of the Veterans' Administration an independent personnel and pay system essentially was urged on policy grounds. Usually, however, status drives are expressed and justified in other terms. The policy overtones are there, nonetheless, and their consequences may be important factors in influencing the equilibrium of satisfactions. On the whole, there is good reason to believe that the major factor determining whether in-groups will respond and adjust to external pressures, or will resist them, is the group estimate of the impact of such adjustments upon the internal status system.

The turning points so far suggested may not be the only occasions in program administration that produce significant policy impacts. The renegotiation or readjustment of intergroup relations may be effected in other ways. Observation suggests that the administrative audit, the cycle survey, the manpower survey and similar devices can become weapons of some significance in the struggle for status and power among competing groups and power centers. There is reason to

believe that insufficient attention has been given to the impact of so-called management techniques upon operating activities. In some instances, at least, the objective of improved operating efficiency gives propriety and force to a wielding of power by so-called management technicians over program specialists. The policy implications of these internal power struggles could well be explored.

There are, in addition, other means for forcing, or fostering, changes in the social system, means that are more likely to be used on an intermittent than a periodic basis. Reorganization is a principal example. Whatever the reasons justifying reorganization from the administrative specialists' point of view, the primary impact perceived by the group structure is manipulation of the social system. The power and prestige positions of the various in-groups are changed in relation to one another; some may be deprived of a valuable basis of affiliation. Often the communication system is uprooted; the new one is open to conquest. The channels of out-group access are frequently so changed that important alterations in influence relationships are threatened. To a lesser extent, revision of operating methods and procedures can have similar impacts. The consequence, typically observed, is that changes will be accepted or resisted depending upon the way each group, or coalition of groups, estimates the impact upon its special and highly prized role. The implications for policy formation are obvious, but they have been seldom analyzed.

Also, brief notice should be given to the use of a familiar mechanism of defense against attacks, particularly those using the management rationale. Often this is based upon the claim by program specialists to the exclusive possession of certain skills, techniques and conditioned professional behaviors. The substance of the defense is that these indispensable capacities cannot be applied reliably unless under the exclusive control of the specialized group that asserts preclusive claim to the possession of them. From this sort of self-protective mechanism come the conventions of organizing along guild or professional lines, supervision of special groups by group members only, and a variety of others. Such conventions are frequently seen in establishments ranging all the way from state universities to regulatory bodies, the military establishments, and social welfare activities. Whenever deeply entrenched attitudes such as these are found, definite impacts upon policy expression can be expected. The drive toward elite status is an unavoidable fact of administrative behavior, and it is a putative source of policy influences.

In summary, these notes suggest that important sources, perhaps in the long run the most important sources, of public policy are found within the program context. The dynamic interplay of out-group and in-group relationships may well generate the energies that produce policy impacts upon the society. The occasions and the mechanisms most likely to prove sources of policy impacts are the regular and recurring administrative devices for committing future production objectives, allotting basic resources, and assigning authority to produce. These may be the means whereby the out-groups commanding external power negotiate and renegotiate working relationships with the in-groups possessing the indispensable capacity to produce the program products. This approach to analysis of program administration may place agency operating activities in a new and much more significant perspective.

THE PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUENCY AND PARTY ALIGNMENT

a paper presented by

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at the 53rd Annual Meeting

of the

American Political Science Association

New York City

September 6, 1957

PANEL 31

THE PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUENCY AND PARTY ALIGNMENT

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A number of observers have pointed out that the American two-party pattern has resulted at least in part from the system used to elect the President.[1] The single-ballot, single-member district system of selecting Congressmen may stifle splinter parties, such as the Socialist and Prohibition parties, which are unable to carry any congressional districts.[2] It does not, however, kill sectional third parties, like the Dixiecrats or the Wisconsin Progressives, which poll a majority in some congressional districts. Yet, these sectional parties do not survive, largely because presidential elections influence the number and kind of parties as much as or, perhaps, even more than congressional elections do. Obviously, a purely sectional party can not win a presidential election. A President can be elected only by a combination of sections, only by a party which crosses sectional lines.

The incentive for a minor party may not be to win the Presidency but to take enough strength from the major parties so that it may hold a balance of power. The system which magnifies the winner's electoral vote, however, allows only parties that can carry entire states in more than one section of the country to deprive the popular victor of enough electoral votes to throw the election into Congress. After polling more than 12 percent of the vote in the congressional elections of 1894, the Populists had no chance of influencing the presidential election in 1896

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except by supporting the Democratic candidate. Yet, fusion with the Democrats in 1896 meant the death of the Populist Party.[3] Like the Populists, the Greenback Party attained its high point in a congressional rather than a presidential election.[4] Although the Progressives of Wisconsin and the Farmer-Laborites of Minnesota became major parties in their respective states and elected governors and Congressmen, they were absorbed by the Democratic Party in presidential elections.[5] Thus, the regional party is doomed to failure in the most important objective of party strategy. In short, the system which enlarges the electoral vote of the victor enables the two major parties to defend themselves against regional as well as against other types of minor parties.

Although there have been various plans for changing this system which magnifies the electoral vote of the winner, only the so-called Lodge-Gossett and Mundt-Coudert plans have received serious congressional attention. The Lodge-Gossett Plan actually passed the Senate with the necessary two-thirds vote in 1950[6] but was rejected by the House.[7] On March 27, 1956, the Senate failed to adopt the Daniel-Mundt-Thurmond Resolution, which embodied both plans.[8] Contrary to popular belief, this proposed constitutional amendment would neither abolish the electoral college nor alter the number of electoral votes to which a state is entitled. New York, for example, would continue to have 45 electoral votes -- one for each of the State's 43 Representatives and two Senators. This involves no change. The

proposal would, however, abolish the general ticket system, which awards all of a state's electoral votes to the presidential candidate who polls a popular plurality in that state. According to the provisions of the Daniel-Mundt-Thurmond Resolution, a state could select either the Lodge-Gossett or the Mundt-Coudert formula for distributing its electoral votes among the various presidential candidates.[9]

The Lodge-Gossett Plan would divide a state's electoral votes among the presidential candidates in proportion to their popular vote in that state. In 1956, for example, Stevenson polled 50.108 percent of the popular vote and won all thirteen electoral votes in Missouri. Under the Lodge-Gossett formula, however, he would have received only 50.108 percent or 6.514 of these electoral votes. Thus, this plan would convert the state from a single-member constituency with a single-ballot system into a multi-member constituency with proportional representation.

The Mundt-Coudert Plan provides that one elector shall be chosen in each congressional district and the remainder in the state at large. Since Eisenhower carried seven of Missouri's congressional districts in 1956, he would have garnered seven of Missouri's thirteen electoral votes. Stevenson won a popular plurality in each of the other four districts and, therefore, would have received four electoral votes plus two additional ones for carrying the State. Although this plan would preserve the single-ballot, single-member district system for selecting electors, it would shift the presidential constituency from the the state to the congressional district.

TABLE I

Comparison of Electoral Votes Under Present System, Lodge-Gossett Plan, and Mundt-Coudert Plan

Year	Total	Present System			Lodge-Gossett Plan[10]			Mundt-Coudert Plan[11]			
		Republican	Democratic	Other	Republican	Democratic	Other	Republican	Democratic	Other	Uncertain
1956	531	457	73	1	296.7	227.1	7.1	409	120	2	0
1952	531	442	89	0	288.5	240.2	2.2	375	156	0	0
1948	531	189	303	39	222.5	261.2	47.3	193	299	39	0
1944	531	99	432	0	223.8	294.7	12.5	166	296	0	69
1940	531	82	449	0	214.6	310.0	6.4	135	321	0	75
1936	531	8	523	0	175.6	340.3	15.1	41	414	0	76
1932	531	59	472	0	189.6	327.6	13.8	86	366	0	79
1928	531	444	87	0	291.9	231.6	7.5	361	96	0	74
1924	531	382	136	13	258.8	191.4	80.8	295	145	15	76
1920	531	404	127	0	299.9	212.6	18.5	312	128	0	91
1916	531	254	277	0	222.1	284.3	24.6	175	271	0	85
1912	531	8	435	88	113.9	246.7	170.4				
1908	483	321	162	0	230.8	226.9	25.3				
1904	476	336	140	0	268.5	179.0	28.5				
1900	447	292	155	0	217.3	217.2	12.5				
1896	447	271	176	0	215.3	221.3	10.4				
1892	444	145	277	22	186.2	202.7	55.1				
1888	401	233	168	0	185.8	202.9	12.3				
1884	401	182	219	0	189.7	200.5	10.8				
1880	369	214	155	0	175.1	181.9	12.0				
1876	369	185	184	0	177.1	188.1	3.8				
1872	366	300	66	0	205.0	159.1	1.9				
1868	289	214	75	0	156.1	132.9	----				
1864	233	212	21	0	129.8	103.2	----				

Figures on distribution of electoral vote under Mundt-Coudert Plan are not available for elections prior to 1916.

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Careful study of these two plans shows that they contain features which would seriously alter the two-party system. One of the bulwarks of the American two-party pattern is the general-ticket system, which gives the popular victor in a state all of that state's electoral votes and which tends to translate a narrow popular victory into a safe electoral majority.

TABLE II

Percentage of the Popular and Electoral Vote Won by Candidate With the Popular Plurality[12]

Year	Popular	Electoral	Year	Popular	Electoral
1956	57.4	86.1	1908	51.6	66.5
1952	54.9	83.2	1904	56.4	70.6
1948	49.4	57.1	1900	51.7	65.3
1944	51.6	81.4	1896	50.9	60.6
1940	53.8	84.6	1892	46.1	62.4
1936	60.2	98.5	*1888	48.7	41.9
1932	57.4	88.9	1884	48.8	54.6
1928	58.1	83.6	1880	48.3	58.0
1924	54.1	71.9	*1876	50.9(?)	49.9(?)
1920	61.2	76.1	1872	55.6	82.0
1916	49.3	52.2	1868	52.7	74.0
1912	41.8	81.9	1864	55.1	91.0

This magnification of the winner's electoral vote prevents even a sectional party with a plurality in some states from depriving him of a majority in the electoral colleges. If we disregard 1912 and 1948, the minor parties have won only 35 electoral votes out of a total of 10,035 since the Civil War.[13] Moreover, as Professor Schattschneider has pointed out, the general-ticket system not only enlarges the electoral vote of the victor but also tends to exclude the minor parties.[14] For a third party can receive absolutely no electoral votes unless

its strength is sufficiently concentrated to carry at least one state. In nineteen of the twenty-four presidential elections since the Civil War, the minor parties have been excluded from the electoral vote altogether.

The Mundt-Coudert Plan would change this situation by giving electoral votes to a regional third party capable of carrying a few congressional districts even if unable to win a state-wide plurality. The Lodge-Gossett Plan would award electoral votes to minor parties unable to carry even one congressional district. Moreover, both plans would reduce the winner's electoral-vote margin and, thereby, enable the minor parties to hold a balance of power.

Although the Mundt-Coudert Plan would have given the popular victor an electoral majority in the last eleven elections, the electoral-vote margin would have been sufficiently small on several occasions for a regional third party, such as a Southern States Rights Party, to have held a balance of power. This would have been the case in 1916, 1944, 1948, and perhaps in 1932 and 1940 as well.[15] While the Mundt-Coudert Plan would give a balance of power to regional third parties capable of carrying enough congressional districts to prevent the popular victor from winning a majority of the electoral vote, the Lodge Gossett Plan would award this balance-of-power position to splinter parties lacking enough regional strength to carry even a single congressional district. As a matter of fact, the Lodge-Gossett Plan would have prevented any party from winning a majority of

the electoral vote in nine of the past twenty-four elections: 1880, 1884, 1892, 1896, 1900, 1908, 1912, 1924, and 1948.[16] In this respect, the Lodge-Gossett Plan would enhance the bargaining power of third parties even more than would the Mundt-Coudert Plan. The present general-ticket system, by magnifying the electoral vote of the popular victor, deprives minor parties of this leverage and thus induces them to compromise with other minorities in one of the two major parties.

Under the majority electoral-vote requirement, these nine elections would have been thrown into Congress, where a regional or other faction could have held the balance of power. Therefore, if presidential elections were decided in Congress rather than in the electoral colleges, third parties or other factions would have every reason to cease being mere presidential parties and to attempt to win congressional seats even if they might have no hope of gaining a majority.[17] An alternative to throwing these elections into Congress would be adoption of the so-called Lucas amendment, which would reduce the electoral-vote requirement from a majority to forty percent.[18] The present requirement of an electoral majority, however, compels minorities to modify their extreme demands and seek terms of accommodation with other groups in order to form a party capable of winning a majority of the electoral votes. This incentive to compromise would be eliminated if the majority requirement were removed.

At least one discussant, Mr. Harvie Williams, agrees with Senator Daniel, Senator Mundt, and me that reduction of the

electoral requirement from a majority to forty percent is likely to encourage third parties.[19] Moreover, some of the proponents of these measures must anticipate that their plans will result in a multi-party system. For they suggest further reducing the electoral requirement to thirty or thirty-five percent on the ground that splitting each state's electoral vote might result in no candidate's receiving forty percent of the electoral vote?[20]

In short, the Lodge-Gossett and Mundt-Coudert plans would provide the minor parties with a real raison d'être. Without the Lucas amendment, these plans would enable a third party to deprive the popular victor of an electoral majority and to throw the election into Congress, where States Righters, Progressives, or some other minority would be in the saddle. No longer could it be argued that the supporters of minor parties waste their votes. Adoption of the Lucas amendment, on the other hand, would remove a powerful inducement to that compromise which is essential for the existence of a two-party system. In this way, abolition of the general-ticket system would endanger the two-party pattern.

The two-party system would be jeopardized not only by enhancing the power of third parties but also by shifting the balance between the two major parties. A few simple calculations show that the Lodge-Gossett Plan consistently magnifies the Democratic electoral vote while it diminishes the Republican electoral vote. In every one of the last twenty elections, the

formula would have given the Republican candidate a smaller percentage of the electoral vote than that to which he was entitled by his percentage of the popular vote. Conversely, the Democrat's portion of the electoral vote would have been larger than his portion of the popular vote in eighteen of the last twenty elections.

TABLE III

Year	Republican Party			Democratic Party		
	Percent of electoral vote under Lodge plan	Percent of popular vote	Difference	Percent of electoral vote under Lodge plan	Percent of popular vote	Difference
1956	55.877	57.371	-1.479	42.779	41.968	+0.811
1952	54.532	55.136	-0.604	45.241	44.377	+0.864
1948	41.902	44.988	-3.086	49.190	49.363	-0.173
1944	42.147	45.869	-3.722	55.499	51.644	+3.855
1940	40.414	44.770	-4.356	58.380	53.847	+4.533
1936	33.070	36.539	-3.469	64.087	60.194	+3.893
1932	35.706	39.651	-3.945	61.695	57.411	+4.284
1928	54.972	58.110	-3.138	43.616	40.793	+2.823
1924	48.738	54.054	-5.316	36.045	28.828	+7.217
1920	56.478	61.237	-4.759	40.038	34.666	+5.372
1916	41.827	46.058	-4.231	53.540	49.265	+4.275
1912	21.450	23.178	-1.728	46.460	41.821	+4.639
1908	47.785	51.581	-3.796	46.977	43.051	+3.926
1904	56.408	56.412	-0.004	37.605	37.597	+0.008
1900	48.613	51.699	-3.086	48.591	45.530	+3.061
1896	48.166	50.934	-2.768	49.508	46.824	+2.684
1892	41.937	43.100	-1.163	45.653	46.119	-0.466
1888	46.334	47.817	-1.483	50.599	48.658	+1.941
1884	47.307	48.215	-0.908	50.000	48.842	+1.158
1880	47.453	48.308	-0.855	49.295	48.225	+1.070

The Lodge-Gossett Plan would hinder the Republicans, because the Democrats can secure large blocs of electoral votes in

the South, where relatively few popular votes are necessary to secure an electoral vote. The Republicans, on the other hand, must seek the bulk of their electoral votes in the North, where approximately twice as many popular votes are required to gain an electoral vote.

TABLE IV

RANKING OF STATES ACCORDING TO VOTING PARTICIPATION IN 1956 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Rank	State	Popular Votes Per Electoral Vote	Rank	State	Popular Votes Per Electoral Vote
1	California	170,824	*28	North Carolina	83,257
2	Illinois	163,237	*29	Texas	81,465
3	New York	157,630	*30	Virginia	80,665
4	New Jersey	155,270	31	South Dakota	73,464
5	Michigan	154,023	32	Arizona	72,543
6	Indiana	151,893	33	Maine	70,341
7	Ohio	148,091	34	Idaho	68,247
8	Massachusetts	146,781	35	Montana	67,793
9	Pennsylvania	143,016	36	New Hampshire	66,749
10	Missouri	140,967	37	North Dakota	63,498
11	Connecticut	139,649	38	New Mexico	63,482
12	Wisconsin	129,213	*39	Louisiana	61,754
13	Washington	127,877	40	Delaware	59,329
14	Iowa	123,456	*41	Georgia	55,743
15	Oregon	122,600	42	Vermont	50,993
16	Minnesota	121,819	*43	Arkansas	50,822
*17	Florida	112,422	*44	Alabama	45,169
18	Colorado	110,512	45	Wyoming	41,376
19	Kansas	108,280	*46	South Carolina	37,573
20	Oklahoma	107,419	47	Nevada	32,230
21	Kentucky	105,381	*48	Mississippi	31,019
22	West Virginia	103,854			
23	Maryland	103,596	--	UNITED STATES	116,812
24	Rhode Island	96,902			
25	Nebraska	96,190	**	Southern States	67,359
*26	Tennessee	85,400			
27	Utah	83,499	--	Northern States	132,521

When the Republican candidate polls enough votes in the North to obtain a national plurality in the popular election, the present general-ticket system enables him to acquire large blocs of northern electoral votes to overcome

this Democratic advantage in the South. In other words, in Republican years, the general-ticken system corrects the disparity caused by the magnified electoral power of the South. Elimination of the general-ticket system would mean abolition of this compensating factor.

Both the Lodge-Gossett and Mundt-Coudert plans would eliminate the general-ticket system and, thereby, would require a victorious Republican presidential candidate to trade large blocs of electoral votes in the North for a trivial number in the South. The GOP will gain relatively little by splitting the electoral votes of the Solid South while the Democrats will gain a great deal in Republican years by splitting the electoral vote of the Doubtful North. This could result in depriving the Grand Old Party of the Presidency despite a Republican majority in the popular election. Although the Lodge-Gossett Plan is likely to be more unfair than the Mundt-Coudert Plan in this respect, yet the latter plan would have deprived President Eisenhower of forty-three northern and five southern electoral votes in 1956. Similarly, in 1924, Mr. Coolidge would have traded somewhere between 13 and 89 electoral votes in the North for two or three in the South.

Thus, as long as the South remains more Democratic than Republican and as long as southern participation in the popular election remains limited, either plan will stack the cards against the Republican Party. As shown in Table V, for example, Democratic advantage under the Lodge-Gossett Plan varies directly

with southern solidarity and/or inversely with southern participation in the popular balloting.

TABLE V

Year	Democratic Advantage taken from Table III[22]	Southern Solidarity (in percentage)[23]	Comparative Southern Popular Participation[24]
1956	2.290	48.82	57.66
1952	1.468	53.16	57.65
1948	2.913	45.03	43.91
1944	7.577	73.66	41.28
1940	8.889	80.44	40.18
1936	7.362	83.07	39.18
1932	8.229	83.27	40.66
1928	5.961	57.18	38.62
1924	12.533	70.36	36.63
1920	10.131	67.55	41.22
1916	8.506	74.73	42.54
1912	6.367	70.94	43.19
1908	7.722	68.02	42.88
1904	0.012	70.33	40.43
1900	6.147	66.27	53.76
1896	5.452	66.33	65.58
1892	0.697	61.47	70.31
1888	3.424	63.45	69.33
1884	2.066	61.41	73.92
1880	1.925	59.75	75.74

Advocates of the Lodge-Gossett and Mundt-Coudert plans have objected to applying their formulas to the statistics of past elections on the ground that the candidates, the issues, and the popular vote would have been different if one of these plans had been operative. This is probably true. Moreover, the number and kind of political parties would probably also have been different. But, would either of these plans increase southern participation in the popular election? Would either of these plans promote a Republican-Democratic-two-party system in the

South? These points are important, because the plans will hinder the Republican Party unless a northern and southern electoral vote represent approximately the same number of popular votes or unless the Republicans receive their share of these southern electoral votes, which represent so few popular votes.

Advocates of electoral change argue that splitting a state's electoral vote would enlarge the popular vote in southern states. They claim that southern Republicans would vote because their efforts would no longer be futile and that southern Democrats would vote because their ballots would no longer be superfluous. In support of this statement, it has been argued that more southerners vote in primaries, where the ballot really counts, than in general elections which are a foregone conclusion. The fact is, however, that southern participation in a presidential election is usually greater than participation in even the largest primaries.

TABLE VI

Southern Primaries and General Elections in 1952[25]

State	Total vote for single office receiving highest statewide primary vote in 1952			Presidential vote, 1952	Number of votes cast in primary per 100 votes for Preside
	Office	Primary	General Election		
Alabama	Public service commissioner	287,620	318,027	426,120	67
Arkansas	Governor	376,500	391,584	404,800	93
Florida	do	764,423	834,412	989,337	77
Georgia	Appellate judge	463,569	547,787	655,803	71
Louisiana	Governor	785,045	123,681	651,952	120
Mississippi	United States Senator	214,182	233,919	285,532	75
North Carolina	Governor	564,505	1,179,635	1,210,910	47
South Carolina	do	346,329	50,642	341,087	102
Tennessee	do	647,117	806,677	892,553	73
Texas	do	1,356,395	1,881,202	2,075,946	65
Virginia	United States Senator	345,309	543,516	619,689	56

These figures suggest that "having one's vote count" is not so effective in bringing southerners to the polls as advocates of electoral change have argued. Consequently, adoption of the Lodge-Gossett or Mundt-Coudert Plan is unlikely to enlarge voter participation in the South.

Rather than enlarge southern participation in the popular election, these plans are likely to lead to further limitations on the franchise in the southern states, where suffrage is already severely restricted by law and extra-legal practices. The more solidly Democratic the South is and the fewer the southerners who vote in the popular election, the more these plans will magnify Democratic strength. This being the case, the Democratic Party in the South would doubtless do everything in its power to preserve this advantage. Southern Democratic legislatures are not likely to extend the franchise to those who might use the ballot to contribute electoral votes to the Republican candidate. History may not be a reliable guide; but southern Democrats met the Populist and agrarian challenge with poll taxes, literacy tests, and other devices to restrict the franchise in order to perpetuate one-party control.[26] If a state's electoral vote could be divided, southern Democratic legislatures would probably restrict the franchise further to guarantee continued control by those southerners who now dominate southern politics.

Adoption of either the Lodge-Gossett or Mundt-Coudert Plan would not necessarily produce a Republican-Democratic-two-party system in the South. The Republicans have no power in southern

legislatures to enfranchise Negroes and poor whites. Moreover, it is quite uncertain that the disfranchised southerner would vote Republican if given the ballot. Appeal to southern Negroes and poor whites would have to be a liberal appeal, which would alienate those conservatives who now support Republican economic and fiscal policy. The other possibility is that the Republican Party might appeal to the southern racist, to the kind of voter who supported T. Coleman Andrews in 1956. That, however, would endanger the Party's liberal and Negro support throughout the North. If the Republican presidential candidate should approve racial segregation in order to woo southern voters, he would doubtless lose more in the North than he could possibly gain in the South. In view of this situation, it seems quite unrealistic to argue that electoral reform will produce southern Republicans.

Some have argued that southern solidarity is no valid argument against abolition of the general-ticket system, because the South is becoming a real two-party area. Although President Eisenhower polled a rather impressive popular vote in the South, he did not win so large a proportion of the southern popular vote as did Herbert Hoover.[27] And we know that Hoover did not permanently crack the Solid South. Moreover, Eisenhower's southern vote may be a personal victory rather than a Republican gain. For, insofar as senatorial, congressional, and gubernatorial elections are concerned, the South is just as solidly Democratic today as in pre-New-Deal days.[28] Yet, without a Republican-Democratic-two-party system in the South, dividing each

state's electoral vote would load the dice in favor of the Democrats.

Rather than enable the Republicans to gain southern popular and electoral votes, abolition of the general-ticket system would enable the South to mold the Democratic Party in its own image. If the South could dominate the Democratic Party, the Republican candidate would have less appeal below the Mason-Dixon line than Mr. Eisenhower had there in 1952 and 1956. Either the Lodge-Gossett or Mundt-Coudert Plan would enhance the power of the South in the Democratic Party and in national politics by placing the South in a balance-of-power position.

Under the present system, the eleven southern states held a balance of power in only four of the past twenty elections -- only in 1884, 1892, 1916, and 1948. In the other sixteen elections, the withholding of southern electoral votes would not have altered the outcome. Under the Lodge-Gossett Plan, however, southern electoral votes would have been absolutely necessary for a majority in every election except 1904. In the other nineteen elections, the withholding of southern electoral votes from the popular victor would have deprived him of a majority in the electoral colleges. Similarly, the Mundt-Coudert Plan would have made southern electoral votes necessary for a majority in three, four, or five of the last eleven elections -- in 1916, 1944, 1948, and perhaps in 1932 and 1940 as well.

TABLE VII

Margin of Victory: Electoral Votes in Excess of a Majority

Year	Present System		Lodge-Gossett Plan		Mundt-Coudert Plan[29]	
	National Margin of Winner	Southern Votes for Winner	National Margin of Winner	Southern Votes for Winner	National Margin of Winner	Southern Votes for Winner
1956	191	67	31.2	59.2	143	62
1952	176	57	23.0	59.8	109	48
1948	37	88	- 4.3	57.2	33	81
1944	166	127	29.2	93.5	30--99	123-125
1940	183	124	44.5	99.7	55-130	121-123
1936	257	124	74.8	103.0	148-224	121-123
1932	206	124	62.1	103.3	100-179	120-122
1928	178	62	26.4	53.4	95-169	48--50
1924	116	0	- 6.7	31.1	29-105	2---4
1920	138	12	34.4	40.0	46-187	9--11
1916	11	126	18.8	94.2	5--90	121-123
1912	169	126	-18.8	89.4		
1908	79	0	-10.7	33.1	Figures on distribution of electoral vote under Mundt-Coudert Plan are not available for elections prior to 1916.	
1904	4	0	30.5	29.5		
1900	68	0	- 6.2	34.6		
*1896	47-R	0	- 2.2-D	74.3		
1892	54	112	-19.3	68.9		
*1888	32-R	0	2.4-D	67.9		
1884	18	107	- 0.1	65.7		
*1880	29-R	0	- 2.6-D	56.8		

*Note that Lodge-Gossett Plan would have translated a Republican margin into a Democratic margin.

To give the South a balance of power in presidential elections means enlarging the political voice of the farmer, the rural American, the native white Protestant, and the illiterate. Forty-two percent of America's farm population live in the eleven southern states. Similarly, 52.3 percent of all southerners are rural[30] and 92.8 percent are Protestant.[31] In contrast, only 9.5 percent of the country's labor union members are southerners.[32] Although only 4.9 percent of America's foreign white stock live in the South,[33] 40.3 percent of her illiterates live in that area. As a matter of fact 20.2 percent of all adults in the South are illiterate. Moreover, southern illiter-

acy is not restricted to Negroes who cannot vote. Actually 13.5 percent of all adult white southerners are illiterate.[34] In short, increasing the importance of the South in presidential elections would extend the political power of the so-called wool hat set to national politics.

While adoption of the Lodge-Gossett or Mundt-Coudert Plan would enhance the voice of the South in the Democratic Party and in national politics, adoption of one of these plans would also shift the balance among various other regional and demographic groups in the Republican Party and in national politics. Before the New Deal, when radicalism sprang from the agrarian community, insurgency in the Republican Party usually came from the west central region and occasionally from the mountain, border, and Pacific states as well. Thus, the "West" fought "Wall Street", "Big Business", and the "Ohio Gang". Westerners were the liberals who sought economic, social, and political reform. In recent years, however, liberalism has sprung principally from the heavily urbanized areas, which are largely in the coastal states of the northeast and far west. Midwestern Republican and southern Democratic farmers, who previously combined to fight "Big Business", now often collaborate to combat the newer metropolitan middle-class and labor interests with business frequently on the side of the farmer. Thus, the midwestern Republican and southern Democrat, the radicals of yesteryear, have become the conservatives of today. They struggled for reform when it was agrarian inspired but fight against it when it is of the urban labor variety.[35]

In recent years the general-ticket system has led both parties to nominate presidential candidates who advocate policies designed to win the votes of metropolitan liberals, who have been presumed to hold a balance of power in populous states having large blocs of electoral votes. According to the 1950 census, there are fourteen cities outside the South with more than a half million inhabitants. Since 1932, the Republicans have often been able to roll up a plurality or even a majority outside the large cities in these eleven states; but their margin has frequently been insufficient to offset the Democratic margin in the large cities.[36] In 1956, for example, Eisenhower won a popular margin of 68,191 in outstate Missouri. But Stevenson's margin of 72,165 in the City of St. Louis gave him all of Missouri's thirteen electoral votes.[37] Thus, these thirteen electoral votes were determined by the big-city margin.

TABLE VIII[38]

Electoral Votes Determined by Big-City Margins

State	1928	1932	1936	1940	1944	1948	1952	1956
California						25		
Illinois				29	28	28		
Maryland					8			
Massachusetts	18	17						
Michigan					19			
Minnesota								
Missouri					15			13
New York		47	47	47	47			
Ohio				26		25		
Pennsylvania					35			
Wisconsin				12				
TOTALS	18	64	47	114	152	78	0	13
All Democratic								

This balance of power position held by certain large cities, which in the past has enabled these cities to determine as many as 152 electoral votes, gave them a voice in presidential politics. It induced presidential candidates to pay at least some attention to the needs and problems of metropolitan voters, whose needs and interests are usually ignored by the more provincial Congress and state legislatures. Although the electoral votes determined by the big-city margins were crucial only to 1948,[39] recent presidential candidates and their programs have been designed to appeal to the metropolitan voter. Consequently, all recent presidential candidates of both parties have supported social security, collective bargaining, and civil rights legislation. Conversely, a majority of congressional candidates and their programs are designed to appeal to the semi-urban and rural voter. For a majority of Congressmen are still elected in semi-urban and rural districts[40] although 64 percent of our people are urban.[41] Consequently, as Professor James M. Burns has pointed out, each party is split between its presidential wing, which supports urban liberalism, and its congressional wing, which represents rural and semi-urban opposition to this particular variety of liberalism.[42]

Both the proponents and the opponents of the Lodge-Gossett and Mundt-Coudert plans agree that the plans would vitiate the influence of urban liberalism by altering the presidential constituency and thereby reducing the importance of the big-city states in the electoral college. Senator Karl Mundt thinks this

is desirable because metropolitan people "push our country leftward toward totalitarian centralized controls and toward national socialism"[43] and because opposition to the Taft-Hartley Act comes principally from the big-city states.[44] One John O. Beaty told the Senate Committee on the Judiciary that he wished each state's electoral vote to be split in order to reduce the political power of metropolitan minorities "largely of Eastern European origin" who favor "unnecessary war" and a lowering of our immigration barriers.[45] Others merely complain that the general-ticket system makes the parties responsive to minorities in pivotal states.[46] This is exactly why a division of each state's electoral votes has been opposed by most Congressmen of both parties from the big-city states,[47] by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,[48] and by the Americans for Democratic Action.[49] In any case, at least two of our discussants, Messrs. Williams and Wilmerding, agree with me and others who believe that abolition of the general-ticket system would lessen the influence of the big-city states in presidential politics.[50]

These states are precisely the ones which are now underrepresented in the political process. Although the eleven big-city states contain a majority of the population, 50.7 percent, they control less than a quarter of the Senate; they are underrepresented in the electoral college to the extent that electoral votes are based on senatorial seats; and so forth. The general-ticket system is the one device which gives these states

a voice in national politics. A presidential candidate will seek the votes of the people living in the big-city states, because they control a large bloc of electoral votes. Both candidates usually campaign in Missouri, for example, because a popular plurality in that State means thirteen electoral votes. This is a prize worth seeking. If the Lodge-Gossett Plan had been operative in 1956, however, Stevenson's electoral vote margin in Missouri would have been 29 one-thousandths of one electoral vote rather than thirteen whole electoral votes. If the Mundt-Coudert Plan had been in effect, Eisenhower would have had a margin of one electoral vote in Missouri although Stevenson carried the State. It is submitted that presidential candidates would have given less attention to the desires of Missouri if they had known that their net gain in that State would have been one or less instead of thirteen electoral votes.

In 1956, the eleven big-city states contributed a margin of 216 electoral votes to the victorious presidential candidate. This was the prize which made it worth the candidates' heeding the interests of the big-city states. If the Mundt-Coudert Plan had been effective in 1956, however, Eisenhower's electoral-vote margin in these eleven states would have been reduced from 216 to 138. In other words, the successful candidate's net electoral-vote gain in these states would have been reduced 36 percent; the prize would have been worth less than 2/3 as much. If the Lodge-Gossett Plan had been operative, the electoral-vote margin in these states would have been reduced from 216 to 39.4;

the prize would have been worth only 1/5 as much. This is why abolition of the general-ticket system would reduce the importance, and hence the voice, of the big-city states in presidential elections and national politics,

TABLE IX

Electoral-Vote Margin in Eleven Northern States Having a Central City of a Half Million or More Inhabitants

Year	Present System	Lodge-Gossett Plan		Mundt-Coudert Plan[51]		
	Electoral Vote	Electoral Vote	Percent Reduction	Electoral Vote	Uncertain	Percent Reduction
1956	216-R	39,399-R	81.8	138-R	0	36.1
1952	242-R	26,592-R	89.0	128-R	0	47.1
1948	23-D	4,843-D	78.9	9-D	0	60.8
1944	167-D	9,975-D	94.0	3-R	60	65.9-137.7
1940	204-D	13,382-D	93.4	34-D	64	52.0-114.7
1936	242-D	51,217-D	78.8	123-D	65	22.3--76.0
1932	170-D	28,171-D	83.4	66-D	70	20.0-102.4
1928	197-R	40,836-R	79.3	143-R	62	a
1924	220-R	81,019-R	53.2	146-R	64	4.6--62.7
1920	233-R	85,359-R	63.4	150-R	79	1.7--69.5
1916	107-R	10,510-R	90.8	44-R	75	b

[a]From a 4.1 increase to a 58.9 reduction in 1928

[b]From an 11.2 increase to a 129.0 reduction in 1916

In 1956, the twenty-six non-big-city states of the North had only a quarter of the population but controlled 161 electoral votes and contributed a margin of 161 electoral votes to the winning candidate. The Lodge-Gossett Plan would have reduced this margin almost as much as in the big-city states. The Mundt-Coudert Plan, however, would have reduced the margin less than four percent in the non-big-city states but would have reduced it 36 percent in the eleven metropolitan states.

TABLE X

Electoral-Vote Margin in Twenty-Six Non-Metropolitan States of the North

Year	Present System	Lodge-Gossett Plan		Mundt-Coudert Plan[51]		
	Electoral Vote	Electoral Vote	Percent Reduction	Electoral Vote	Uncertain	Percent Reduction
1956	161-R	33.450-R	79.2	155-R	0	3.7
1952	125-R	29.978-R	76.0	123-R	0	1.6
1948	3-D	7.003-D	a	23-D	0	b
1944	39-D	3.274-R	108.4	12-D	7	51.3--87.2
1940	39-D	5.197-D	86.7	32-D	9	c
1936	149-D	30.975-D	79.2	130-D	9	6.7--18.8
1932	119-D	26.439-D	77.7	96-D	7	13.5--25.2
1928	162-R	38.102-R	76.5	150-R	10	1.2--13.6
1924	152-R	43.947-R	71.1	124-R	10	11.8--25.0
1920	146-R	47.080-R	67.8	140-R	10	d
1916	4-D	4.648-D	e	22-D	8	f

[a]Increase of 133.4 in 1948

[b]Increase of 666.7 in 1948

[c]From a 5.1 increase to a 41.0 reduction in 1940

[d]From a 2.7 increase to an 11.0 reduction in 1920

[e]Increase of 16.2 in 1916

[f]Increase of 250.0 to 650.0 in 1916

While the Lodge-Gossett Plan tends to reduce the electoral-vote margin, and hence the political bargaining power, of the big-city states more than it does that of the other northern states, the Mundt-Coudert Plan seems to do this consistently. Thus, abolition of the general-ticket system would muffle the voice of the metropolitan community in national politics.

In order to understand exactly which area would gain under the Lodge-Gossett and Mundt-Coudert plans, one should compare how these plans reduce the electoral-vote margins in the North

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with how they reduce the electoral-vote margins in the South. These comparisons show that the Democratic South could contribute relatively substantial electoral-vote margins to the Democrats while the Doubtful North often could contribute only trivial margins to whichever candidate carries the North. In 1928, for example, the Lodge-Gossett Plan would have increased the Democratic electoral-vote margin in the South 832 percent while reducing the GOP electoral-vote margin 79 percent in the big-city states. Similarly, the Mundt-Coudert Plan would have increased the Democratic margin approximately 1300 percent in the southern states while reducing the GOP margin up to 59 percent in the big-city states. In short, these plans would increase the political voice of the South at the expense of the North in general and at the expense of the big-city states in particular.

TABLE XI

Percent Reduction of Electoral-Vote Margin under Lodge-Gossett Plan

Year	11 Big-City States From Table IX	26 Other Northern States From Table X	11 Southern States*
1956	81.1	79.2	146.4
1952	89.0	76.0	40.9
1948	78.9	133.4 increase	69.5
1944	94.0	108.4	49.5
1940	93.4	86.7	38.1
1936	78.8	79.2	33.5
1932	83.4	77.7	32.8
1928	79.3	76.5	831.9 increase
↓	Northern States		↓
1924	66.4		54.3
1920	66.1		55.7
1916	94.3		46.0
1912	81.3		39.4
1908	81.2		59.6
1904	54.3		54.3
1900	84.0		64.6
1896	84.0		65.0
1892	234.6		61.2
1888	92.0		71.2
1884	81.3		77.7
1880	91.4		80.4

*All southern margins were Democratic except in 1956, when the Lodge-Gossett Plan would have converted a Republican margin into a Democratic margin in the South. A table showing reductions under the Mundt-Coudert Plan can be found in Appendix F

To decrease the importance of the eleven big-city states in presidential elections means to decrease the political voice of the Catholic and Jewish American, the northern Negro, the foreign-born and first-generation American, and the union worker. For in these eleven states live 83.6 percent of America's Jewish people,[52] 66.5 percent of her Catholics,[53] 59.2 percent of her urban dwellers,[54] 73.8 percent of her northern Negroes,[55] 70.9 percent of her foreign white stock,[56] and 65.2 percent of her union labor.[57] These figures do not mean that these minority groups in pivotal states now have undue influence in presidential elections or on national policy. The fact is that neither major party can afford to yield to the extreme demands of one of these minorities lest it lose its broad support throughout the Nation. Moreover, these groups are not able statistically to dominate the politics of the eleven big-city states. Only 5.7 percent of the people in these states are Jewish,[58] only 24.2 percent are Catholic,[59] only 5.8 percent are Negro,[60] only 9.7 percent are foreign born,[61] and only 20.3 percent of the potential electorate in these states are unionized.[62]

Senator Paul H. Douglas suggested that those who advocate electoral change do so, not because they wish to free the major parties from giving undue attention to these minorities, but because they wish the two major parties to ignore these groups almost completely. In support of this, he quoted the remarks of former Congressman Ed. Gossett, complaining about the influence of the Negro, the organized labor, the Jewish, the Italian, the Irish, and the Polish vote in presidential elections. Also in support of his suggestion, Douglas quoted an editorial from the Wichita [Falls, Texas] Times:

> Southerners in Congress, laying plans for quieting the loud voices of racial and labor minorities in the Democratic Party, have high hopes of putting the Gossett-Lodge constitutional amendment through Congress. * * * Southerners were the first to rally in large numbers behind the amendment following President Truman's civil-rights recommendations. They argued that if the President had not felt he needed the Negro vote in Harlem, Chicago, and Philadelphia to win the huge electoral votes of New York, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, the [civil rights] message never would have been written.63

If the major parties cease to represent the various economic, racial, religious, sectional, and other groups in the Nation, the parties will cease to be two in number. Giving consideration to the interests of these groups incorporates them into the national community and makes a two-party system possible. It means that most members of a minority group are willing to compromise with other and conflicting groups inside a major party. Most members of such a group do not now feel the need to form a special party to protect the interests of the group. This means that the so-called radical elements are forced to

moderate their extreme demands and seek terms of accommodation with other groups within a major party. Consequently, the Nation has avoided the creation of numerous political parties to represent and protect the many and various racial, religious, economic, ethnic, and sectional groups. Today, neither major party excludes any significant element of our population. Both parties recognize and protect the interests of these groups.

In a heterogeneous Nation, majorities can be formed only by compromise among minorities. In the United States, this compromise is made within each of the two parties before the election in order to construct an electoral majority instead of being made among several parties after the election in order to form a legislative majority as happens in France. This has made a two-party system possible, because most Americans know that neither party is a serious threat to the legitimate interests of any group. This, in turn, has resulted in two moderate parties which include a wide divergency of views. At least one of the discussants, Mr. Wilmerding, agrees with me that this is a desirable situation.[64] As a matter of fact, Senator Mundt himself admits that one of the strengths of the existing electoral system is that it requires the major parties to seek the support of diverse groups and thus avoids the formation of splinter parties.[65]

According to the authors of the Lodge-Gossett and Mundt-Coudert plans, the avowed purpose of these plans is to establish a system under which the major parties would tend to give less attention to the interests of the minorities living in the big-

city states.[66] In an attempt to win presidential elections, the parties would be forced to give almost undivided attention to the demands of the South and rural areas. Senator Mundt has stated that the great merit of these plans lies in the fact that they would force the parties to pay greater attention to the South,[67] the small states, and the farmer.[68] These are precisely the minorities who are already over-represented in the political process as a result of gerrymandering congressional and state legislative districts, as a result of equal representation in the Senate, and as a result of apportioning congressional seats on the basis of population rather than on the basis of actual voters.[69]

Mr. Williams is probably correct in saying that both proposals for electoral change would shift the center of political gravity of the White House from New York City to points further South and West, somewhere near southern Indiana[70] -- from Senator Ives' and Senator Javits' State to Senator Capehart's and Senator Jenner's State. An increase of the South's power in the Democratic Party would doubtless force northern liberal and labor elements to split off and form a third party. Enhancing the power of the rural and semi-urban areas of the interior states in the Republican Party would undoubtedly force many Republicans in the big-city and industrial states to split off and organize a fourth party. Thus, alteration of the presidential constituency would undermine the two-party system. Perhaps, Senator Mundt believes that the southern and mid-

western parties would fuse into one party while the third and fourth parties would combine into a second party.[71] If this should happen, our major parties would cease to be middle-of-the-road parties which include a wide range of views and, consequently, would also probably cease to be two in number.

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APPENDIX A

Republican percentage of major-party vote in presidential elections

Year	New England		Mid-Atlantic		East Central		West Central		Mountain		Pacific		South	U.S.
1896	71.7		60.5		54.1		52.7		18.3		51.4		39.5	52.7
1900	61.5		57.5		54.5		55.8		45.7		56.9		39.2	53.2
1904	63.0		61.0		64.5		66.7		62.2		73.1		34.9	60.0
1908	63.9		58.3		56.2		56.0		53.6		63.1		37.8	54.5
*1912	33.6		26.7		27.0		26.5		30.2		11.1		18.7	25.1
1916	52.5		54.2		51.9		49.7		40.0		49.6		31.5	48.3
1920	68.9		68.3		66.3		69.5		61.9		71.6		41.7	63.9
*1924	63.5		58.9		61.0		50.2		49.9		56.0		34.5	54.3
1928	40.1	59.1	46.7	65.7			53.5	61.4	59.4	61.7			51.6	58.8
1932	38.3	54.0	37.2	53.3	43.0	46.5	36.2	37.4	41.9	39.2	38.2		23.7	40.9
1936	33.5	51.0	30.2	47.9	34.4	45.5	30.0	41.0	31.7	34.3	30.1		24.3	37.5
1940	37.6	50.7	39.6	53.0	41.5	53.3	41.7	53.6	43.3	44.6	40.6	43.4	27.1	45.0
1944	38.0	51.2	39.6	54.8	39.9	55.9	41.6	54.8	45.6	47.8	41.2	45.4	30.8	46.2
*1948	34.1	51.7	39.0	56.0	41.8	54.6	39.2	48.2	46.2	45.4	45.1	48.4	29.7	45.3
1952	44.5	60.5	45.3	61.5	46.5	61.6	47.6	63.7	58.0	60.7	54.0	58.7	49.0	55.4
1956	51.2	65.5	50.1	66.1			49.1	60.0	60.3	60.3	54.4	56.0	51.4	57.8
Year	**	***	**	***	**	***	**	***	**	***	**	***	South	U.S.

*Republican percentage of three-party vote. In 1948, Wallace's Progressive Party was considered a third major party outside the South and the States Rights Party was considered a third major party in the South.

**Cities with 100,000 or more inhabitants in 1950. There were 13 such cities in New England, 21 in the middle Atlantic, 18 in the east central, 10 in the west central, 3 in the mountain, and 12 in the Pacific states, totaling 77 outside of the South. There are 29 in the southern states, totaling 106 in the 48 states.

***Area outside the cities mentioned above.

New England: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
Middle Atlantic: Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.
East Central: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio.
West Central: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.
Mountain: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
Pacific: California, Oregon, and Washington.
South: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

See also George Gallup, Political Almanac 1952, pp. 26-32.

MORE

APPENDIX B

Republican percentage of total vote for U.S. Senator

State	1920	1922	1930	1932	1938	1940	1950	1952	1954	1956
Alabama	33.1		*	13.8	13.6		*		17.5	*
Arkansas	34.1		*	10.3	10.4		*		*	17.0
Florida	26.0	11.7		*	17.6	*	21.2	*		*
Georgia	5.1	*	*	7.2	*		*		*	*
Louisiana	*		*	*	*		12.3		*	*
Mississippi		5.4	*			*		*	4.4	
N.Carolina	42.5		39.4	31.4	36.2		31.3		34.1	33.4
S.Carolina	*		*	1.9	1.1		*		*	17.8
Tennessee		32.0	27.1		26.2	29.2		20.9	30.0	
Texas		33.1	12.7			5.7		*	15.0	
Virginia	8.7	26.9	*			*		*	*	

*No Republican candidate.

APPENDIX C

Republican percentage of total vote for Governor

State	1920	1922	1930	1932	1938	1940	1950	1952	1954	1956
Alabama		21.1	38.2		12.4		8.9		28.1	
Arkansas	24.4	21.9	18.5	8.9	4.8	10.9	15.9	12.6	37.9	19.4
Florida	19.9			32.1		*		25.2	19.5	26.3
Louisiana	2.4			*		0.6		*		*
N.Carolina	42.8			29.9		24.3		32.5		33.1
Tennessee	54.9	42.1	35.6	30.5	28.3	27.9	*	20.6	*	*
Texas	19.7	18.0	19.8	37.4	2.3	5.5	10.1[f]	*	10.4	15.2
Virginia		31.1[a]	37.0[b]	24.3[c]	15.8[d]	17.7[e]	27.4[f]	44.3[g]		h

*No Republican candidate. a, 1921. b, 1929. c, 1931. d, 1937. e, 1941. f, 1949. g, 1953. h, 1957.

There were no Republican candidates in Georgia or Mississippi in any of these elections. The Republican candidate in South Carolina polled 0.6 percent of the vote in 1938.

APPENDIX D

Southern Republican Congressional candidates, 1920, 1938, and 1956

State	Election of 1920			Election of 1938			Election of 1956		
	Number of districts	Number of districts with GOP Candidates	Average % received by GOP Candidates*	Number of districts	Number of districts with GOP Candidates	Average % received by GOP Candidates*	Number of districts	Number of districts with GOP Candidates	Average received by GOP Candidates*
Alabama	10	7	30.9	9	3	15.7	9	3	26.7
Arkansas	7	7	32.6	7	0	0.0	6	1	38.7
Florida	4	4	15.7	5	1	18.5	8	6	39.6
Georgia	12**	2**	5.9**	10	0	0.0	10	5	8.3
Louisiana	8	0	0.0	8	0	0.0	8	2	33.7
Mississippi	8	4	5.1	7	0	0.0	6	0	0.0
N. Carolina	10	10	38.6	11	7	36.3	12	8	35.4
S. Carolina	7	2	7.8	6	5	0.7	6	2	11.4
Tennessee	10	10	47.1	9	4	38.2	9	5	54.5
Texas	18	12	21.3	21	7	8.8	22	5	31.6
Virginia	10	10	30.4	9	3	37.8	10	9	41.6

*The Average GOP percentage of the total vote ONLY for the districts where there was a GOP candidate.

**The Georgia election returns for 1920 are not available. Therefore, the figures given in this table are for 1922.

MORE

APPENDIX E

REPUBLICAN PERCENTAGE OF THE MAJOR-PARTY PRESIDENTIAL VOTE IN THE FOURTEEN CITIES HAVING AT LEAST A HALF MILLION INHABITANTS

	1928	1932	1936	1940	1944	1948	1952	1956
Los Angeles	71.0	37.0	28.7	38.9	40.4	46.8	52.1	53.6
San Francisco	49.8	32.7	25.0	39.7	39.1	48.8	53.5	51.8
Remainder of California	64.2	40.7	34.5	43.2	44.8	50.7	58.4	56.7
Chicago	50.8	40.8	33.1	41.5	38.6	41.4	45.6	51.3
Remainder of Illinois	62.0	44.9	46.4	54.0	56.3	56.7	61.5	64.7
Baltimore City	51.7	33.0	31.7	36.0	40.8	45.2	48.2	55.9
Remainder of Maryland	63.0	40.6	42.8	46.0	54.2	54.8	60.5	62.2
Boston	31.9	30.3	30.1	36.7	37.7	28.6	40.4	46.4
Remainder of Massachusetts	53.2	51.5	47.9	48.6	49.0	47.1	56.9	61.5
Detroit	61.6	40.0	31.1	40.2	35.0	38.1	39.5	38.2
Remainder of Michigan	74.2	48.1	44.6	53.6	54.3	56.7	62.4	61.8
Minneapolis	60.8	43.2	35.0	44.1	41.8	42.3	50.8	51.6
Remainder of Minnesota	58.1	36.4	33.0	49.0	37.6	40.8	56.7	54.2
St. Louis City	47.8	35.3	33.0	41.9	39.6	35.4	38.0	39.1
Remainder of Missouri	58.0	35.6	40.1	49.2	51.0	43.4	54.0	52.3
New York City	37.9	28.6	24.6	38.8	38.3	41.0	44.6	48.9
Buffalo	50.3	48.9	41.9	45.5	44.4	41.8	50.4	57.7
Remainder of New York	62.7	56.2	56.0	59.3	59.0	61.0	67.5	72.0
Cleveland	47.4	41.3	23.5	30.1	32.1	35.5	40.1	45.4
Remainder of Ohio	67.3	49.3	41.1	50.1	52.5	51.5	58.6	62.7
Philadelphia	60.3	56.0	37.9	40.0	41.1	49.6	41.6	43.0
Pittsburgh	52.0	41.9	29.4	38.4	39.2	38.9	43.9	47.7
Remainder of Pennsylvania	68.3	52.8	44.0	49.4	51.9	54.2	57.0	60.9
Milwaukee	40.5	22.3	17.9	35.9	38.3	39.0	48.5	52.7
Remainder of Wisconsin	57.3	35.1	35.3	52.1	54.0	49.9	64.1	64.1

See also Gallup's Political Almanac 1952, pp. 30-32.

APPENDIX F

Percent Reduction of Electoral-Vote Margin Under Mundt-Coudert Plan

Year	11 Big-City States From Table IX	26 Other Northern States From Table X	11 Southern States*
1956	36.1	3.7	157.1
1952	47.1	1.6	128.6 increase
1948	60.8	666.7 increase	16.0
1944	65.9-137.7	51.3--87.2	3.2----6.3
1940	52.0-114.7	a	1.6----4.8
1936	22.3--76.0	6.7--18.8	1.6----4.8
1932	20.0-102.4	13.5--25.2	3.2----6.5
1928	b	1.2--13.6	1200.0-1400.0 increase
1924	4.6--62.7	11.8--25.0	3.2----6.4
1920	1.7--69.5	c	2.0----5.9
1916	d	250.0-650.0 increase	4.8----7.9

*All southern margins were Democratic except in 1956, when the Mundt-Coudert Plan would have converted a Republican margin into a Democratic margin in the South.

[a]From a 5.1 increase to a 41.0 reduction in 1940

[b]From a 4.1 increase to a 58.9 reduction in 1928

[c]From a 2.7 increase to an 11.0 reduction in 1920

[d]From an 11.2 increase to a 129.0 reduction in 1916

Since the electoral votes under the Mundt-Coudert Plan have not been tabulated for all districts prior to 1948, the reduction can be given only in terms of a minimum and maximum reduction. In 1944, for example, we know that the Mundt-Coudert Plan would have reduced the electoral vote margin in the big-city states at least 65.9% and perhaps as much as 137.7%. See notes 11 and 29 supra.

1. Arthur N. Holcombe, The Political Parties of Today (Macmillan, 1924), p. 316; Arthur W. Macmahon, "Political Parties: United States," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (Macmillan, 1933), Vol. 11, pp. 596-97; E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (Rinehart, 1942), p. 83.

2. Ibid., pp. 69-80; Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (Wiley, 1954), pp. 216-28; F. A. Hermens, Democracy or Anarchy? (Univ. of Notre Dame, 1941).

3. Macmahon, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 599; Frederick E. Haynes, Third Party Movements Since the Civil War (State Historical Society of Iowa, 1918), pp. 221-303; John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt (Univ. of Minnesota, 1931), pp. 321-79; M. S. and S. W. Stedman, Discontent at the Polls, A Study of Farmer and Labor Parties 1827-1948 (Columbia, 1950), pp. 38, 80, 110-12.

4. In the election of 1878, when it received 12.7 percent of the nation-wide vote. Ibid., p. 49; Haynes, op. cit., pp. 105-52, 202-17.

5. Stedman, op. cit., pp. 26, 39-40, 42, 43-6, 66, 74. See also Cortez A. M. Ewing, Congressional Elections 1896-1944 (Univ. of Oklahoma, 1947), pp. 65-6.

6. Cong. Rec., Vol. 96, p. 1278 (Feb. 1, 1950).

7. Ibid., pp. 10427-28 (July 17, 1950).

8. Ibid., Vol. 102, pp. 5673-74 (Mar. 27, 1956).

9. Ibid., pp. 5644-45 (Mar. 27, 1956) for text of resolution.

10. Hearings on H. J. Res. 2..., 81st Cong., 1st sess., p. 99 (1949) for elections 1864-1944. The electoral votes for

the elections of 1948-1956 were computed by the author from Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election..., compiled from official sources by the Cerk of the [U.S.] House of Representatives and issued as a House Miscellaneous Publication after each election.

11. Electoral votes under the Mundt-Coudert Plan were determined on the basis of a tabulation of the popular vote for President in each congressional district. The tabulation for the elections of 1916-1948 were made possible by a grant from the Pennsylvania State University Council on Research and by assistance from the Library of Congress and from a number of city and county election boards. The reason for listing some electoral votes as "uncertain" is that the tabulations for these districts are incomplete. Tabulation of the presidential vote by congressional districts involves determining which counties, cities, wards, and precincts were in each congressional district on the date of the election in question. After the composition of each district has been established, the actual tabulation involves a tremendous amount of detailed and laborious work. For example, tabulation of the presidential vote in the ten congressional districts of Los Angeles for 1948 required dealing with the election returns for 6,500 separate precincts. Obviously, completion of the tabulations in the "uncertain" districts would be a major project. These districts are largely in metropolitan areas, such as Los Angelos County in California and Cook County in Illinois. For a tabulation of the presidential vote by congressional districts in 1952 and 1956, see Cong. Quar. Almanac

(1955), pp. 716-17 and a special supplement to the Cong. Quar. Weekly Rept. (May 10, 1957), pp. 2-41.

12. The percentages in Table II were computed by the author on the basis of statistics published in the sources listed in note 10 supra. *In 1876, both the popular and electoral votes were in dispute. The figures in Table II are based on the "Democratic count". In 1888, Cleveland polled 48.7 percent of the popular vote to Harrison's 47.8 percent, representing a margin of 95,713 votes. For a discussion of these elections, see the remarks of Senator Paul H. Douglas, Cong. Rec., Vol. 102, p. 5564. (Mar. 26, 1956).

13.

Elections	Total Electors	Minor Party Electors Present System	Minor Party Electors Lodge-Gossett
1864-1956 except the following:	10,035	35	361.1
1912	531	88	170.4
1948	531	39	47.3
Total	11,097	162	578.8

Because a complete tabulation of the electoral vote under the Mundt-Coudert Plan has never been made for these elections, it is impossible to say how many electoral votes the minor parties would have received under that plan. See note 11 supra.

14. Op.cit. supra note 1, p. 78.

15. See Table VII infra.

16. See Table VII infra.

17. On this point, see the comments of Paul H. Douglas, Cong. Rec., Vol. 102, pp. 5568-69 (Mar. 26, 1957).

18. Ibid., Vol. 96, p. 1275 (Feb. 1, 1950). The Daniel-Mundt-Thurmond Resolution originally required a majority of the electoral vote for election. After it was pointed out that the

victor in the popular election would have lacked the necessary majority in nine of the past nineteen elections, Senator Daniel amended his plan, reducing the requirement from a majority to forty-five percent of the electoral vote. Ibid., Vol. 102, p. 5639 (Mar. 27, 1956).

19. Williams, Hearings on S. J. Res. 3..., 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 278 (1955); Daniel and Mundt, ibid., pp. 61-63. See also the comments of Professor John A. Davis, ibid., p. 180.

20. Former Congressman Clarence Lea, ibid., p. 62; Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., Hearings on H. J. Res. 11..., 82d Cong., 1st sess., p. 61 (1951).

21. The author's computation based on Statistics of the... Election of November 6, 1956, compiled by the Clerk of the [U.S.] House of Representatives and issued as a House Miscellaneous Publication (1957).

22. Since the Democratic candidate runs against the Republican, the former would benefit not only from the formula's magnifying his own electoral vote but also from its minimizing the Republican's electoral vote. Consequently, "Democratic Advantage" is the sum of the Republican difference and the Democratic difference in Table III.

23. "Southern Solidarity" is an average percentage of the popular vote polled by the Democratic candidate in the southern states, weighting each state according to its electoral vote. This method must be used because it makes a great difference whether the Democrats poll 95 percent of the popular vote in a state with three or twenty-three electoral votes. The rank-dif-

ference coefficient of correlation between southern solidarity and Democratic advantage is .671. The eleven southern states are: ALABAMA, ARKANSAS, FLORIDA, GEORGIA, LOUISIANA, MISSISSIPPI, NORTH CAROLINA, SOUTH CAROLINA, TENNESSEE, TEXAS, AND VIRGINIA.

24. Popular participation in the South compared to that in the other states is a relation between the percent of the national popular vote polled in the South and the percent of the total electoral vote cast by the South. Popular participation in the South for 1924, for example, was measured as 36.63 percent, which means that, if the election had been determined by the nation-wide popular vote regardless of state lines, the South would have had only 36.63 percent of the power she actually had in choosing the President. The rank-difference coefficient of correlation between Democratic advantage and popular participation in the South is negative .636; the coefficient of multiple correlation between Democratic advantage, southern solidarity, and comparative southern popular participation ($R_{1.23}$) is .757.

25. Cong. Rec., Vol. 102, p. 5551 (Mar. 26, 1956). South Carolina had no state-wide primary in 1952. Therefore, the South Carolina figures are for the 1950 primary and election.

26. Ibid., p. 5559 (Mar. 26, 1956).

27. See Appendix A infra.

28. See Appendices B, C, and D infra.

29. Since a number of districts are "uncertain", the electoral vote margin under the Mundt-Coudert Plan can be given only

in terms of a minimum and a maximum margin. Similarly, the percentage of reduction in Tables IX, X, and Appendix F (infra) can be given only in terms of a minimum and maximum possible reduction. See note 11 supra.

30. Statistical Abstract of the United States 1956, p. 23.

31. American-Jewish Yearbook 1954, pp. 8-12; Official Catholic Directory 1950, table following p. 1022; Statistical Abstract of the United States 1956, p. 12.

Catholic	2,427,132	(6.6%)
Jewish	211,252	(0.6%)
All Other	33,911,731	(92.8%)
Total	36,550,115	(100.0%)

32. Labor-union membership by states (1953) supplied by the National Bureau of Economic Research, 261 Madison Avenue, New York 16, New York:

Area	Union Members	Percent of U.S. Total
11 southern states	1,545,400	9.5
11 big-city states	10,574,800	65.2
26 other states	4,097,100	25.3
United States	16,217,300	100.0

33. 1950 Census of Population, Vol. IV, Part 3A, pp. 20-44. "Foreign white stock" includes foreign born and native Americans who have at least one foreign-born parent.

34. U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, "Literacy Education," Ofc. of Educ. Circular No. 376 (June, 1953).

"Functionally illiterate" includes a person who has completed less than five years of schooling.

35. Kenneth W. Hechler, Insurgency (Columbia Univ. Press, 1940); Hannah Grace Roach, "Sectionalism in Congress", Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev., Vol. 19, pp. 500-26 (Aug., 1925); Earle Dudley Ross, The Liberal Republican Movement (Holt, 1919); Julius Turner, Party and Constituency (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1951), chs. 6 and 7.

36. See Appendix E infra.

37. Roster of the...State of Missouri 1957-1958 (Missouri Secretary of State, 1957), p. 16.

38. Table VIII was computed by the author from official returns for each of the eleven states. The fourteen cities are listed in Appendix E infra.

39.

Year	Winner's Electoral Vote	Electoral Votes Determined By Big-City Margin	Remainder (266 necessary for victory)
1956	458	+13	470
1952	442	0	442
1948	303	-78	225*
1944	432	-152	280
1940	449	-114	335
1936	523	-47	476
1932	472	-64	408
1928	444	-18	426

40.

Northern Big-City Districts	94
Northern Semi-Urban Districts	134
Northern Rural Districts	87
Southern Districts	120
Total	435

Supplied by the American Institute of Public Opinion. For definitions of "Big-City", "Semi-Urban", "Rural", and "Southern", see

George Gallup, Political Almanac,1952, p. 67.

41. Statistical Abstract of the United States 1956, p. 23. On urban underrepresentation in the national House of Representatives, see Cong. Rec., Vol. 102, pp. 5543-48 (Mar. 26, 1956).

42. "America's 'Four-Party' System", New York Times Magazine (Aug. 5, 1956), p. 10+. Because the people seem to be voting for "the Center" since 1940, the less conservative Republican presidential candidate has tended to lead his more conservative congressional running-mates in the popular election. Conversely, the more liberal Democratic presidential candidate rides on the coattails of his less liberal congressional running-mates. In 1948, for example, Truman led only 48 successful Democratic congressional candidates and trailed the other 216. Conversely, in 1952, Eisenhower led 176 successful Republican candidates and trailed only 45.

43. Hearings on S. J. Res. 8..., 83d Cong., 1st sess., p. 91 (1953).

44. Ibid., p. 100. See also Harvie Williams' chart, ibid., p. 179.

45. Ibid., p. 103.

46. For example, Congressman Glen R. Davis of Wisconsin, Hearings, op. cit. supra note 20, pp. 92-93.

47. Congressional votes on plans for changing the electoral system:

Area	Lodge-Gossett: House, 1950 For	Against	Daniel-Mundt-Thurmond Senate, 1956 For	Against
11 southern states	61	13	19	2
11 big-city states	33	146	5	14
26 other states	40	51	24	21
Total	134	210	48	37

Tabulated by the author from: Cong. Rec., Vol. 96, pp. 10427-28 (July 17, 1950); ibid., Vol. 102, pp. 5673-74 (Mar. 27, 1956).

48. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 19, pp. 171-190.

49. Ibid., pp. 201-05.

50. Williams: ibid., pp. 283-91; Hearings, op. cit. supra note 43, pp. 163-64, 167, 168, 175-79 (1953). Wilmerding: Hearings, op. cit. supra note 19, pp. 68, 69, 73; Hearings, op. cit. supra note 20, p. 51.

51. See notes 11 and 29 supra. Since the "uncertain" votes were in the large cities, a majority would likely be Democratic in the elections of 1928-1944. See Samuel J. Eldersveld, "The Influence of Metropolitan Party Pluralities in Presidential Elections since 1920", Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev., Vol. 43, pp. 1189-1206 (Dec., 1949); and Appendices A and E.

52. American-Jewish Yearbook 1954, pp. 8-12.

53. Official Catholic Directory 1950, table following p. 1022.

54. Statistical Abstract of the United States 1956, p. 23.

55. 1950 Census of Population, Vol. II, Part 1, Table 59.

56. Ibid., Vol. IV, Part 3A, pp. 20-44. "Foreign white

stock" includes foreign born and native Americans who have at least one foreign-born parent.

57. See note 32 supra.

58. See note 52 supra and Statistical Abstract, op. cit., p. 12.

59. Idem. See note 53 supra.

60. See note 55 supra.

61. See note 56 supra.

62. Estimate of civilian population of voting age on Nov. 1, 1952: Bureau of the Census, Current Population Report, P-25, No. 63 (Aug. 31, 1952). For union membership, see note 32 supra.

Area	Potential Voters	Union Members	Percent Unionized
11 Big-city states	52,031,000	10,574,800	20.3
11 Southern states	21,852,000	1,545,400	7.1
26 Other states	24,494,000	4,097,100	16.7
United States	98,377,000	16,217,300	16.5

63. Cong. Rec., Vol. 102, p. 5558 (Mar. 26, 1956). Gossett's remarks were made before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings, op. cit. supra note 20, pp. 263-65.

64. Ibid., p. 64.

65. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 19, p. 25.

66. Karl Mundt, Price Daniel, and Ed. Gossett all agreed that their plans were designed to reduce the importance of the big-city states and the minorities therein, ibid., pp, 20, 30, 36, 148, 150; also Mundt and Frederic R, Coudert, Hearings, op.

cit. supra note 43; pp. 89-101, 259; Gossett cited in note 63 supra; and Henry Cabot Lodge, Hearings on S. S. Res. 2, 81st C Cong., 1st sess., pp. 3-4 (1949).

67. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 40, p. 94. Congressman Brooks Hays of Arkansas said he favored dividing each state's electoral vote in order to make the President more responsive to the alleged needs of the South. Specifically, he thinks this would help the South get larger items in the federal budget for local projects. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 20, pp. 99-104.

68. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 43, p. 96. Estes Kefauver also agreed that division of each state's electoral vote would enhance the power of the one-party states and of the small states, ibid., p. 24. Mundt thought that changing the presidential constituency from the state to the congressional district would have the merit of tying presidential elections to the specialized local interests of various segments of agriculture --- e.g. sugar beet districts, dairy districts, etc. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 19, pp. 25-26.

69. See the remarks of Paul H. Douglas on under-representation of the urban areas and on over-representation of the South, the small states, and rural areas. Cong. Rec., Vol. 102, pp. 5535-53 (Mar. 26, 1956).

70. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 43, p. 168 and charts 4, 5, and 6 on pp. 172-74.

71. For a number of years, Senator Mundt has advocated a major-party realignment, from which would emerge a frankly con-

servative party supported primarily by midwestern Republicans and southern Democrats. See, for example, his speech to the South Carolina Bankers' Assoc. at Charleston, S. C., May 19, 1951 (mimeographed from the Office of Senator Mundt); United States News and World Report, April 27, 1951, p. 36, and Aug. 3, 1951, pp. 22-28; New York Times, April 11, 1951 (15:1), Sept. 18, 1951 (17:1), Sept. 23, 1951 (IV, 9:5), and Sept. 24, 1951 (19:3); John Underhill and J. Harvie Williams, Liberty and the Republic (Washington, 1952).

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

by

Harold Sprout

Paper prepared for delivery at annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1957.

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

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Governments these days—at least in the major countries—maintain massive files of data regarding their own and other countries. Such data are collected with many different purposes in view. But any list of purposes would certainly include the felt-needs of the executives and staffs responsible for foreign policy and military defense.

Of course, no one unconnected with government can pretend to know the scope and scale of these intelligence-gathering and research-and-analysis activities. But anyone can surmise from public discussions of this subject that government files of background and current information have expanded enormously during the last twenty years.

This expansion parallels (at least in the United States) a comparable proliferation of the data deemed essential to the teaching of international subjects in colleges and universities. Academic scholars are indeed responsible in some degree for the trend in government activities. Scholars have participated in government-operated and in government-supported intelligence and analysis projects. They have contributed indirectly as teachers of foreign policy and international politics, as writers of textbooks, and as producers of analytical schemes and theories designed to improve the understanding and practice of statecraft on the international stage.

Implicit in all this effort and output lurks an assumption that the decisions of statesmen and the operational results thereof are significantly connected, or related, to the properties of the political stage and to the other actors upon it. Such relationships are often explicitly asserted.

It is claimed, for example, that abundant coal and iron resources are essential ingredients of a Great Power; that geographical location influences foreign policy; that insular states tend naturally to become sea-powers, etc.

The late Nicholas J. Spykman, who emphasized the relations between geographic factors and international politics, was noted for such statements as: "Size affects the relative strength of states in the struggle for power. Natural resources influence population density and economic structure, which in themselves are factors in the formulation of foreign policy.... Topography affects strength because of its influence on unity and internal coherence.... States that are long and narrow in shape ... tend inevitably to disintegrate.... A network of rivers converging on Paris makes that city the inevitable center of France and centers France inevitably about Paris...." (my italics)

Such forms of speech are remarkably prevalent in political discourse. But those who practice statecraft, and those who teach and write about it, have given relatively little attention to the characteristics of the environmental relationships which they commonly take for granted. Some critical examination of these relationships constitutes the main focus of this paper. To this focus I would like to bring for discussion the following propositions, or theses:

1st. In any discussion of environmental factors in international politics, it is fruitful to distinguish analytically between policy-decisions and the operational results of decisions.

2nd. It is possible, and in general fruitful, to include within the same frames of analysis all the aspects of environment, human as well as non-human.

3rd. Environmental factors become related to the foreign policies of states only through being recognized and taken into account in the policy-making process.

4th. Conclusions as to the manner in which environmental factors are dealt with in foreign-policy making depend on the analyst's conception of human nature and behavior in general, and on his attitude towards various theories of decision-making in particular.

5th. Environmental factors may affect the operational results of policy-decisions irrespective of whether or how these factors are recognized and taken into account in the policy-making process.

6th. What is variously called analysis of state power, analysis of power position, or (preferably) analysis of state capabilities, consists essentially of calculating the opportunities and limitations latent, or implicit, in the environment of the state under consideration.

7th. Capability calculations, or estimates, are always carried on against some background of assumptions—which may be either implicit or explicit, very general or quite specific—regarding the policy-objectives and operational strategy of the state under consideration.

8th. Conclusions as to the manner in which environmental factors limit the capabilities of specific states depend on the analyst's conception of man-environment relationships in general, and on the topical explanatory hypotheses which he brings to bear in the case under consideration.

The Problem in General

In dictionary definitions and in common usage, the word "environment" connotes some idea of relationship. Something is conceived to be meaningfully encompassed, that is to say environed, by something else. The

concept of environment thus includes sub-concepts of environed unit, environing factors, and relationships between unit and factors.

Environed unit. In the discussion of human affairs, the "something" environed, the environed unit, may be a single human being or some human group. In the context of diplomacy, military operations, and other aspects of international politics, the environed unit may be a single policy-making agent of the state, or some ad hoc policy-making group, or a formal organ of government, or some non-policy-making group within the body politic, or the population of the state as a whole, or the state itself conceived as an entity, or some supra-state grouping such as, for example, the Atlantic Community, etc.

The precise referent is often obscure. But some referent there must be. Otherwise, by definition, there is no concept of environment or of environmental relationship.

Environmental factors. There is, of course, no intrinsically correct definition of environmental factors. Much confusion arises from the varied and inconsistent usage which has evolved in different fields. Because environment means such different things to different specialists speaking in different contexts, we have suggested the French word "milieu" to designate the general concept, restricting the term "environment" (with appropriate qualifying adjectives) to more limited sets of environmental factors.

As used in this discussion, the general concept of milieu includes all phenomena (excepting only the environed unit's hereditary factors) to which the environed unit's decisions and the operational results thereof may be related. So defined, milieu includes both tangible objects, non-human and human, at rest and in motion, and the whole complex aggregate

of social patterns, some embodied in formal enactments, others manifest in more or less stereotyped expectations regarding the behavior of human beings and the movements and mutations of non-human phenomena.

This aggregate of physical objects and social patterns is conceived as comprising the potential maximum set of environmental factors relevant to any environed human unit. What specific components of this aggregate are judged to be significantly relevant in a particular context depends on how the analyst defines the problem in hand, and on the relationship hypothesis, or hypotheses, which he favors.

The trend in recent yearshas been to bring more and more environmental factors into the analysis of foreign policies and the estimation of state capabilities. This trend is reflected in almost all textbooks and methodological essays published since the early 1940's. These works usually include chapters on such topics as geography, natural resources, population trends, science and technology, economic development, economic systems, governmental systems, military forces, ideologies, national character, etc.

This trend contrasts sharply with earlier attempts to explain the distribution of power and the policies of states with reference to simpler sets of environmental variables. One recalls, for example, the geopolitical generalizations of Mahan and Mackinder, based chiefly on the geographical layout of lands and seas. One recalls, to cite another example, the geopolitical implications of the late Ellsworth Huntington's studies of climate and human achievement.

These and numerous other simple explanations have repeatedly been branded simple-minded. It is certainly true that their limitations have

been abundantly demonstrated. But one may well ask whether the field of international politics may have escaped from the booby-trap of naive over-simplification only to become seriously bogged down in a swamp of overstuffed filing cabinets. The issue, in short, is whether any system of analysis yet devised can cope with so many environmental variables as are now widely assumed to be essential to the explanation of political actions and to the calculation of future possibilities and probabilities in the relations of states.

May we perhaps be approaching the state-of-affairs eloquently expressed by the young daughter of a well-known scholar. One day she asked him for help in preparing a school-assignment on penguins. He brought her a book devoted entirely to penguins. A few days later he asked her how she was doing. Rather unenthusiastically she replied: "o.k."; and then added after a pause: "You know, daddy, that book tells more about penguins that I really want to know."

In sounding a mild warning, I am not to be construed as casting doubt on the need for bringing geographic, demographic, or any other set of environmental factors into the analysis of foreign policy and state capabilities. My point is rather that the proliferation of data may have outrun the development of fruitful criteria of inclusion and exclusion, and fruitful hypotheses for utilizing what is included.

Consider, for example, the Suez crisis of 1956. In order to explain satisfactorily what was attempted and what resulted therefrom, what kinds and how much knowledge is required? Then turn the question around. What kinds and how much knowledge is required in order to make useful calculations regarding future potentialities latent in that still unresolved problem? Does one need the same kin s of data to explain decisions as to explain the

operational results of decisions? Does one need different kinds of data to calculate the short-term and longer-term possibilities and probabilities? In attempting to deal with this problem, how does one decide whether to emphasize the strategic geography of the British Commonwealth and Empire, Europe's dependence on Middle Eastern oil, Arab nationalism, the personality of Nasser, the policies of the United States, the Commonwealth countries, the Soviet Union, etc., the economic position of Britain, the French predicament in North Africa, the personalities of British and French political leaders, political conditions inside Britain and France, or some other set of environmental factors?

I do not pretend to have any "pat" answers for these questions. I am inclined to doubt whether fully satisfactory answers can be framed in the present state of knowledge. But I would suggest that any attempt to cope with such questions involves the application of appropriate theories of man-milieu relationship, theories of social action, and theories regarding the behavior of non-human phenomena.

Man-milieu relationships have been hypothesized in various ways. In a previous paper, we have discussed five more or less distinct relationship hypotheses. Space does not permit any detailed recapitulation of that discussion. But it will be useful perhaps to summarize those hypotheses, with special reference to their applications and limitations in foreign-policy analysis and in the estimation of state capabilities.

Environmental determinism hypothesizes an invariable correlation between a given set of environmental "causes" and environing "effects." Rigorously applied, such a view of human events postulates man as a helpless chip in the stream of history. He is borne along by a current which he is incapable of resisting, within a channel which he is incapable of altering,

and from which he cannot escape. In the view of the strict determinist, man has no choice; indeed he is by definition incapable of choice. The properties of the milieu determine his behavior. Hence his past behavior is explicable and his future behavior is predictable by reference to the variation of the given set of environmental factors.

I have never discovered any interpretation of history that even closely approaches strict environmental determinism. The determinist label has been loosely pinned on numerous interpretations which are more or less based on the correlation of human responses to environmental variables. The late Ellsworth Huntington is a typical case in point. Huntington has been called a determinist, because he claimed to discover more or less regular correlations between climatic variables and a state-of-affairs that he called "civilization." But neither Huntington nor any other alleged determinist known to me has denied man's capacity to choose the road he desires to travel. All that such pseudo-determinism implies, in effect, is that (other things remaining constant) a given set of environing factors sufficiently narrows the limits of variation to account satisfactorily for concurrent variations in human response. I would contend that such correlations are more satisfactorily explicable in non-deterministic terms to be considered a little later on.

Free-will environmentalism, or simply environmentalism, represented a retreat from strict environmentalism. The environmentalist substitutes "influence" for "control." Most environmentalists have concerned themselves mainly with man's relations to the so-called natural environment. Environmentalist discourse frequently has a strong teleological flavor. "Nature" is conceived as a wise and purposeful entity guiding human destiny. Man is the target of Nature's "signals." If he is wise he heeds them. But in

the environmentalist view (in contrast to strict determinism), man is always conceived to be capable of choosing the "wrong road"—albeit to his future frustration and sorrow.

One still finds traces of environmentalism in many fields. I have already quoted some samples from Spykman who was chronically addicted to that idiom. I shall consider some further examples later. But for the present it will suffice to say that this way of relating man and milieu has fallen pretty much into disrepute. As was said of environmental determinism, free-will environmentalism explains nothing that is not more satisfactorily explicable in terms of other relationship hypotheses yet to be considered.

Environmental possibilism is the relationship hypothesis that took form early in this century, more or less in reaction against determinism and environmentalism. In the possibilist hypothesis, man is assumed to be capable of choosing freely. The milieu as a whole—or some set of environmental factors—is conceived as a sort of matrix which limits the operational results of whatever is attempted.

These environmental limits are conceived to vary from place to place, and from time to time. The limits implicit in one set of factors (e.g., Atlantic winds and currents) may vary with changes in other factors (e.g., invention of steamships). But at any given place and time, possibilism postulates some set of limits that affect the outcome of any given course of action.

The limits may circumscribe narrowly or broadly; that is to say, they may leave room for little or considerable variation,or range of effective choices. Under conditions of primitive technology, for example, the range may be very narrow. As men attain more efficient tools and skills, accumulate

capital, and perfect their social organization, the limits are pushed back, and the range of effective choice widens. This has been notably demonstrated in the temperate zones. The arid and humid tropics have generally presented greater obstacles. In certain milieux—the polar regions, for example,—the range of effective choices still remains narrowly circumscribed.

In the possibilist hypothesis, environmental limitations are assumed to be discoverable. But there is no built-in assumption that the environed unit will in fact discover the limits prior to making a given decision. Nor is there any assumption that prior discovery would necessarily affect his decision. In the possibilist frame of reference, motives and decisions are <u>taken as given</u>, not as phenomena to be explained or predicted.

Broadly speaking, environmental possibilism is the frame of reference within which the capabilities of states are calculated. But possibilism provides no basis for analyzing environmental factors in the context of foreign policy-making. I shall return to this point later on.

<u>Cognitive behaviorism</u> is a rather fancy label for a simple and familiar principle basic to any discussion of the relations of milieu to decision-making. The principle is that a person reacts to his milieu as he apperceives it—i.e., as he perceives and interprets it in the light of his past experience.

Milieu as apperceived is variously designated in the special vocabularies of psychology: "life space," "psychological field," "behavioral environment," "psychological environment," etc. (On the whole, we prefer "psychological environment" to the others).

Cognitive behaviorism postulates no particular theory of human motivation, and no particular mode of utilizing environmental knowledge in decision-making. It simply draws a sharp distinction between the psychological environment (with reference to which an individual makes choices and takes decisions) and the operational environment (which sets limits to what can happen when the decision is taken and carried into execution).

This distinction was at issue in a recent rejoinder to a familiar passage in R. C. Collingwood's work on The Idea of History. Collingwood argued that "the fact that certain people live ... on an island has in itself no effect on their history; what has an effect is the way they conceive of that position...." To this the geographer, O. H. K. Spate, replies that "people cannot conceive of their insular position in any way unless they live on an island."

Spate's rejoinder makes a great deal of practical sense, but it does miss the point that decisions are constantly taken on some incomplete or inaccurate image of relevant conditions. Psychologists in recent years have paid much attention to such discrepancies between the psychological and the operational environment.

One thoroughly investigated demonstration of this phenomenon and its operational consequences was the now all-but-forgotten panic that was triggered-off in New Jersey back in 1938, by Orson Welles' rather too realistic radio-description of the landing, near Princeton, of imaginary invaders from Mars.

Strategic discrepancies between psychological and operational environment have repeatedly affected decisions on the international stage. Boundaries have been drawn in ignorance of the geographic layout. The

Battle of New Orleans was fought in 1815, after the peace treaty was signed in Ghent. The Battle of the Bulge in 1944 caught the Allied High Command by surprise because of faulty evaluation of intelligence. The Monroe Doctrine was formulated in 1823 on assumptions about a European threat that had largely ceased to exist. Diplomatic decisions are constantly being taken on fragmentary and often quite erroneous estimates of the situation.

Cognitive behaviorism is simply an explicit re-affirmation of the elementary first principle that what matters in decision-making is not how things are, but how the decision-maker imagines them to be. The next step in linking environmental conditions to policy decisions involves application of some hypothesis as to the decision-maker's environmental knowledge and the uses he makes of it.

Probabilism, in the present context, is a general label for various behavioral models by which human choices and decisions are explained or predicted on the basis of probable conformity to a hypothetical norm. Such a model may be simple or complex. It may be set forth explicitly or (what is more likely) left implicit. The analyst may even deny that he has any model in mind at all. But such denials are largely quibbles over terminology. For every explanation of past action, and every prediction that is more than a random throw of the dice, is based on some set of assumptions regarding what is normally expectable behavior in the situation under consideration.

Some historians, geographers, and political scientists profess to believe that every human being is unique, and hence that human decisions are unpredictable. But such persons generally do not hesitate, for example, to cross a busy street when the traffic light turns green. In stepping from the curb, they are making a prediction that adverse traffic will obey the signal. In effect, such a prediction is simply an inference (generally

sub-conscious) from a generalized model (rarely articulated) of how a "typical" motor car driver is likely to behave in the milieu under consideration. The pedestrian generally knows nothing about the lives of the specific drivers of oncoming cars. Nor does he usually know anything about their specific driving habits. But he does have some notion of how drivers generally behave in that city and country; and he predicts driving behavior on the expectation of conformity to that hypothetical norm. That is all any behavioral model provides or can provide.

Before considering some of the assumptions incorporated into models of decision-making, I would like to stress a little further the probabilistic nature of such a model. The model, to repeat, is not a description of any specific person; and it carries no built-in guarantee that the generalized description of the "typical" behavior fits any particular person exactly. No general model can possibly anticipate idiosyncratic deviations from the hypothetical norm.

Norms are derived from generalizations of past experience. Such a generalization is initially a trial hypothesis to be tested. When (in the example cited above) further experience confirms that car drivers almost invariably obey traffic signals, the hypothesis is said to be confirmed to a high degree of probability. In due course the hypothesis evolves into an assumption accepted without further proof, and eventually hardens into a firm expectation. At any stage in the evolution from trial hypothesis to firm expectation, the proposition may constitute the general premise (also called explanatory hypothesis, principle, or law) from which future decisions are deduced.

No model can completely eliminate uncertainty from the calculus of human behavior. With respect to decisions, the closest approach to certainty

ever justified can be expressed by some such sentence as: "A" will almost certainly choose "x". Generally, if deliberation is involved in the decisional process, the most one is justified in predicting is that "A" will probably choose "x". Frequently, one can find no justification for more than: the odds are about even that "A" will choose "x". In every gradation of certainty-to-uncertainty, prediction is essentially a rough estimation of the betting odds for or against a certain choice being made. The more deliberative the decisional process is (or is assumed to be), the greater the uncertainty as a rule.

One way to narrow the range of uncertainty is by means of negative prediction. One eliminates (by means of suitable general premises) the more improbable alternatives before venturing to predict what choice will be made. This is standard practice in many situations. It is often a fruitful approach to foreign policy.

Behavioral models of special interest to students of foreign policy include assumptions regarding purpose, knowledge, and mode of making choices. Ideological coloration and other characteristics of the model depend, of course, on the content of these assumptions. The assumption regarding purpose, for example, can have an acquisitive, self-denying, utopian, Marxist, racist, or other content. The assumption regarding mode of making choices may be derived from simple rationalism, or from the theory of games, or from the Freudian theory or its variants, or from some other theory of human behavior. Comparably various theories can be embodied in the assumption regarding the knowledge at the command of the hypothetical "typical" person represented by the model.

A very familiar version of decision-making model is what one might call common-sense probabilism. In this model men are assumed to be predominantly

acquisitive, adequately knowledgeable, and generally rational. In the context of daily living, the assumption of acquisitiveness generally has a strong pecuniary coloration. People are assumed to want more money and the things money buys. In the context of foreign politics, acquisitiveness takes the form of assumption that desire for power—and its corollaries, expansion to get more, and protection of that already acquired—are the supreme objectives of statecraft.

Common-sense probabilism further assumes that men generally have environmental knowledge adequate for the purpose in hand. That is to say, one's psychological environment is assumed to correspond in essential respects to the operational environment in which his decisions are executed. Finally, common sense probabilism assumes that the individual applies his environmental knowledge rationally to the choice of appropriate means to achieve possible ends. That is to say, he calculates rationally the opportunities and limitations implicit in his operational environment.

Some such behavioral model seems to me to be implicit in the pseudo-environmental determinism of Huntington, Griffith Taylor, and various others who have employed deterministic forms of speech. The purport of what they say is about as follows: <u>If</u> the range of fruitful choices (with respect to establishing a permanent settlement in Antarctica, for example) is narrowly circumscribed, and <u>if</u> (as assumed) the persons involved are adequately knowledgeable of what is possible, and <u>if</u> (as is also assumed) they take that knowledge rationally into account in making choices, <u>then</u> there will occur a close correlation between environmental limits and human response. Starting with observed correlations, common-sense probabilism enables one to reason backwards to the above explanation; or, starting with a set of environmental factors, to reason forward to the

probable correlated behavior. And this, I am convinced, is substantially what environmentalists and pseudo-environmental determinists do.

The assumptions of common-sense probabilism may provide close enough approximations for many purposes. This model appears to underlie a good deal of fruitful research on industrial layouts, crop patterns, and other economic distributions. Common-sense probabilism may serve less well to explain or predict decisions in complex organizations, of which modern governments are among the most complex of all.

Probability models are manifestly better suited to predicting average occurrences in large aggregates, than to pin-pointing the future actions of a specific small group or a single person. An insurance company, for example, can predict within a more or less calculable narrow margin of error how many buildings in a given milieu will catch fire during the next year. But if the insurance company attempts to predict which specific houses will catch fire, the probability of error will manifestly be very much greater. Yet that would be no more difficult than the task that confronts the foreign policy analyst.

In this respect, one should distinguish sharply the problems of explanation and prediction. The historian constructs a narrative account of what happened within some chosen frame of reference. If he is sophisticated, he will consciously attempt to contrive a convincing explanation of how it was possible and how it came about. Historiographers have evolved more or less explicit rules for deducing from historical records the purposes, knowledge, and mode of choice and decision of the personages under consideration.

The student of contemporary politics has to proceed rather differently. For him historical records and interpretations are useful mainly as the

source from which he derives assumptions regarding the behavior norms of hypothetical "typical" decision-makers in policy-forming roles in the social context in question. The historical experience from which such assumptions are derived never approaches in quantity or in regularity the aggregates of experience from which actuarial tables are calculated. The most that one can expect of a decision-making model in the context of foreign-policy is that it embodies discriminating generalizations from as much experience as possible that is relevant to the role (e.g., foreign minister) and particular social context (e.g., Soviet Union).

Environmental Factors in the Context of Foreign Policy Analysis

In opening this discussion I alluded to the practice of ascribing environmental influences and even controls over the foreign policies of states. This practice is remarkably prevalent. One could easily collect thousands of examples in which statesmen, journalists, or scholars have ascribed this or that policy pattern or specific policy decision to the influence of some environmental factor.

How many times has one heard the historic isolationist tendency of United States foreign policy attributed to the influence of the oceanic separation of the New World from the Old. German demands for Lebensraum were ascribed to the influence of that country's geographical location in the heart of Europe. To the influence of a state-of-affairs called "over-population" have been attributed the expansive policies of the Japanese Empire. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is said to have forced the United States into World War II. A state-of-affairs called the "British economic crisis" is said to have compelled the British Government in 1957 to curtail its political and military commitments overseas.

One could go on and on, citing statements in which foreign policies (i.e., decisions of government) are explained as the effects of environmental causes. Such forms of speech seem to indicate the persistent survival of deterministic and environmentalistic habits of thought. The very limited utility of this way of looking at man-milieu relationships has been repeatedly emphasized and demonstrated. But environmental determinism and free-will environmentalism are hardy perennials in the garden of political discourse.

Our own view of this matter was made explicit in the opening section of this paper. Environmental factors enter into policy decisions only through being recognized and taken into account by participants in the policy-forming process. That is to say, only as environmental factors are perceived, interpreted in the light of experience, and considered relevant to the problem in hand, do such factors have any effect on policy decisions.

The policy-maker's image of the situation (that is to say, his psychological environment) may or may not correspond substantially to the operational environment in which his decisions are executed. If the discrepancy is slight, the operational consequences may be trivial. But if there is discrepancy in some strategic particular, the operational consequences may be radically different from those contemplated by participants in the policy-making process.


Consider, for example, the situation at Pearl Harbor in the night of December 6-7, 1941. The American commanders had deployed their land, sea, and air forces in ignorance of imminent Japanese attack. The psychological environment of Admiral Kimmel and General Short contained no approaching enemy ships and planes. Yet the hostile task force was only a few hundred

miles distant and coming closer every minute. The strategic discrepancy between psychological environment and operational environment was to have catastrophic consequences a few hours hence.

Now consider another example—in part hypothetical, since so much of the record is still obscure—the case of the British decision to re-occupy the Suez Canal with military forces in October 1956. It was repeatedly asserted at the time that the Cabinet was giving careful attention to all aspects of the developing crisis. I think we may take it for granted that this attention extended to such issues as the technical requirements of the contemplated military occupation, and the capabilities and potential responses of other governments and peoples.

Let us assume, for the purpose of this discussion, that the decision to intervene was predicated on the following calculations, among others: that the operation could be executed swiftly; that the Egyptians would have neither the time nor the know-how to block the Canal; that other Arab governments and peoples would not disrupt the production and flow of oil contrary to their manifest economic interest; that the Soviet government would keep hands off; that the United States and Commonwealth governments and peoples would accept a fait accompli without serious protest; that the United Nations would offer no major obstacle; and that public opposition within Britain itself would speedily collapse once British forces were reëstablished in Suez.

If some such set of hypotheses did, in fact, constitute elements of the British Cabinet's estimate of the situation (i.e., its psychological environment), events were to demonstrate that in several strategic respects that estimate failed to correspond to acualities, or the operational environment in which the decision was executed.


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But this case, it should be emphasized, differs somewhat from the Pearl Harbor case. In the latter, the strategic unknown factor was a set of physical objects whose movements were predictable to a high degree of probability. In the Suez case, the strategic miscalculated factors were predominantly potential human responses to the decision under consideration. It might be difficult to establish that all the damaging counter-responses, that subsequently did in fact emerge, were predictable in advance of the decision to intervene. It may well be that some at least of those counter-responses might have failed to take form if the all-important calculation—that the operation could be swiftly executed—had proved to be sound.

With this qualification, the main conclusion would seem to hold, that if the policy-maker's psychological environment, or estimate of the situation, differs significantly from the operational environment, the results of the contemplated decision may turn out quite differently than intended or expected. Thus, fruitful analysis of the relation of environmental factors to foreign policy begins logically with investigation of the so-called "universe of the decision-makers," or in the older phrase, the "pictures in their heads."

This presents plenty of difficulty. Excluding the special problem of self-analysis by the decision-maker himself, the analyst has to construct at second hand a sort of replica of the decision-maker's estimate of the situation. For this purpose, the analyst may have access to various verbalizations uttered orally or in writing. Often he has very little verbal evidence with which to work, and has to resort to other devices.

One very common expedient is for the analyst to imagine himself in the role of his subject. One has only to put himself in the other fellow's

position, and look at the milieu as it is, runs this argument, in order to understand how it probably appears to him. This is frequently called understanding by intuition. At least one important school of historiography is founded upon it. Let us see what is involved.

Consider the case of "X", professor of international relations. He leads a more or less cloistered life, teaching and reading in libraries. He has occasional opportunities to observe practicing statesmen at first-hand, and rather fewer opportunities to meet and converse with them. Is it realistic to assume that "X" can effectively project himself into a given role as that role is played by a particular statesman? Let us not underestimate the difficulty. "X" must be able to imagine himself not merely as Secretary of State, but as Secretary of State Dulles; not merely as Prime Minister of Britain, but as Prime Minister Macmillan; not merely as Party Boss of the Soviet Union, but as Party Boss Khrushchev.

Consider now the case of "Y", a special envoy charged with carrying on certain negotiations with President Nasser. Let us assume that "Y" is a well educated man, a lawyer by profession. He is moderately knowledgeable of foreign lands and peoples, but has no special background on Egypt or the Middle East. Is one justified in assuming that such a man can project himself into the viewpoint of Nasser? Can he do so any more effectively than can Professor "X" who has no political experience but at least some academic knowledge of the Arab World?

There appears to be some tendency to under-rate the difficulties implicit in these examples. It is rather usual to discover both academic scholars and practicing statesmen who profess to believe that it is perfectly possible to intuit the universe as adverse parties probably view it. Differences between observer and the subject observed are brushed aside

as relatively minor obstacles. Likewise dismissed are objections that a person's estimate of a situation may depend on a good deal more than ability to see, hear, and read; that it may depend heavily on his values, purposes, role, mode of making choices, and other factors; and that these may differ significantly from person to person—between observer and subject observed—especially when they are widely separated in space and societal background and conditioning.

Even when one has come to terms in some fashion with these questions, he is still only on the threshold of explaining or predicting foreign policies. In order to take a single further step in relating environmental factors to policy decisions, one has to apply some theory of decision-making. This involves, among other things, framing and applying hypotheses with regard to: (1) the objectives (goals, purposes, ends) envisaged; (2) the environmental factors (setting, milieu) which the decision-maker considers significant (estimate of situation); and (3) his mode of defining issues, formulating alternatives, making choices, etc.

I am convinced that most foreign-policy analysis (both outside and inside of government, at least in the United States) is carried on within the frame of reference which I discussed earlier as "common sense probabilism." In that behavioral model, it will be recalled, men are assumed to be predominantly acquisitive, adequately knowledgeable, and generally rational.

With reference to foreign policy, acquisitiveness appears generally as an assumption that politics is a struggle for power, in which desire to enhance the state's power is the paramount objective of its foreign policy. Power is conceived with reference to the concepts of expansion and protection—expansion to get more at the expense of other states, protection of things

previously acquired against aggression or encroachment on the part of other states. It is not the function of this discussion to explore in any detail the adequacy of this widely accepted norm. It is sufficient to note that the environmental factors that one deems significant will depend on the particular policy-objectives that one takes for granted.

I have already mentioned some of the difficulties posed by the hypothesis that foreign-policy makers generally possess and take into account environmental data that is strategic for their purposes. This view is implicit in the venerable cliché that "politics is the art of the possible." That cliché is sometimes quoted as a description of typical policy-making behavior, sometimes as a precept for policy-makers. In either case it carries a connotation that those who make policy-decisions can be presumed in general to know what is possible—that is to say, their estimates of a situation generally reflect close enough approximations of opportunities and limitations implicit in the operational environment.

Unless carefully qualified, this is a dubious generalization. It is one thing to assume that farmers generally know the elements of good farming practice in a given milieu. It is something else again to assume that a head of state or foreign minister commands personally the vastly larger range of knowledge required to conduct adequately the foreign relations of a modern state.

The higher one goes in the hierarchy of a Great Power's foreign office or other department of government, the more one is impressed by the remoteness of executives from the operational environment in which their decisions are executed. What passes for environmental knowledge at the top level may be no more than highly generalized and frequently biased staff

estimates of opportunities and limitations with reference to some proposed action or to alternative proposals under consideration. On most issues the top man will have little time and only general knowledge for checking what is prepared for him.

Let us assume, for example, (and I think it is a reasonable assumption) that the British Cabinet's decision to send military forces to reoccupy the Suez Canal was predicated on a firm expectation that this operation could be carried out with speed and precision. How did Eden and his colleagues come to this conclusion? One can only speculate, or course. They undoubtedly received estimates of the situation prepared by civil servants and military personnel. Such estimates undoubtedly included statements regarding the strength and deployment of Britain's land, sea, and air forces, their state of readiness, landing craft and other transportation and handling equipment available, liaison arrangements with the French Command, the state of Egyptian defenses, the morale of Egyptian forces, etc. In addition, we may perhaps assume that Eden and those associated with him in the decision to intervene, each had some general notions about British military forces and what it would take to reoccupy the Canal. But is it likely that they had much up-to-date detailed knowledge of this subject, or that they had the time to check up on their military experts?

This question poses others. To what extent was Eden a virtual prisoner of the civil and military officials who provided operational information for him? On the other hand, to what extent may Eden's tough public utterances have affected the content of what his staffs decided to tell him? What other blindspots and biases may have obscured the observations and calculations prepared for him? To what extent may he have discounted any

pessimistic warnings that cast a shadow on the course to which he was predisposed?

Such questions and others that will occur with reference to any policy-making situation would appear to indicate that the proposition, that a head of state or other top-level executive has adequate knowledge of the operational environment is no more than a hypothesis to be confirmed, rarely if ever an assumption to be taken for granted.

With reference to past actions, it is sometimes possible to discover what information and analysis were in fact recognized and taken into account at the top. With reference to future contingencies, however, one has no alternative but to work from some hypothesis of the way information is "normally" or "typically" collected, analyzed, and communicated upward through complex organizations in general, and the given organization in particular.

The third assumption in the model of "common-sense probabilism"—that policy-makers generally apply their knowledge rationally in formulating appropriate means to achieve possible ends—is perhaps the most debatable of all.

At one pole stand the pessimists who profess to despair of attaining, by intuition or any other method, any reliable basis for explaining or predicting the decisional behavior of persons or groups of radically different societal background and conditioning. I have heard it repeatedly asserted that it is useless to try to forecast how Chinese, or Russians, or other "inscrutable" foreigners are likely to react. This pessimistic attitude is summed up in Churchill's description of Soviet foreign policy as a "riddle wrapped in an enigma." The frequency with which that epigram has been quoted is perhaps some indication of the prevalence of this view.

At the opposite pole one encounters the equally if not more prevalent working assumption that people everywhere are pretty much alike, and that one can within limits intuit the actions of others. This is one of the most firmly established hypotheses of historiography. It underlies most of the discussion of current affairs. Churchill, in a flight of oratory, might call Russian policy a riddle wrapped in an enigma, but Churchill's own actions gave the lie to his belief in any such recipe for futility.

The belief that one can intuit within limits the actions of others rests upon assumptions previously mentioned in connection with the difficulty of analyzing another person's estimate of a situation. It is commonly assumed, for example, that persons of different nationality, social class, education, functional role, etc., will nevertheless reason in substantially similar ways. When doubts arise, these are resolved by reasoning that analyst and subject of analysis alike function rationally in accord with universal laws of logic.

Between these extremes of pessimism and naive rationalism, the searches go on for fruitful hypotheses that throw more light on the manner in which persons in particular roles tend to behave, both in general and in the context of particular social systems.

Environmental Factors in the Context of Capability Analysis

One of the recurrent themes thus far is the persistent survival of deterministic and environmentalistic patterns of expression in discussions relating environmental factors to foreign policy. The same tendency is observable in discussions of power in international politics, or (in the phrase that I prefer) the capabilities of states.

One could cite any number of illustrations. Consider, for example, the statement in E. W. Zimmermann's World Resources and Industries that the

invention of the so-called "basic" steel-making process "led inevitably to Germany's industrial hegemony on the continent of Europe." (My italics) Or the statement in a recent history of seapower, that "England, driven to the sea by her sparse resources to seek a livelihood and to find homes for her burgeoning population, and sitting athwart the main sea routes of Western Europe, seemed destined by geography to command the seas." (my italics)

In reviewing the seapower book, I said: "neither sparse resources nor any other environmental condition ever drove England to do anything, and geography did not destine England to command the seas. I interpret the passage to mean simply that available resources ashore, configuration of lands and seas, and other conditions in the environment enabled Englishmen to achieve the kind of history which they did in fact make for themselves.

One could similarly recast the Zimmermann statement. The invention of a new steel-making process rendered it possible to produce good steel out of acidic ore. A lot of acidic ore was available in Germany. German industrialists took advantage of the process to expand steel production. That and nothing more!

The first requisite of clear thinking about power and capabilities in international politics is to make a clean break with deterministic and environmentalistic idioms which bedevil all discussion of human affairs. The second requisite, in my opinion, is to define more precisely the concepts of power and capability.

A terminology of power figures conspicuously in political discourse. International politics is characterized as a "struggle for power." Desire for greater power is said to be the paramount objective of foreign policy. States are graded in a hierarchy of power—super powers, great powers,

second-class powers, etc. A state's "role" in world affairs is said to depend on its "power position."

The precise meaning of the word is often obscure, and usage is quite varied. Power is often conceived as military force, and just as often as the sum-total of a state's capacity to affect the behavior of other states, or to "get its own way" in international relations. For this broader concept, I would prefer some other term. The term that suits me best is "capability," or "capabilities," which readily accommodate both the military and the non-military aspects of statecraft.

One can analyze state capabilities either retrospectively or prospectively. In a historical context, capability analysis consists of formulating a convincing explanation of how it was possible for a given state to perform certain functions which were in fact performed. Thus, for example, one can attempt to explain the historical state of affairs known as "British command of the seas." In the predictive context generally more interesting to students of international politics, analysis of capabilities involves calculating the odds for or against a state being able to perform certain functions in a given milieu.

Such calculations, or estimates, may take various forms, depending on the purpose in view. The problem may be to calculate the probable operational results of a given policy decision taken or contemplated. Or it may be to calculate whether the state has what is judged to be required in order to achieve a given objective. Or one may attempt at a more general level to describe the resources, instrumentalities, and techniques at a state's disposal, and to draw conclusions as to the adequacy of these means in relation to the state's policy objectives. Such a general estimate may be very comprehensive. It may embrace the state's diplomatic, informational,

subversive, economic, and military capacities. It will almost certainly take into account the limitations imposed by location, distance, the layout of lands and seas, and the policies and capabilities of other states.

Capability calculations, as we have seen above, normally constitute an aspect of policy formation. Policy decisions proceed from some estimate of what is possible, what it will cost, etc. Capability calculations may also be carried out by an observer unconnected with the policy-making process. The outside observer-analyst may concern himself with two questions. He may desire to find out how the policy-makers and their staffs themselves conceived the opportunities and limitations implicit in the milieu. But he may also desire to reach an independent judgment as to what those opportunities and limitations are, irrespective of whether or how these are conceived by the decision-makers in question.

From what has been said thus far, it is clear that I conceive capabilities to be calculable only with reference to some set of policies—some set of objectives or operational strategy, or both. It seems to me quite meaningless to speak of capabilities in the abstract. Capability is always capability to do something—to perform some set of functions, to bring about or to perpetuate some desired state of affairs.

Such policy assumptions may be left more or less implicit. They often are. But unless some set of ends and means is envisaged, no calculation is possible, no listing of environmental factors is meaningful. Failure to keep the discussion of capabilities within some policy frame of reference seems to be quite common. Such failure is one of the reasons, in my opinion, why a good deal of what has been said about environmental factors in international politics is vague and footless. Geographic, demographic, technological, or other environmental data have no intrinsic political

interest or significance. They acquire significance only with reference to assumptions about what is to be attempted, by what means, when and where, and in relation to what adversaries, associates, and bystanders.

The policy framework may be short-term or longer-term, very specific or rather general. Calculations connected with day-by-day foreign relations tend naturally to be short-term and specific. How vulnerable is Nasser to economic sanctions? How much assistance will it probably take to tide King Hussein over the next twelve months? Such short-term questions shade off into broader and longer-term questions. Is it really impossible, as asserted in the British defense statement for 1957, to provide "adequate protection for the people of [Britain] against ... an attack with nuclear weapons?" Is it reasonable to believe, as a prominent geographer asserted recently, that "permanent environmental restrictions of cold, drought, and continentality will never permit" the Soviet Union "to achieve strictly first-class rank?"

In the end one comes to such global long-range questions as: Does the trend of events—inventions, revolutions, economic development, etc.—justify Mackinder's historic prediction that "the grouping of lands and seas, and of fertility and natural pathways, is such as to lend itself to the growth of empires, and in the end of a single world empire?" Or his more familiar prediction that "who rules East Europe commands the Heartland, who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island, and who rules the World-Island commands the World?"

The above examples suggest the further point that short-term policy questions tend to focus capability analysis on rather different aspects of the milieu than do long-term calculations based on more general assumptions of policy. A short-term estimate of Soviet military capability, for example,

would manifestly focus on military forces in being, their weapons, transport, and communications, current industrial production, stockpiles of raw materials, recent intelligence of social conditions inside the Soviet Union, etc. A fruitful critique of Mackinder's predictions, on the other hand, might open up such questions as: How does the revolution in weapons affect the military properties of location, distance, topography, and the "grouping of lands and seas?" How strong are the ideological links binding communist states to the Soviet Union? How does the emergence of an independent India and the political consolidation of China affect the Heartland hypothesis?

I know of no analytical routines that promise "right" answers to such questions. I know of no standard formulas for calculating the political opportunities and limitations latent in a given milieu. What factors appear relevant and significant will depend on the analyst's own general theory of international politics, and his special theory of the particular question or problem under consideration. That is to say, the environmental data that one regards as significantly relevant will depend on the general explanatory hypotheses (i.e., logical premises) which he brings to bear. The hypotheses which he regards as fruitful will depend directly or indirectly, as a rule, on his previous experience with the given problem's antecedents or on generalizations derived from other problems which, in his judgment, exhibit fruitful analogies. There is no guarantee whatever that two analysts will reason from exactly the same premises or reach the same conclusions. The most that one can ask is that explanatory premises be made explicit, that environmental factors considered significantly relevant be so designated, and that logical procedures be observed in drawing conclusions.

Perhaps an illustrative demonstration is needed to indicate more clearly what I have in mind. Suppose the problem in hand is to estimate how much Britain can and will contribute to the military defense of the Atlantic Community during the next five years. So stated, the problem combines two separable issues—a policy question and a capability question—which involve different analytical procedures. The policy question is: How will the British Government probably define Britain's interest and capabilities with respect to Atlantic defense? The capability question is: What factors will set limits to the operational results of whatever policy decision is taken? We are interested here in the capability question. But it is still too large and too complicated. In the limited compass of this discussion, it will be sufficient to consider only one aspect; to wit: Whether and how the structure and characteristics of the British economy set limits to British military expenditures.

(The following is a sketch to illustrate a procedure. The explanatory hypotheses represent my best thinking on this subject to date; but hypotheses, supporting environmental data, and inferences therefrom, are all purely tentative and are submitted here only for purposes of illustration and discussion of a technique of capability analysis.)

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1st hypothesis. A densely populated country, poorly endowed with natural resources, can achieve and maintain a diversified and high level of production of goods and services only at the price of heavy dependence on imported foodstuffs and raw materials.

Environmental data. Britain is a densely populated country. It is poor in natural resources. Coal, the most abundant resource, is heavily depleted and increasingly costly to produce. The country is highly industrialized; about 50% of the working population are engaged in manufacturing and related occupations; another 12% in finance and the professions;

only 5% in agriculture, forestry and fishing combined. Agriculture itself is largely mechanized, and is a large consumer of machines and minerals fuels. Britain imports nearly 60% of its food. Except for coal and some low-grade iron ore, Britain is dependent on foreign sources for most of the raw materials and semi-finished products required by its diversified manufacturing economy.

2nd hypothesis. In such an economy, a large fraction of all production of goods and services has to be exported to pay for essential imports of food and raw materials.

Environmental data. Britain is the largest exporter of ships and textiles, second largest exporter of machinery and transport equipment, a very large exporter of consumer manufactures of all kinds, and of services such as banking, insurance, shipping, tourism, etc. Heavy dependence on exports could be relieved only by borrowing abroad (which only postpones payment for imports) and/or by receiving gifts such as those under the Marshall Plan. Mutual Security subsidies have shrunk and now constitute a small item in the total picture.

3rd hypothesis. Under conditions of full employment, any substantial increase in the allocation of goods and services to one category of consumers will be at the expense of lower consumption by other categories, unless total production is rising sufficiently and/or unless additional goods and services are being provided gratuitously or by loans from outside the economy.

Environmental data. The British economy produces for four main categories of consumers. These are the British public, British capital market, export markets, and British military forces. British military expenditures doubled between 1948 and 1955. During the same period large allocations of goods and services were necessary to replace war-damaged plant and other capital, and to catch up on war-delayed arrears of depreciation. Production increase to meet these demands was greatly facilitated by loans and gifts, chiefly from America. Military and capital expenditures were also facilitated by continued rationing and other consumer controls. Increasing production to meet military, capital, and severely curtailed consumer demands necessitated corresponding increase in raw material imports. These were paid for in part by loans and gifts from abroad, but more especially by increased exports of manufactured goods and services. By 1957, foreign loans and gifts had shrunk to relative insignificance, restrictions on public consumption had been largely removed, military expenditures stood at £1,500m., or more than 8% of GNP, and the demand for new capital continued unabated. Production showed only a 1% increase between 1955 and 1956, and competition in foreign markets was becoming more severe. Only by achieving a much more substantial increase in production could all these demands be met.

4th hypothesis. In order to achieve a substantial increase of production in a fully employed economy, it is necessary to expand or improve plant and/or to increase the efficiency of labor.

Environmental data. The British economy is very nearly fully employed. Any substantial increase in the labor force could be achieved only by radical changes in living habits or by reduction of the military forces. The latter not only consume large quantities of goods and services. They also withhold from the civilian labor market three-quarters of a million men and women otherwise employable. And they tie up in military sponsored research and engineering projects a high proportion of the scientific and engineering personnel which is desperately needed in the drive to modernize British industry and thereby improve its competitive position in foreign markets. This shortage is especially acute because of the much lower proportion of professionally trained scientists and engineers in Britain as compared with the United States.

5th hypothesis. In order to increase significantly the output of labor in a fully employed economy, it is necessary to install more labor saving machines or to rationalize working habits and routines, or both.

Environmental data. A great deal of British industrial machinery is obsolescent or obsolete; and British utilization of labor is in many fields inefficient. There is room for improvement in both respects.

6th hypothesis. The extent and pace of labor rationalization that is possible in any economy depend on the strength of labor organization and the prevailing attitudes of workers and their leaders.

Environmental data. British labor is firmly organized, and British workers and their union leaders are plagued by memories of chronic unemployment during the inter-war period. Working rules are permeated with restrictive practices, originally designed to spread and to protect jobs. There is also considerable evidence in certain sectors of apathy, and workers are quite generally reluctant to depart from traditional habits and routines. Rationalization is proceeding in many industries, but progress is generally slow, and no radical improvement in the whole labor picture is expected right away.

7th hypothesis. In a fully employed economy, in which production is rising only slowly, significant expansion or improvement of plant can be achieved in only two ways: by additional savings for investment and/or by increasing imports of machines or raw-materials to build machines.

Environmental data. In Britain increased allocation of goods and services for plant expansion and improvement involves reduced allocations to other categories of consumers: that is, to the public and/or to the military forces and/or to the export market.

Reduced allocation to the export market would react against almost all parts of the economy, since imported raw materials enter so heavily into production. Thus large allocations to capital investment can be achieved only at the expense of the public or the military forces, or both.

8th hypothesis. Public consumption can be reduced by direct controls (rationing) or by indirect controls (higher taxes, higher commodity prices, tighter consumer credit, lower wages).

Environmental data. During the war and for several years thereafter, all of these controls (except wage reductions) were utilized to restrict public consumption.

9th hypothesis. Publics vary from country to country in their tolerance of "austerity" policies designed to cut down consumption.

Environmental data. During and immediately after World War II, the British people demonstrated exceptional tolerance for austerity, and remarkable discipline in complying with austerity regulations. But my own impressions gained from several months of residence in Britain during 1955 and 1957, all indicate that British consumers have had about all the austerity they can take for a while. Their threshold of tolerance is recognized by official and unofficial observers to be a good deal lower than wartime experience might suggest.

10th hypothesis. In the absence of a widely shared sense of common peril, a free electorate will reject, or at least react strongly against, rationing and other austerity policies imposed by government.

Environmental data. A visitor to Britain today gets the definite impression that the British people, with remarkably rare exceptions, are far more concerned about high taxes, high prices, installment-purchase credit, and better wages, than they are about the Communist peril, Russian threats, or the H-bomb. In the prevailing climate of public opinion, the tenure of any Government would seem to be more dependent on raising the standard of living than on contributing to the common defense against a hypothetical future peril. If this observation is correct, no significant reduction of public consumption (by direct or indirect controls) is politically feasible or probable as long as prevailing conditions and attitudes continue.

11th hypothesis. Any significant plant expansion achieved by increasing imports of machines and/or raw materials to build machines will require a corresponding increase of exports of goods and services to pay for the additional imports, unless these are paid for by loans or gifts from outside the economy.

Environmental data. No large loans or gifts are in sight; and in the prevailing climate of opinion, it seems unlikely that the British Government would willingly incur further indebtedness or accept large-scale subsidies from the United States, even if tendered.

12th hypothesis. During a period of plant expansion, accompanied by a rise in imports, increased exports of goods and services can be achieved only by some curtailment of consumption by other groups.

Environmental data. In the existing situation in Britain, this means reducing either military expenditures or public consumption. If the consuming public is capable of resisting, and in a mood to resist, reimposition of severe controls, the military forces become the most vulnerable consuming group in the economy.

General conclusion. British military expenditures cannot be increased, and probably cannot be maintained at the present level, without reimposition of austerity policies which the British public is capable of resisting, and is currently in a mood to resist, If the British Government should attempt to maintain or increase military expenditures at or above the 1956 level, without imposed curtailment of public consumption, it would be at the expense of exports or capital investment, or both. Either course would create a foreign payments crisis which would imperil food and raw-material imports upon which the whole structure of production depends.

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The illustrative analysis just concluded has been confined to one aspect of the total problem of estimating British capabilities: to wit, the limitations imposed by the structure and characteristics of the British economy. A comprehensive analysis of British capabilities in the context of international politics would require numerous additional studies of various kinds. I shall not attempt here to list them all, but merely to suggest one or two more for purposes of further illustration.

One manifestly important analysis would deal with the technological limitations on British military defense. The 1957 "White Paper" on Defense opens with the statement that "the time has come to revise not merely the size, but the whole character of the defense plan." The ensuing memorandum recognizes not only the economic limitations on

British military capabilities (dealt with in the illustrative analysis above), but also the limitations imposed by nuclear bombs, ballistic missiles, and other new weapons. This "outline of future policy," as it is labelled, is the latest development in a discussion of British military capability that has been waged furiously in the British press and in Parliament for several years. The White Paper has intensified this debate, by its bold assertions and assumptions regarding the military geography of Britain in the nuclear age. Here manifestly is a fruitful field for further analysis.

I would suggest as another fruitful focus, an analysis of the effect on British capabilities of the changing economic geography of our planet. A century ago Britain was the leading industrial country. Britain provided the greatest market for foodstuffs and raw materials, and was the chief supplier of manufactures. London was the banking center, and sterling was the world's international currency. British ships carried the lion's share of seaborne commerce, and British companies insured the ships and cargoes of all countries. Many of these patterns still persist. But superimposed upon them are other patterns—notably the spread of industrial society into every continent, the challenge of formidable economic competitors, etc. Britain's potentialities in this new economic setting is likewise a subject worthy of serious investigation by students of international relations.

The conclusions reached in the illustrative analysis or in comparable studies are, and can be, no better than the materials and procedures that go into them. The calculations cannot rise above the explanatory hypotheses (i.e., logical premises) brought to bear, the empirical data (i.e., observations) to which the premises are applied, and the logical inferences derived therefrom.

In the illustrative case, for example, someone with broader knowledge might demonstrate that my 10th hypothesis has not been confirmed with sufficient regularity to justify any strong prediction regarding public tolerance of austerity policies. The empirical data—whether derived second-hand or from the analyst's own personal observations—may be inaccurate or too fragmentary. In the above case, for example, my personal impressions of widely prevailing public attitudes might be shown to rest upon too narrow a sample of British opinion to be fairly representative. Finally, there is always danger that the conclusions drawn from premises and data may be logically defective.

For all these reasons, there is some inescapable degree of uncertainty in all capability calculations. Estimates may be formulated in terms of what is possible, or probably possible; but rarely, if ever, in terms of inevitability. One recalls in this connection, the many disconfirmed predictions, often phrased in terms of certainty or near-certainty, which were made before and during World War II. Nazi Germany could not stand the financial and moral strains of a great war! Civil populations could not carry on under heavy bombardment with the weapons of airpower then available! The Red Army would collapse in a few weeks under the blows of the Wehrmacht! etc., etc.

It is easy to be wise after the event. But the burden of my argument is that we should be able to avoid such gross miscalculations at least, by more sophisticated application of the analytical tools and environmental data that are available. Among other things, this involves a clean break from environmentalistic habits of thought and forms of speech. The essence of capability analysis is calculation of the opportunities and limitations latent, or implicit, in the milieu. The basic assumption of

capability analysis is that certain of these limitations may significantly affect the operational results of policy decisions, irrespective of whether or how these are perceived or taken into account in the decision-making process.

Conclusions

The most obvious conclusion that emerges from this discussion is my conviction that the concept of man-milieu relationships, and certain (but not all) relationship hypotheses, are fruitful analytical tools both for those who participate in foreign-policy making and for those who teach and write about it.

The second position which I have tried to establish is that it is useful to distinguish analytically between the relation of environmental factors to policy decisions, and the relation of such factors to the operational results of decisions. With respect to policy-making and the content of decisions, the position is that what matters is how the decision-maker imagines the milieu to be, not how it actually is. With respect to the operational results of decisions, what matters is how things are, not how the policy-maker imagined them to be.

In discussing various aspects of these separable issues, I hope I have not exaggerated what can be achieved in the present state of knowledge with any theory or analytical procedure. At the same time, I hope that I have made quite clear my conviction that the ecological concept of man-milieu relationship is a useful device for bringing to the study of foreign policy and the international capabilities of states, relevant theories, data, and conclusions drawn from geography, psychology, economics, sociology, and other systems of learning.

Panel 7 (First Session)

Necessity and Principle in Meinecke's Staatsraison

by
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Unlike Woodrow Wilson, Friedrich Meinecke may need some introduction to this audience. This despite the fact that one is certainly justified in calling him the most eminent German historian of this century. Moreover, he was first of all an intellectual historian, and the ideas with which he dealt are ones of central interest to the political scientist: nationalism and internationalis power and restraints on power, the relationship of state and individual, politics and morals.

In addition to all these recommendations, Meinecke is a peculiarly instructive guide into the German world of ideas. 1862-1954, the dates of his life-span, are enough to indicate what a diversity of German history he personally experienced. His intellectual and emotional powers made him at once a devoted representative and a discerning critic of German political and cultural traditions. He was an enormously productive scholar and had a striking facility of expression. Yet it is only in this year that a major work of his appears in English translation. This work, Die Idee der Staatsraeson--the English translation has been given the title Machiavellism--was first published in 1924.[1] It is both Meinecke's response to the giant political issues raised by the first World War and a classic study of the problem of power politics. It constitutes the chief resource in an analysis of Meinecke's contribution to the theme with which this panel is concerned.

By way of further introduction, it should be noted that Meinecke was a vehement critic of Wilson. At the time America entered the First World War Meinecke was fifty-five and near the peak of his prestige as a historian and of his more modest influence as a political thinker. A sometime counselor to Bethmann-Hollweg and Kuehlmann, he was a leader among the German intellectuals like Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch who opposed extremist war aims and who fought for internal political and social reforms. But these reforms must accord with Germany's unique heritage and the requirements of her international position. Meinecke was a liberal in his commitment to the ideal of the free personality, but he was not persuaded that Western-style democracy was the logical guarantor of that ideal. A blending of monarchic and democratic forms was infinitely preferable to a revolutionary transfer of power from the old bureaucratic-aristocratic state to a majority untutored in the complexities of foreign and domestic politics. Hence Meinecke was seeking delicate compromises, and Wilson's wholesale ideological assaults against the German political system were bound to arouse his opposition in a way which went beyond simple war-time patriotism.

Since we are occupied here with Meinecke as a political thinker, it is appropriate at this point to summarize some of the key concepts with which he operated in political analysis. These will serve to develop further the contrasting approaches of Meinecke and Wilson. At the same time they will lead to the specific problem which occupies us today.

The central lesson of history for Meinecke was that mankind's cultural and political development displays an apparently inexhaustible diversity. Men and societies, as products and agents of diversity, are incapable of transcending their individualities to the point where they represent universal norms unalloyed by particular interests. Every attempt to do so must end in the self-contradiction of seeking to impose individually conditioned standards upon a world which will necessarily resist them. Hence Meinecke rejected the implications of the Wilsonian doctrine that only one form of political organization could claim the sanction of reason and morality.

Moreover, in the ebb and flow of historical eras Meinecke found no suggestion that men were moving from diversity toward unity and the resolution of the ambiguities of morality and reason which diversity created. New loyalties replaced old, and larger communities superseded those of narrower scope, but only to yield once again to fragmentation and dispersion. Human subjectivity, irrationality and self-concern were inevitable and indeed indispensable and beneficial components of any community of loyalties. But they also constituted the ferment which fated such communities to transience. Such a view of history could not be reconciled with the millenarianism implicit in Wilson's picture of the world. History was not a procession toward God in which each generation, possessed of a truer and more universal understanding of life, moved closer to the goal. Meinecke took his stand with Ranke on the proposition that every age was as near to God as any other.

These views of history required acceptance of the assumption that there is an ineradicable element of anarchy in political life. For domestic politics this meant that the problem of liberty and authority would never be finally resolved. The most one could expect was a succession of more or less successful adjustments to it. The state was the means to effect these adjustments. It was the indispensable restraint on anarchy. As such its security and continuity constituted a task of the first importance.

The implication which Meinecke drew for the international realm was consistent with his assumptions about human diversity. The state could successfully carry out its ordering functions where affinities deriving from language, religion, historical background and propinquity helped it to counter men's heterogeneity. But it could not hope to embrace all of disparate mankind. Political organization was fated always to be geographically and culturally limited. Hence the world would continue to be the meeting-place of a multitude of societies, with chance and their own unique needs deciding at each moment whether there was to be cooperation or conflict.

It was in this great uncertain realm beyond the reach of the ordering state where the issue of survival came closest to the surface. For this reason Meinecke was moved to locate the chief threat to state security in the prospect of external violence. Within the limits of the organized society the use of force was only intermittent. But beyond these limits the threat of violence was constant, and the state's organization must be capable of meeting this threat.

These were the premises that led Meinecke to accept a doctrine radically at odds with Western thought in general and Wilsonian thought in particular. It was Ranke's doctrine that "foreign policy has primacy over domestic policy, that the internal constitution and development of the state are subordinate to the compulsions generated by the struggle for power and independence in the outside world. The state must build its internal organization in such a way that it will be in the best possible position to pursue its external interests."[2] One might argue parenthetically that Wilsonian doctrine was the reverse: the state must fashion its external environment in such a way that it will be in the best possible position to pursue its internal interests.

In any case, the idea of foreign policy primacy sheds a very different light on the nature of politics than does the Western concept of the constitutional state. The Western doctrine sees the key political issues taking place within the state. The problem is how to bend the state to the will of the individuals who comprise it. The Ranke doctrine, which also became the dominant German doctrine, saw the key political issues located outside the state. The problem was how to control the will of the people to assure the survival of the state in the external world. Foreign policy was not an incidental conditioner but the central determining factor in constitutional organization.

Whatever the merits or defects of this doctrine, it served to focus Meinecke's attention on the state as a coercive power. Indeed, all the concepts we have summarized here portray the world as a precarious environment and suggest that those who wish to survive will sometimes have to use harsh methods. The picture of

the state demanding obedience from its citizens is far sterner than one of the citizens demanding freedom from the state. All these considerations pointed to a conflict between the needs of the state and the idea of morality based on individual freedom in a way which the dominant Western theory of the state could never do.

At this point we are well into our central theme of the relationship between necessity and principle. For Meinecke used the term necessity in the way familiar to political science. Necessity is the imperative of state survival. Meinecke identified raison d'etat itself, the idea around which so much of his political thought revolved, as the reflection of this necessity. Raison d'etat is the formula which "tells the statesman what he must do to maintain the health and strength of the state."[3] The meaning of raison d'etat, Meinecke says in another place, is "determinism in political conduct."[4]

Ideally, then, conduct guided by raison d'etat had no other criterion than the welfare of the state. Such an ideal ran directly counter to the concept of a universal moral law which claimed for itself the function of ultimate yardstick for human conduct. Acts must be judged finally by the generally accepted canons of good and evil and not according to their utility to the state. Here then was the realm of principle where morality was the commanding consideration.

Necessity and principle were bound to clash. Their contending claims for supreme jurisdiction made antagonism a certainty even in cases where one might judge that the useful and the good coincided. Where there was no such coincidence, there the contest would be

exposed in all its ramifications. Where circumstances did not permit moral political methods, Machiavelli said, the prince must learn how not to be good. His advice to the statesman confuted the injunction to avoid evil and do good. True, Machiavelli did not argue to the contrary. The statesman should not do evil all the time. He ought to do good where he can. On the other hand, and more importantly, an evil deed was not merely a regrettable aberration from the norm. It was not an aberration at all, but quite within the range of normalcy--to be resorted to whenever necessity required.

Machiavelli's doctrine was a radical usurpation of the position claimed by morality and natural law in Western society. It was, Meinecke observed, as if "the devil had invaded God's kingdom."[5] Yet this invasion was at once more subtle and less repugnant if one accepted Machiavelli's persuasive position that the state was a good in itself. As the bringer of that order indispensable to civilization, was not the state's preservation a purpose which commanded obedience and even veneration? Human freedom, in any meaningful sense of the term, also depended upon political order. Without it, the quality of social relationships was bound to be deficient and unpromising.

All these services to cultural and moral values gave the state a moral dignity of its own. Hence the conflict of political necessity and moral principle was not a clash of opposites but of approximates. The state's loss would not automatically be morality's gain; the world of morals would be the poorer for the lack of the state's ordering hand.

The relationship between state survival and moral principle becomes still more ambiguous when its context is considered. The state is not an isolated entity but exists in a world of rivals. Should the state sacrifice its security needs to the commands of ethical behavior, the profit would go not so much to abstract morality as to a political rival. In this case the most that can be said is that the rival's claims to the status of a moral entity are as good or bad as those of the sacrificing state.

The impossibility of achieving absolute justice, whether the statesman uses the standards of political necessity or moral principle, has the effect of making both standards relative. When faced with contradictory demands required by moral behavior and political survival, the statesman faced a choice not between moral and immoral action but between conflicting moral duties.

This was Meinecke's view in his first elaboration of the proble "The laws of morality," he wrote, "of brotherly love, of sanctity of agreements, are eternal and inviolable. But the duty of the statesman to care for the welfare and safety of the state and people entrusted to him...is also sacred and inviolable. What happens when these two duties conflict with one another?" Meinecke reminded thos who denied the possibility of such conflicts that "Every authentic tragedy is a shattering demonstration that moral life cannot be regulated like clockwork and that even the purest strivings for good can be forced into the most painful choices.... In relations between states, moreover, clashes between private morality and state interest are plainly inevitable and as old as world history itself."[6]

How then was the statesman to decide between the two duties? In 1915 Meinecke's answer was that both "history and conscience teach...that in such cases the statesman can act only in accordance with the principle salus populi suprema lex esto. This is exactly what Bismarck meant when he said that 'state egotism is the only healthy basis of a great state.'"[7] Such an answer was a telling illustration of the aggressiveness with which the "devil had invaded God's kingdom." The statesman's two absolutes of state responsibility and moral norm have become relativized only to permit the one to assert its permanent supremacy over the other. Here salus populi is not demanding mere equal status to the moral law; it insists that morality subordinate itself to the needs of the state whenever the issue is drawn.

This is essentially the doctrine of Machiavelli which Meinecke was later to label both "great" and "demonic": "In politics state interest has predence over morality.--Morality is not denied; it is simply...relegated to the realm of secondary concerns."[8] Meinecke own involvement with the doctrine testified to its demonic powers of attraction. There is ample evidence to suggest that his resolve to probe the nature of raison d'etat was inspired in part by a sense of culpability in having failed on first attempt to place any theoretically meaningful limits to state egotism.[9]

Whatever doubts and confusion attended Meinecke's post war thought, he stood by the conviction that the establishment of such limits had become a task of utmost importance. He was too deeply shaken by the spectacle of the contending state egos in the great war, each driven by its survival imperative to cast away more and

more of the moral restraints which also tended to restrict war's destructive powers. All the values which the state's existence was designed to protect--civilization, culture and ordered liberty--were being wrecked in the struggle of the states to maintain themselves and destroy their enemies. In this perspective one could not derive much comfort from the doctrine that the existence of the state is a good in itself and that the presumed necessity of its continuation must override every other consideration.

This, then, was the background of Meinecke's study of raison d'etat. All his investigations were directed toward an attempt to get the doctrine of necessity of state out into the open, to discover the extent of its validity as a concept. He wanted to know whey it exerted such an obvious fascination for political thinkers and how to avoid entrapment by it. Thus he created a study which was in essence a dialogue between Machiavelli and all the generations that followed him. He documented the triumphs which Machiavelli celebrated in the camps of his critics--Bodin, Campanella, and the young Frederick. None could spare the Florentine recipes, no matter how determined they were not to use them. But Meinecke also recorded the dangers which beset those who attempted a reconciliation with Machiavelli. Hegel, Fichte, Ranke and Treitschke, all seminal influences in German thought generally and in Meinecke's own personal intellectual development, sought to effect a marriage between the expedient and the good. The result, as Meinecke's own experience had indicated, was an ever stronger tendency for the expedient to suppress the good--to the point where expediency ruled alone.

The basic thesis of Meinecke's reappraisal was that both critics and admirers of Machiavelli failed to deal adequately with the challenge he confronted them with. Those who insisted that moral principle must always have primacy over the necessities of state could not be consistent. The complexities of subjectivity and diversity, of irrationality and self-concern which they shared with their environment were an insuperable obstacle. Narrowness of view and particularity of advantage continually betrayed their doctrines and their actions. As they attempted to disguise their inconsistencies they moved from expediency into hypocrisy and even beyond to the point where they no longer realized themselves when principle had departed from their conduct. At this point their appeals to principle fell on deaf ears among those whom their actions disadvantaged. The credibility of moral principle was undermined and with it the whole concept of a universal ethical standard superior to the interests of the individual state. Thus the opponents of Machiavelli and the doctrine of state necessity destroyed the very thing they had set out to champion.

It was in criticism of this process that those who sought to restore Machiavelli to respectability built their systems. After all, Machiavelli symbolized the protest against sham. He wanted to discuss the truth of politics and not what men imagined it to be. Let us concede that the state must sometimes violate the moral law, they argued, so that we will not deceive ourselves and embitter others by false preachments. But let us build into the state a moral value and a cultural creativity of such proportions that the egotism of its conduct may be justified. When it transgresses

the laws of truth and justice in pursuit of its advantage, let it be done in the name of perserving that heritage of order and common enterprise without which none of men's spiritual and cultural values can flourish.

Here was the element of greatness in Machiavelli's doctrine. It challenged men to face the truth about politics and human nature. In their efforts to deal with life and society they could not avoid incurring guilt. "It seems," Meinecke wrote, "that the state must sin."[10] The recognition of this truth could serve as a spur to compensate for guilty actions in such a way that even sin could be productive of virtue. For the state this meant that it must have such virtue of its own that even a resort to the techniques of Machiavelli would not be without an element of moral grandeur.

The building of such a state was a dazzling objective. It began with the confession that men were not gods but earthbound and sinful. It proposed to construct a society whose norms were honest enough to admit to this limitation. Its claim would be not to serve virtue in the abstract but in the only form which was socially meaningful--within the boundaries of the order-bringing state. Here the dignity and creative powers of men would be cultivated and given protection from the chaos of the surrounding world.

The state would not be diverted by the hopeless task of assuming similar responsibilities for humanity at large. It would resemble a great and free personality whose claim to exist in the world rested on its own moal achievements. When its existence was threatened it would not resort to cant but defend itself frankly on the proposition that it was dedicated to its own self-preservation.

It would refuse to speak in terms of absolute right and wrong; in the light of its original self-limitation it could not assert with certainty that there were not contending rights. Its only certainty was its own interior worth and the need to sustain it.

If the necessities of conflict demanded the use of evil means, there was no cause for dismay among those who had already confessed that this was the way of the world. The ancient wisdom that men faced only a choice of evils meant that evil must be used to outwit evil. Evil would be made to serve the good if its purpose was the virtuous state's salvation. At the end of this line of reasoning stood the admonition of Machiavelli: "Where the very safety of the fatherland is at stake, there should be no question of reflecting whether a thing is just or unjust, humane or cruel, praiseworthy or shameful. Setting aside every other consideration, one must take only that course of action which will secure the country's life and liberty."[11]

Even here, where the consequences of the state's absolutization were revealed in all their nakedness, the element of humility in the original proposition could still be ascertained. After all, the state's decisions were being made by the men who were its rulers. Machiavelli's words were for them, and they were not a recipe for victory at any price--for the victory that would assure the rulers glory. The necessity of state embraced defeat as well as victory. If victory was beyond grasp, then its rulers must prepare the state for defeat, seeking to mitigate its losses and spare its vital parts. Here Machiavelli remarked that "It will always be difficult to induce the masses to accept decisions which appear to be cowardly and ruinous but which in fact bring safety and advantage."[12]

Nonetheless, in the name of the state the rulers must accept their own loss of power and the humiliation which accompanies failure, they must be ready to save the fatherland even at the expense of their personal ignominy. "This is the summit of ethical pathos which conduct governed by state reason can achieve," Meinecke observed. Machiavelli's words "should have sounded in the ears of a great German statesman during the world war."[13]

It would be too much to say that Meinecke&s own retreat from the doctrine of salus populi was rooted in his disappointment that there were no German leaders capable of following such an ethic. Indeed, the record of his previous positions and the tenor of his other wartime writings justify the contention that the idea of the state's knowing no law beyond its own survival would rest uneasily with him--that his avowal of the doctrine was a counsel of desperation and that the fact that he had given it unqualified articulation was itself the moving force which finally led him into his monumental endeavor to lay bare the meaning of raison d'etat. It is true that he was an intellectual heir of the German tradition which built up to the supremacy of the state's ego. He was touched personally and deeply by what he later called its demonic force. But he had long before developed positions of resistance to it. If Germany's crisis demonstrated that the men who ruled it could not meet the supreme ethical requirements of the doctrine of state necessity, one could draw some valid conclusions about their personal shortcomings. But in a more important sense it provided dramatic evidence that the doctrine itself was no solution to the dilemma of means and ends. Meinecke's assumptions about human diversity and the subjectivity and irrationality of human nature

were given terrible confirmation by the very system which sought to allow for them.

If subjectivity and irrationality prevented the men who preached the supremacy of universal moral principles from seeing when principle had departed from their conduct, the same qualities prevented the state supremacists from seeing when virtue left the state. What was the basis for their claims that the state was virtuous? Was it that the state was truthful in admitting the egotistic nerve of its policies? But what had happened to truth when the rulers lied to hide the state's defeats in the name of maintaining morale? What chance did candor have when the destructiveness of world conflict made the people doubt that preservation of the state's ego was sufficient justification for the carnage?

The resolve not to deal in terms of universal moral principles and absolute right and wrong collapsed before the necessity to gain allies and influence neutrals. One could not leave to the enemy a monopoly claim to be fighting in the name of universal justice and of interests and standards which transcended the narrow ego of the individual state. Wartime associates must not be permitt to infer that their efforts in a common venture would benefit only one of the partners. The greater the sacrifices demanded from the masses of civilians and soldiers, the greater the temptation to picture the enemy not merely as alien but unjust.

Finally, if the rulers claimed that the state provided the order which freedom and cultural creativity must have, what could sustain them when that order began to crumble under the pressures of war? As every nerve was strained in the struggle to survive, the

freedom to dissent became narrower, every national energy was channeled into the war effort, and the conception of reality as complex, upon which every thriving culture rests, must give way to the black and white patterns of the propagandist.

All this experience must bring into question the whole concept of equating the state's ego with the salus populi. Were they not ambiguous concepts in themselves, coinciding or not as circumstances decreed? "The state's advantage is...always somehow related to advantages for the rulers," Meinecke wrote, and only too often "the state served not the general welfare but the welfare of the rulers."[14] True, this was a universal phenomenon of politics, not to be done away with by the mere alteration of a doctrine which elevated the necessity of state to the supreme commandment of life. But the destructive effects of this truth about politics were immeasurably magnified if people were trained to bow down and question not whenever the idea of raison d'etat was invoked. Narrow interests, the product of man's inherent diversity, could find all too convenient a hiding place behind absolute ideas whether of the virtuous state or of a universal code of morality and justice.

Necessity and principle--each when converted into an ultimate commandment distorted the real issues in man's political life. In this light the demonic element in the doctrine of raison d'etat is clear enough. Its claim to the status of an absolute erects a creature between men and God whose demands of allegiance are God's own and which, if fulfilled, prevent men from seeing its true

nature and their duties transcending a being "higher than men but lower than God." But the demon of untruth is also present in the doctrine of the supremacy of moral principle in politics. The assertion that principle is always the guide in political decision is also a denial of truth which deprives men of the capacity to understand the ambiguous meaning of their own actions and hence of the opportunity to purify them. The root of corruption in both cases is the supposition that either can claim sole validity as a criterion for political conduct.

Thus Meinecke saw the two concepts as both antogonistic and complementary. Neither could be spared as a referent for political thought and action. Hence they joined a long list of conceptual polarities--nationalism and cosmopolitanism, power and morals, ideal and real, subjective and objective--upon which Meinecke built an ever more explicitly dualistic philosophy. Men were fated to be torn between the antipodes of these concepts, each of which had both positive and negative connotations. Only the apprehension of the human situation in these terms could discipline subjective, irrational and diverse men to turn their limitations into cultural and moral assets. Only the recognition that the problems posed by these polarities are inherently insoluble could guard against the temptation to eradicate the ineradicable anarchy of human existence and challenge human beings to use this anarchy as freedom to dissent from and freedom to change the transient if necessary modes of political order.

In regard to the specific problem of state necessity, Meinecke wrote that "monism, whether naive or consciously elaborated, whether idealistic or naturalistic, is not inevitably the foundation of a ruthless raison d'etat. But it can become one; restraints can be sought only by means of some kind of dualistic approach..."[15] Thus the climax of his study of raison d'etat gave the statesman a far more difficult task than Meinecke's earlier recipe always to resolve conflicts between necessity and principle in favor of the salus populi. The statesman "must carry both God and the state in his heart to prevent the demon he cannot completely escape from overpowering him."[16]

This admonition imposes on the statesman a double obligation which nc longer permits the automatic option for the norm of state necessity when it is in conflict with the norms of moral principle. The juxtaposition of the state with God emphasized the claim and responsibility of the state to represent a moral content of its own, but it must strive always to find means of self-preservation in harmony with the transcendent moral obligations. Violations of these obligations are not ruled out, for the fact that good can sometimes come from bad is undeniable. But violations must be kept to a minimum for "one must avoid any idealization of this fact. It is a demonstration not of reason's cunning but of reason's impotency."[17] Each violation is a confession of imperfection and incurs a guilt for which there can be atonement only by a renewed and more intense striving to abide by moral norms.

The pairing of the state and God in the statesman's heart has an obverse function. It warns him not to suppose that his conduct can be wholly without blemish. It reminds him that his relationship to God can be only a mediate one, that his striving for good can never be truly universal in its significance and effects. It admonishes him that political order has, in fact, powerful claims and that he must be cautious in pressing against them his subjective concepts of what abstract morality requires.

Both aspects of the juxtaposition constitute a remonstrance to humility. Whether the statesman opts for state necessity or moral principle as the basis for decision, he must do so in the knowledge of his own fallibility. But here we are at the crucial distinction between Meinecke's wartime embrace of the salus populi argument and the conclusions he reached in his study of raison d'etat. The juxtaposition of state and God liberated the statesman from determinism in politics. It gave to his conscience the freedom not only to violate moral principles in the name of state survival but also to turn his back on the necessities of state when he found its demands morally intolerable.

Meinecke did not spell out this radical consequence of the formula with which he capped his study of raison d'etat. Indeed, the whole tenor of the book indicates an unwillingness to speculate on the possibility that the responsible statesman might be forced to make a choice in violation of the state's interests. What he had done, however, was to elevate the individual conscience to a seat of judgment over the contending claims of necessity and principle. Whatever Meinecke's subsequent deviations, this answer

to the problem of political obligation was foreshadowed long before when in the early years of the century he wrote that "the inner freedom of the human being is the highest of all values."[18]

This inner freedom made it possible in the first instance for Meinecke as a private citizen to reject from the outset the raison d'etat of the Nazi state. As the Hitler years brought ever more brutal violations of morality in the name of the state ego, he explicitly extended this inner freedom to responsible officials sworn to uphold the state. In his approval of the conspiracy against the Nazi regime,[19] Meinecke accepted the full consequences of his juxtaposition of God and the state. To the state whose necessities had become a moral enormity the only possible answer was treason.

This was, of course, a rejection of Machiavelli and all the subsequent doctrines which absolutized the necessity of state. It also contradicted the theory of the primacy of foreign policy in that it conceded that the internal enemy could be as dangerous as any external foe.[20] Was it not also a rejection of the dualistic conclusions at which Meinecke arrived in his study of raison d'etat? Was not the devil clearly ejected from God's kingdom and the statesman presented with a hierarchy of values in which the necessity of state was clearly subordinate to moral principle?

In an ultimate sense one would have to answer in the affirmative and so accuse Meinecke of self-contradiction. But he would argue in return that it is not often human fortune or misfortune provides the opportunity for such a clear-cut choice. Indeed, it must be the statesman's aim to avoid such moments of clarity, for they

tend to come only when the state has become corrupt. He must strive to make the state virtuous and so justify its claims to survival. To the extent that he succeeds the counsel of Machiavelli will not be irrelevant. But his indispensable support in seeking to make the state a moral being is the knowledge that there are obligations which transcend the state. He must constantly endeavor to meet those obligations in order not to be forced by them to violate his political trust. The duty--and the tragedy--of a statesman, therefore, fates him to will a situation in which the dualism of necessity and principle constitutes a never-ending challenge.

Footnotes
(All references are to Meinecke's writings)

1. Die Idee der Staatsraeson in der neueren Geschichte, Munich and Berlin, 1924.

2. Vom geschichtlichen Sinn und vom Sinn der Geschichte, Leipzig, 1939, (Fourth edition, Leipzig 1942, p. 30)

3. Staatsraeson, op. cit., p. 1.

4. Ibid., p. 369.

5. Ibid., p. 49.

6. "Kultur, Machtpolitik und Militarismus" in Otto Hintze et. al., Deutschland und der Weltkrieg, Leipzig and Berlin, 1915, p. 631.

7. Ibid.

8. Introduction to Machiavellis Der Fuerst (Klassiker der Politik, Vol. 8) Berlin, 1923, p. 6.

9. Cf. Staatsraeson, op. cit., p. 27 and Nach der Revolution, Munich and Berlin, pp. 54-55.

10. Staatsraeson, op. cit., p. 15.

11. Discourses, III, 41, quoted in Staatsraeson, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

12. Discourses, I, 53, quoted in Staatsraeson, op. cit., p. 55.

13. Staatsraeson, loc. cit.

14. Ibid., pp. 9 and 429.

15. Ibid., p. 536.

16. Ibid., p. 542.

17. Ibid., p. 537.

18. Das Zeitalter der deutschen Erhebung, 1795-1815, Bielefeld, 1906. Fourth edition, Leipzig, 1940, p. 52).

19. Die deutsche Katastrophe, Wiesbaden, 1946, pp. 143-150.

20. Ibid., p. 152.

Engineering of Consent as a Dynamic of Communism in East Europe*

Prepared for the 1957 Convention of the American Political Science Association in New York, September 1957

Although the over-emphasis on military power in our era of power politics tends to conceal it, the fate of Communism depends in the long run upon the result of the Communist endeavor to create a new type of a "Socialistic man"--a man who would genuinely believe that Communism gives him a better deal than "capitalism," materially as well as politically and socially, collectively as well as individually; a man who if given true freedom to choose would reach for Communism rather than western democracy and who would turn out to be so altruistic and self-sacrificing that he would fit into the promised utopia supposedly awaiting him at the end of the lengthy transition from socialism to Communism, which, according to Khrushchev, is now in progress in the Soviet Union. Should such a progeny be successfully developed and reproduced en masse, the victory of Communism is assured. Should the endeavor fail, the ultimate defeat of Communism is enevitable no matter how much more ground may yet be conquered and how many people subjected to its rule.

That the Communist rulers of East Europe are earnestly attempting to procreate this new strain of the human race and are fully aware of the vital importance of that task is amply revealed both by the magnitude of their effort is that direction and by their pronouncements. "We shall change nature in accordance to our needs," said the Nestor of Satellite Communist intellectuals, Zdenek Nejedly, dubbed "Red Grandpa" for his ultra-orthodox views. "We shall not be satisfied with the innate gifts of man." The crucial character of this battle for the mind has been further enhanced by the realization of the disastrous consequences of a nuclear war, a realization which well-nigh bars direct and decisive use of armed force as a means of solving the East-West conflict. Indeed, Khrushchev's amendment, at the Twentieth Party Congress, of Lenin's thesis of the inevitability of a war between the socialist and capitalist camps and the recent strong Soviet re-emphasis of a "free competition of ideas" stems mainly if not solely from this Soviet "agonizing re-appraisal" of the "atomic stalemate."

However, such psychological warfare can hardly bring victory to the cause of Communism unless the battle for the mind has first been won in Communism's own backyard. If the Communist rulers would prove conclusively that the substantial majority of those who had actually experienced life under a Communist regime like it and accepted it of their own free will, only then could their hope come true that, as Khruschev put it, "the working people on earth, once they have become convinced of the advantages Communism brings, will sooner or later take the road of struggle for the construction of socialist society."[1]

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* I am greatly indebted to the Free Europe Committee for various materials lent me from its files for the preparation of this paper.

Thus the engineering of consent is a fundamental part of Communist dynamics, truly indispensable for the ultimate Communist victory both at home and abroad. It is the purpose of this paper to explore how that vitally important process is being attended to by Moscow's European satellites, what methods, media and instrumentalities are used and how much effort goes into it; to determine which factors help and which impede it; and to assess the interim results thus far attained. The materials on which the paper is based are mainly of the following two kinds:

1. Communist sources, such as pronouncements of East European Communist leaders, decrees and other directives issued by Party and government agencies, various satellite periodicals, newspapers, and monitored broadcasts. 2. Information obtained from anti-Communist refugee groups, interviews with escapees from behind the Iron Curtain, etc. Added to these twofold sources will be occasionally the knowledge of Communist policies and processes gained through my own personal experience.

Laying the groundwork

The Communist battle for the East European souls began while the area was still in firm grip of the Nazis and their Wehrmacht. Hardly had the Soviets recovered from the shock of their initial defeats when they began to go with a fine-toothed comb through the ranks of East European refugees in the Soviet Union in order to squeeze out an adequate number of fellow-traveling non-Communists pliable enough or opportunistic enough to qualify for positions on various "committees of liberation." Having non-Communists alongside with Party members on such East European "shadow governments" was a condition sine qua non for the Communist strategy of displaying their willingness for friendly cooperation with non-Communists on the basis of equality, and of obviating the rise, and denying the need of, any independent opposition. Thus the concept of the "National," Fatherland's," or "People's" front was born, allegedly embracing all the progressive, anti-fascist forces. This concept greatly aided the Communist engineering of consent, as did the Communist-fathered idea of people's committees which, dominated as they have subsequently become by the Communists, placed all the local instrumentalities at virtually exclusive Communist disposal. Simultaneously, the Soviet radio began to pour out in regular broadcasts in the native languages of the East European peoples a steady stream of cunningly designed propaganda emphasizing the Soviet role as a liberator whose only concern was to chase out the Nazis and enable the peoples of East Europe to proceed to a free choice of government. Subtly modulating the tune in addressing itself to individual ethnic groups in the area, professing, to cite just one sample, friendship for the German people victimized by the Nazi overlords in its German broadcasts while simultaneously harping on the anti-German bitterness of the Czechs and the Poles in programs beamed at Czechoslovakia and Poland, the Soviet transmissions sought to present Communists as the most trustworthy guardians of national sovereignty and independence of their respective nations as well as social-minded reformers

and genuine protectors of rightful interests of all groups except the small bunch of industrial and agricultural magnates. When the time came, in 1944 and 1945, to set up new governments for the areas freed from the Nazis, the positions concerned with, or important for, the engineering of consent were among those the Communists coveted most, and fought for most ferociously. When inter-party negotiations were held in Moscow in March of 1945 with the view of forming a Czechoslovak cabinet, the Communist party spokesmen, while willing to compromise here and there, consistently refused to budge one inch when it came to the ministries of the Interior, Information and Education, all of which had a crucial role to play in the thought control and the creation of the new Communistic man. As a result the hapless Benes was compelled to bring back with him to Czechoslovakia such arch-Stalinists and Kremlin's trustees as Vaclav Kopecky and Zdenek Nejedly who headed the ministries of Information and Education respectively and thus were in supreme charge of the whole field of indoctrination. Except for some difference in timing due to local conditions an essentially similar process took place throughout the remainder of East Europe controlled by the Red Army.

Thus even before the Iron Curtain fell down completely on East Europe, the Communists were, but for a few notable exceptions, in supreme control of the main media and instrumentalities of thought control. They were taking ruthless advantages of their position in such matters as allocating newsprint and rotation paper, setting up radio programs, slanting educational curricula, browbeating teaching faculties and discriminating in granting permits for public gathering.

Methods, Media, and Instrumentalities

Having secured such a broad base for their ideological onslaught in the very first years of the post-liberation era the East European Communist leaders could not only pursue with less difficulty their "salami tactics" of gradual strangulation of democracy in the area, but also prepare themselves and their machinery for the full-fledged battle for the human mind which they unleashed after they seized complete control in their respective countries.

What methods, media and instrumentalities have they been using in this battle?

Those familiar with the practices employed for the engineering of consent in the Soviet Union will quickly recognize that the East European equivalents bear an indelible "Moscow-made" trade mark. Here and there an adaptation to native conditions has taken place, as permitted under the precepts of "creative Marxism," some of the trappings have been changed or emphasis shifted with regard to differing developmental stages, but the essence has remained the same. The Kremlin chef's recipe has been slavishly followed by the satellite cook although their soup a la Moscou (at times) got off flavor and caused more upsets

to subtler East European stomachs. That was especially true of the Stalin era. Soon after the Dictator's death the rigid Muscovite pattern has been somewhat loosened and more variety could be noticed from one satellite to another. Although the Soviet reaction to the Hungarian revolt has begun to push things back again toward the previous orthodoxy, the sycophantic uniformity of the Stalinist era has thus far not been fully restored.

While all the methods and instrumentalities used for the Communist engineering of consent constitute a unified pattern which can be understood and evaluated only in its entirety, they can nevertheless be divided into two broad categories: 1) a negative one which attempts to shield the object of indoctrination from refractive influences, and 2) a positive one which comprises those media which seek to evoke consent proper.

Eliminating adverse influences from within and without

The purpose of the negative category has been, of course, to isolate the East European peoples as fully as possible from the non-Communist world as well as to suppress such internal factors as might interfere with the processes of positive persuasion. It fulfills much the same function which a long solitary confinement of a prisoner or detainee has in the process of individual brainwashing. Besides cutting off the captive nation from sources which could contradict Communist assertions, it tends to create a feeling of helpless abandonment, of despondency and resignation, thus providing a mental climate which the Communists find especially valuable for their engineering of consent. Achieving such isolation, or as much of it as can be attained, is more imperative than it has been in the case of Russia since East Europe had been so much more an integral part of the western world and its civilization.

There is quite an array of methods and instrumentalities resorted to in this "Iron Curtain" strategy against adverse influences from without as well as from within.

Cutting contacts with the outside world

There has been, to begin with, a drastic curtailment in the transit across state boundaries, particularly those bordering on non-Communist nations. At the peak of the Stalinist era the international tourist traffic between the Western and the satellite parts of Europe came to a virtual standstill, permits to leave or to enter being issued solely to persons on recognized official business or for special political reasons.[2] A ban has been imposed on foreign publications. While pre-war East European reader had at his disposal in public reading rooms in larger cities and in his cafe a wide selection of foreign newspapers and magazines of all possible shades of opinion in the main European languages, he can now obtain at best, besides the ubiquitous Soviet Pravda and other Russian periodicals, only a few western Europe's Communist--edited journals, such as l'Humanite or the Daily Worker. And even their supply is strictly limited. Nothing attests better the Communist thoroughness in this respect than the enforced closing of public reading rooms kept by some of the foreign missions in satellite capitals. Although these reading rooms could handle only a negligible fraction of the populace, not even this minute keyhole into the arena of the free press could be permitted.

Nor can the satellite subject go to his public library and borrow translations of western European and American authors which used to be available by hundreds and thousands. What he will find there today will be a small and carefully expurgated selection of those foreign authors whose books have been approved by Communist censors because they are either so called "progressive" writers, or their books, like some of Upton Sinclair or Charles Dickens, might serve the Communist purpose by leaving a distorted impression in the mind of a reader ignorant of present conditions in "capitalist countries." Even writings of such authors as Plato and St. Augustine have been removed, as has recently been admitted by a Polish periodical.[3]

To discourage him from seeking contacts with those few non-Communist foreigners permitted to reside within the country, both the offices of foreign missions and residences of their personnel as well as of foreign correspondents are watched, and a frequent check of their native visitors is made. Occasional arrests, trials, or expulsions of foreigners also have been motivated to a great extent by the desire to scare satellite subjects from associating with such potential alien enemies and exposing themselves to accusations of complicity in their "crimes." Indeed, a foreign diplomat, newsman or businessman who attempts to establish closer personal relationship with the natives is signing his own warrant of expulsion.

Correspondence with the inhabitants of the free world has also been held objectionable, except for occasional exchange of mere greetings. While the bills of right of the satellite constitutions solemnly guarantee "privacy of mail" and no formal censorship of ingoing and outgoing mail has been set up, all available evidence shows that such mail is in fact tampered with. Moreover, postal authorities have been directed to keep tab of persons corresponding more frequently with addressees abroad.

Groups, organizations and societies which used to have regular contacts with the West or were members of international units have been gradually wiped out. That has happened to Y.M.C.A., the Scouts, Rotarians and great many other societies for the promotion of international friendship and cooperation with the non-Communist world.

Nor have monuments of past associations with the free world been allowed to remind the local population of pre-Communist days. No longer is there a Woodrow Wilson station in Praha, Czechoslovakia;[4] the hundreds of streets or squares throughout the area which have been named after Eisenhower, Winston Churchill, King George, Herbert Hoover and many other western statesmen have been rechristened to more appropriate designations such as Stalin, Moskva, Red Tankists, etc. The monument commemorating the liberation of the well-known Czechoslovak beer-brewing city of Pilsen by General Patton's Army, a most awkward memento indeed, has been removed as have been so many other statues reminiscent of western participation in recent East European history since as far back as World War I. Not even such hallowed place have been left untouched as scattered graves of French, British and Americans who had died in Nazi camps and had been properly buried by local population at the end of the war.

Similar treatment has been meted out to school textbooks, especially those on social sciences, recent history, and geography. When the Marxian-Leninist re-writers were through with them, the "capitalist states" emerged as decadent villains and plutocratic exploiters of peoples living under their rule. All the traces of "bourgeois objectivism and cosmopolitanism" have been ordered removed and a ban has been decreed even on "illustrations which embellish life in capitalist countries and conceal the oppression and misery of the working people."[5] For instance, a 1950 Hungarian two-volume textbook for sixth and seventh grade gives to United States only ten out of four hundred pages devoted to countries outside Hungary, and those pages are replete with gross distortions about "the ever-increasing exploitation" of workers, their decreasing incomes, and ever-increasing resistance, on persecution of "the progressive-minded scientists," on how "all the democratic aspirations of the working masses are stifled" and "how the American capitalists are trying to extend their power over the whole world."[6]

Study of western European languages, highly developed throughout the area prior to Communist seizure of power, has been cut most severely both in schools and out of schools. Private teachers of such languages have almost become prima facie suspects and textbooks and dictionaries of these languages have been so rare that they have begun to command very good prices on the black market. When the Government Publishing House Orbis in Prague did publish a Czech-English dictionary in a pitifully small edition of one thousand copies, long lines formed to secure a copy.[7]

Not even such trivialities as gay ties, striped socks--held as signs of pro-American sympathies--or the restaurant menus have escaped the puritanic zeal of satellite Communists. Use of such foreign culinary designs as Chateaubriand, rumsteak Jackson, or even plan ham-and-eggs, has been chastised as "relics of feudalistic times when culinary delicacies were stylishly called after statesmen, artists and their mistresses."[8]

While the de-westernization of menus or campaigns against striped socks or jitterbugging must be considered as ridiculous and rather seasonal excesses of overzealous eager beavers, this cannot be said of the persistent Communist drive against the western penetration through airwaves. Listening to foreign broadcasts in native languages via B.B.C., Voice of America, Free Europe Radio and other such programs has become the basic source of information and encouragement for the captive nations of East Europe, their major link to the free world, and thus a major interference with Communist engineering of consent. Small wonder that the Communist rulers have been doing their utmost to curb, and if possible, to eliminate such a dangerous breach in their Iron Curtain. Having for a while ignored such broadcasts, they have soon shifted toward counterdicting and ridiculing them, which in itself amounted to an implied admission that the transmissions were getting through to broader audience. They have developed jamming operations along the Soviet pattern. Although listening to foreign stations is not technically an offense, stern and well publicized penalties have

nevertheless been imposed occasionally on such listeners, especially if caught in "spreading malicious rumors" based on "enemy broadcasts."[9] The so called "house wardens" have been instructed to eavesdrop on apartment dwellers they are to watch and to report those overheard tuning in such foreign stations. In the production of radio receivers there has been a pronounced switch to the output of cheap one-wave "people's radios" capable of tuning in only local stations.

A major emphasis has been laid in recent years on the expansion of wired radio that permits listeners to receive only official broadcasts. The satellite regimes have gone heads over heels to hail wired sets as giving much better reception, free of atmospheric and other disturbances, besides being much cheaper than ordinary sets. What "other" disturbances are meant was openly revealed by a satellite Minister of Communications who declared that the wired radio system would be one of the means how to prevent transmissions of imperialist countries from "interfering with a large number of stations in Central Europe...."[10] This "radiofication" as it is called in Communist terminology has been advancing quite rapidly since 1953. By 1954, 1,179,000 loudspeakers were hooked into the wired radio network in Poland, 200,000 in Bulgaria, 250,000 in Hungary, 280,000 in Rumania,[11] and 200,000 in Czechoslovakia,[12] with fast pace continuing through the ensuing years.

A lot of energy has been spent also on a ferocious campaign against the launching of freedom balloons by the American Crusade for Freedom. Violent protests were lodged with the United States and West German governments as well as with the United Nations, based on alleged claims that such balloons constituted a serious hazard to air navigation. Charges were made that some balloons carried explosives and poisoned materials and a special exhibition of allegedly captured balloons was held in Czechoslovakia to show the "criminal" work of the "pirates of the air."

Hand in hand with the actions taken against this "abuse of the air" a determined effort has been undertaken by the East European governments to administer a knock-out blow to anti-Communist exiles. Scathing denunciations of East European politicians abroad as characterless lackeys selling out their nations to foreign interest were coupled in 1954-1955 with a concerted endeavor to woo the "ordinary" refugees to come back home. Those who did return were induced to write articles, give interviews, or report on the radio on their real or trumped-up disillusionment with the capitalist west so that the satellite public might realize, through those who have had the bitter taste of living under capitalism, how much better off they were under their "people's democracy."[13]

Liquidating foci of interference within

While one arm of this ideological pincer movement against undesired influences kept chopping off links with the outside non-Communist world, its

other arm has been frantically busy crushing the native sources of interference. As such, religion has been the foremost candidate for Communist concern, for obvious reasons. Taking out a leaf from the Soviet manual of tactics of the forties, the East European Communist regimes have resorted to devious maneuvering rather than launching a wholesale frontal attack. On the one hand, they posed pharisaically as being tolerant of "genuine" religious belief devoid of "reactionary misuse of religion for anti-State purposes"; they boasted of huge sums of money allocated in their state budgets to the repair and maintenance of churches, salaries and social security of clergymen, and other ecclesiastical needs, claiming that more had been spent on such matters under Communism than in pre-war days.[14] They even kept catholic priests in high government positions, the most striking illustration being the appointment of Father Plojhar as Czechoslovak Minister of Health. On the other hand, they confiscated church property, arrested and tried church leaders and clergymen who stood up against Communist interference with religious affairs, kept closing religious institutions, banning religious instruction from public schools (though allowing it upon written request of parents in off-school hours) and saturating their curricula with anti-religious indoctrination. They led a persistent crusade against "religious obcurantism," attempted to incite lower clergy against their church superiors and to set up "national catholic churches" in order to break Catholicism which, because of its predominance in Eastern Europe and its strong international ties, was deemed to be more dangerous than other denominations.[15] Even Baby Jesus, Central Europe's Santa Claus, had to yield to Grandpa Frost--commuting from the Soviet Union's Chukhotka.

What the Communists have been mainly aiming at thus far has been to develop what they call a "patriotic priest" who would trade pastoral integrity and spiritual freedom for personal and material security, plus the privilege to hold religious services which would be strictly limited to non-controversial topics and implied at least an occasional approval of the general Communist goals. Such a type of "patriotic priest," allowing as he does the Communists to add the pulpit to their media of propaganda, is of great value for the Communist engineering of consent at this stage of the battle for human minds, no matter whether he lends himself for such a function because of smallheartedness, gullibility, or because of an honest belief that he saves for religion what can be saved under the given circumstance. "Plojhars and Hromadkas[16] harm the cause of religion more than hundreds of atheist agitators," a prominent religious leader reported recently from behind the Iron Curtain, conveying the consensus of opinion of those who have the cause of religion deeply at heart.

Next in line to be weeded out or perverted have been various native influences, institutions, and traditions likely to buttress resistance to Communist indoctrinatory processes. Most spectacular of these endeavors has been a colossal re-writing of history, primarily the most recent history but to a lesser extent also of the more distant past. Thus, soon after they had seized power, the Czechoslovak Communists have been engaged in an incessant drive designed to kill "masarykism," the love and profound respect which the bulk of the Czech people of all walks of life have for Thomas G. Masaryk, the founder of Czechoslovakia.

They have been consistently portraying him as a reactionary and enemy of the workers; his works have been removed from libraries; his grave in Lany, place of pilgrimage for non-Communists, has been virtually kept out of bounds. On the other hand, the famous Czech reformer of the fifteenth century, John Hus, who, unlike Masaryk, could not have written any critique of Karl Marx, has been posthumously elevated to nothing less than the precursor of the Communist movement, proclaimed as having been "the people's tribune and revolutionary" whose vision is now being "realized by the proletariat under the leadership of the Communist party."[17] With straight face the Communist press dared to claim that the Hussite field priests were precursors of the present" enlightenment officers," and equivalent of Soviet Zampolits. Many other examples could be cited from various East European countries. National holidays, festivals, and other commemorative days have been disposed of, shifted, or otherwise tampered with to fit into this new "interpretation" of East European history. All organizations of pre-Communist days, however non-political they may have been, have been either disbanded or usurped in an endeavor to use them for the engineering of consent by distorting their original mission.

Building the new Communistic Man

Schools. Turning from what we have called the negative aspect of the Communist engineering of consent to its positive part, it is proper to begin with the schools. Communist rulers of East Europe know that making the new Communist man is a long-term proposition and that it should therefore be started as soon as the mind is capable of grasping the meaning of the words. As in Soviet Russia schools in East Europe have thus become the primary medium of Communist indoctrination. Indeed, the program begins literally on nursery and kindergarten level. "The education and formulation of the new man....must start in kindergarten," says a Bulgarian handbook for kindergarten teachers, that is where one must "create a foundation for political education and a Marxist-Leninist attitude toward the world."[18] There children are taught by means of toys, songs and plays "collectivist habits according to principles of socialist morality."[19] They are told stories about bad Americans beating poor little Negro boys and girls and brave Russian soldiers helping good people against the bandits sent from the West. To quote just one of many authentic samples brought from behind the Iron Curtain, here is one designed for children five to six years old: Pointing to the sun the teacher tells the children that where it comes from there is the East and there live our good friends the Russians who have freed us from our enemies. Where the sun goes down, that is called the West. There, behind a big sea, is America where a few rich people have everything and workers and peasants live in misery. And here is how a Bulgarian paper described, under the title "Happy Childhood," what goes on in such kindergartens: "After breakfast children have their study hours where they are taught to count, to distinguish the right side from the left; to love the fatherland, peace, and our great teacher, Stalin. Although they are still very young, they already know the difference between war and peace....In kindergarten a feeling of comradeship, love toward the fatherland.... and hatred toward the enemy is cultivated in the children--qualities which are

typical of the new Socialist man. What an enormous difference from the lives of capitalist children."[20] What a difference indeed.

Thus, in setting up nurseries and kindergartens, an undertaking given high priority, the Communists kill two birds with one stone. They release more mothers for work in the "socialist upbuilding" and they subject children almost from infancy to year-round indoctrination. "We cannot afford to leave the children to the mercy of anybody," said Nejedly, explaining his plan of all-day compulsory kindergartens for all children to the Czechoslovak National Assembly in March of 1951.[21] Although it has thus far proved impossible to accommodate all children, the number of children in nurseries and kindergartens have been steadily increasing during the Stalinist era. Thus, more and more children under school age have been withdrawn from the influence of their parents and exposed to the full impact of Communist morality.[22]

Whether or not the child is among those who have been fed their first "ideological pudding" at the kindergarten level, he is served ever increasing doses of the same from the first grade through the University (if he is one of those found worthy enough to have higher learning). One could cite pages and pages of authoritative Communist statements demonstrating how the entire East European school system is intended to play a key role in creating future Communists. The following statement of August 1952 is a typical example: "Our schools teach the younger generation to have a patriotic spirit; love of the Socialist fatherland and proletarian internationalism; and an unlimited fidelity toward the Communist party, the friendly Soviet Union, and the teacher and leader of all progressive humanity--the Great Stalin."[23]

The pursuance of such an objective necessitated a complete remodeling of the pre-Communist educational system from top to bottom. The curricula have not been changed too drastically, particularly at the elementary level. Russian has become the main foreign language, Latin abolished, and other foreign languages pushed into the background. At the same time, at secondary and college levels, science and technical schooling have gained substantially at the expense of the humanities. But the iron grip of the Marxian-Leninist dogmatism has made itself strongly felt in every phase of schooling: the methods of teaching, the contents, and the emphasis. It goes without saying that the most sharply hit have been the social sciences in which distortions are fantastic beyond belief. But all other subjects as well have been made to serve as vehicles of Communist indoctrination. The natural sciences have been found suitable as the primary medium for planting the seeds of atheism in children's minds. As might be expected, reading in the native tongue and the study of Russian have become central stations of general indoctrination. Class readers and reading programs have been packed full with subtle materials well calculated to mold the youngster's malleable mind into the desired pattern. "Marshal Stalin's Childhood," "How the Workers Lived in Old Days," "Fireman of Train 71" (describing dramatically Lenin's escape to Finland in 1917), "Pioneer Pavlik Morozov," the well-known bolshevist story about a boy who was so loyal to Communism that he denounced his own family, are but a few samples. Most of those that I have had

the opportunity to read are written in a highly interesting fashion likely to keep the youngster's interest. Thus the child swallows in sugar-coated from a large amount of ideological propaganda without being aware of it. Nor have the Communist educators left along such non-political subjects as arithmetics or whatever has remained of foreign languages other than Russian. Mathematical problems are phrased in such a manner as to extend indoctrination into a field where ideological bias would be least expected. Textbooks in foreign languages contain only such "information" on the respective "capitalist" countries that blends very well with the distorted pictures fed the youngster in his history and geography classes. The French textbook used in Czech high schools, for instance, carries a conversation between a guest and a waiter in Marseilles in which the guest asks the waiter for the recent news. The waiter's reply is that workers in the city are striking against the unloading of American war materials. "Our harbor will never become an American military port," concludes the "progressive" waiter.

A very good insight into the indoctrination process in East European schools is afforded by the perusal of directives on methods and themes for final examinations. For instance, the following are titles of a few of the themes prescribed in 1951 by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Education for final examinations in high schools: "Fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan and the struggle for world peace in our literature;" "Which Czechoslovak poets and novelists teach us to learn and to love Lenin and Stalin?" "The heroes of Soviet literature who are models for our life." The accompanying instruction directs the examiners to ascertain in oral examinations: whether the pupil is "aware that without the experience and brotherly aid of the Soviet Union we would not have our independence; what is his attitude toward our great model and friend, the USSR...why the capitalists had won in Czechoslovakia in 1920...how the Red Army liberated us...how the people defeated in February 1948 the attack of the reactionaries....how Michurin's biology helps the Unified Agricultural Cooperatives...."[24]

A similar situation prevails in colleges and universities. Soon after the Communists have taken over they have set up chairs of Marxism-Leninism, gradually expanded them into departments, and staffed them with dependable Party theoreticians. Additional chairs have also been set up for the study of Soviet law, history, language and literature. Contents of all the other disciplines have been revised from the point of view of the new Weltanschauung, and whatever did not seem to square with it has simply been cut out or amended. As in lower schools the grossest mutilation took place in social sciences and law, but hardly any field escaped at least some amount of surgery. Departments of Western European languages and literature as well as schools of fine arts had to "enrich themselves" in a hurry with "socialist realism" and other Marxist-Leninist precepts. In this respect they virtually had to turn upside down their tables of values. Biology departments and agricultural colleges had to throw their doors wide open for a glorious entry of Michurin-Lysenko theories.

No matter what is the student's major, he must take several basic courses in Marxism-Leninism such as "The Principles of Marxism-Leninism," "The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," "Dialectical Materialism," and "The Development of Society" (from the Marxist standpoint). Those enrolled in social sciences have to take still more of them. It should be added that those admitted to University studies are already supposed to be well versed in theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism. An elaborate screening process seeks to bar all those whose devotion to the system is in doubt. Needless to say, the extinction of academic freedom has been accompanied by the total elimination of traditional University autonomy. Instead of being elected by the academic senate composed of all University professors as in pre-war days, rectors, deans and department heads are appointed by the government authorities as are University councils and similar advisory bodies.

The main and still unsettled problem, which has been plaguing the Communist rulers in their use of schools for the purpose of building new Communists has been the matter of teachers. It does not take too much time to re-write textbooks or to re-arrange curricula and their contents by a ministerial fiat, especially when it has been the question of imitating the Soviet model. To train adequate quantities of teachers so that they will become dependable apostles of the new creed is quite a different proposition. Although the majority of teachers in pre-Communist East Europe were, generally speaking, inclined to the left, very few of them were genuine Communists. The Communist leaders have been trying hard to remedy the situation. They have turned the pedagogical schools into full-fledged workshops of Marxism-Leninism and an especially concentrated effort has been made to recruit only students with "the right background" who offer the best promise of developing into pliable tools of Communist indoctrination. Teachers have been compelled to take special courses in Marxism-Leninism and Soviet educational methods. All sorts of teachers' conferences and workshops on national, regional, and local levels are held, taking a big slice of teachers' free time and vacations, for the purpose of improving their ideological work and exhorting them to work more assiduously on the development of future communistic men in their schools. Selected teachers are sent to the Soviet Union to gain "on the spot" experience along these lines. In spite of all this, the build-up of a corps of truly Communist teachers will at best be slow and gradual. The Communist rulers have thus been left with no choice but to wage the battle for the mind in East European classrooms by using, as the bulk of its front fighters, those who do not actually believe in the merits of the cause for which they are supposed to fight. Such a situation calls for special Party controls over the faculties to see to it that these unwilling tools apply the Party directives properly.

While stern disciplinary measures serve as the main deterrent to teacher disobedience, various supplementary devices have been developed to meet the problem. Many of the small number of true Communists among the teachers have been appointed to key positions of control, such as principals, inspectors and supervisors. The remainder have been spread out so that there will be a few of them in each institution to keep watchful eye over their colleagues. To assist them, persons with little or no qualification have been added to the staff and faculties of many schools. Assistants have been appointed

to keep check on University professors and their lectures. Under the pretext of "mutual improvement" the teaching members of the faculty are obligated to pay each other unannounced "observation visits" and report the findings in the faculty work-meetings held once or twice a week.[25] Detailed "student books" have been introduced to keep a record of all the classes and the student's "socialist commitments," and their perusal by supervising authorities affords and additional check on what has been going on in the classroom. In high schools and universities there are invariably a few informers in each class, drawn from families loyal to Communism and members of the Pioneers or Communist Youth Organizations, who must report regularly on class proceedings. In grade schools the same purpose is usually achieved by having principals and their aides enter into frequent conversations with the pupils, (mostly inadvertent of the objective of such approaches,) on what they learned in class. The highly rigid and very detailed schedule of day-to-day instruction for each class hour, prepared in strict accordance with equally detailed higher directives and approved by the principal, is also designed to eliminate any undesirable digressions. Such schedules provide also for appropriate commemorations of major Communist events for which purpose each instructor is supplied with a precise outline of what he is to say, how long it should last, etc. Essays on prescribed topics, prepared in class or at home, are also subjected to spot-checks by Communist supervisers in order to see whether or not the pupils are guided along correct ideological lines. A good opportunity for achieving the same end is afforded by final examinations, especially their oral portion in which, as shown earlier, the pupils, and through them their teachers, are thoroughly quizzed on delicate political and ideological topics. As a directive of one satellite Ministry of Education states: "The purpose of the final examination in high schools is to ascertain how well the student is prepared, politically and professionally, to meet the demands of college studies whether he is capable of becoming a member of the new socialist intelligentsia, devoted to the working class and to the cause of socialism....and whether he has mastered the foundations of the Marxist-Leninist attitude."[26]

Outside-of-class Indoctrination. Nor can the youngsters run away too far from indoctrination when they leave their classrooms. "Outside of class education is an extremely important component of the overall education of youth in the stage of building socialism," says the official magazine of a satellite Teachers' Union.[27] This is where the various youth organizations step in and extend the process well into the youngster's free time. A majority of pupils below 14-15 are expected to join groups which correspond to the Soviet Pioneers. When they reach the age of 14-15 they become eligible to enroll in their country's youth league in which they are brought together with the working youth. Although membership in all such groups is voluntary, various kinds of inducements and pressures have been used to persuade the youngsters to join. For those who harbor ambitious thoughts of getting admitted to higher studies and aspire for better positions membership in such groups is mandatory. So it is for anyone who wants to obtain a scholarship, which is admittedly used as a weapon of class struggle. As revealed by Mlada Fronta, the newspaper of the Czechoslovak Youth Union in one of its

occasional outbursts of frankness applications for membership in the Union were distributed by the teachers at the beginning of the school year and the pupils "were afraid to refuse to sign them."[28]

While these youth leagues, embracing many millions of East European youngsters, pursue some secondary purposes such as helping in the fields at harvest time or collecting scrap metal, their main objective, proudly and openly proclaimed by the Communists themselves, is "political education," i.e. sheer undiluted indoctrination. To attain this goal frequent regular meetings and social get-togethers are held; discussions sponsored with shockworkers and "Heroes of Socialist Labor"; excursions organized to factories and collective farms; games arranged. Youth newspapers and magazines are published and frequent checks are made as to whether they are actually read. "Youth Palaces" or special "Houses of Culture" for the youth have been set up to provide congenial meeting places. Collective holiday camps and vacation resorts in confiscated hotels, private residences and restored old castles in which ideological treatment can be sweetened by fine recreational facilities and pleasant physical surroundings have also been established.

The overall supervision of these youth groups and their work is in the hands of the Party which has a special commission for the youth attached to the Central Committee and corresponding commissions at the regional and district levels. The leading functionaries of youth organizations are also Party members. If we take into account the substantial amount of homework assigned to pupils of higher classes and to students, and the fact that all satellite gymnastic and sports clubs are government-controlled and compelled to mix appropriate doses of ideology with whatever they do, we can see that, should he do all that he is supposed to do and attend all that he is expected to attend, the East European youngster has very little indoctrination-free time--except when he sleeps.

Adult indoctrination. This heavy concentration on the younger generation does not mean that the Communists have relaxed in their efforts to convert the middle-aged and older people. There are a number of devices and instrumentalities devoted to that end.

The primary concern here is with the Party's own rank-and-file. In addition to the continuous ideological education and control to which they are exposed by virtue of their participation in usual Party activities, the Party members are obligated to attend Party schools offering several types of graduated courses designed to improve the members ideological level.[29] There is usually a basic course in Marxism-Leninism and higher courses dealing with the history of the Soviet Communist party and Marxist-Leninist economics. The courses are held in the evening and generally continue through the entire school year. Those who pass them obtain certificates to that effect. The Party members are expected to take the basic course plus

at least one higher course. Additional training for higher Party functionaries is offered by "Evening Universities of Marxism-Leninism" or "Cadre Training Courses" in which ideological education is combined with instruction in organizational and other matters about which Party functionary ought to be well versed. Finally, at the top of the vast system of Party schooling, there is in each satellite country a "Party University" or "Party Academy" designed for the cream of the Communist elite. In such schools future Communist leaders and sub-leaders are subjected to several years of intensive study of all that a graduate Marxist-Leninist is supposed to master.[30]

Apart from formal schooling the Party demand for the correct attitude of its members is attended to by several different functionaries who provide a multiple check on each and every Party member. There are in every local unit several "trustees." Each is in charge of a relatively small number of Party members whom he is to watch mainly with regard to their loyalty and Communist zeal. Another function of the "trustees" is to see to it that Party members read the Party press. There are so called "instructors" assigned by higher Party organs to help the local units not only in organizational matters but to bolster their idelolgical and political alacrity. Among the most dreaded Party functionaries is the "cadres reporter." He prepares the "cadre report," a sort of political and ideological bill of health for each Party member which is of vital importance for members' fortunes.

Although non-Party adults are not exposed to as heavy an ideological bombardement as Party members, or as the school-age youth, they are not by any means left to "rot in bourgeois prejudices." On the contrary, thanks to the thoroughness of the Communist engineering of consent, they cannot help stumbling over ideology at every corner and all times of the day, from early morning when they scan their morning paper on the way to work until the moment when they turn off their radio before going to bed.

Radio and television. The most ubiquitous medium of general mass indoctrination is the radio. Since air-waves in East Europe have always been state-controlled, the Communist only had to secure dominant positions in state-appointed Radio boards or councils and in the ministry which supervised them. Having done so, in most instances even before they gained complete governmental control, they quickly converted raid broadcasting into a potent ideological weapon designed, in their own words, "to speak about the magnificent achievements of socialism...to educate the people in the spirit of socialist ideas...to shape the political consciousness of the working masses..."[31] The programs have been thickly studded with items of indoctrination. Although music continues to predominate, and not much ideology can be worked into it, political and cultural parts of the programs have been greatly expanded. Such items as news and commentaries, ideologically slanted lectures, reviews of Soviet and native press articles, answers to selected "listener's questions," Russian courses, reports on main events of "socialist construction," the "University of the Air," the "Radio political circles" and children's programs with deftly wrapped ideological filling take up a substantial portion

of the broadcasting formula and command the best hours. Dramatic production and novels adapted into radio plays, invariably selected because of a particular ideological message they are to convey, are also of frequent occurrence.[32]

In order to make this major source of indoctrination available to every citizen the satellite regimes have been consistently expanding the receiving facilities. There has been some increase in the production of radio sets, especially the cheap ones enabling the owner to tune in local stations only. A steady growth of radio subscribers has been claimed by all East European countries, especially those in which radio-listening had been lagging well behind the European average in pre-war days, such as Bulgaria and Rumania.[33] As mentioned earlier, there has been a conspicuous expansion of wired radio networks. All over East Europe a virtually all-embracing public address system has been developed along Soviet lines, with loudspeakers in city streets and on village greens, and even in streetcars and trains. Thus, when there is a broadcast which the regime wants everbody to hear, they can and do convert the whole populace into a captive audience.

As far as television is concerned, its usefulness for the engineering of consent is as yet negligible, due to the fact that satelite video is in its infancy with viewing limited to a relatively few areas. But undoubtedly its potential is great and will in due time become of major significance. Already there have been reports of "house wardens" attempting to organize "television clubs" in apartment houses for the purpose of pooling resources to buy sets for collective viewing and discussion of programs.

Periodical press. Next to radio, the press figures as the main instrumentality of day-to-day mass inoculation with ideological serum.[34] As stated very aptly by a satellite magazine, the newspaper is "a propagandist which day after day conveys Marxist-Leninist theories, an agitator which day after day speaks...about the Party's and people's government policies, an organizer which day after day mobilizes our forces for their active participation in socialist construction...a powerful instrument for the Party in its endeavor to bring up a new generation of builders of socialism...."[35] In pursuance of this mission the Communist rulers of East Europe have patterned their press strictly after the Soviet model, in form, in structure and in contents. There are central papers and provincial papers; there are those published officially by the Communist party and its subdivisions, and those published by other approved groups, such as Labor and Farmers' Unions, cultural organizations, the Army; and there are special newspapers for the youth. Thus in each satellite country one finds counterparts of Pravda, Trud, Krasnaya Zvezda, Literaturnaya Gazeta, Partiinaya Zhizn, etc. Periodicals are also published for ethnic monorities in their own languages, such as Aufbau und Frieden and Arbeiterstimme for the Germans in Czechoslovakia and Poland respectively. Unlike the situation in the Soviet Union, there still exist a few official newspapers of the other parties of the "national front" permitted at the people's democratic stage of development toward Communism. However, as far as the engineering of consent is concerned, all of these periodicals are just so

many more eggs in one basket. They all publish essentially the same materials channelled to them mainly through the Communist-controlled state news agencies and abide meticulously by the directives of the central agency in charge of overall press control. Only in purely secondary and local matters is there variety, and a few items differ to appeal better to the professional interests of the clientele. Except for the sports page and a few other items of non-political importance, the bulk of the papers does full justice to the above description of their mission, seeking as it does to persuade the readers of the virtues of Communism and the rottenness of capitalism.

In an effort to supply every citizen with this useful vehicle for the transmission of Party directives the Communist regimes have substantially increased both the number of newspapers and their total circulation in every satellite country.[36] Thousands and thousands of Party members and "activists" have been engaged in continuous campaigns to that effect and special "Press Days" are held every year to keep the campaign alive. To see to it that the press is not only bought but also read, Party functionaries and "house wardens" are directed to enter into exploratory conversations with persons entrusted to their general control. "Reading and discussion circles" are set up in offices, factories, collective farms and various organizations. Occasionally special lecturers are sent to rural areas, where newspaper reading has been lagging, to engage in newspaper discussions directly with the peasants in the fields.[37]

Supplementing regular newspapers are factory and enterprise papers as well as village papers, usually weeklies. According to Rude Pravo over two million copies of 1,300 factory and plant papers were published every month in 1952.[38] Also, the practice of wall newspapers, an equivalent of Soviet stengazety, has been developed and posters with them are found in most establishments and organizations. A vast network of volunteer local correspondents of the Communist press has been set up. In addition to being Party spies, who are supposed to "analyze critically" the manner in which things are done in their area, they serve as Party propagandists directed, as Chervenkov put it, to "incite public opinion" in favor of socialist justice.[39]

Books and Libraries. Shifting from periodical to non-periodical press we find a similar proponderance of indoctrination. With the theory of "socialist realism" reigning supreme, the satellite publishing programs, although considerably larger than in pre-war days, can have little room for manuscripts without appropriate ideological messages. "All our statements, all articles, poems, reporting, stories, radio scripts, satires, etc," wrote an East European cultural magazine in 1952, "...must be subordinated to the political function which derives its logic from the present international and domestic situation." "Literary work must become an organic part of systematic Party work," said the Hungarian Minister of Culture.[41] Nor has there been much room for publication of older works, unless there was a special reason for it, such as to claim the author, often posthumously, as an early friend of Communism or to misuse the work for propagandistic purposes.

As a result, East European printing presses have been virtually monopolized for the production of books, booklets and pamphlets of two kinds: (a) textbooks, manuals and other materials of practical guidance necessary for the paramount tasks of "socialist construction" and (b) Marxist-Leninist literature and such belles lettres as contribute toward the build-up of the new Communistic man. They have been pouring out edition after edition of the works of Lenin, Stalin and native Communist leaders such as Gottwald, the Short Course of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and translations of other Soviet books running into tens of millions of copies. For instance, 7,250,000 copies of the works of Marxism-Leninism were published in Hungary between 1945 and 1951; 21,000,000 copies of 1500 new Soviet titles were issued in Czechoslovakia in 1951 (including 842,000 copies of Stalin's works and 551,000 copies of the Short Course) and 113 works of Marxism-Leninism in 2,281,000 copies appeared in Bulgaria in 1952.

Most of these books have been placed in the growing network of East European public libraries. They have taken the place of huge numbers of books put on the Communist Index Librorum Prohibitorum and serve as another important medium of indoctrination. In addition to the usual school and communal libraries there are now libraries and Red corners attached to factories, collective farms, youth centers, recreation halls, and wherever there are goups to be indoctrinated. The regimes have also begun to experiment with "bibliobusses." The Czech Communists have even provided some to improve the ideological level of vagrant gypsies, supplying them with books printed in extra big letters and depicting "the flourishing life in the USSR" and the "ravages" of Americans in Korea.[41] Nor do the Communist regimes accept the proverb that "You can lead a horse to water but you can't make him drink." On the contrary, they have been trying hard to make the beneficiaries of their cultural sollicitude actually read what they have placed in the libraries. Realizing that it was not enough to check the borrowing cards, they have been encouraging, as in the case of newspapers, creation of "volunary-compulsory" reading and discussion circles operating according to the slogan, "that which is not prohibited, is mandatory."

Movies and theaters. Yet another leaf has been taken from the Soviet book in the ideological exploitation of motion pictures and theaters. A satellite journal in 1952 wrote: "More and more the cinema is being used as a mighty device for mass agitation and propaganda in order to indoctrinate the working classes with the socialist spirit..."[42] And this is the advice given to East European movie-makers by one of the most prominent satellite Communist leaders, Poland's Eduard Ochab: "By creatively exploiting Soviet examples, you must show the beauty and pathos of the battle for socialist progress in our industry and agriculture...Expose the criminal fact of British-U. S. imperialism and its agencies.....Deepen in the masses hatred and contempt of the imperialist aggressors, barbarians, exploiters, genocides, monstrous organizers of bacteriological warfare, and the enemies of man and mankind."

The satellite film industry has certainly striven hard to emulate Ochab's advice. With few exceptions it has kept turning out films, both of documentary and entertainment nature, glorifying the joyful life under Communism and overflowing with abuse for the West and for the non-Communist past.[43] As the productive capacity of satellite film industries, despite its steady increase, is in no position to meet the demand of movie theater network,[44] the bill of fare has been supplemented by imports of films from other countries of the "socialist camp", primarily from the Soviet Union. A few movies from the non-Communist countries have managed every year to slip through the ideological curtain even at the peak of the Stalinist era, especially if they dealt with darker aspects of life under capitalism.

To put this "mighty device for mass agitation and propaganda" to its fullest use the Communist regimes have been engaged in a massive effort of movie theatre building in accordance with the slogan: "A permanent cinema building in every village." In every satellite country spectacular increases have been claimed both in the number of movie theaters and attendance.[45] Furthermore, there are substantial numbers of mobile units and "movie caravans" on automobiles and railway cars which serve the rural areas.

Since crude overdoses of dogma make a great many of the Communist-made pictures dull, they have been suffering from poor attendance. In contrast, occasional showings of non-Communist films have people scrambling for tickets and buying them under the table at black market prices. Therefore, in order to attain "planned audiences", spectators are often organized for collective attendance through their labor unions, Party or youth organizations, or even by special activist movie-attendance organizations. Also, no feature film is shown without an accompanying newsreel or a documentary short feature, or both, so that even a viewer of non-Communist movies has to swallow the insipid ideological hors d' oeuvre before he can touch the tastier main dish.

Although live theaters are far behind the movie theaters in the sum totals of their audience, they nevertheless play their part in the Communist engineering of consent. Their repertoires consist predominantly of contemporary products by Soviet and satellite authors that meet the sacro-sanct test of "socialist realism," several plays by western "progressive" authors, and an admixture of a certain number of standard Russian and western classics such as Chekhov, Ostrovsky, Moliere, and Shakespeare.[46] Sometimes classic plays are adapted to give them the proper ideological twist. Thus a special epilogue was added to Romeo and Juliet explaining that the two classic lovers "had to die because their families belonged to the exploiting class and did not appreciate the longing of youth for a world of peace and mutual love."[47] Even operas and operettas are occasionally "adjusted." This happened in the case of a Budapest performance of Offenbach's "Orpheus in the Underworld." Olympus was made to symbolize imperialism and the underworld was its ally," while Orpheus' peace song" causes mankind to rise against war."[48] Nor do the Communists frown on puppet shows or even circuses when it comes to the battle for human minds.[49] "The capitalist circus regards arousing an atmosphere of fear as its main aim," wrote a Hungarian magazine." In our circus

the training of animals...has another goal; it demonstrates the victory of human will power over nature and animal instincts.... In our circuses the training of animals and juggling have an educational effect."[50]

Although theatres in cities have been increased and supported generously, the emphasis has been mainly on enlarging the theater network in rural areas. A great many new provincial theaters have been added to those already in existence. Countless amateur theatrical groups and folk ensembles have been formed by trade unions, individual enterprises, schools, collective farms and other institutions. Operating sometimes under the very fitting name of "Artistic Agitation Brigades," they bring the Party message virtually into the peasants' own backyards.

Houses of Culture. Theatrical groups are also developed in conjunction with the Houses of Culture, another Moscow-made heavy gun in the Communist ideological fire which are designed to serve as "the unified social-cultural centers of the community."[51] Full-fledged Houses of Culture with clubrooms, libraries, game rooms and auditoriums are developed in cities and district centers. They have various groups for reading and reciting, singing, dancing, discussing, amateur acting, for agricultural and industrial production techniques and political education, led by trained and thoroughly indoctrinated "cultural activists" and closely controlled by the appropriate Party organs. They set up "cultural brigades" which compete with each other in various ideologically motivated activities and carry "socialist culture" into rural areas.[52] Some of the Houses of Culture in the main cities are quite elaborate affairs, the most sumptious of them all being the Stalin Palace of Science and Culture built by the Soviets for the Poles in Warsaw. It is an avowed Communist ambition to establish a House of Culture or at least a cultural club in every community and, judging by what they have done thus far, there is no reason to doubt that this ambition will one day be realized.[53] "The village House of Culture," declared the Hungarian Minister of Culture, J. Revai, "must become the center of rural community life, replacing the tavern and the church..." Among the functions assigned to them, as gleaned from the satellite press, are "strengthening the worker-peasant alliance," "the socialist transformation of the village," "combating kulaks' gossip and obscurantism, "popularizing the Five-Year plan" and other such worthy Communist causes.

Soviet Friendship Societies. The Houses and Clubs of Culture cooperate very closely with Soviet Friendship societies which have spread like mushrooms throughout the whole area and claim multi-million membership. They attempt to engineer consent for the regime by extolling the virtues of the Soviet system through lectures, exhibitions, meetings, performances by Soviet artists or of Soviet art, persuading people to subscribe for Soviet magazines and to buy Soviet books, using various anniversaries to remind people ad nauseam how much their countries owe to the brotherly aid of the Soviet people, etc. They also sponsor the huge network of Russian language courses with tens of thousands of study circles with annual enrollments of between one and two million people.

Societies for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge.

An important function in the battle for East European minds is assigned to the Societies for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge, satellite equivalents of the Soviet society of the same name. Unlike most other Communist instrumentalities which seek to peddle the ideological wares in disguised wrappings however thin and transparent they may be, the said Dissemination Societies pursue indoctrination as their sole line of business. It is their specific assignment, as the die-hard Czechoslovak Stalinist, V. Kopecky, put it when outlining the Society's aims at its constituent congress, "to train masses in Communist ideology, to conduct a persistent campaign of persuasion of those who doubt socialism...to fight against religious obsurantism."[54] In carrying out their ideological mission the societies cosponsor an annual Soviet Friendship Month and operate such enterprises as "the People's Film University" popularizing Marxist-Leninist philosophy with the aid of documentary films. But their main task is to organize Marxist-Leninist lectures, seminars and ideological conferences on political, philosophical, economic and scientific topics, and to publish various pamphlets and magazines along the same lines.

Since it is inherent in the concept of totalitarianism, especially its Communist variety, to use each and every institution for the propagation of its infallible credo, one could and should actually bring within the scope of this paper many more instrumentalities that attend to this all-embracing task, at least as their secondary mission. This would include the Trade Unions whose statutes impose on them the duty to raise the ideological level of the workers; the Machine Tractor Stations which are supposed to do the same for the farmers; Army enlightenment officers who take care of the correct orientation of the soldiers. One could also dwell on the ideological mission of East European posters and stamps, etc., etc.

But all that has been said will suffice to document the truly unfathomable magnitude of the satellite effort to build a new Communistic man. It would be quite intriguing to attempt to translate this effort into such categories as the amount of money expended on it, the numerical count of people employed in it or the sum total of man-hours spent on it per annum. I have been playing with such an idea for a while, but finally gave it up as quite futile. Neither the analysis of satellite budgets nor statistics, or any other sources that are available, warrants results which would be meaningful. What share of the moneys spent on satellite education, radio, press, etc. can be said to go into indoctrination, into the engineering of consent, and how much into things which are ideologically irrevelant? While virtually all Party members, most administrative workers of central and especially local governments, and millions and millions of "activists" of all sorts are engaged in dishing out varying ideological doses, they do so mostly along with other functions and it is impossible to say what exact portion of their time should be debited to the engineering of consent. All that one can safely say is that, next to the national economy, engineering of consent is the biggest item in terms of financial outlay, manpower, and time spent on it.

Shifts of the post-Stalin era

Have there been any changes in the methods and instrumentalities of the engineering of consent in the post-Stalin era? There have been, but only very few and none of them of any major significance--except in Gomulka's Poland which, since it can no longer be considered as a full-fledged Soviet satellite, will not be considered in this paper.

The need of thorough indoctrination itself has become more important in the post-Stalin era than ever before. The Dictator's death and subsequent downgrading removed the untouchable personal symbol of Communist unity and nullified the validity of loyalty to Stalin as the supreme test of a good Communist. The demolition of the Stalin myth at the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev's reconciliation with Tito, the new theory of "different roads to socialism" and other unusual post-Stalin events could not but confuse even seasoned Party members and shake their reliance on the safe-conduct of Communist ideology. By the same token these developments are greatly comforting and encouraging to East European masses opposed to Communism. All this called for renewed ideological vigilance and redoubled effort in the engineering of consent. Indeed, realizing the deadly danger of ideological laxness at a time when the whip could not be cracked quite so readily as in Stalin's heydays, the satellite Communist leaders have been busy making speeches, writing articles and sending out directives exhorting for "an implacable struggle against the penetration of enemy ideologies," "signs of loss of faith," "anarchistic rejection of Party policy," and "petty bourgeois tendencies opposing the Party line...which must be strangled in the embryonic stage."[55] Satellite periodicals of 1954-1957 abound in these and similar proclamations. Conference after conference has been held to inject new life into the sagging efforts to build the new Communistic man. Party propagandists and agitators in every area and in every group have been ordered to work over time and step up the education of the masses in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. Reprisals have been threatened against those who fail to get results. For instance, as many as fifty teachers of university courses in Marxism-Leninism have been reported removed in Czechoslovakia in 1955 for laxness in ideological effort.[56]

However, in spite of the changed conditions of the post-Stalin era, the methods and instrumentalities used in this stepped-up indoctrination have continued to conform to the earlier patterns. Stalin's name has ceased, of course, to be emphasized. No longer do school children have to memorize adulatory poems on Stalin and articles on his childhood, and his exploits are passed over in reading assignments. Public abuse of Tito and "Titoism" no longer takes place though "National Communism" still is considered a damnable deviation. But the most notable shift in the post-Stalin engineering of consent is the soft-pedalling of the previous excessive praise of everything Soviet. "There are people in our country who, for God knows what reasons, describe Soviet citizens as people who can do everything and do it to perfection by a simple wave of the hand," wrote the editor-in-chief of the Czechoslovak Communist humor magazine Dikobraz, the equivalent of Moscow's Krokodil, in September of 1955. A similar trend has been apparant elsewhere in the area, no doubt as

a response to Khrushchev's line that the Russians could learn from the experience of the "people's democracies."

There have been other changes affecting the Communist use of various media of indoctrination, such as publication of quite a number of books and articles deviating from the principle of "socialist realism," more frequent showing of non-Communist motion pictures and plays, disbandment of many "clubs of culture" in rural areas, especially at the time of the exodus of great many peasants from collective farms. But these are not changes undertaken by the Communist rulers or with their willing approval, but rather advantages wrested out by anti-regime forces at a moment of the regime's weakness and existing only by that regime's sufferance. As such they are not by any means a part of Communist engineering of consent and are thus outside the scope of this papers.

Factors that help and impede the engineering of consent

Having reviewed the methods, media and instrumentalities used by the East European Communist regimes in their engineering of consent, let us now consider the factors which help them and those which hamper them.

Factors that help. A potent ally of Communism in the battle for East European minds are, first of all, certain positive achievements of the Communist regimes. Such things as the all-embracing system of social security and free health service, however deficient they may be in many respects, strike a positive response with a substantial majority of East Europeans. The bulk of the working class strongly believes that the danger of economic depressions has been licked and no threat to the security of their jobs can come any longer from that direction. Although the living standards in the area are still low and most people are undoubtedly worse off than they had been before World War II, some categories of workers have had their living standards improved under Communist regimes. That is especially true of landless agricultural workers of pre-war days who used to be real underdogs. The manual laborers have seen their status elevated, not only politically but also socially, and it certainly tickles their pride that the many spas, holiday resorts, hotels, and other facilities, which had erstwhile been beyond their reach, have been thrown wide open to them. Again and again these particular matters are stressed by escapees from behind the Iron Curtain when asked what features of the Communist regime they liked. Nor are they unimpressed by the fact that with the advent of Communism many an executive position has been made available to the workers which they would not have had a chance of attaining under the previous systems; or that their children, instead of being hampered, are actually aided by their social background and origin when it comes to the admission to higher education. While these advantages do not necessarily convert their recipients into believing Communists, they nevertheless make their minds more receptive for the new creed. Indeed, it is among the former agrarian proletariat, housemaids, janitors, custodial ranks of government employees and lowest categories of unskilled laborers that one finds today the highest ratio of loyal Communists, although they may not know much about the doctrine as such.

Another major factor aiding Communist efforts is the uncertainty in which East European nations are left with regard to the attitude of the free world, especially the United States. They know, of course, that they have western sympathies, but they are bitterly disappointed that nothing is done to free them from their ordeal. A man-in-the-street behind the Iron Curtain simply cannot understand why such an industrial and military giant as America allows herself to be cheated, pushed around and humiliated without hitting back. He has been clinging desperately to the hope that America cannot afford letting the Communists grow and expand, and that her action will somehow set a process into motion which will bring freedom to his land. That is why to him, in his lack of sophistication, the late senator McCarthy was a hero and he suspected those opposing him of being little more than a bunch of crypto-Communists. That is why he was elated over the first election of President Eisenhower whose resolute words advocating the liberation of East Europe he mistook for a promise of positive action. As hopes are dashed resentment ensues and resistance to indoctrination weakens. Human nature has a built-in tendency to submit to the hard facts of life, however disagreeable, if nothing can be done about them. With their unholy knack for exploiting human frailties, Communist strategists have been ruthlessly capitalizing on such shorter or longer fits of psychological depression, using every possible device to hammer into the minds of their subjects that no one is going to help them, that Communist rule is there to stay and they better come to terms with it. That is also why they gave such a publicity to the Geneva Big Four meeting and to the cultivation of the "Geneva spirit," and ran into a rage when President Eisenhower then re-stated his belief in eventual liberation of East Europe. That is why the photograph showing President Eisenhower and Khrushchev pleasantly smiling at each other found such a favor with them that appeared so prominently in satellite newspapers and magazines.

The third factor contributing substantially to whatever success Communists have thus far scored in their engineering of consent has been the virtual monopoly of the media of indoctrination except for foreign penetration via the airwaves. Although this monopoly has been subjected to a hard test in the post-Stalin era and here and there inroads have been made into it, it seems to have weathered the storm well, except in Poland. That is especially true of indoctrination in schools, the central field of the battle for the minds. Moreoever, unless things change radically, it is likely to become even more thorough as time passes. The steady spread of wired "radiofication" and increased output of sets capable to get local stations only at the expense of better sets cannot but limit the effectiveness of foreign broadcasts in the long run. The iron laws of life expectancy will gradually wipe out those who had lived under other systems and thus remove from the Communist body politic millions of cells of inner resistance to the Communist virus.

Finally, mention should be made of the fear of the Germans. Unlike the other factors which apply to all East European countries under Communist rule, this one affects only two of them, Czechoslovakia and Poland, however, it affects them most importantly. For reasons which are too obvious to be spelled out here the Czechs and the Poles, Communists and non-Communists

alike, have a profound mistrust of the Germans and many of them feel that they ought to have Russian support to thwart any future German pressures. Communist propaganda has been making good use of such worries, reminding the Poles of the Oder-Neisse line and the Czechs of Munich and of the activities of the expelled Sudeten Germans in West Germany.

Factors that impede. Influences helping the process of creating the new Communistic man have thus far been greatly outnumbered and outweighed by forces acting in opposite direction.

The most powerful of these forces is undoubtedly the fact that Communists have so far failed to fulfill what they had promised. As mentioned above, their rule has not been utterly without merits and a few categories of citizens may even be said to have benefited by it, at least economically and socially. Taking all things together, however, the bulk of the East European population feels definitely worse off than before. Contrasting lofty Communist promises with the harsh realities of their drab everyday life, they cannot but develop bitter resentment against their masters. What makes it especially serious is the fact that the Communist rulers have lost faith with the bulk of the workers, the class on which they have most depended. When asked what he felt was worst under Communism, a seventeen-year old escapee worker from Czechoslovakia answered without the slightest hesitation: "The worst thing is that the Communists do everything by using violence and don't want to allow any freedom. The workers who used to support them found out that they had been cheated and that they must work more for less money." Similar thoughts transpire from all the information available and the workers' disillusionment has, of course, been amply demonstrated by the Poznan riots and the Polish and Hungarian revolts. Equally disastrous for the efforts to imbue the masses with loyalty to Communism has been the amazing phenomenon that among those "devoured by some kind of mistrust as to the rightness of our cause," as Bulgaria's Chervenkov put it,[57] seem to be not only the majority of the Party's rank-and-file but also quite a number of high dignitaries and Marxist theoreticans, i.e. those who are supposed to spearhead the process of creating the new Communist-addicted generation. If the generals display "signs of ideological instability, of succumbing to illusions of tolerant liberalism, and of an incorrect conception of freedom under socialism,"[58] how can they lead their cohorts in the right direction, let alone hope to conquer the citadel of the mind?

The resentment is made worse by Communist insistence that people display enthusiasm for what they dislike. "If only they did not lie so shamefully." How often have I heard or read this or similar exclamation in interviews with escapees and in reports from behind the Iron Curtain! It is bad enough to have to swallow and contain one's anger but it is much more humiliating and exasperating if one has to praise what one hates. Since such rituals of hypocritical sycophancy are inherent in the Marxian-Leninist totalitarian formula, the East European Communist regimes employing it actually weaken their appeal by adding insult to injury.

It is this excessive use of the "Big Lie" technique, which more often than not, backfires and makes defectors of one-time converts, especially among the younger generation. For instance, children in the last grade of elementary schools are told about how wonderful it is to become a miner or steel worker. Comrades in neat miner's uniforms come and talk about the pride and the many advantages of working for socialism in the mines, and children sign up enthusiastically for such work. Reality then fails to square with such a rosy picture and the youngsters turn bitterly against Communism. Such sharp contrasts between the idealized image planted in children's minds by school indoctrination, and the actual practice which they find subsequently in factories, fields or wherever they work, break sooner or later the spell of ideology and in fact act as a highly effective vaccine against any further indoctrination. Its effect is further boosted by natural youthful opposition to authority. In pre-war days it frequently pushed some of the youngsters toward Communism, but now that authority is in Communist hands it pushes them rather in an opposite direction.

Hand in hand with all this goes the boredom which pervades much of Communist indoctrination. Peddling ideology is seldom a hilarious occupation, but judging from the results and from complaints which have been flooding Communist press in recent years, there must be more tedium in the East European processes of collective brainwashing than can be condoned even by such humorless fellows as the satellite Communist leaders. Incessant teaching of politics and enforced participation in countless meetings and celebrations has been scored by almost every interviewed escapee as being among the matters they detested most, whatever their age and occupation. Out-of-school indoctrination of the youth seems to have suffered most. "Tedium and passivity are killing the ZMP [the Union of Polish Youth]," bewailed the Polish Radio in November, 1954.[59] "....instead of being a jolly, youthful group, we are like robots," complained students of a Higher Industrial Mining School in Czechoslovakia, "a group which hears nothing but interminable accounts of what has happened and what is going to happen, and which occasionally raises a hand to vote for something without bothering to consider whether the proposal is worth supporting...."[60]

It seems that school curricula have suffered relatively less from the impact of the ideological tedium than extra-curricular indoctrination. But even so there is often more than children can usefully consume and digest. A very enlightening insight into this matter was revealed by an eight-year old school boy whose parents fled with him from behind the Iron Curtain. He explained that he and his school-mates likedbest to play "war" by dividing themselves into two camps, Americans and Russians. Nobody cared whether he was a "Russian" or an "American." When asked why they liked so much to play this game, the boy said that they were so fed up with hearing the word peace so often and reading it on every corner that they rather wanted to play "war." As with over-feeding, there is bound to come indigestion with ideological overdosing.

Speaking of youngsters, one must list parental influence as a major obstacle to Communist indoctrination. "The teachers will have to fight not only for the souls of the pupils, but also those of the parents," said a prominent satellite Communist addressing a teachers' conference in 1951.[61] All the evidence that I have studied substantiates his view. Most East European parents do not want their children to succumb to atheistic Communism and they have been doing all they can to prevent it. Sometimes it is quite a risky matter and some of them had been caught at it when children inadvertently betrayed them by revealing knowledge which they could not have gained at school. But with subtler tactics and adequate caution, and a lot of collusion among teachers and parents, they do manage in most instances at least to weaken the impact of indoctrination - until children reach an age when they can gradually be told the truth.

A high place among the factors impeding Communist efforts is held by the persistent hopes of early change, possibly outright liberation. Although such hopes have lost some ground over the years, particularly so after the West's inertia at the time of the Hungarian uprising, they are still very much alive. With people who have seen so many regimes come and go, such hopes are hydra-headed and can take a lot of beating. They may seem to be fading and giving way to despondency and frustration at times of slumping fortunes - only to erupt with renewed vigor when another chance arises. The depth of such beliefs, and of course their naivete, was illustrated some years ago in Czechoslovakia. A rumor began to circulate in late spring that the Russians would re-enter Czechoslovakia whereupon the Americans would march into those parts of the country which they had liberated in 1945. The consequence was that in that summer all the accomodation facilities and camp sites in the area supposed to be reoccupied by the Americans were packed to the limit while the hotels in the rest of the country remained well-nigh empty.

These wishful hopes are buttressed by strong nationalism characteristic of all East European nations. The Russians are generally looked upon by most people as foreign intruders and the native Communist rulers as their subservient stooges and hatchetmen. The behavior of the Red Army in 1944-45 and of the many Russian supervisers who had come in its wake killed for good the "Big Brother" complex which had blinded so many Czechs, Slovaks and Bulgarians. The innumerable summersaults and about-faces which the native Communist leaders have had to execute in order to remain on good terms with Moscow, and their uncritical praise of everything Soviet could hardly enhance their prestige. By erecting everywhere those pompous statues of Stalin and hanging out his pictures, the local comrades were actually playing into the hands of that "bourgeois nationalism" they have been trying to defeat.

The deep-rooted western orientation of East European culture is another terrific hurdle which the Communists have to overcome before they could claim victory in the battle for the mind. In their history, philosophy, literature, art, science, traditions and ways of life East European nations have for long centuries been closely linked to Western Europe. That is especially true of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. While a dictator with

an absolute power of coercion may not find it impossible to superimpose a thin layer of veneer of his choice over the original western-made woodwork of East European culture, it would prove infinitely more difficult to change its substance. (Even about the most fanatical among the East European Communists there is something which makes them different from their Russian comrades.) These ties with the free world are helped by the immutable factors of geography, the Iron Curtain notwithstanding. In spite of Communist endeavors to seal the area off, foreign broadcasts still get through on a major scale and have thus far denied the East European Communists the coveted monopoly of information. Even if their effectiveness is weakened by the spread of wired networks and other devices, it will prove impossible to cut them off completely.

In connection with the western orientation one has to speak of religion. Belief in the Supreme Being of any kind is, of course, incompatible with the philosophy of Marxian Communism and, if deep enough, represents a most powerful barrier to Communist indoctrination. But in East Europe the problem is made more difficult for the Communist than in Russia because both Catholicism, which predominates, and Protestantism, which comes next, are so closely linked with the West. Thus the Catholic and Protestant churches of East Europe are in fact foes with two heads protecting one another. The Greek Orthodox church, predominant in Rumania and Bulgaria, with no links to the West, is a somewhat easier target.

Finally, the Communist engineering of consent has been constantly hampered by wrong methods. The primary concern of a Communist propagandist or agitator, as of any other functionary in the Communist system, is not whether he does his job as well as it can be done, but whether his superiors will think that he has done it well. They in their turn are guided in their approval or disapproval by the reaction they anticipate higher up. Under such a system the relatively safest course for anybody concerned with the indoctrination is to abide to the letter by Party directives and not to deviate one iota from the rigidly prescribed pattern no matter how dull and how insipid the stuff or the procedure might be. That leads to what Communist leaders call "fossilization," "estrangement from the masses," "bureaucratism," "schematism" and it makes the agitator often behave like a bull elephant in a china store or speak over the heads of the bored-to-death audience. What the net results of such indoctrination amount to is jokingly described in the following story from behind the Iron Curtain: A peasant attended a lecture on Marxism. Speaking of the relations between Hegel and Marx the Party propagandist sought to explain it by saying that Marx took Hegel's grain and discarded his husks. When the peasant came home and his wife asked him about the lecture, he condensed its essence with these laconic words: "They just told us about a guy stealin' grain from another. Looks like he'll get at least ten years."

Conclusions

What have been the results of the engineering of consent in East Europe so far? Have the Communist rulers been successful or unsuccessful in their endeavor to develop a new strain of Communist men?

Since neither free elections nor public opinion polls are possible behind the Iron Curtain, an answer to such a question can be based only on such partial and mostly circumstantial evidence as can be gathered. Therefore, it is bound to be to a great extent subjective, depending as it does so much on personal evaluation of this or that piece of evidence.

In full awareness of these limitations I am nevertheless convinced that the Communist effort to create a new Communistic man in East Europe has thus far been a dismal failure. After some ten or more years of persistent indoctrination from cradle to grave there are today fewer genuine believers in Marxism-Leninism in East Europe than there had been when the Iron Curtain began to fall in 1944-1945. Whatever new converts have been gained their numbers have been more than offset by defectors who have turned their backs on the creed once they realized the abysmal gap between its theory and its practice. The faith of most of the new converts themselves is sooner or later dissolved or diluted by the acid of hard everyday reality. Thus most of those Party members and huge numbers of apparent fellow-travelers who sign so "spontaneously" peace petitions, applaud anti-western tirades of their rulers and volunteer so "enthusiastically" for extra work to protest against "American imperialism," are in fact only "radishes," as they call themselves, hiding like a radish their true white substance under a thin red skin. It seems that the only substantial number of followers loyal to the regime can be found among school children, but that even their loyalty mostly gives way when they reach the age of reason. They behave rather like the little puppies shown, as a joke from behind the Iron Curtain goes, to Josef Stalin when he paid visit to a Moscow Zoo. "I thought that such puppies are usually red, but these here are brown," wondered Stalin. Whereupon the jittery director of the Zoo hurriedly explained that this indeed was so as long as puppies were small and blind. But when they grow and begin to see they quickly turn brown or black.

In support of these assertions about the failure of Communist endeavors I could cite hundreds upon hundreds of Communist pronouncements, articles, resolutions and directives which, taken all together, amount to an implied admission that their colossal indoctrination program has so far failed. Some of them have been mentioned on preceding pages. Particularly revelative in that respect have been the several post-Stalin outbursts of frankness and public repentance. I could draw on a source which most likely would be classified as unscholarly and unscientific but which I think is essential when it is the matter of gauging and interpreting innermost beliefs and mental reactions of a people or nation: namely, the knowledge of such groups psyche gained through having been one of them and shared life with them for almost forty years. But the most convincing evidence undoubtedly has been

provided by the events leading to the Polish and Hungarian revolts, by the course of these revolts, and by their aftermath. When the chance of liberation seemed to beckon to the Hungarians, all that was left on the side of Marxism-Leninism were small nuclei of die-hard Communists and several tens of thousands of security police. All the main strata of the Hungarian population turned en masse against the Communist regime, including the workers, students, and intellectuals, i.e., those groups most belabored by Communist indoctrinators. That the Poles have not gone as far as the Hungarians, and that no large-scale revolts have broken out in the other satellite countries is due to differences in temperament, traditional attitudes, evaluation of the chances at hand and other conditions, but not by any means to any difference in loyalty to Communism. The Communist effort to create a new Communistic man has not been any more successful in Czechoslovakia, Rumania or Bulgaria than it has been in Poland or Hungary.

Let me therefore conclude by agreeing for once with a statement made in 1952 by a former old colleague of mine on the faculty of Charles University of Praha, Czechoslovakia, a colleague of whom I am none too proud since he is no other than the "Red Grandpa" himself, Zdenek Nejedly: "It is far easier to supply new techniques or new weapons than new brains. We gain this conviction from our daily experience."

For once the "Red Grandpa" was absolutely right.

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Notes

1. In his speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, cf. Pravda, February, 15, 1956.

2. Thus, for instance, a sum total of 30 persons with Czechoslovak passports and 61 foreigners crossed the Czechoslovak frontier at the border station on one of the main communication lines from Czechoslovakia to the West in January 1952 as compared to over 14,000 Czechoslovaks and over 25,000 foreigners who crossed there as late as May 1947. About 2,500,000 Czechoslovaks and 3,500,000 foreigners used to enter and leave the country annually in pre-war years. Cf. Statisticka Rocenka Republiky Ceskoslovenske, Praha, 1937, p. 37.

3. Express Wieczorny, January 7, 1957.

4. Woodrow Wilson was listed as enemy of Czechoslovak independence in Tvorba, Czechoslovak equivalent of the Soviet Kommunist, on February 28, 1951.

5. A resolution of the Party's Central Committee. Cf. Lidove Noviny, June 17, 1951.

6. News from behind the Iron Curtain (henceforth referred to as News) Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 45.

7. Zprava o Ceskoslovensku, Vol. I, No. 21-22, p. 43.

8. Lidova demokracie, December 18, 1953.

9. Three-and-one-half years of penitentiary and loss of property was the penalty imposed by a Czechoslovak people's court against a man who spread Czechoslovak transmissions of Western capitalist nations. Ceskoslovensky Prehled, Vol. II, No. 5, p. 14.

10. Svobodne Slovo, May 7, 1954.

11. News, Vol. 3, No. 8, pp. 38 ff.

12. Rude Pravo, January 7, 1955.

13. News, Vol. 4, No. 10, pp. 3 ff.

14. Rude Pravo, May 18, 1952.

15. For a good review on religion in East Europe cf. News, Vol. 4, No. 12, pp. 3 ff.

16. Hromadka, a prominent Czechoslovak Protestant leader, had taught at Princeton during World War II.

17. Rude Pravo, June 20, 1951, and May 30, 1952, reviewing Josef Macek's book Husitske Hnuti Revolucni, Praha, 1952.

18. News, Vol. 3, No. 5, pp. 37-38.

19. Lidove Noviny, April 28, 1951.

20. Trud, April 2, 1952. Cf. News, Vol. 1, No. 6, p. 27-28.

21. Lidove Noviny, March 15, 1951.

22. 6,310 kindergarten were established in Czechoslovakia by 1956, 8,125 in Poland in 1952. Ceskoslovensky Prehled, Vol. , No. , p. and Wola Ludu, August 22, 1952. Cf. News, vol. 3, No. 5, pp. 37 ff.

23. Zemedelsko Zname, August 14, 1952. Cf. News, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 44. Also Rude Pravo, August 18, 1952.

24. Vestnik ministerstva skolstvi, ved a umeni of May 10, 1951. Cf. Zprava o Ceskoslovensku, Vol. II, No. 9, pp. 53-55.

25. News, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 47-48.

26. Zprava o Ceskoslovensku, Vol. III, No. 4, p. 54.

27. Ucitelske Noviny, July 7, 1955.

28. Mlada Fronta, May 6, 1956.

29. News, Vol. 4, No. 7, pp. 3 ff.

30. Cf. also News, Vol. 3, No. 6, pp. 22 ff.

31. Glos Pracy, May 7, 1953.

32. For an analysis of Communist radio broadcasting in Czechoslovakia cf. Ceskoslovensky Prehled, Vol. I, No. 7, pp. 19 ff.

33. There were 2,717,000 sets in Czechoslovakia by 1952 (Rude Pravo, December 17, 1952). Poland had 1,747,148 radio subscribers by the end of 1951 (Trybuna Ludu, May 2, 1952) and Hungary 887,000 subscribers by January 1, 1953.

34. Cf. World Today, IX, 6, pp. 256 ff.: The Press in the Satellite Countries. Also News, Vol. 2, No. 7, pp. 35 ff.: The Fettered Fourth Estate.

35. Sztandar Mlodych, May 5, 1953.

36. Bulgaria claimed 67 newspapers and 92 magazines with 2,364,560 readers in 1953, Poland a daily circulation of 16 million copies, Czechoslovakia is over two million readers of its twelve leading newspapers, while Hungary reported 880,000 copies of newspapers printed daily in Budapest in 1953. Cf. News, Vol. 2, No. 7, p. 35.

37. Otechestven Front, August 9, 1952, mentioned such a case.

38. Rude Pravo, August 2, 1952.

39. Rabotnichesko Delo, May 6, 1953.

40. Nowa Kultura, August 31, 1952.

41. Mlada Fronta, March 19, 1951.

42. Vecherni Novini, January 11, 1952.

43. News, Vol. 1, No. 11, 1952, pp. 38 ff.

44. By 1955 Czechoslovakia was producing 22 feature films per annum, Hungary 10-12, Poland about 8, Rumania 6-7, Bulgaria 3-4. The Polish goal is to turn out 30 feature films per year by 1960. Cf. News, Vol. No. 7, p. 29.

45. Czechoslovakia reported 3,500 theatres in 1954 as against 1,838 in 1937, and 143 million movie-goers in 1953 as against 84 millions in 1937. Bulgaria claimed 1272 theatres in 1954 as against 213 in 1944, and over 60 million movie-goers as against 17 millions in 1947. Poland listed movie theatre audience in 1954 as 96 millions. Figures are taken from various satellite periodicals and some of them may include also showings of 16 mm films, especially in rural areas.

46. News, Vol. 1, No. 11, pp. 32 ff.

47. Lidove Noviny, February 13, 1951.

48. News, Vol. No. 3, p. 34.

49. For puppet shows cf. News, Vol. 2, No. 9, pp. 34-35.

50. Ibid., Vol. 4, No. 8, p. 37.

51. Ibid. Vol. 4, No. 7, pp. 42 ff.

52. Bulgaria reported 6,403 such permanent brigades by September 1953. 11,000 of them took part in a contest in Rumania in 1954.

53. There has been a steady rise in the number of such houses and clubs in East Europe since the Communist seizure of power, especially in its easternmost part. 13,500 houses of culture were to be set up by the end of 1955 in Rumania, not counting 10,400 cultural clubs and 1720 cultural "corners." Hungary had 1900 district houses of culture by 1954, Bulgaria 4417 and Poland 89 district houses, 72 factory houses, 14 youth houses of culture as well as 10,720 factory and 17,000 village culture clubs. Cf. News, Vol. 4, No. 7, p. 42.

54. Rude Pravo, June 22, 1952.

55. Chervenkov's speech at a closed meeting of the Communist party group within the Bulgarian Writers Union, published on February 2, 1955. Cf. Stefan Marinoff, Literary Ferment in Bulgaria, Problems of Communism, Vol. V, No. 3, pp. 37 ff.

56. Information, a mimeographed magazine published by the Council of Free Czechoslovakia in Britain, No. 2, 1956, p. 5.

57. Cf. Stefan Marinoff, op. cit.

58. J. Hendrych, Zivot strany, December, 1955.

59. News, Vol. 4, No. 6, p. 26.

60. Mlada Fronta, January 23, 1955.

61. Lidove Noviny, July 6, 1951.

TRENDS AND PROBLEMS
IN
POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS

by

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A paper prepared for the 53rd annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 5-7, 1957, panel 14, "Trends in Campaign Management"

TRENDS AND PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS

I. Introduction

As one considers the broad trends and problems in the management of political campaigns over the past fifty years, one is impressed by the difficulty in discerning trends, and by the hardiness with which certain problems recur before campaign managers. The tasks of campaigns remain the same: first and foremost, to win victory for candidates at the polls; secondarily to present issues and to gain power and favor for a political party. The objective of winning victory overrides the desirable but tangential objective of seeing to it that the voters get campaign fare adequate to permit a rational choice. An election is neither a plebiscite nor an expression of yea and nay on initiative or referendum, but a choice between competitors for public office. In all but the most unusual of elections, it is difficult if not impossible for the voters to make choices of issues by this device. And the fact that candidates may not always be equated with parties makes elections a less than ideal device for expressing party choice. Yet candidates, parties, and issues are bound up together in the electoral process, and every campaign manager faces the problem of how to vary the mix of his emphasis to produce his victory for the instant election, and to shore up his power for elections to come. Because of the changing styles and tactics of campaigning, but even more because each campaign must be waged within its own context and its special opportunities and weaknesses, it is difficult to discern trends that will serve to indicate better-than-chance probabilities of party behavior in the campaigns of the future.

Within the media of political communication, it is impossible to miss the rise of television and radio, and the relative de-emphasis of the newspaper,

leaflet and billboard. But it is already clear that no one medium will drive out the others, and campaign managers face continuing problems of how to bring all these mass media into harmony with themselves, and relate them to the still-indispensable work of face-to-face political agitation, played by speakers and by precinct workers, or carried on by the diplomats of our parties who go for the key conversions that will bring fat increments of political influence in their train.

In the field of organization, one is struck by the relative decline of the power and influence of the urban machine as a core for permanent professional political organization. The rural machines seem to have suffered less. But both parties now share a problem of how to create a large permanent corps of political workers animated by motivation that will assure enthusiastic support while not threatening dominance of the professional core over any group of amateur enthusiasts that may try to capture a candidate and play a main role in his election. Since devotion by rank-and-file workers to the cause of party is no longer founded wholly on gratitude, new and continuing motivations must be brought forward to elicit sustained activity. Party managers point out that work for a political party can provide a respected and effective way of expressing oneself politically. And the party now offers an outlet for community activities and community spirit, enlivened by periodic contests. And in many jurisdictions, the managers of one or the other party may be able to evoke support by appeals to preserve important interests. The successes or failures of the various party men may prick out trends in the future in ways of founding party loyalty. The shift from bossism and machine politics is still too incomplete and too new to permit clear discernment of long-term waves. One is tempted, however, to hope

that the broad appeals of civic involvement imply a general toning up of the moral character of politics, and of the behavior and performance of politicians.

So much for the larger picture of media, organization, and political motivation. When one turns to the questions of political practice and the practical wisdom that underlies it, one is again struck by the relative unanimity with which political maxims are shared by practicing politicians of all but the extreme wings of politics. These wings are ruled out of effective participation by their unrealistic and revolutionary aims. But from the CIO-PAC or COPE over to the right of the Republicans, there is great consensus on the values and the practices of political intelligence, plans, strategy and operations, the use of media, the structure and role of organization, and questions of fund-raising and budgets. So long as one leaves out the passions that arise over particular issues, particular candidates, and the death or survival of political factions, the doctrine on how to proceed and the underlying expectations of friendly, tolerant, decent behavior on the part of the common citizen, are commonly shared. And not only the expectations about decent behavior; the seasoned political practitioner shares realistic views about the objectives of elections--to reward and to punish--and objective notions about how to use truth, innuendo, and rumor for political ends. Precepts about how to conduct political canvassing; how to restrict get-out-the-vote action to one's own partisans; whether to convert the opposition or to ignore determined opponents;--these read about the same whether from the Republican or the Democratic manuals.

Therefore, one is tempted to conclude that the future of political campaigning will be written pretty much within the framework now worked out and shared among our serious political practitioners. The difference between defeat and victory in the districts where there is a chance of either for

both contestants, rests partly on the accidents of candidate and of events, and partly on the relative skill, efficiency, and dogged thoroughness with which the contestants put into practice knowledge and technique available to all.

Some of the general conditions of American politics may be worth specifying, to make explicit some of the assumptions within which this effort to project campaigning into the future is made. American politics will continue to be a domain of struggle between two confederal parties; loose coalitions of state and local organizations that are only gradually moving toward a continuing national center of influence and control. These parties wield nearly equal power in the nation as a whole, with nearly equal hard cores of highly motivated partisans. Old sectional dominances in South, Northwest and Far West are being reduced with corresponding consequences for factional struggles within the dominant party. Candidates and managers expect to fashion victory by appealing to enough of the indifferent or independent voters to make a majority, while keeping partisans in line and bringing all possible favorable voters to the polls. Neither party will make great efforts to convert the convinced members of the opposition, although either will be grateful for whatever converts come by way of response to economic or other frustrations, Frustrations, because both parties will continue to capitalize on hostilities more than loyalties, and will try to put together coalitions of those who are against an opponent, rather than to emphasize the centripetal effects of constructive programs. Both parties remain in fundamental agreement on the American constitutional consensus. Republicans differ from Democrats more in their preference for nongovernmental workings of the social system as a means of achieving economic progress and distributive justice, than in their vision of the economic and political values of the nation. The parties

are not fundamentally separated in their political goals, no matter what strenuous efforts are made by each in the course of campaigning to create the illusion of difference or to validate imputations of selfishness and venal motive. Both parties embody components that are more widely separated than similar echelons in each party, although the particular component mix varies in each as to the elements of social and economic status.

All these matters influence campaigns and campaigning, as will be apparent as we sketch out some ofthe salient points of decision and of future development arising under the main phases of the campaign process. These phases include the intelligence function; the key activities of planning, strategy, and operations; the use of media; the regulation of the content of campaign communications; the creation and management of campaign organizations; and the problems of fund-raising, budgets, and compliance with laws governing campaign finance.

II. Intelligence--political

Most political organizations today--certainly the national organizations of the major parties and many of their state and local organizations too--possess fairly well developed intelligence organizations. These need not go by that name, but they are indispensable to modern political campaigning. Intelligence, whether formally designed and administered or not, lies at the bottom of political strategy, the selection of candidates and of issues, the timing and execution of party propaganda, the creation and manipulation of political organization. Like military intelligence, political intelligence is concerned with the capabilities and intentions of the opponent. The candidate and his manager must not only have a good estimate of what the opposition can do and wants to do, but needs an equally good estimate of what he will do, and of its consequences. Much of this function has in

times past been discharged in both parties out of available stores of political information and practically tested hunches and know-how. Of recent years both parties have refined and extended their intelligence organizations, formal or informal; and during campaigns they rise to considerable aggregations of manpower. Whether celebrated or not, political managers turn increasingly to polling and market research for the refined data they need in determining the trouble spots and estimating what they can do to reduce them.

But polling and market research are time-consuming and expensive, and not always prompt or detailed enough to give sure guidance to managers in doubt. Therefore they will continue to welcome, to exploit, and at times to be bewildered by political intelligence coming from a variety of sources: news reporters and editors; labor unions or other organizations; press intelligence services; and most of all, information coming up through the network of political organizations composing a national party. Tension continues between the supporters of the more intensive, modern, and scientific forms of political intelligence and those who have founded political success on personal hunch and the more traditional sources.

In general, there are two broad sorts of political information of interest to campaigners: the long-run, basic estimates of conditions and trends; political strengths and weaknesses of self and opposing candidate, party, and issue; expectations about economic or other changes that will shift political perception and preference in an election; and so forth. Then there is the current intelligence of the course of a campaign actually under way. As political parties are now organized, the instrumentation appropriate to these two sorts is somewhat different. For the former, there can be reliance on small, effective, permanent headquarters installations, depending in part on strategically placed polling and research and in part on flows of information from news sources and from organizational

allies. For the latter, there can be prime dependence on the volunteer manpower recruited for the duration of the particular campaign.

The intelligence potentialities of volunteer manpower are enormous, and have yet to be fully exploited. These potentialities help to offset the shortcomings and supplement the strengths of professional polling, offering the possibilities of independent checks on the implications of professional studies. The major danger inherent in the use of volunteers for political intelligence is lack of skill and ever-present bias. This can be partly offset, at least, by training and by shrewd, objective leadership at the precinct and county levels. And reliability may be enhanced by keeping the questions asked in volunteer surveys to simple, gross, easily testable questions that are nevertheless of key importance to the campaign. Such questions as who is the candidate;is he known; who is his opposition; do you like him or don't you, and for what reason; these provoke relevant answers affecting decisions of campaign managers. Questions about party and issues can also be added, although the questions about party may be best used as a check on registration information, and a screening device to sort out the people on whom the canvassers need most urgently to work. Questions about issues may lead into inconvenient political discussion, that may take the canvasser beyond his depth or lead to acrimonious argument--thus destroying the easy, friendly rapport the canvasser is usually instructed to seek. But questions about party or issue may serve to round out the canvasser's real interest in the position and prospect of the candidate, and remain appropriate.

The mass of volunteer manpower available during the heat of the campaign can also be used for such tedious but necessary jobs as media research; checking the appearance of the cause in newspapers, radio and television, spotting

friendly commentators or editorialists, noting response to the issues or themes being stressed by the campaign.

The more vital functions of intelligence, however, have to be done much earlier, and call for the best in professional talent. These have to do with the intelligence that will not only shape the course of the campaign, but will affect the choice of candidate. A party organization may have a choice of several candidates, and the key managers may decide, for a time, to put forward alternatives. But concentation of effort, and the counsel of an early start, force a fairly early choice. Some shrewd campaigners estimate that the campaign must get going at least a year before election, to give time to estimate and then deflate the opposition, and to build the party's candidate. If it is true that the most successful campaigns are those blueprinted in advance, the blueprint will require political intelligence early to permit determination of geographic areas to be stressed, key groups or individuals to be brought around, selection of appropriate propaganda themes and issues, the selection of media, the production of canned speeches. The canny campaigner must start early to work on the record of all his potential opponents, seeking out the points of strength and weakness in each, comparing them with the strengths and weaknesses of his own candidates, and looking especially for those potential sources of embarrassment that may play a disproportionate role in deciding who is "available."

III. Planning, Strategy and Operations

In politics as in diplomacy and military affairs, the intelligence function in itself is only the beginning of plans, strategy, and operations. Beyond the proper intelligence evaluation for accuracy, degree of probability, and inclusiveness, there must be the strategic evaluation: what does a fact or a series of facts mean in terms of political action? Facts without doctrine have no meaning;

it is the function of the political strategist to give them meaning. Even though most political strategists today would shudder at the idea that they apply doctrine, they might shake less if it were suggested that the doctrine they apply consists in native shrewdness, common sense, etc., tempered by political experience and distilled into rules of thumb.

The important trend in planning and strategy is that they now tend to be continuous rather than sporadic. The national committees maintain permanent headquarters that form centers (not exclusive ones) for the continuing estimate of the emerging political record in terms of its meaning for the future of parties, issues, and candidates. Although national committee chairmen may risk rebuffs if they speak up on matters of legislative action or other controversial issues of policy, they must nevertheless keep under constant review the political implications of the record as it is written by party members in the legislative, executive, and even in the judicial branches.

But such continuous work on plans and strategy is far from a monopoly of the national headquarters, or even of the national committees. The party in Congress is not the same as the party outside of it; and the situation of the party in power differs from that of the party out of office. The famous decentralization and federal nature of our parties reveals itself nowhere more clearly than here. National party strategy is always subject to deviation by the sitting member, who looks primarily to his constituency and to his state or local organization for guidance. And national party strategy is almost perforce some sort of compromise among the strategies open to the various representatives of the party who hold office. This makes for diffuseness and for a party propaganda stressing candidates more than issues. More important,

it allows for a politics in which there are many centers of ambition and of initiative in the search for political power, and its exercise. Political juntas may turn up almost anywhere.

The central task of any political strategy is to come up with the right mix of candidate, issue, and party, properly timed and emphasized.

Current political folklore envisages a campaign timed to rise to a crescendo immediately before the election, so the candidate is at the peak of his interest and popularity when the voter decides to go to the polls and make his choices. But, as we have suggested before, this effect is usually the result of quiet work done many months before,culminating in the public, overt, and exciting period of six to eight weeks in which the canvassers are canvassing, radio and television are spewing forth spots in profusion, newspapers are running stories, editorials, and advertisements, and leaflets appear spontaneously in every mailbox and on every automobile seat.

There are several reasons for keeping the overt campaign short. One is to keep as many publicity avenues open as possible: to postpone the operation of Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act; to keep the candidate available for speaking engagements in key spots that do not make a practice of asking candidates to come around and talk; and to conserve the strength and energy of the candidate so he can give the most convincing appearance of leadership and performance under pressure. A further reason is to avoid boredom and to keep the repetition necessary for full political coverage of the contested area to a minimum. With modern methods of communication it is possible to replicate appearances as well as to repeat arguments. Given the penchant of modern managers to keep issues down to two or three at most, and to concentrate on the most telling aspects of each,

the range of argument is shortened. And with a short campaign, there is less temptation to be drawn by the opposition onto shaky ground, merely because the candidate is looking about for something new to say. One can expect frequent use of the Nixon technique of having "the speech," that is varied to the particular needs of place and audience, but is substantially the same for all.

Political strategists must always decide whether to have a "constructive" or a "hard-hitting" campaign--clean or dirty. Many professionals counsel the latter, no matter what the personality or the preference of their candidates. People like to "vote mad," they say; and managers faced with the constant problem of getting attention for their candidate find it hard to overlook the proved attraction of a fight. What is more, nice guys finish last. (But there are ways of hitting hard without involving the candidate himself.) Thus one is tempted to predict that the hard-hitting campaign will be foregone chiefly when the manager believes he can win by having a minimum of excitement and attention, vote his regulars, and profit by citizen apathy. One is more sorely tempted to predict that the hard-hitting campaign is here to stay.

In facing his problem of candidate selection, the political manager must consider the preferred position of the candidate who has been subject to a public draft. Eagerness in pursuit of public office has never been highly regarded by Americans, although once chosen as candidate, competitors are expected to campaign vigorously. The manager, however, is always tempted to instigate expressions of public demand--sometimes for the candidacy of highly regarded persons thought to be "above politics". . . People like to think <u>they</u> are selecting the candidate, even when they are only responding to a skillfully planted suggestion. If William Carleton is right, and the convention of the

future will be restricted to ratifying the already-made choice of the public, managers will devote even more attention than today to the pre-selection process.

Who is "available"? A candidate must today be pretty well above reproach, for the hard-hitting opponents can be trusted to bring out anything in the record that will prove embarrassing or costly in votes; and only the occasional candidate is skillful enough to turn such exposures to his political advantage. But Milquetoasts will not do either, however sanitary. The candidate must exude vigor of body if not of mind; and there is a temptation to prove it by a strenuous campaign schedule, however mitigated by the comforts of modern transportation. The candidate is expected to be forthright, at least on those issues he chooses to talk on. However much he may plan to straddle once he has won office, the candidate today is expected to let the voters know where he stands on the critical issue. And on some point, the candidate is expected to be constructive. However much the campaign is really founded on deflating the opponent and putting together a coalition of dissidents, the appearance of being constructive seems to be necessary, if only to reassure each sector of dissidents that they may hope for constructive action in their field of interest. Positive government now places both parties under its imperatives. Figureheads and timeservers will not do.

The problem of candidate malleability continues. Managers tend almost because of their position to regard the candidate as malleable within limits. But these limits are very definite. Even the Jonkels do not seem to be able to stay in business with candidates who are infinitely pliable, capable of being made to appear ideal through the manipulation of mass media and other determinants of mass opinion. The candidate may even turn out to be his own chief political

manager; he may use his professionals, but reserve the basic decisions to himself, and maintain his leadership by his continued demonstration of professional political skill. Franklin D. Roosevelt was one of these. He rejected counsel to play a passive role in his first campaign for President, electing instead to undertake extensive campaign trips, giving an unmistakable demonstration of action and hopefulness against the doctrinally enforced passivity of the incumbent administration. Whether he needed to do that to win, or whether he could have won as Jack Garner thought he could, simply by staying alive until election day, is beside the point. He made the decision, and it reinforced his chances of victory.

The oft-repeated liberal allegation that devious managers can make almost anything out of anybody, or foist off a movie star as a political personality, seems vastly overdone. First, the opposition is only too eager to expose a manufactured personality; and it is usually powerful and skillful enough to do so. And second, the public increasingly, I think, discriminates among types of achievement and skills. Movie stars remain movie stars. Used as testimonials or as supporters, they have their place, and partisans can be found for all--even, it seems, for fellow-travellers if not Communists at times. But to qualify as politicians, they have to have more than profile and voice; they have to demonstrate political savvy. And as some of the more handsome candidates can testify, excessive comeliness may be more of a handicap than a help. Political elections are not beauty contests.

The issue of issues seems to be in durance firm, if not in durance vile. For there is an increasing disposition on the part of managers to concentrate on issues only as they contribute to victory, and to keep well in the background any ideas that consistent and appropriate programs of public policy need to be explored

in detail as a part of the overt campaign. Therefore managers will always be on the lookout for those one or two or three issues---three at most--that seem to be of most concern to the electorate, and that allow their candidate to appear in a favorable light. Whether there is debate in the campaign is a matter of no importance. If the opponent is foolish enough to debate on ground chosen by the manager, the manager is of course delighted. But not because a debate is taking place, issues are being clarified and the public is being edified. But because the opposition is coming up against the well-laid artillery.

In the larger campaigns, there will be continuing attention to issues for all. That is what platforms and platform committees are for. But the platform committee provides a field of action more than a choice of particular strategy. The campaign will be fought on the themes and issues selected by the candidate and his managers. And those will be the ones that market research, polling, and the various intelligence sources reveal are the ones that can contribute most to victory.

Platform committees, as now treated, do give opportunity for public expression of opinion, and thereby a chance to show the party as respectful of such expressions---or as judicious, or as mindful of the pleas of the disadvantaged or the oppressed. They will continue to do so; but the planks will be written by those who must merge preference with political advantage, and who must do the best they can to give a self-consistent appearance to the party position as a whole.

But in the campaigns themselves, conservation and concentration of effort dictate emphasis on the politically vital fronts. Theoretically or doctrinally vital issues need not be stressed, unless they bring votes. Even under the pressure of enemy attack, the manager is foolish if he departs from his chosen strong points.

A continuing counterpoint in all campaigns is the prospect and position of the party. But parties will have to be much stronger reference-groups than they are today to provide the reason for support from large masses of the population. There may be trends moving people in this direction. Party affiliation is taken seriously; even notorious voters of split-tickets hesitate to declare themselves as independents, or to shift their formal allegiance from an inherited affiliation. Candidates and issues seem to be the more powerful determinants. But, so long as the surest vote comes from the man who is at one in his preference for candidate, issue, and party, campaign managers can be expected to make appeals in the name of the party. At the same time, the search for dissidents in the opposing party may be made on the basis of candidate or issue, with the element of party regularity or loyalty played down. Or the manager may decide to put sharply the issue, hoping to create disunity in the opposition party by creating division of principle within it, while holding out the opportunity for those caught in a dilemma of principle to resolve it by coming across. Such moves are of course hindered by the existence of difference on principle within the manager's party. Changes in party affiliation seem to come about less from conversion efforts spearheaded by any party organization, than they do by response to broad sources of discontent. The shift of the Negro to the Democratic Party seems to have been more an incident of the depression and of the New Deal than of any political argument. The successes of the Republicans in enlisting first-voters during the recent years is partly a function of approval of the party in power, and a response to postwar economic prospects; these may have been more influential than the sustained and shrewd programs run to bring the first-voters into the Republican fold.

IV. Media

The problem of media is the problem of balance. There is no one sovereign medium of political campaigning. The future of balance among media of campaigning appears fairly stable. There are no new major communications devices in the offing, although technological improvement is rapidly increasing the spread and effectiveness of the electronic media, and to some degree, newspapers and mailing. The excitement over television seems to have abated, and it is now clear to all that this medium is not going to drive out the others from the arena of political argument. But television will retain a prominent place because of its inherent flexibility and persuasiveness. Chief brake on its future employment may not be the sheer economic factor of high cost, although that will continue to counsel parsimonious use. Boredom and resentment of interference with the cherished pleasures of the electorate will keep candidates and managers from trying to blanket the voters by this medium. The growth of educational television may provide new channels and new challenges for political managers. There is hope that use of the medium will permit examination of issues, candidates and parties in depth, and the audience for it will be accustomed to more than sloganeering as a means of validating requests for votes. Whether the audience will also be large enough, and strategically placed to influence electoral decisions, to warrant serious attention from campaign managers, it is too early to say. Intellectuals have not dominated politics in the past in America, although they have played a prominent role at times. But with a general increase both in literacy, and in leisure that permits pursuit of political questions in a serious manner, there is, at least, hope for more intensive and demanding concern with matters of public policy.

Radio has a continuing future; it is more widespread and more flexible than television. Both the spot and the short speech will continue useful; and the discussion or panel show may come into new prominence if public taste demands it.

The problems posed by the role of newspapers in campaigns are not quite the same for both parties. The Democrats still seem to have basis for complaint in the extent to which the press is predominantly pro-Republican--as indicated by avowed preferences in 1956. But this is not all gain for the Republicans; pro-Republican material in the press can be discounted as biased, and the whole system denounced as a traverse on freedom of the press and freedom of competition. The Democrats can appeal to fair play and to the emerging canons of responsible journalism, under which a press no longer numerous or varied enough to give independent expression to many political viewpoints, comes under special obligation to give coverage to issues and points of view that may differ from those of its owners or managers. The newspaper retains its advantage of being in print; special editions can be put out and kept around for future reference. Battle pages may come into increasing demand; but the demand must be made clear to editors and managers.

The party newspaper is always a possibility; but it is expensive and avowedly partisan. Managers of the future will probably continue to try to get their material into the naturalistic channels--the columns of news and comment, as well as the editorials of the established media--as a first choice. Hence parties will provide mats, slipsheets, and other special press services, and will be alert to the needs of the rural and weekly press, as well as attentive to the deadlines, the proclivities, and the convenience of the urban and metropolitan organs. Only when local media are hopelessly inadequate will the party paper appear as a good choice--a paper designed for people outside the party, and as something other than a house organ or an intra-party morale builder.

Advertising, whether via newspaper or by billboard, will continue to have a place. In newspapers, the advertisement assures the party of an overt but official hearing. Advertising revenue, although not eagerly sought by much of the press, is nevertheless something of a bait, and the parties will not ignore this. The amount of advertising, and its prominence, may be damped by the need to avoid appearances of excessive cost, and may be cut down by the financial demands of television. Billboards demonstrate amazing hardihood, even though used for very restricted purposes today. To familiarize the public with the face of a candidate; the fact that he is there, and is running for a particular office; to play a role in such political gimmickry as carrying the enemy as "the faceless man"; or demanding pro or con action on an issue of initiative or referendum--these seem about to exhaust the current uses. But space is space, and prominence is prominence. Billboards furnish both. Managers will continue to consider their possible uses and their relative cost.

As men of a mechanized era, we sometimes overlook the vital medium of human face-to-face communication, whether via speakers, via canvassers, or by movement of the candidate himself. Managers do not overlook them, and will not. As a society of organized groups, where the accepted method of communication is via the speech (with or without audiovisual aids), the speaker remains vital. And if our population is in fact predominantly other-directed, anyone would be foolish to omit giving the voter a chance to find out what the omnicompetent other wants him to do. Parties may be trusted pretty much to concentrate their efforts on their own people, and on the persons who are in doubt. The latter class may find themselves entertaining persuasive partisans of both parties, and the kinds of people who go around canvassing are going to be important in shaping the party composition of the future. Other than by inspecting the party

in convention, the only way we get a chance to sense the quality and composition of a party is by its representatives, by those who speak and act in its name. It may be predicted that parties will be even more solicitous about this aspect of canvassing in future than today; especially a party that is trying to move up from a minority position.

One interesting point of tactics is the relation of conventions to the overt campaign. It seems fixed now that the convention is inescapably a part of the total campaign, and there is a current disposition to put conventions close to the overt campaign so a unified impression is gained. Political managers must consider elements of timing that involve not only appearances but plans and organization. If organization is important, there is need for time between the final choice of candidate and the start of the overt campaign at local and precinct levels to build organization and plan the particular and final strategies of propaganda and precinct work. Defeated candidates and factions sometimes drag their feet, and the choice of candidate must be made before the central managers can estimate what groups will really throw themselves into the electoral effort. And the long-term foundations on which the total campaign has been planned may need modification in the light of the convention choice. These modifications can affect campaign literature, timing, and itineraries. Both plans and operations need time for maturing.

Nevertheless, the bold manager may be lucky or prescient enough to be able to see his way clear from initial covert strategy, through the primary or convention, to the final electoral struggle. If he has a convention or primary, the choice of candidate itself offers important opportunities for publicity and for proving his man a vote-getter. Moreover, the rally function of the convention may in itself help to generate enough broad enthusiasm to heal factional rifts and send the canvassers to the electorate full of good

spirits and expectations of victory. Can he count on it, or must he prudently allow a period between convention and campaign to gather his forces for the final attack?

Conventions are more than rallies: they choose candidates, decide on issues and programs, and regulate the administration of the party. Certainly the first two of these are important for the propaganda phases of the campaign, and even party administration may help give a good public impression.

Choice of the candidate is usually the most serious business. It offers opportunities for testimonials from a variety of supporters, for demonstrations of unity, loyalty, vitality of support. At best, a good race in the convention focuses public interest and belies charges of behind-the-scenes rigging. At worst, conventions can present chaos or a dragooned uniformity with overtones of simulated struggle.

Choice of issues is equally serious, though harder to dramatize, unless there are one or two key points of general public concern, such as civil rights. Here platform proceedings, both before and during the conventions, offer opportunities for the parties to consult their publics, to weigh their courses, and to put up the positions on the full range of issues that concern their various components and their possible sources of support.

Both of these functions, it seems to me, offer opportunities for good public impressions. The tradition of the news media is to give them ample coverage, and the temptation to managers is to dress the convention so as to make the most of it. This is done with varying success; but I hope I can discern a trend toward treating party business as something of importance and interest in itself, something worth paying attention to, and something worth protecting from the standards of show-business for the short, the easily assimilable, the non-fatiguing, the colorful, and the trivial.

V. Content

Inseparable from the question of media is the question of content--who will say what, when, where, to whom about candidates, issues, and parties. Managers should always take care to adjust content to the peculiar requirements of each medium. A visual medium stresses pictures and graphical modes of presentation as well as print; an audio medium stresses presentations that are easily assimilable and retained by ear. Television, of course, can combine both. And so can a canvasser, who can carry his propaganda materials with him and leave them about even if he is under instructions not to get into any political arguments, but to play a role of registry and reinforcement. (Registry of party members, registrants, or sympathizers; reinforcement of the already convinced, seeing to it that partisan views are supported and voted on.)

But with the current preconception of managers that everything must be easy and graphic and short, the differences between political communication among media are small, and the usual effort is to get cross-advertising and reinforcement of the centrally-adopted propaganda directive, which relates speech and symbol to the selected issue or theme.

Facts, preferably in capsule form, remain in favor and will do so as long as the national mind and form of argument stay as they are.

Truth, especially biting and plausible truth, will remain a preferred form of campaign content. Research divisions will continue a sustained search for the verified useful fact. Only when the available truth does not suffice for campaigning purposes will the manager move into the more subtle, more vulnerable reaches of imputation and implication. There is nothing particularly honorable about all this. Truth works better, if it is available.

VI. Organization

Just as there are two phases to the campaign, there are two aspects to the organization. There is the relatively permanent, continuing body of devoted professionals, who may be in politics as an avocation, or as a vocation. This is a small group, comparatively; but with a sustained determination to stay in the game, for whatever reward there may be of power and influence, if not of respect. Then there is the relatively large group of volunteers, recruited chiefly for the purposes of a single campaign, whose loyalties are largely a function of the particular campaign and the particular candidate or issue. Interwoven into this twofold structure is the web of allied groups: front organizations, independents for the candidate, opposition party groups for the candidate. In some campaigns these may be numerous and powerful enough to present a threat to the dominance of the permanent central group; or at the least to present difficult problems of co-ordination and control. But in most campaigns these allied groups come into being at the bidding of the permanent oranization, and are normally amenable to its leadership. They are regarded as indispensable accouterments to most campaigns, whenever the managers feel that it is necessary to make a full-scale effort to get out the regulars and swing the balance with the independents.

If one had to choose between media or organization, most managers would unhesitatingly choose organization. But this is an unrealistic choice, just as it is unrealistic to suppose that any manager would put all his resources into one medium and ignore the others.

The real problem is how to get media and organization to run smoothly together. The main task for media is to present the candidate and the issues,

and to carry the detailed argumentation of the campaign. Organization can do these things, but is better employed at the more manageable tasks of intelligence, getting out the registration and the vote, and of administration. It is not for the canvasser to get into political arguments, according to our current tastes for an innocuous and friendly attempt to find out who the voter is for, to reinforce him with recognition and arguments if he is favorable; to bring up persuaders if he is in doubt; and to get him to the polls if he turns the right way.

A point of future development that is unclear today is the motive underlying political participation. There is agreement that the day of the old urban boss is done; the modern service state has undercut the foundations of his political machine and the underpinnings of the loyalty that he could bring to the polls (whether in the form of votes cast or votes counted). But what is to replace him? In our essentially confederal parties, issue-loyalty provides at best a weak, and less than inclusive motivation. Both parties are making considerable attempts to win faithful supporters by offering opportunities for public involvement, if not service; by offering opportunities to a nation of joiners to join another group and to serve it. Politics has one advantage over many other groups: the subject of public issues today is often complicated and interesting, and the outcome of political discussion can make a difference to important matters. There is thus a built-in interest and challenge. But the partisan's approach is not always the most satisfying. Intellectuals particularly are prone to note the efforts of parties to oversimplify matters, to overemphasize the difference between candidates and party positions on public issues, and to create an atmosphere of crisis when the real choice between the positions of the candidates or parties is often small.

At the local level, there may be genuine cleavages over interests and loyalties that create intense interest and evoke great efforts by many; but there is always difficulty in trying to build a national party and a national issue out of these local differences. The requirements of coalition politics gloss over many differences, and the ultimate question is that of who shall have power.

Loyalty to candidates or to political factions seems to provide a more enduring basis of organization, whatever its authoritarian tinge arising from loyalty to leader.

The continuing difficulty of political organization arises from the fundamental cross pressures of interest which feature our society. Which ones should be specifically recognized within the organizational pattern, and what power should be allowed to each? There is a general tendency to consider including all of them--women, labor, minority groups, racial groups, special professional groups. Like speaks easily to like, managers reason. But this is an organizational strategy open to both sides, and the question soon becomes whether the spokesmen available to your side will be able to compete effectively with those allied with the opposition. No politician likes to organize so as to demonstrate weakness. And he does not have to. For cross pressures themselves offer opportunities to cover people who are found in a number of special groups. Workers are taxpayers. Negroes are consumers. And each can be appealed to on the grounds of one or several important interests.

And not only the he's provide a problem. What to do with the women? Both parties have been trending toward dual chairmanships in party organizations, and not just to appeal for the women's vote. The dual chairmanship

offers an element of insurance, that the activity covered will be well managed. Women's divisions may become a thing of the past; but not for quite a while yet. Different occupational patterns still permit many women to enjoy freedom during the day, and thus allow for many forms of specialized service. But more than this, both parties have a good way to go in giving women equal representation in the functions of party or of government; so each can consider stealing a march on the other, bidding for the special consideration of the female vote. Meanwhile each party will need to keep the problems of the women's vote under continuing review.

VII. Fund-raising, Budgets and Administration

It is obviously impossible to go adequately into the many question raised in the field of fund-raising, budgets and administration, and their particular implications for the future of campaigning and for the control of party activities. A few salient points may be mentioned. One is the effect of the Hatch Act--and all the little Hatch Acts--that attempts to assure a check on corruption in party campaigning by limiting the total amount that may be spent by any one organization in any campaign. The result, one may say baldly, is the opposite of the intention. For costs in campaigning rise, as do other costs; the ceilings placed by the various limiting Acts are unrealistic today, or are quickly becoming so; the effect is to proliferate campaign organizations, create enormous problems of co-ordination and control for the candidates and for the parties; and to make almost impossible the task of checking on who spends what for whom, and how. The opportunities for corruption increase as the tasks of inspection grow complex and difficult. The drastic solution appears to be to take off the ceiling limitations on expenditure, strengthen requirements for

centralization of campaign fund-raising and expenditure in party treasurers, and review and revise the types of expenditures found repugnant to public policy. These, I suggest, should be kept to the minimum, and maximum reliance placed on the judgment of the electorate to punish those who turn to illegitimate or over-extravagant practices. There is some reason to believe that the two parties might be put on a more nearly equal basis if the ceilings came off. The comparatively few very wealthy Democratic contributors could then offset the Republican strength in the mid-range contributions of $1000 to $5000. Both parties, for reasons of their public relations, would continue to strive for the numerous small contributions that argue mass support and a popular cause.

The results of limitations on campaign expenditures run counter to the development of national party structures. The need to decentralize fund-raising and spending reinforces centrifugal tendencies among the national committees, the Senate and Congressional Committees, and the state and local committees--not to mention the various citizens-for groups. But there is a counter-tendency to share in the party's assets for fund-raising, especially if a party boasts a popular President in the White House; this calls for co-operation among the various committees, and rules for sharing the take of such events as the closed-circuit television Salute to Eisenhower. On balance, however, the national party headquarters cannot easily dominate either organization or policy by reason of its ability to grant or withhold the sinews of political war.

At least one party official has pointed out the effect on party structure of budget decisions made by treasurers of the various party committees,

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acting as a national budget committee. These are to reduce outlays for research, poll-taking, and other special studies; and to emphasize conservative judgments as to the proper objects of expenditure. It can be surmised that developments in the fields of business organization and management may offset these tendencies, insofar as business becomes better accustomed to balanced and extensive outlays for special studies to guide decisions in advertising, public relations, and company policy generally.

Campaign management calls today for a high degree of sheer administrative skill, with special emphasis on ability to improvise and to gain efficient service from a rapidly erected, largely temporary organization. Much of the effectiveness of campaigning depends on the skill and efficiency of the shipping department; speeches and materials that do not arrive don't affect the vote. There is a continuing challenge from the loose, decentralized structure of parties, especially in their campaign phases, calling for smooth interaction between national, state and local party organizations, and with the various front groups. (Diplomacy is involved here too.) There are special tasks, that vary with the particular laws and practices of many jurisdictions, arising from registration and get-out-the-vote drives; poll-watching; and campaign schools tailored to the requirements of state and local constituencies. And there are the special problems of administration geared to the convenience and necessities of dealing with TV, radio, the press, and other media of mass communication.

To try to discern trends in these matters is a near-hopeless task. But one can hazard the opinion that a country increasingly devoting itself to life within organization matrices will be increasingly easily adjusted to the familiar loosely-hierarchical structures put up by parties as well as business and government.

VIII. Some over-all concluding comments

Campaign management, fundamentally, involves a mixture of emphasis on candidates, issues, and parties; and the objective of managers is to get the greatest unanimity of direction of preference for all three. Such tripartite reinforcement is the best guaranteedfavorable action at the polls. But where choice of emphasis must be made, and this is usually the case, the manager will emphasize candidate first, issue or party second. The prospects for a politics founded on preference for a party or for an ideology remain dim in the United States. Elections, at bottom, are perceived as methods of choice of individuals for jobs. As plebiscites they are clumsy at best, and leave the questions of public preference among issues ambiguous, open for adjustment and interpretation in the light of developing interests and pressures. The electorate senses this, I think, and sensibly puts its main attention on selection of the person. If this is so, the belabored and much-criticized emphasis on personality rather than issues as the subject of campaigning, is neither surprising nor irrational. The man for the job, after all, is the point at issue. He is far from malleable in the hands of managers or public relations artists, especially in a controverted situation. Appearances are not infinitely variable, and modern campaigners don't behave as if they were. They study the product carefully in advance, determine its marketability, compare it with its competition, launch it in the struggle--and then may find themselves in charge of something more than a piece of merchandise. They can't simply go back to the design department, work up a new prototype, and test public acceptance in a few key marketing areas.

For this, and for other reasons, I do not believe that the specialist in advertising and public relations on the field of professional politics will make

much deeper inroads than they have today. The nub of the advertising man's claim to an influential role is his ability to manage media. He can, in addition, bring up batteries of special services: marketing surveys, product analyses, etc., that may help managers select candidates and focus on the issues most likely to produce a favorable result. They can help with the intricate chores of television time-buying. But their contribution to the strategies and directions of politics is played down by professional managers, and it is tempting to conclude that only as the advertising man becomes himself a professional (or serious) politician will he play a more weighty role. If he does so he subjects himself to the disciplines of his new calling. In the meanwhile, despite all the denigrations of Madison Avenue, both parties will continue to seek out and use the best advertising and public relations talent they can get.

Both managers and advertising men who play a prominent role in politics run the risk of appearing as king-makers--a role not unfamiliar to politicians and sometimes eagerly sought by them. Underlying this is the feeling that the manipulative approach to candidates and politics is somehow wrong and may be self-defeating. Specialty in the overt skills of campaigning, and in the manipulation of appearances, somehow detracts from the model of a pair or more of sincere and honest public men, laying bare their records, making their views felt on public questions, and creating well-founded expectations as to how they will behave if given office. Even a campaign strategy of deflation of the opponent will suffer if it is thought rigged and insincere. Yet, because of the complexity of modern communications, it is easily concluded that we have created new opportunities for manipulation and a

new skill basis for a new form of political bossism, one no better-founded because morally as ambiguous as the bossism founded earlier on jobs, favors, gratitude, and influence.

The main reason, I think that we do not need so to conclude is because of the inherent revolution in campaigns and campaigning that has been wrought by the fact that political jobs today--especially at the higher ranges of national elections and in the key state offices--dispose of elements of public interest so vital as to make the electoral choice worth working at. This is an incident of two things: the state of national and international politico-military affairs; and the rise of the service state. Many aspects of world crisis have implications at the level of state and local government; civil defense offers a clear example. Therefore, political managers and candidates must look to quality, and to the putting together of combinations of interest and of appeal that will hold up under the pressures of many persons and groups seeking highly valued ends. There is not only a negative sanction enforcing stringent standards of past behavior on political candidates; there is the positive sanction of ability to discharge important and onerous tasks, under surveillance and under pressure.

Can we look forward to shorter, easier campaigns, more gentle with the strength and skills of the candidates? Probably not, because one test of fitness for modern political office is strength and endurance. The candidate will always be tempted to show what he has, the hard way. Modern campaigning precepts call for organization to take as much load off the candidate as possible; but this is to permit him to be as bright, energetic, and full of ostensible leadership as possible at the many appearances he is supposed to

make. The overt campaign may be a bit shorter and easier, because of the capacities of modern communications and transportation. But the number of profitable points of appearance are theoretically infinite; and the candidate must rely on his judgment and that of his managers as to how many of the national, regional, and local appearances he must make. National candidates, if potent, must consider not only their own interests, but those of fellow-partisans and of their party. Juxtaposition of two faces on a television screen, showing the national candidate blessing his regional favorite, will not fully substitute for the real joint appearance.

Will campaigns of the future resemble debates more closely, and offer for the discriminating voter all the data he needs to make a rational choice? Without anticipating the conclusions of the paper to be presented tomorrow, or the discussion it will provoke, let me state my own view categorically: They will not. And this is because the end of campaigning is victory, not edification or clarification. Victory requires concentration of force; both sides will continue to emphasize those aspects of the struggle that favor their cause; full debate will be the result of a mistake or of accident rather than the systematic intent of the participants. It is to the outside groups among voters that we must turn for the full-scale appreciation of the pros and cons of any campaign--the specially educated, informed, and interested citizens who can put the campaign into context, and make judgments accordingly. These have been few. Will they remain so? This is a function of the policies of the future. Citizen involvement to date has remained small, in terms of campaigning and contributions. Politics today is still largely a spectator sport. Yet, the parties offer ample opportunities for participation--

opportunities that can lead to greater political sophistication and direct acquaintance with vital strands of interest and influence in American life. Political participation offers instruction in tolerance and accommodation, based on demonstration of the central truth that our political system is not bound by any single ideology, but finds its endurance and its central meaning in a continuing effort to seek agreement and achievement through the practical consequences of practical programs.

Possibly more of our citizens could be tempted into continued political participation if they or their friends could experience this pragmatic search. To understand such an experience is neither popular nor easy--but once understood, it is likely to call forth sustained and skillful participation in the political process. And this may be more valuable than transient crusades.

The Limits of Principle in International Politics: Necessity and the New Balance of Power

By K. Thompson

If the moralist "is to deserve a hearing among his fellows, he must set himself this task which is so much humbler than to command and so much more difficult than to exhort: he must seek to anticipate and to supplement the insight of his fellow men into the problems of their adjustment to reality." (Walter Lippmann)

No problem on the agenda of America's relations with the rest of the world is more bewildering, compelling and ultimately decisive than the moral evaluation of foreign policy. It must be apparent in the second decade of the cold war that we judge ourselves and in turn are judged by the calculus of principles affirmed and principles realized. We know that national morale and international prestige are the casualties of moral outlooks that are either too egocentric or too pretentious and our moral stock in the world rises and falls as we express this most clearly. Yet intellectuals and policy-makers alike are alternately tempted to exaggerate or underestimate the influence of moral principles, to fall prey at one extreme or the other to moralism or cynicism. Perhaps this is more true of the United States than the rest of the English-speaking world where questions of political morality are decided in specific cases as required by contemporary events oftentimes with the conscious avoidance of generalized propositions. Or it may be that the immediacy of national problems merely underscores the American dilemma. In any event, most Americans are offended to know that principle and necessity are frequently in conflict when man acts politically. They are distressed to learn that it is the essence of politics that man chooses goals and objectives which are limited both in application and scope and therefore just and self-fulfilling only for particular groups and nations. For example, in practice those measures which are for the good of labor often work an injustice upon management. Only in pure thought can actions and policies remain uncorrupted and undefiled by at least some margin of injustice. This universal aspect of the corruption of absolute justice within the

realm of politics finds its outstanding expression in international politics. There my nation's justice can mean your nation's injustice, my nation's security and its requirements can appear as the cause of your nation's insecurity. Armaments, defense preparations and alliances essential to a nation's safety are simultaneously a threat to security as viewed through other eyes.

Faced with such conflicts, the moralist maintains that at present men pursue a double standard of conduct in their private and public lives. Privately, man is honest and ethical; publicly he covers his acts with a tissue of lies and deception. His virtue in private affairs is seen as the conquest of culture over barbarism, of a rational age over an irrational one. Once in an earlier stage in man's evolution, his private conduct was marred by brutality and violence but education, a legal order and free institutions transformed him. In the same way the cultural lag from which nations have suffered in international relations is being erased. The forward march of history is carrying nations from a retarded condition into a new and enlightened era when private standards will become public international rules. Those who doubt are denounced as foes of progress and men of little faith.

The shattering effects of two World Wars have thrown a dash of political realism on the sanguine expectations of moralism. Its hopes and predictions bear little resemblance to the recent conduct of states. The melancholy unfolding of the past four decades has left the most ardent believers shaken and uncertain and in practice simple moralistic viewpoints have tended to induce their opposite, namely, a bleak and hopeless cynicism. The cynic tends to argue that politics and ethics diverge only because they are unlike quantities. Politics are means and ethics are ends. Means may be evil, but good ends, to which means are subordinated, can endow means with good ethical content. The dictum that the end justifies the means seems

in the realm of politics to furnish a simple clue to the problem. Yet for men and for nations, the universal practice is to justify every evil measure by claiming it serves an ethical goal. For Stalin the gross brutality of liquidating the kulaks found justification as an inevitable step in the history-fulfilling communist design; for Hitler the cremation of so-called inferior races was excused as a necessary hygienic measure if Teutonic superiority were to continue unimpaired. Since nations in the present anarchic world society tend to be repositories of their own morality, the ends-means formula has prevailed as an answer to the moral dilemma, for undeniably it is a concealed but essential truth that nations tend to create their own morality. In its extreme form, however, this development has found nations accepting as ethical whatever redounded to their own material advantage and judging whatever was detrimental to their purposes as immoral and evil. Yet it inheres in the nature of man and politics that statesmen and nations never wholly escape the judgment of elementary ethical standards. The history of politics discloses that no people have completely divorced politics from ethics but however grudgingly have come to see that men were required to conform to standards more objective than those of success. Neither moralism nor cynicism have the intellectual resources for illuminating these vital issues but fortunately there are other contemporary alternatives.

1. Four Contemporary Approaches to Principle and Necessity

One source of hope is the intellectual ferment that results as outstanding minds turn to reflect on these problems. It has been said that first-class problems attract first-class minds and by this test the moral problem has in recent years proved one of our most challenging and persistent concerns. Four writers in particular have probed more deeply than many of their contemporaries: one an historian, another a legal philosopher and international jurist, a third a political theorist and a fourth a theologian. Quite obviously others have made significant contributions

but this group is noteworthy - to paraphrase William James - for making an unusually stubborn attempt to think clearly. Moreover, the conclusions they draw while complementary are not identical and from their differences as well as agreements certain guiding principles emerge.

Herbert Butterfield, the Cambridge historian and Master of Peterhouse, has analyzed international morality and the historical process in a series of important writings. The most characteristic statement of his viewpoint appears in books like Christianity, War and Diplomacy; Christianity and History and Christianity and European History. Morality, in his view, is not one thing for the statesman and another thing for the rest of mankind. There is no such thing as a separate political ethic. Philosophers and poets, no less than decision-makers, must daily choose not between good and evil but between lesser evils or partial goods. The quality of the decision fundamentally at least is no different in politics or business, education or family life. Therefore Butterfield has argued: "I don't see why in politics the virtues which I associate with the Christian religion should be suspended: humility, charity, self-judgment, and acceptance of the problem Providence sets before one; also a disposition not to direct affairs as a sovereign will in the world but to make one's action a form of cooperation with Providence."

Morality rests on the doctrine of individualism, an essentially Christian conception which is espoused alike by "lapsed Christians" and religious thinkers. It assumes that nothing but human beings exist or matter and their claims override those of mundane society. The individual can choose the God he will worship and the moral end he will serve. He sees himself and others as more than mere wilful bundles of caprice or chance combinations of atoms. In his society progress is measured by the opportunities afforded for human

enrichment and individual growth. "Fundamental to this kind of society, is respect for the other man's personality, the other man's end - in fact, the ability to put oneself in his place and see that he may have a conscience too." Present-day thought has its difficulties with this conception. For example, secular thinking which accepts as its premise the rights of man runs the risk of encouraging an unbridled egotism according to which man need not obey the law unless he agrees with it. By contrast, thinking which starts with the duties of man is likely to end by making man the slave of the state. That is why it is useful to see both man and the state as subject to something which transcends them and prompts them to treat one another as more than means to an end. "If in the Anglo-Saxon world there has been the necessary amount of the spirit of give-and-take, the disposition to compromise, the respect for the other man's opinion and the reluctance to resort to desperation-policies," this may be due to our greater security, longer political experience or state of urbanity free from violence but it may also be due to the survival of religious influences. We are members of a single western civilization or cultural community which embraces the moral criteria of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. The absence of "a higher law" or regulative principle makes for doctrinaire politics and "those who have no religion are particularly liable to bring a religious fanaticism to problems of mundane organization which ought to be matters for transaction and negotiation. Lord Acton was probably right when he said that liberty is impossible except amongst people who have a sense that the whole political game is being played in a realm over which there rules a higher law."

If the beginning of wisdom is the recognition that men live finally in some kind of a moral order, the next step is an awareness that the moral is not the merely moralistic. On the one hand, moral judgments can sometimes

confound our practical responsibilities to society and ourselves. "A careless librarian, who establishes no regular system for the checking of his books may be satisfied just to heap blame on the people whose delinquencies have resulted in gaps in his shelves." A military or political leader who has failed to organize his policies effectively is tempted to submerge the issue in moral indignation against those who have merely taken advantage of his errors. One is reminded of that distinguished scientist over whose desk there hung the inscription of a prayer asking for courage to do his duty without calling on God to carry all the more onerous burdens.

On the other hand, moral judgments may also spill over into Pharisaism exemplified by the priggish moralizers Christ condemned in the Gospels. If there are obscurities in the Gospels, this text is not among them. Nothing is clearer than the distinction between those who claim to be and those who are righteous. We recall the parable of the Pharisee and the publican in the eighteenth chapter of the Gospel according to St. Luke:

> "Two men went up to the temple to pray; the one a Pharisee, and the other a publican. The Pharisee stood and prayed thus with himself, God, I thank thee, that I am not as other men are, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, or even as this publican... And the publican standing afar off, would not lift up so much as his eyes unto heaven, but smote upon his breast, saying, God be merciful to me a sinner. I tell you, this man went down to his house justified rather than the other: for every one that exalteth himself shall be abased, and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted."

Now of course the moral lesson to be drawn is not that some states are pharisaic and others publicans but rather that all nations are strongly disposed to endow their particular national ethical systems with universal validity. Nations find themselves today in a situation not too dissimilar from that obtaining domestically within the United States prior to the Civil War. The sanctities of

religion and science are invoked to show that one course of action, one nation's program will execute a divine mandate. Nations go to war not in dispute over territorial boundaries but to make the world safe for democracy or to destroy human wickedness incarnated in evil men like Hitler and Mussolini. Wars of righteousness in which compromise and limited objectives are looked on as treason are today's counterpart of historical wars of religion or the conflict between freedom and slavery within the States. Conflicts become holy wars and the establishment of justice is equated with the spread of a political system.

The first inkling of this development making war a clash between organized systems of self-righteousness came with the contest between Napoleon and the First and Second Coalitions organized against him. On both sides, the War was fought in the name of principles claiming universal validity, namely the principles of the French Revolution and those of legitimacy. President Wilson's crusade for democracy, however humane and noble its goals, must fall within the same tradition. In the present crisis, we confront the most extreme and demoniac of political religions, Soviet communism which on the basis of scientific pretensions proclaims a universal system determined objectively by historical materialism to be the proper form of government for peoples everywhere. In general it can be said that "the most dangerous argument...is the assertion that since my country wants to work for righteousness, or my own country has the right idea of what is virtuous, its power to do good in the world must be enhanced as far as possible." "If a party within a country (or a national government in its relations with the world at large) is so strong in its...zeal for a certain kind of righteousness that it will not give way at any price, it may convince itself that it is putting morality in the supreme position. But it is egotistical in claiming the right to stand as the highest judge, and in reality it is only saying that the issue shall be decided by war."

In a revolutionary age, states are seized with an extra measure of missionary fervour which gives them the pretext for interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. When the international order has been weakened and there is a situation operating in favor of aggression, the trend toward an expansive self-righteousness becomes all-powerful. "We are suffering the double consequences of Revolution and War; and since the victories of communism from 1917 have been so closely associated with war, perhaps what we are really suffering from is the heritage of 1914. If it is true that communism in our time has been the chief beneficiary of war...we shall be skeptical of the possibility of destroying it by means of victory in war - indeed the defeat of Russia and China would not wipe it out."

Professor Butterfield's diagnosis of the present crisis brings him to offer some practical alternatives. He finds that "once the aggressor is held in check, and once a balance of forces is achieved, the healing processes of time, and these alone, can solve our problem..." The core of his prescription for peace and morality is time and the absence of war and revolution. Any conflict that time and reason cannot solve will not be solved by war. He is persuaded that it is possible to live with ideological deadlocks and to discover a modus vivendi as in the struggle between Catholicism and Protestantism, and Islam and Christianity. With patience and good luck, justice can eventually emerge. His critics ask whether this is not a counsel of perfection. How would this precept have applied to Hitler? Apparently Butterfield believes that a balance of forces against Hitler sometime prior to 1939 might have prevented the conflict and allowed time to work its healing effect.

The alternative to wars of righteousness is a restoration of the international order. "On moral grounds, as well as on prudential calculations,

national egotism requires to be checked, superseded and transcended." Partly this demands "every possible variation and extension of the art of putting oneself - and actually feeling oneself - in the other person's [or nation's] place." It requires states to recognize themselves as imperfect parts of an imperfectly ethical world and to show somewhat greater awareness of the moral complexities and disparities in the objective environment underlying the state behavior of others. In Christ's day the wickedness of Tyre and Sidon was a legend but He pointed out that had they seen the Son of God in their midst as others, they would have repented and lived better lives than the people of Capernaum. It is as though Christ were to say to Britain and America: "Don't pride yourself on being better than the Germans. If the Germans had been as fortunate as you have been, and if they had been in the same position, they might have behaved at least as virtuously as you." The condemnation of others in the political realm is particularly questionable when judgments are so gravely entangled with interests and security. Indeed if states are fighting for Persian oil or in behalf of Alsace-Lorraine or for a stake in the Middle East, it is better to say so than to talk in absolute terms of right and wrong. If states desire to assert the existence or authority of an international order, they must refrain from conceiving the ends of, say, war as though they were fighting barbarian hordes entirely outside the system. And however [and justifiably] they feel against the enemy of the moment, it is wiser not to introduce a permanent irreconcilability into the international order partly because today's enemy almost invariably turns up as tomorrow's ally against a new aggressor. Therefore statesmen must ask the question whether their policies are likely to produce the kind of international order in which their values can survive. In this sense they transcend national self-interest at the point of

the query, "everything considered, what is best for the world?" Indeed "a state may fairly acquire virtue from the very fact that it contrives to make its self-interest harmonize with something that is good for the world in general." A case in point may be the liquidation of large segments of the British Empire when morality and the necessity of reducing its overseas commitments converged in a common policy. In this same connection, the intrinsic logic of the Marshall Plan comes naturally to mind. In Mr. Butterfield's words:

> "Whether we are practising diplomacy, or conducting a war, or negotiating a peace treaty, our ultimate objective is the maintenance and the development of an international order. This is the purpose which transcends national egotism and puts the boundary to self-interest - the purpose to which all our more immediate aims in foreign policy have reference."

It is striking that another tiny European country has given us the second writer of note on international morality. Judge Charles de Visscher of Belgium is a philosopher and international jurist, formerly a member of the International Court of Justice and now Professor at the University of Louvain. An English translation of his classic treatise, Theory and Reality in Public International Law has recently been published by the Princeton University Press. In importance it has already been compared by some to the writings of Grotius and Vattel. Whatever its place in the annals may be, however, its doctrines for present-day international law are profoundly significant. Against the overly sanguine proposals of most international lawyers, de Visscher cautions that law cannot be built upon a heedless sacrifice of reality. In this connection he notes that politics which makes the preservation of the power of states an inescapable minimum objective is still the dominant factor in international relations. Moreover, the international order to which Butterfield alluded is not based on a moral and political community. In broadest terms de Visscher observes that it

is in contact with the world outside that any social groups differentiates and becomes conscious of itself; only against the stranger does its solidarity fully assert itself. In particular the modern state owes it historical cohesion and community to external pressures and the sentiments of national and collective loyalty generated thereby. International society is lacking in these incentives to greater solidarity. It substitutes for them an appeal to sacrifice and to a common supranational good. But this perception is closed to the great majority of mankind. In the State it is vital interests and the most highly political experiences that evoke supreme solidarities. In the international realm, the opposite is true, for minor solidarities of an economic or technical order can be found but the nearer one approaches vital questions, such as the preservation of peace and the prevention of war, the less influence the community has on its members. "If the international community, or more accurately the sense of such a community, finds so little echo in individual consciences, this is less because power obstructs it than because of the immense majority of men are still infinitely less accessible to the doubtless real but certainly remote solidarities that it evokes than to the immediate and tangible solidarities that impose themselves upon them in the framework of national life."

Judge de Visscher is constrained to discuss moral and political realities because he believes that "neither politics nor law will ensure equilibrium and peace in the world without the 'moral infrastructure.'" At present, men are disposed to transfer all their most important moral impulses to the state. Loyalty to the group is seen as the cardinal virtue for the individual and may even require him to condone behavior by the group person he would condemn in himself. "The morality that peoples practice in their mutual relations is in large measure the product of their historical partitioning. They are refractory to a higher morality only because their sentiments like their interests

continue to gravitate exclusively about the units which are today the Nation-States. These, though theoretically subordinate to the higher unity are in fact real and almost absolute centers of moral cohesion." "'Sacred egoism,' the fascist formula, was only the blustering expression" of collective morality which makes the national good the supreme good and civil duty the absolute duty. "Merely to invoke the idea of an international community, as the habit is, is immediately to move into a vicious circle, for it is to postulate in men, shut in their national compartments, something they still largely lack, namely the community spirit, the deliberate adherence to supranational values." Thus Judge de Visscher is sharply critical of much of earlier international law. He bases his indictment largely on the grounds that "it exaggerated the specificity of international law, separating it off from the moral, social and political data which form its sphere of application and condition its effectiveness." If international lawyers re-examine the law in its social context, they will discover the obstacles confronting the extension of any normative order and thereby make law a more relevant if modest force.

As we come down to the present date, the dread disease which enfeebled international law as the expression of a normative order, has also made impossible the attainment of other modes of world order. In de Visscher's words: "Collective security, common interest of all nations in the maintenance of an indivisible peace, outlawry of war - none of these high objectives could touch off that instantaneous rational illumination of public opinion, or better, that swift onrush of sentiments that could have penetrated the depths, enlarged horizons, and convinced men of the new necessities of international life." The simple notion that international law and morality once proclaimed would be swept along by the consciences of public opinion is thrown into question and

and the mischievous might suggest that certain present-day American statesmen would find de Visscher more instructive bedside reading than mystery stories. Judge de Visscher quotes the aphorism of J. B. Bossuet: "The greatest disorder of the mind is to believe things because one wants them to be so and not because one has seen that they are so."

It is a fair question then to ask how Judge de Visscher seeks to meet these seemingly overwhelming and oppressive problems? If we can give a much too abbreviated response, he calls for a drastic change in the modern conception of the State and its power. "These pulled down from their present eminence as the supreme goals of political organization, must be subordinated to the ends of the human person." Here we find a link between national and international social development; the approach to a broader morality ironically demands a narrowing of the exclusive moral claims of the all powerful nation-state. "For the State's unceasing invasion of all fields of human activity, even in democratic countries, seems to point to the consolidation and increase rather than the subordination of its power. How can the State organization be used to maximize individual welfare and yet be prevented from usurping the position of the end in itself?" The human ends of politics and the obstacles to their attainment are the common problems of contemporary law and politics whether in the national or international sphere. The human end of politics from a purely formal point of view "may be defined as the pursuit of the common good, understood as that which in a community should ensure the good of each in the good of the collectivity." Whenever the notion of the common good is no longer harnessed to human ends, there sets in a fatal deterioration in the ends of power. These human ends have been dealt with somewhat naively and impatiently in some of the declarations by the United Nations in the proposed

Covenant on Human Rights. But de Visscher concludes: "It is the fate of any idea of a highly spiritual character to be exposed to some distortion when it is introduced into a new environment... [Yet] the bond that is being established beyond any shadow of doubt between the rights of man on the one hand, and the maintenance of peace and respect for law on the other hand, constitutes the first assertion by the international organization of a great moral and civilizing principle...A functional conception of power here joins hands with Christian doctrine, making human values - the only values that can command universal acceptance - the ultimate point of convergence of peace and law. We must neither count upon its immediate efficacy, nor reject the hopes that it awakens."

The third voice that deserves a hearing is Hans J. Morgenthau, a political theorist who looks with the realist's discerning eye at the moral claims often put forward by states in justifying their conduct. He finds and submits impressive evidence that most of the protestations of selfless and humanitarian conduct by states are not realized in practice. For instance, the keeping of promises, the protection of minorities and the repudiation of war as an instrument of national policy are honored as often in the breach as in the keeping, especially when vital interests are at stake. The lessons of history are evoked with convincing effect.

Yet in one broad area he is much impressed with the role of morality, namely, in the effects of moral restraints on the use of power. He notes that for certain lines of contemporary conduct moral restraints impose an almost absolute barrier. Viewed in terms of power politics, the use of almost any device to increase a state's power and reduce that of its antagonist would seem justifiable. In practice human life is protected even at the expense of national aims. In an earlier day practice appears to have been more unrestrained.

"According to its official records, the Republic of Venice, from 1415 to 1525, planned or attempted about 200 assassinations" to weaken its prospective foes. Moreover, the Venetians carried on their rolls an official poisoner. Cardinals brought their own butlers and wine to papal coronations for fear they might be poisoned. Obviously today it is not a matter of indifference to a state whether friendly or antagonistic leaders are in power in neighboring states or whether their policies of hostility and aggression are capable of implementation. Furthermore, the technical difficulties of disposing of unfriendly leaders are if anything less difficult today than in the past. Yet through the civilizing influence of present-day practical morality these acts have become ethically reprehensible and normally impossible of execution. Or take the present attitude toward larger political groups. Clemenceau described the nature of the German problem for France and Europe when he declared that there were 20,000,000 Germans too many. The expedient way of dealing with this problem would be the decisive method by which the Romans solved the Carthaginian problem once and for all. Yet there are moral restraints involving the prohibition of mass killings in peacetime that for all practical purposes have ruled this out as a serious possibility, even though Sir Winston Churchill's memoirs tell of Molotov's precautions in wartime conferences in concealing a revolver under his pillow. The fundamental difference between two conceptions of international politics, one operating within moral restraints and the other outside this moral universe is graphically illustrated by the exchange between Stalin and Churchill at the Teheran Conference. Churchill reports a conversation with Stalin regarding the treatment to be inflicted upon the Germans following World War II:

> The German General Staff, he said, must be liquidated. The whole force of Hitler's mighty armies depended upon about fifty thousand officers and technicians. If these were rounded up and shot at the end of the war, German military strength would be extirpated. On this I thought it right to say: "The British Parliament and public will never tolerate mass executions. Even if in war passion they allowed them to begin, they would turn

violently against those responsible after the first butchery had taken place. The Soviets must be under no delusion on this point."

Stalin however, perhaps only in mischief, pursued the subject. "Fifty Thousand," he said, "must be shot." I was deeply angered. "I would rather," I said, "be taken out into the garden here and now and be shot myself than sully my own and my country's honour by such infamy."

There have also been a whole procession of attempts to impose moral restraints on the conduct of war especially with respect to the protection of human life. Following the Thirty Years' War, the conception flowered that war was not a contest between whole populations. Distinctions between combatants and noncombatants grew up and the aim of protection of civilians in combat was sought. Between 1581 and 1864, 291 international agreements were concluded for the protection of the wounded and the sick. The lives and well-being of prisoners of war were safeguarded and conventions were concluded for the humanizing of the conduct of war, e.g., the Hague Declaration of 1899 prohibiting the use of dumdum bullets. More recently the emphasis has shifted from rules for the conduct of war to the outright moral condemnation of conflict. All this must be seen less as the product of expediency and more as the outgrowth of moral convictions. It is worthy of mention that one of the principal students of power in international politics has devoted a major part of his writings to an analysis of the moral restraints on power.¶ Finally, it is redundant to say that the American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr has influenced thinking on international morality. George F. Kennan has called him "the father of all of us" writing on international politics. Niebuhr is persuaded that men and states cannot follow their interest without claiming to do so in obedience to some general scheme of values. Two very grave moral and practical questions have continued to trouble him and have led him to make a series of distinctions

regarding the national interest. First, he has asked whether a consistent emphasis upon the national interest is not as self-defeating in national, as it is in individual, life. Or put in other terms, does not a nation concerned too much with its own interests define those interests so narrowly and so immediately (as for instance in terms of military security) that the interests and securities, which depend upon common devotion to principles of justice and upon established mutualities in a community of nations, are sacrificed? Secondly, nations which insist on the one hand that they cannot act beyond their interest claim, as soon as they act, that they have acted not out of self-interest but in obedience to higher objectives like "civilization" or "justice." Applied to the conduct of contemporary American foreign relations, we claim more for the benevolence of our policies than they deserve and arouse the resentment of peoples already inclined to envy our power and wealth. Thus national interest is imperilled at one time by the hazard of moral cynicism and at another time by moral pretension and hypocrisy. In his earlier writings on the subject Niebuhr has dealt with the first of these questions and more recently with the second. In the evolution of his thinking, moreover, he has come to view them as parts of a single problem. The problem involves our continued ambivalence toward the moral issue, claiming at one moment that nations have no obligations beyond their interests and at the next moment that they are engaged in a high moral crusade without regard for interests.

Moral cynicism arises from the identification of the brutal facts with the normative aspects of international politics. Interest which is the lowest common denominator of political behavior is made the highest practical standard. It is, of course, obvious that the ultimate norms of religion are almost never the effective ethical standards of politics, which is generally marked by some form of coercion, force, or resistance.

Pacifists and perfectionists who undertake to translate the law of love of the Kingdom of God directly into the language of politics provide at best a protest and at worst a wholly unrealistic and harmful alternative to a more cynical approach. They try to make a success story out of the story of the Cross. There is one form of pacifism, pragmatic in character, which accepts the world as it is with interest set against interest and seeks through political imagination and intelligence to adjust, harmonize and mitigate the conflict on the assumption that overt violence is a great social evil. For the most part, however, the purest standards of love and generosity are not directly relevant to the life of nations. But neither are they wholly irrelevant as final norms, for while love is impossible in that it is never fully realizable in history, it never loses its significance as an ultimate moral norm. It inspires and makes possible ethical conduct at a more proximate level and provides a standard against which social ethics may be evaluated and judged.

If the standard of love is to be made useful and relevant, however, it must be translated into relative and proximate terms more appropriate to the realities of politics. Justice for Niebuhr satisfies this demand as the most significant approximation of the ideal of love in politics. But justice involving the compromise of love with the darker elements of politics is also its contradiction. It should be explained that Niebuhr in his analysis of the international scene proceeds simultaneously at two levels. He constructs a rational theory of the behavior of states based on the primacy of their interests, and here he travels the same road as other contemporary realists. "Beyond national interest," however, he is concerned to establish a normative theory in order to avert what he has called the abyss of moral cynicism inherent in a merely rational theory. If I understand him he believes that this normative

approach is applicable in the more integrated communities of western civilization but less relevant for the nascent world society. In his most recent writings, he has addressed himself to the problem of prestige which along with a nation's capacity for force he considers essential ingredients of national power and influence.

To mention one difference among the four theorists, Niebuhr along with Morgenthau has been most consistent in stressing the peculiarities and uniqueness of collective morality. He notes the ferocity and intensity of the struggle among groups, when compared to the rivalry of individuals, stemming from the tendency of collectivities like the nation to express both the virtue and selfishness of their members. One consequence of modern mass society had been to thwart the attainment of personal security and the satisfaction of basic human aspirations, especially for particular groups. Frustrated individuals strive to fulfill themselves vicariously by projecting their ego to the level of the national ego. In mass society, collective attainments offer possibilities of self-aggrandizement which individual pretensions no longer serve. At the same time, appeals are made to the loyalty, self-sacrifice and devotion of individuals in the group. In this way, social unity is built on the virtuous as well as the selfish side of man's nature; the twin elements of collective strength become self-sacrificial loyalty and frustrated aggressions. From this it follows that politics is the more contentious and ruthless because of the unselfish loyalty of the members of groups, which become laws unto themselves unrestrained by their obedient and worshipful members. Group pride is in fact the corruption of individual loyalty and group consciousness; contempt for another group is the pathetic form which respect for our own frequently takes. The tender emotions which bind the family together sometimes are expressed in indifference for the

welfare of other families. In international society a nation made up of men of the greatest religious goodwill would be less than loving toward other nations for its virtue would be channeled into loyalty to itself thus increasing that nation's selfishness. The consequence for Niebuhr's political theory is his conclusion that "society...merely cumulates the egoism of individuals and transmutes their individual altruism into collective egoism so that the egoism of the group has a double force. For this reason no group acts from purely unselfish or even mutual intent and politics is therefore bound to be a contest of power."

2. The Fourfold Limitation of International Morality

The insights and the wisdom of the four observers stand out most clearly against the background of four persistent problems or limitations lying at the roots of most of our modern confusion and uncertainty regarding principle and necessity. Moreover, the difficulties of some of their views may be seen most clearly in this way. The first problem or limitation results from the tendency of states to see their national purposes as universal principles and ends. The second limitation stems from the effect of this spirit of national self-righteousness upon international tensions and conflicts. The third limitation arises from the nature of collective morality and its apparent differences with individual morality. The fourth limitation derives from the fact there are few if any absolutes in international politics.

To take the first limitation then the fundamental source and cause of what has been called nationalistic universalism rests in a profound human dilemma. We are never as moral as we claim to be. This is true of the parent who disciplines the child "for its own good" no less than of the powerful nation who works its will on less powerful states. Even when justice is the goal of a loving father it invariably becomes mixed with coercion, caprice and injustice. The

Athenian envoys to Melos who were perhaps more transparently honest than some of their latter-day successors said of a powerful rival: "of all the men we know they are most conspicuous in considering what is agreeable honourable and what is expedient just." Centuries later the historian Dicey found that in Western society: "Men come easily to believe that arrangements agreeable to themselves are beneficial to others." Nations with few exceptions have seen their cause and supremacy as equivalent to universal justice. Lord Wolseley maintained: "I have but one great object in this world, and that is to maintain the greatness of the Empire. But apart from my John Bull sentiment upon the point, I firmly believe that in doing so I work in the cause of Christianity, of peace, of civilization, and the happiness of the human race generally." Or in 1935 in an early phase of his writings, Prof. Arnold J. Toynbee discovered that the security of the British Empire "was also the supreme interest of the whole world."

Nor is American history lacking in comparable examples. It provides the story of President McKinley who spent the night in prayer for divine guidance before deciding as one might have expected to annex the Philippines. Or President Wilson who following the bombardment of Vera Cruz in 1914 assured the world that "the United States had gone to Mexico to serve mankind" and who shortly before our entry into World War I identified American principles and American policies as "the principles of mankind...(which) must prevail." We are reminded of de Tocqueville's words: "If I say to an American that the country he lives in is a fine one, aye, he replies and there is not its equal in the world. If I applaud the freedom its inhabitants enjoy he answers 'freedom is a fine thing but few nations are worthy of it.' If I remark on the purity of morals that distinguishes the United States he declares 'I can imagine that a stranger who

has witnessed the corruption which prevails in other nations would be astonished at the difference.' At length I leave him to a contemplation of himself but he returns to the charge and does not desist until he has got me to repeat all I have been saying. It is impossible to conceive a more troublesome and garrulous patriotism."

It should of course be obvious that every nation has its own form of spiritual pride, its own peculiar version. Our version is compounded I would suppose of several factors. The first derives from the role of the immigrant who had turned his back on the vices of Europe and was making a new beginning. Having shaken the dust of the old world from his feet, he was anxious to prove that none of its ancient failings were his failings. Their purposes often sullied by the ambiguities and compromises bound up with national existence in the cockpit of Europe were not his purposes. And strikingly enough his affirmations of moral purity - or more specifically those by which national leaders appealed to his virtue - seemed to be confirmed by early American social history. In the first phases of this history the frontier saved us from the acrimony of class struggle and later our superior technology gave new outlets to the ambitious and adventurous. Beyond this we were freed from international responsibility by the fortuitous coincidence of our geographic isolation and a European equilibrium of power which British policy and naval power was dedicated to preserve. In such a world, it was natural to assume that domestic policies were more important than foreign policy and that the alliances so prevalent on the European scene were an expensive and pernicious nuisance. These objective conditions have passed but the psychology they inspired lingers on, for instance, in the sweeping and indignant denunciations of the exercise of power by European states followed abruptly by our own decision to use force unilaterally if necessary in the Middle East.

A second factor shaping the American outlook results from the fact that our prevailing philosophy of international relations has been a curious blending of legalism and rationalism. Law and reason are of course indispensable ingredients of an orderly life. They are precious fruits of the flowering of a free community and the good life. And ultimately peace becomes inevitable only when law and order prevail. However the tragedy of much of our thinking has been to assume this ultimate end was either realized or shortly realizable and to tailor our words and sometimes our deeds to fit this mistaken assumption. American lawyers whose influence on our foreign relations has been immense have confused the realities of municipal law with the hopes of international law. They have imposed on the international system burdens it could not bear. If the problem was war, it must be outlawed (the Kellogg-Briand Pact). If the peril was aggression a legal formula proscribing and defining it was the goal - even though a few months ago a United Nations Commission gave up this task in despair. If states trembled in a state of insecurity, reassure them with security pacts heaped one upon the other! If a state threatened the peace, pass a resolution! All these acts so frequently a positive force in organized and integrated communities, have on balance weakened the feeble system of international order, for pacts, declarations and formulas at odds with the realities of international life tempt the lawless to reckless adventures and the law-abiding to a whole chain of emotional responses beginning with self-righteousness and indignation, shading off into disillusionment and finally into despair.

If we have suffered from legalism, the price of liberal rationalism has been still greater. It has been said of the League of Nations and the United Nations that they represent an attempt to apply the principles of

John Locke's liberalism to the machinery of international order. They carry into world affairs the outlook of a liberal democratic society. One rather acute critic has noted in some rational spokesmen the tendency to believe that there existed a card index of situations or events to be consulted for the appropriate and prescribed action whenever the event or situation turns up. There is a temptation to value standardized procedures more than prudence, the perfection of machinery more than political wisdom. Four decades of experience in transplanting liberal rationalism to the world scene have taught that this approach which logically is unexceptional can be full of unforeseen difficulties. This is not the place to discuss these problems except to suggest that where prestige of states is involved rational discussion need not necessarily be served by open forums. Mr. Lester Pearson has written of the problems of diplomacy in a "goldfish bowl." Moreover, responsible international conduct is not the necessary result of gathering together representatives of up to eighty states differing widely in size, in power, and in political, economic and cultural developments. States not affected by events and not required to sacrifice vital interests can more easily strike poses than those whose security is in jeopardy. Nations with limited interests in a question may band together to outvote states whose survival may be at stake. It would be helpful to know how often uninstructed delegates on matters of no concern to their government throw their votes capriciously to the support of a resolution for which they would be unwilling to accept direct national responsibility. It would be useful to discover how often states turn to the United Nations when they are unwilling or unable to evolve a viable foreign policy of their own.

To ask such questions is not to detract from the vital and constructive role of the United Nations. However if this new international

institution is to survive and grow, its members must face the hard facts concerning it. It provides a set of methods and procedures and embodies certain fundamental aims and goals. It can contribute only what its members bring to its affairs in the form of policies, resources and loyalties. It will not in the foreseeable future be a substitute for foreign policy and we should remind ourselves continually of this when we are tempted to drop the hard issues and unsolved problems in its lap. One observer has argued: "When the government of the United States is asked, What is your policy for the Middle East? and it replies We shall act through the United Nations, it has only replied to the procedural question and still owes an answer to the all-important question, What is your United States policy for the Middle East?" A former Secretary of State in a recent statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee declared: "It will not do to say that the United Nations will determine policy, make decisions, and enforce them. The United Nations is not a supranational entity with a mind, a will and power. It is a forum, and no more than the nations which meet there. Nothing more comes out of it than is put into it.

"If a great nation, like the United States, looks to the United Nations to form American policy, instead of fighting in the United Nations for what the American Government believes should be done, then we have committed an unprecedented abdication of responsibility and power. We deserve what we get. If we believe we have exhausted our responsibilities when we join in the United Nations to pass resolutions which are defied, and which we have no intention of backing up, we have engaged in a most dangerous form of self-deception."

The second limitation on morality arises from the dread conflict that rages today between giant organized systems of self-righteousness. The

most profound and far-reaching change in the last half-century is not the technological revolution or even the revolt of three-quarters of the world's people against so-called colonial domination. Rather it has been the fragmentation of a formerly cohesive international society into morally self-sufficient national communities. This change has brought civilization to the threshold of a twilight era in international morality. It has prompted Dean Roscoe Pound to say: "It might be maintained plausibly that a moral order among states was nearer attainment in the middle of the eighteenth century than it is today." In the seventeenth and eighteenth century and to a lessening degree up to the First World War international morality addressed itself to a body of aristocratic sovereigns who spoke the same language, shared common cultural values, were bound by family ties, and, in a word, were members of the same club. Their goals were simple and limited. They might seek a piece of territory, a bit of glory or greater power and prestige. But the whole world was not their oyster and they accepted the fact that they were partners in an international order that "gentlemen" were pledged to preserve.

This aristocratic fraternity of leaders who preferred speaking with one another rather than with their own peoples has passed and in its place is a leadership responsible to the popular will. In consequence we witness the kaleidoscopic spectacle of a rapid and continuous turnover of diplomatists who must deal with one another. The popular selection of officials with all its potentialities for good has shattered the community of interests and the imponderable ties of loyalty and affection on which a crude but unmistakable personal international morality had been based virtually from the seventeenth century until the eve of World War I. In this era the morality of individual leaders was identical with the morality of States. Lest we too hastily dismiss the benefits

that flowed from these ties we need only reflect that Anglo-American unity was more recently served by the comradeship of a Churchill and an Eisenhower and that the former's dream enunciated as early as his Fulton Speech in 1947 was perceived and carried forward by the President in the Meeting at the Summit at Geneva. Nor can we discount the bonds that unite our present leader with certain prominent Russian military and political leaders. It is also worth noting that the crumbling Anglo-American alliance was strengthened when the President's wartime colleague became Prime Minister Macmillan. These examples are the exceptions that prove the rule. Contrast this with the task of Ambassador Lodge working in the United Nations without benefit of long contact and friendly relations with some of our Latin American and European allies. Or note the effects of the mass exodus from Washington following 1952 of some of our most experienced diplomatists, e.g., that remarkable group surrounding George F. Kennan and Paul Nitze in the Policy Planning Staff. Furthermore, you may recall that in the eighteen months from July 1945 to 1947, the U.S. had three secretaries of state and of all policy-making officials of the State Department, i.e., under and assistant secretaries of state, in office as of October 1945, none was still in office two years later. One need not despair of democracy to confess that this phenomenon of the rapid fluctuation of personnel with its consequences both for continuity of policy and community of interests with the leaders of other nations whose membership is similarly in flux presents us with a major problem. Observing this trend, Hans J. Morgenthau writes: "Ethical rules have their seat in the consciences of individual men. Government by clearly identifiable men who can be held personally accountable for their acts is therefore the precondition for the existence of an effective system of international ethics."

This factor of a passing international corps of leaders is but a symptom of an infinitely more profound transformation of international society. The fabric of moral consensus which existed among approximately equal political entities has been rent by the rise of separate and self-contained moral systems which today take the form of national political religions. These changes have weakened to the point of ineffectiveness supranational moral rules of conduct and have endowed particular national ethical systems with universal validity. What is at stake today in the world conflict is a system of beliefs and ethical convictions. Gone is the era of the eighteenth century described by Gibbon in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire in which wars were "temperate and undecisive contests" which "cannot essentially injure our general state of happiness, the system of arts, and laws, and manners."

Righteousness plainly has a place in an assessment of the behavior of states. Yet the patterns of history are more complex than this. For example, we are often told that Germany has invaded France four times within a century and a quarter. Who among us remembers that on the first occasion it was England and Russia which finally induced the German powers to join them in rolling back the tide of Napoleonic empire? Who recalls that on a second occasion France made clear that if it won the War of 1870, it had in mind in Belgium, Luxembourg, and elsewhere a more scandalous aggrandizement than Bismarck ever dreamed of? Who is aware that the crime of Alsace-Lorraine begins not in 1871 but with the aggressions of Louis XIV? Multiply these instances a hundredfold and the whole tragically complex pattern of history unfolds and calls for understanding of a kind that is blurred rather than clarified by national self-righteousness which destroys the international order and the prospects for an accommodation of interests on the basis of mutual respect and trust.

The third limitation has its origin in collective as distinct from individual morality, an issue on which the four writers place different degrees of emphasis. This is the other side of the coin from the self-righteousness about which I have been speaking. Religious ethics calls self-interest into question. Man must lose himself in order to find himself. As soon as we move to the level of organized communities, the problem of legitimate self-interest arises for political ethics takes self-interest for granted. A political leader cannot ask his people to sacrifice themselves. His first duty is to preserve the Constitution and he owes allegiance to the safety and well-being of the nation and of its generations yet unborn. Short of treason he cannot bargain away what he holds in trust. Moreover in another respect any equating of morality in individual relations with international morality is bound to be misleading. One of our great American Presidents who can hardly be dismissed for lack of moral fervor was Woodrow Wilson. In a lecture at Princeton he declared: "Morality is a great deal bigger than law. The individual morality is the sense of right or wrong of one man. The social morality must strike an average. This is where reformers make their tragic mistake. There can be no compromise in individual morality but there has to be a compromise, an average, in social morality. There is indeed an element of morality in the very fact of compromise in social undertakings." In this same vein we recall the words of Cavour: "If we had done for ourselves what we did for the state, what scoundrels we would have been."

Reinhold Niebuhr has distinguished between moral man and immoral society and while he has subsequently modified the sharp lines of his dichotomy, he would hold, I believe, to the "hidden truth" which this distinction lays bare. Accordingly, those virtues of gentleness, magnanimity, love and trust which enrich the dimensions of our family life at its best and are possible in the more intimate

communities in which we move and have our being, must be viewed with circumspection, reserve and uncertainty on the world stage where states through power and force press their claims and counterclaims. We may as moral beings deplore and renounce the evil portents of a massive armaments program but who among us, if responsible for the nation's security, would have persisted in meeting Soviet power through compassion and the repudiation of force? Or who confronted by the threat to Western civilization of the Nazi juggernaut would have turned aside an alliance with the equally oppressive Russian communist regime? Burckhardt observed that "for every truth there is a balancing truth." Assertions such as those by Herbert Butterfield that the only morality is individual morality have to be seen in the light of the differences between the individual and the collectivity and the imperatives to which each must respond.

A fourth limitation derives from the proposition that there are few if any absolutes in international politics. Lord Acton warned that "an absolute principle is as absurd as absolute power." In foreign relations particularly, every attempt to conceive political ethics in absolute terms has floundered on the shoals of circumstance. This is because broad moral principles seldom if ever can be said to furnish a direct, precise and unambiguous guide to action. For example, the noble injunction "Thou Shalt Not Kill" has only a peripheral relevance when nations are suddenly plunged into total war. Moreover, less ultimate moral and political principles such as a belief in the common interests of, say, all the workers of Europe or of the world scarcely deters British and German laborers from going to war against one another when their nations see their interests in conflict.

There is another absolute principle with which Americans in particular are familiar. In the aftermath of World War I, we blithely assumed that the creation of democratic regimes everywhere would remove the threat of conflict. This tempting illusion has since come home to haunt us. On one hand it was illusory to believe we could play any more than a marginal role in shaping the evolution of other political systems beyond the jurisdiction of this nation. Not only is our power limited but,more fundamental, political institutions are matters of organic growth. The ways in which people move toward more enlightened government constitute the profoundest processes of national life. Nor are we persuaded that we have penetrated the veil concealing the mystery of the absolutely best state for all peoples. The words of de Tocqueville written in 1831 about the United States have deeper meaning for us today: "The more I see of this country the more I admit myself penetrated with this truth: that there is nothing absolute in the theoretical value of political institutions, and that their efficiency depends almost always on the original circumstances and the social conditions of people to whom they are applied." In any event the record is unmistakable that the trappings of democracy can be used for purposes as cruel and bellicose as those of autocratic regimes. One need only mention in passing the rise of totalitarian democracies; the ability of tyrants, for example in the Middle East, to manipulate democratic machinery and symbols to their own selfish ends; the pattern of ideological conquest evolved during the libertarian French Revolution and the annexationist dreams of the German liberals of 1848.

3. Necessity and the New Balance of Power

Historians looking back on the events of international politics following World War II will doubtless stress the massive concentration of influence and authority in two world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The

novelty of this configuration may be seen by contrast with the seventeenth, eighteenth or nineteenth centuries when numerous states of more or less equal power crowded the European landscape. The power of the Soviet Union so greatly overshadowed that of any other European country that the whole of Western Europe buttressed by the United States was compelled to organize its military and economic resources to preserve the balance of power. In the same way, American power inspired an editorialist of The Economist (London) to say: "In any comparison of the potential resources of the Great Powers the United States, even before Hitler's war, far outstripped every other nation in the world in material strength, in scale of industrialization, in weight of resources, in standards of living, by every index of output and consumption. And the war, which all but doubled the American national income while it either ruined or severely weakened every other Great Power, has enormously increased the scale upon which the United States now towers above its fellows."

This condition of two immensely powerful states each with the capacity to fatefully damage if not destroy the other and each commanding the homage and obedient cooperation of friendly if not client states has obtained for the better part of the past decade. The objective basis on which the Soviet Union and the United States have founded their relationships has been what Winston Churchill described as a "balance of terror," not the mutual confidence and trust of moral consensus. Necessity and their respective power has induced the super-powers to follow policies of limitation and restraint as in Korea, Berlin and Eastern Europe even though the elements that constitute the equilibrium of forces between them have continually shifted with advances in military technology. Bipolarity and the nature of Russian and American objectives have made possible a decade of uneasy peace not because of morality but due to common sense. Harold Nicolson has observed: "Diplomacy is not a system of moral philosophy; it is,

as Sir Ernest Satow defined it, 'the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent States.' The worst kind of diplomatists are missionaries, fanatics and lawyers; the best kind are the reasonable and humane sceptics." Soviet diplomats plainly have not been noted for their tact but the best among them have shown a scepticism and common sense, a preference for policies of advance and retreat and have earned thereby such grudging respect of western statesmen as may be illustrated in the statement of the present British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Captain Peter Thorneycroft: "The Russians are nothing if not realists." Nonetheless, until recently these restraints have resided in the political judgment of the leaders of two mighty states who are endlessly tempted to assume they possess greater power and virtue than the rest of the world.

The new balance of power has altered the relationship between necessity and foreign policy and introduced novel limits and restraints on the actions of the two giants. The more than twenty nations who have emerged since the war and their friends in the Middle East, Africa and Asia constitute a major force in world politics. Their ultimate power may be exaggerated by their strategic role in the United Nations where they hold the balance of power but their importance seems destined to increase in the future. Both Moscow and Washington have shown a consistent unwillingness to act without counting the consequences among the so-called underdeveloped countries. Beyond this the bipolar world has shown signs of crumbling on the edges of Soviet and American power and authority. Europe's crisis in October of 1956 had its roots in a recovery of national identity on that continent. For nearly a decade the postwar "Grand Alliance" between Europe and America was founded on mutual or identical interests. Both Europe's recovery

and its security were guaranteed by American power for its recovery was an outgrowth of the Marshall Plan and its security rested ultimately with our atomic monopoly. In this context it mattered little that certain concrete European interests in Asia and the Near East were sometimes at odds with American interests. Economic, political and military necessity dictated that Europe stand with the United States or invite catastrophe and possibly national suicide. Ironically the success of European recovery followed by the withdrawal of Marshall aid undermined the first pillar of this concert of power. The Russian explosion of an atomic bomb shattered the other pillar. At this point Europe far from being reassured by our stockpile of bombs, trembled in fear at the thought of being pulverized by one side or the other and nations like France and Britain whose postwar policies had often been subordinated to American programs stirred, questioned their policies and reasserted their sovereign rights on such matters as the fulfillment of rearmament pledges (the British White Paper is merely the logical culmination of these tendencies accelerated, perhaps, by diplomatic ineptitudes on both sides). Chancellor Adenauer called for a United Europe capable of standing upon its own feet in a world threatening to pass it by and a speaker of the BBC Third Programme predicted: "It is no longer so foolish to think of Western Europe as a potential Third Force."

Simultaneously the eruption within the Soviet Empire made it clear that unity of purpose in the East would no longer be taken for granted even under the shadow of the Red Army. On November 3, 1956, The Economist (London) commented: "By swift changes, the consequences of which are still incalculable, the peoples of Eastern Europe have ceased to be mere pawns on the political chessboard." Poland revolted for "Bread and Freedom," gained a new leader who symbolically enough had once been imprisoned for his "nationalist" tendencies, dismissed the

Russian General Rokossovsky as Minister of Defense and installed a national Communist regime. Nationalist sentiment again fanned the flames of revolt in Hungary but Hungarians were unwilling or unable to accept a Titoist solution. The historic consequences of these changes and their relationship to a more general upheaval are beyond prediction but their effect on the beginnings of a breakup of the two-power world seem plainly beyond dispute.

More difficult by far is the question of the effect of these changes on international morality. At the risk of oversimplification I would suggest that the consequences are bound to be ambiguous. One effect of a multipower world will doubtless be to set restraints on conduct. The curious paradox of the present-day international realm is that great nations have never had more power, yet they have never had more trouble with the small nations they have the power to crush, and the voices of students and peasants in Poland and Hungary and rising national groups in Africa, Asia and the Middle East are commanding more and more widespread attention. It is written within mankind that injustice threatens whenever great weakness is confronted by unlimited power. Perhaps this is why victorious nations so often wreak vengeance on conquered foes. This tendency has been allayed by the rise of competing centers of power and out of the claims and counterclaims of a number of countries for influence and respect a rough and approximate justice may result. In the same way the ability of the smaller powers ultimately to use nuclear force theoretically might exert the same decisive effect on all use of force that now prevails in Soviet and American calculations vis-à-vis one another. Necessity might compel them to turn to the peaceful pursuit of their goals.

However there is also something terrifying about the specter of twenty or more states brandishing absolute weapons. For example, possession of these

lethal weapons by Egypt might have deterred the Franco-British-Israeli intervention but one or the other side might also have been tempted to use them with a tragically fatal and chain reaction effect. With the multiplication of the producers, the prospect of their use through an accident or in frenzy increases perhaps in geometric proportion. Moreover, there are risks as well as opportunities in the sudden catapulting of new and inexperienced nations to positions of unaccustomed prominence and world leadership. They will not always be right. Almost without exception they lack apprenticeship in the subtleties and uncertainties of world affairs. Their will as expressed in the liberum veto of the holder of the balance of power in the United Nations is not necessarily the embodiment of wisdom and virtue. In recent months the trend has become more pronounced to equate the positive law of the United Nations with moral law. In view of the structure of this body and its original purposes this solution of the moral dilemma in foreign policy raises as many questions as it answers. Especially in the context of American attitudes on foreign policy, the tendency to covet popularity and gratitude, to seek a more intimate relation with other nations than is possible, to be too apologetic toward the underdeveloped countries and to be forever on the defensive with those who hold up our more extravagant professions of principle to our practice, these recent changes in the balance of power and our instinctive responses are as much a cause for sober reflection as for dancing in the streets. It would be a fatal error if beguiled by the new configurations of power, American philosophers and policy-makers should assume that because of our sympathy for the newer states, we had transcended for the first time in American history the inevitable tension between necessity and principle.

A leading American has written that one of the unchallenged principles in American foreign policy is our traditional opposition to colonialism. "When the State Department follows policies which oppose colonialism the American people applaud. When it abandons this traditional approach...our people are confused and frustrated." Other liberal Americans feel the United States should do what it can to dissolve colonial ties that have outlived their usefulness, but avoid all sweeping generalizations that lead to a rigid anti-colonialism. The dogmas of crusading colonialism or anti-colonialism will not waft the problems away. In any case it is probably poor history to suggest there is one American tradition for the defense of liberty and freedom in the world. In 1792, the War of the First Coalition had united Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain and the United Netherlands against revolutionary France with whom the United States was allied. Those who spoke for coming to the aid of France argued that "the cause of France is the cause of liberty; and that we are bound to assist the nation on the score of their being engaged in the defense of that cause." Washington and Hamilton resisted this trend, the former in the Proclamation of Neutrality of 1792 and the latter in the Pacificus articles. Hamilton counseled: "The obligation to assist the cause of liberty must be deduced from the merits of that cause and from the interest we have in its support." There are dilemmas involved in our support of liberty or self-determination around the world - as Wilson learned - and in the colonial problem. Instead of alternately defending and attacking Wilson, we might rather inquire whether his tragic experience has any lesson for us. In the recent Middle Eastern crisis, a pro-American British journal noticed: "The American desire to keep the good will of the Arab states is good sense...but it will defeat itself in the end if, in pursuing it, the Americans think in anti-colonial conventions which are current...In that way

they will merely seek to please everybody, committing their strength to the support of local weak men, and overlooking that the conflicts which trouble the region, being real conflicts, require solutions of substance which are bound to give offense to some."

4. Notes on a Theory of International Morality

Whatever the limits of moral principles, there is need for the type of normative theories discussed at the outset of this paper. The late Charles A. Beard in considering the role of moral principle suggested that:

> "the mandate of moral obligation appears to be operative in three spheres which, on occasion, seem to overlap: 1) the nation itself, as something of an independent entity; 2) the nation in respect of other single nations and certain limited groups of nations; and 3) the nations as one unit in a larger whole made up of many diverse units forming what is commonly called the community of nations."

It may be useful taking this as our clue to consider three possible layers or dimensions of international morality. Scholars relating these three levels of morality might uncover new insights on the relationship of principle and necessity. A concluding note on one possible theoretical framework for approaching these tantalizing and awesome problems may be in order.

The core of this conception rests in the moral content of the national interest. Whereas it is obvious that the first duty of a nation's foreign policy must be to safeguard its territorial integrity and the interests of present and future generations, it should also be clear that the moral values of any society are protected and defended in this way. The nation-state is both the problem child of international relations and the highest effective expression of a genuine moral consensus in large communities. More progress has been made in creating

freedom and order and opportunities for the individual, say, within the United States, than in any foreseeable international community. Moreover, nations can in practice usually give moral content however modest to their national self-interest while the international interest is more vague and ill-defined.

The moral dignity of the national interest finds expression in various spheres. The interests of a nation's people in its basic values and common welfare transcending sub-national loyalties are an antidote to crass materialism. The mere existence of a citizenry that takes its history and tradition seriously assures that a nation's reputation shall not perish nor its will to stay alive be destroyed. The sense of membership and of partnership in a common enterprise with ancestors who have gone before and heirs who are to follow gives moral stamina and political vitality to a society. Moreover, national attachments are the one sure and sound basis for transcending partisan political loyalties. In a period of crisis in British politics, Winston Churchill counseled his fellow Conservatives: "We are Party men but we shall be all the stronger if in every action we show ourselves capable, even in this period of stress and provocation, of maintaining the division - where there is division - between national and party interests."

In general a more tolerable relationship is achieved between nations who speak in their national interest than those who claim to speak for the whole world. Hence states while asserting the moral integrity of their interests ought never to see them too exclusively as ends in themselves. World patterns are too complex and variegated to reserve all virtue to a single state or course of action. The periods of greatest decline in international morality have come when national purposes have been presented as pure and unsullied goals for acceptance or rejection by the rest of the world. There is an important area in

foreign policy where national interests must be asserted confidently and with pride and courage. Indeed Americans sometimes run the risk, having proclaimed our virtue and indulged in all manner of pretentious talk, of alternately feeling shame over the fact that we are a great power with a noble tradition and shrinking when not everyone loves us. But our actions will be more honored and esteemed if we are somewhat more humble about equating them with final and absolute virtue. They can be justified as necessary and proper steps without casting them in the form of crusades and filling the air with the most extravagant claims.

A second dimension of this conception of the norms and principles of international politics is the opposite side of the shield from the national interest.

The one thing which saves the idea of the national interest from itself is its essential reciprocity. To the extent that nations are in earnest not alone about their own self-interests but in their recognition of the application of similar criteria by others, the national interest as a guide escapes any temptation to conceal real designs for world aggrandizement. The English political philosopher Edmund Burke declared: "Nothing is so fatal to a nation as an extreme of self-partiality, and the total want of consideration of what others will naturally hope or fear." After a nation has determined its own objective interests in terms of its national security, it has an obligation to draw back as it were and appraise coolly and realistically the interests of its neighbors. In this way alone can nations decide if their interests are compatible or can be adjusted. There is no other basis for true coexistence. It is as tempting as it is hazardous to treat other peoples as pawns in the struggle to preserve one's own national interest. There is a tendency to treat other nations as means instead of

as ends embodied in their own national purposes. Yet in relations particularly with those societies in Asia and Africa which have most frequently been treated as instruments to be used and exploited by others, their claims upon international society to accord them means of national recognition and personal self-respect make such a tendency well-nigh fatal. It is essential that every nation pursue wisely its own best interests but the pathway for each nation must not be strewn with the remnants of the interests of others that were forgotten in its headlong drive to attain national security. Among nations with decent intentions there must be a reciprocal process of recognizing each other's vital interests and avoiding collisions and conflicts in so far as it is possible through the compromise of divergent interests. Interests we know are capable of being compromised; principles can never be made the object of bargains. Yet if nations are to survive somehow they must find ways of compromising their differences while at the same time they succeed in protecting and safeguarding their interests. For as it is the essence of politics that individuals possess the capacity to compromise their differences, the art of diplomacy merely raises this process to the level of nations and founds it upon a structure of multiple national interests. The unequivocal lesson of history is that conflicts which seem at the time to present to the parties a clear case of right and wrong, almost without exception have appeared to future historians, less blinded by passion and loyalty, as something infinitely more tragic than good men fighting bad ones. The real pattern of conflict and war is one of minor differences hardening into intractable political divisions, of men faced by terrible dilemmas and of nations eventually driven by the inner dialectic of events to wars which no one desired. The difference between a struggle between good and evil and actual struggles in world politics in which every party in some way is at fault but is unable to

disengage itself from the tragic predicament of fearing others but never comprehending their counter-fears is the difference between the substance of "heroic" and "revisionist" or scientific history. In this predicament, each party has a sense of its own insecurity but never imagines that its own righteous efforts could have anything to do with the insecurity of others. After each military conflict, the minds of the early or "heroic" historians are locked in the combat expounding their own nation's cause. Their judgments are generally the kind that stem from self-righteousness. Subsequently, it remains for "revisionist" historians to re-write the narrative in terms of the mutual fear of each side for the power of the other. In their histories of conflict the revisionist schools have frequently proved we have muddied the waters and darkened our minds about the true nature of a struggle when it has been interpreted in terms of certain accidental characteristics. In the present crisis between East and West, for example, historians may show that the ideological aspect of the struggle was accidental in comparison to the more profound and underlying political struggle. In this tragic predicament, the one source of relief from the struggle can come from the accommodation of conflicting political interests. The first step in this process is to discover what are the vital interests of the foe. The one escape from this human predicament is the patient quest of mutually compatible national interests if they are found to exist. A firm and steady endeavor to find out what are the interests of the other party to a crisis provides any nation with some basis for predicting its actions and in the same way of anticipating the faithfulness of its allies.

There is a form of political morality which stems from a decent regard for the interests of others. While it is not always the same as the private ethics enjoined by the great religions, it nonetheless is expediency grounded in

morality. In the writings of philosophers from the Greeks to Edmund Burke it is identified as prudence or practical morality and in guidebooks to diplomacy like Richelieu's Political Testament it appears as expediential morality. It has been considered the lubricant by which the smooth workings of international society are made possible and in modern times as the cement without which the sturdiest alliance will crumble. It is too much to expect that nations will show gratitude or lasting affection for one another. Generosity is as likely to produce envy, resentment and contempt as good will for no government based on popular support can afford to acknowledge the full scale of its dependence on others. But there are other personal factors that are not inconsequential. Diplomats, as has been said, are men sent abroad to lie and deceive in the interests of their country. But as Harold Nicolson points out they must also return to negotiate another day. If a diplomat or nation is known to be habitually retrograde in the observance of obligations, it can hardly look forward to long and effective diplomatic commerce with others. Winston Churchill measured this dimension of international morality in these words:

> "There is, however, one helpful guide, namely for a nation to keep its word and to act in accordance with its treaty obligations to allies. This guide is called honour. It is baffling to reflect that what men call honour does not correspond always to Christian ethics...An exaggerated code of honour leading to the performance of utterly vain and unreasonable deeds should not be defended, however fine it might look."

A final or third layer of international morality comprises general principles like opposition to tyranny, or community, or values embodied in the United Nations Charter. Men seem obstinately to reject the view that state behavior at some point is not a fit subject for moral judgment. One sign that principle is accepted as relevant is the apparent compulsion of political actors to justify their needs in moral terms. Hypocrisy is the tribute vice pays to virtue. Beyond this there is a striking dialectical movement of expediency and

morality which has its impact on international politics. Moves in practical politics must be articulated in such a way as to pay tribute to moral principles. However limited and particular, acts of political expedience must seem to carry forward aims of justice and the common good. Thus political morality in these modest terms, forces the statesman who would justify expediency with ethics to choose his measures so that on some points at least the practical and moral march hand and hand. "It is political wisdom to act successfully in accord with the interests of state. It is political and moral wisdom to choose the most moral of several alternatives through which both expedience and ethics may be served." The margin which separates cynicism from this form of wisdom is frequently narrow indeed but by it the statesman is saved from a fatuous "moralism" or the despair of unqualified expediency. It is the essence of moral judgment to transcend the limits of expediency and narrow self-interest in this one sense at least.

Principle in this final sense is an ultimate objective, not an immediate guide to action. It is a lodestone of moral conduct not a mere ideological rationalization by which practical steps are legitimatized. Principles in this sense are concepts held by statesmen whose reach quite self-consciously exceeds their grasp. Whereas their implementation in practice is dependent upon considerations of the national interest, they shine in the firmament of political philosophy as objective standards of political behavior. In any full and complete political system there must be room both for philosophy and action yet there can be no more serious error than to confound these two conditions. The realms of ideals and practice are not the same yet it is equally false to imagine they can never meet. If the vertical dimension be conceived as of the line of ideals, it does intersect at certain points in history the horizontal dimension of political practice. In this respect principle in relation to contingencies and necessity has a role to play.

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Operational Coordination in International Administration

by F. J. Tickner
United Nations Technical Assistance Administration

The present writer is only competent to discuss this subject in terms of the experience of the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration. Since this organisation is typical of the technical assistance agencies, it is convenient to study the problem from the one point of view, but it is important to remember that the Technical Assistance Administration has administrative differences from the other specialised agencies of the United Nations, in that it is part of the Secretariat and, unlike the World Health Organisation, the Food and Agricultural Organisation and so on, it has no Governing Body of its own outside the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council.

The executive departments of the United Nations are not a centrally controlled civil service. Indeed the whole international organisation is a loosely organised association of eighty member countries, each of which has an equal vote in committee deliberation and has the final say in the operations of the United Nations agencies within its own territories. Thus a technical assistance project, which is the unit in the operations of the Technical Assistance Administration, has to conform to a general pattern laid down by all the member countries acting together in the appropriate central body - the Technical Assistance Committee of the Economic and Social Council - and at the same time to conform to the wishes of the individual country, which has brought the project into existence by making the request for technical aid in this particular field. This relationship of sovereign units, operating through an international organisation is different from the relationship of states operating in a federation, or of regional units with powers delegated from a central government, and it determines the pattern of coordination ultimately achieved.

From a very early stage in the United Nations technical assistance operation a central coordinating administrative body, called the Technical Assistance Board,

was set up, consisting of the heads of the agencies engaged in technical assistance work, presided over by an executive chairman. The Board very soon found the need for direct contact with the countries principally concerned and in each of those with a substantial programme of technical aid, it established a Resident Representative, responsible to it and to the Government for the coordination of the work of all the United Nations agencies in the country. The Resident Representative soon became the key factor in the local situation. Several of the Specialised Agencies have regional organisations, with some consequential overlapping with the Resident Representatives, but the principle of the local coordinator, responsible to the central coordinating authority, is now generally accepted.

The Resident Representative is not, as has at times been imagined, a diplomatic personage, since the United Nations has no sovereignty equivalent to that of the government, the classical basis of diplomatic representation. He exercises rather a catalytic influence; he interprets the wishes of the government to the technical assistance organisations and interprets the work of these organisations to the government. The government is under no obligation to accept direction but the operation can only be effective if it conforms broadly to the general policies of the Technical Assistance Board, which in turn are based on the recommendations of the Technical Assistance Committee to the Economic and Social Council.

The Resident Representative is therefore far from being in the position of a regional director in a national organisation. His general approach to his problems is based on a compromise between the general procedures laid down by the Board and a local procedural pattern conforming to the governmental organisation of the country in which he is working. Thus every Resident Representative's attempts at coordination are at the same time similar to, and different from, those of his colleagues. He has to implement, or rather he has to persuade the government to implement, certain defined procedures, such as the preparation of an annual country programme of technical assistance, to observe certain administrative and financial obligations to each

expert and to provide certain supporting services. All of these are defined in directives from the Technical Assistance Board, but their interpretation depends on the local situation. In some countries there is a Ministry of Planning; in others the Ministry of Foreign Affairs accepts responsibility for technical assistance. Many countries have technical assistance coordinating committees, through which the Resident Representative has to work in all major matters.

The Resident Representative's lines of communication with the Technical Assistance Board and the Agencies are thus easily defined; his local system of communications varies from country to country and is influenced by his own personal relations with the officials with whom he works. There can be no common pattern, since no two capital cities of the world are exactly alike. In one country a formal call on the Foreign Minister may be necessary to settle a matter which in another is decided at a lunch engagement with a senior official. One expert's journey into the hills may require major planning; another may be settled by a telephone call.

Coordination within the country is thus a country matter, since the government's wishes have always to be met as far as general directives allow and the Resident Representative's conformity to the general pattern of technical assistance is as close as his powers of persuasion can make it. The government will always interpret its sympathy with the general objectives of the programme in terms of its own administrative procedures, to which the Resident Representative has to conform. A well established Resident Representative tends to become a counsellor to the government and his relations with it are much more dependent on his ability and personality than on the prestige of the United Nations flag which he is entitled to carry on his official car.

Although the Resident Representative is the normal channel of approach to the government, there is inevitably a good deal of correspondence between the Technical Assistance Administration and the Permanent Delegations to the United Nations, if

only because they are both located in New York. To a large degree this is of an amplificatory character. A government requiring clarification on a particular point may ask for information through its normal diplomatic channel of approach to the United Nations. This may in fact mean that a member of the delegation will discuss the matter with a professional member of the staff. Some delegations take an opportunity, early in the year, to review the country programme already presented through the Resident Representative. From time to time technical assistance matters are the subject of official letters between Delegations and Headquarters but wherever possible the Resident Representative is kept informed of what is going on. Occasionally the Technical Assistance Administration takes the initiative in writing to a Delegation on a matter of unusual interest in addition to using the channel of communication through the Resident Representative, who receives a copy of the letter sent to the Delegation. Besides this more or less formal correspondence, there are naturally informal discussions between secretariat staff and delegates on individual projects or in connection with meetings of one or other of the many official committees, which both may be attending.

This picture of coordination at the point of direct contact between the United Nations agency and the government is at times confusing. Each country has different ideas of good administrative practice, complicated by the linguistic differences of communication, which beset all international organisations. When it comes to coordination within the United Nations organisation itself the picture is far more regular and some at least of the text-book methods of administrative procedures tend to apply. The preparation of the annual programme follows a well-defined pattern, since no budget is possible without some measure of standardised procedure. Country targets of expenditure are set in terms of the total funds available by the Technical Assistance Board early in the year. Each government is then invited to prepare a programme which follows certain definite rules to achieve uniformity; variations from year to year between one agency and another must not be so great as to upset the

general trend of their operation as a whole; priorities among projects must be defined, and so on. On the whole this procedure works smoothly, since much of the competition for attention goes on within each country's own governmental organisation and priorities between projects are settled before the country programme is submitted to the Technical Assistance Board. Resident Representatives play an important role in ensuring that realistic and workable programmes finally reach the Technical Assistance Board in October after review by the various agencies.

The weakness of this budgeting system lies in the fact that the country is the unit not the type of technical assistance. The total amount of funds allocated to particular country thus tends to show little variation from year to year; the amount allocated to each individual agency within the country is not very much more flexible. Well established programmes inevitably contain a vested interest of continuing projects, that is of projects which are not completed within the calendar year and so must take precedence over new proposals. Therefore, since the total available funds also does not vary very greatly, it is very difficult for, say, a newly independent country, whose needs are considerable and immediate, to build up an adequate country programme, except gradually and over a period of years.

In actual fact the technical assistance effort in any one field, in public administration for example, tends to run at a constant, or at a very slowly growing, level, since the number of experts who can be identified and recruited has now become fairly constant. However it is not easy to transfer the effort, which has been put into a completed project in one country, to another country which has not yet had very much assistance of this kind, since the country and not the field of assistance is the unit in the construction of the budget.

However the programme cannot be built up in any other way, since the Technical Assistance Committee has decided that the country must be the unit in programming, thus reflecting the fact that each country is a sovereign unit. Notwithstanding the complications of this international procedure and the obvious difficulties which it

creates in preparing a workable programme, the situation is made even more complicated by the fact that supplementary requests for technical assistance, received during the year even after the programme has been so laboriously and so meticulously drawn up, average ten a week to the Technical Assistance Administration alone, although the restricted amount of the total funds available is well known. Optimism is an important characteristic in international affairs.

In this budgetary operation the channels of communication tend to become formal and necessarily somewhat impersonal. The Resident Representative conducts the correspondence with the Technical Assistance Board and the Agencies, but the matters dealt with tend towards schedular patterns: Numbers of projects and fellowships, man-months, financial estimates and so on. Once the programme has been set up and the projects transformed into personalities by the recruitment of experts, communication becomes more personal and at the same time more complex. At this stage it becomes necessary to describe in greater detail the organisation of functions at Headquarters.

In the technical assistance operation there are two main interests: the programming and administrative function and the so-called "substantive" function. Each project has to find its place in the programme; each expert required to operate the project has to be identified and recruited, put into the field and maintained there. In addition every expert has to be supported by professional staff able to help him with the "substantive" implications of his project.

In the Technical Assistance Administration the programming and administrative function are performed by a Programmme Division. In the field of economic development and social affairs the substantive support is given by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs. To meet the need for support to the programme in public administration, a specialised Public Administration Division has been set up within the Technical Assistance Administration itself.

The result is not a very logical pattern of organisation, which none the less functions with reasonable success. In this respect the international civil service seems to be developing characteristics similar to those of the national ones. In matters concerning the programme itself the Programme Division makes the Resident Representative its normal channel of approach to the government. In matters concerning the individual expert, correspondence may go to the Resident Representative or to the expert himself, as appropriate. Almost inevitably the organisational pattern of the Division has become a geographical one. It is divided into three main sections, dealing with projects in (i) Latin America, (ii) the Middle East, Europe and Africa and (iii) Asia and the Far East.

An attempt has recently been made to decentralise this work and as an experiment an operational office has been set up in Santiago in Chile, to deal with projects in Latin America. The arguments for this innovation are the need for closer geographical proximity between the countries and the officers dealing with their programmes and a closer association between the technical assistance operation and the Economic Commission for Latin America. The budget and recruitment functions remain centralised at headquarters. It is as yet too soon to assess the value of the experiment.

At one time the substantive support given to the experts was channelled through the officers in the Programme Division primarily responsible for the project, but experience has shown that there is a material gain in good-will and confidence if the expert can be put into direct touch with someone who is to him an individual and uses the same professional vocabulary. Thus, particularly in public administration, there is a tendency to encourage direct correspondence between the expert in the field and a professional colleague at headquarters. This is not always practicable and there remain a number of enthusiasts for the idea of an individual, geographically determined, monopolising all headquarters dealings with a particular expert.

Theoretically of course there is much to be said for the monopoly system, but the individual professional contact is more important than the bureaucratic advantages of the other method and the interest of the individual in the operation is heightened and his working morale strengthened by a personal contact in matters affecting the substance of his project. The fact that there is someone in New York, even someone whom he may never have met, who obviously talks his particular "shop," does in fact encourage the expert and tends to give a human touch to the world wide organisation.

In the field of recruitment a personal contact is also obviously necessary. A candidate of good professional standing expects individual treatment. The organisation, which has been built up, has two recruitment offices with a common staff, one in New York and one in Paris. The European countries and Canada have also, in their different ways, created a recruitment organisation within their own governmental structure, usually with some kind of professional advisory committee. These National Committees circularise advertisements of vacancies and submit candidates, who thus have the support of their own governments, a very necessary factor in the operation of a United Nations programme. Candidates are interviewed, if possible, and their merits assessed by staff from one or other United Nations recruitment office, and then each application is reviewed in collaboration with appropriate and qualified members of the professional staff of the Technical Assistance Administration and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs. After final selection a name, or a short list of names, is presented through the Resident Representative to the government, with which the final decision lies.

This accounts for the procedure of coordination between the Technical Assistance Administration and the governments with which it works; there remains the problem of coordination between the agencies themselves. The creation of the Technical Assistance Board attempted to deal with this situation at the highest level in the determination of policies for common application. Its secretariat has remained relatively small and concentrates on two main tasks of coordination: the preparation

of the annual budget and the establishment of rules of procedure so that the operation as a whole functions to a common pattern.

Coordination between agencies is complicated by the geographical problems which arise from their being located in a number of different cities in Europe and North America. Moreover although most of the agencies operate on a self-contained footing, three - the International Telecommunication Union, the World Meteorlogical Organisation and the Universal Postal Union - use the Technical Assistance Administration as their operational unit, notwithstanding the fact that their headquarters are located in Geneva or Berne.

Faced with problems of this character the Technical Assistance Administration has created a small unit, attached directly to the office of its Director General, through which all correspondence passes between it and the Technical Assistance Board and the other agencies. The same unit has the duty of keeping abreast of all instructions from the Board to see that they are followed by the staff concerned, as well as the somewhat thankless task of representing the Administration at every conference or committee in which technical assistance is the major interest. It also has to coordinate all published material presented in reports of a general character. The publication of individual expert reports is necessarily a matter primarily for the appropriate professional officers, guided by a small specialised group, which acts as a link between the Technical Assistance Administration and the general publications organisation of the United Nations.

A recent trend in the administration of technical assistance has been the growing attention which is being given to the evaluation of programmes and projects, but this has not so far produced a separate organisational unit. Indeed, no very definite pattern has as yet been evolved for evaluation. Professional officers associated with a project can usually offer a useful opinion on its substantive development but only the government, or possibly the Resident Representative can ultimately assess its impact on the local situation. Seminars and Working Groups

are held from time to time to attempt an evaluation of a particular phase of the programme, sometimes with this end primarily in view, sometimes as part of a wider study of technical assistance in a particular field. Unsatisfactory features of a particular project are necessarily the subject of correspondence between the Technical Assistance and the Resident Representative, but fortunately such difficulties are relatively rare.

It will be appreciated from this description of the methods of coordination in this particular field that in international affairs administration has not yet achieved the smoothness and regularity which might be possible within a single country. It must be remembered that the United Nations itself is a new organisation, the growth of little more than a decade. It is ambitiously entering fields of activity which were never within the range of the League of Nations and much of its organisational development is empirical. Its cumbersome committee machinery does not seem designed to produce clear and simple solutions, since each resolution must give attention to varied opinions expressed in debate. To give administrative expression to a legislative compromise is one of the oldest problems of a governmental executive and in this particular operation the international civil service has inherited in full measure the difficulties of the national ones.

Collective Security:
What Has Been Set In Motion?

R. W. Tufts

We tell ourselves that the purpose of the collective security system is peace. Yet we and our allies are piling up arms and the competition with the Soviet Union looks like an arms race. And, we also say, an arms race leads inexorably to war. Where does the truth lie? Is collective security a euphemism for our part in an arms race leading to war or is it something new? Is it possible that the best chance for peace lies in the direction not of disarmament but of military superiority? This is the question I want to discuss in this paper, which marks, I should add, the beginning rather than the end of a study of American foreign policy and which might be described as an effort to see the forest before the trees.

The development of collective security policy, 1947-1957

American foreign policy has undergone a remarkable transformation in the decade since President Truman stood before a joint session of Congress and announced that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."[1] Few in his audience can have suspected the depth and range of the involvement in world affairs, or the cost, to which this course would lead in the next decade. Mr. Truman may well have seen farther than anyone else; he knew that the principle he had announced was far broader than the immediate program of aid to Greece and Turkey. George Kennan, then Director of the Policy Planning Staff and a man with a sensitive ear, feared that the Truman Doctrine might be interpreted as "a blank check to give economic and military aid to any area in the world where the communists show signs of being successful."[2]

The Truman Doctrine was an effort to adjust American policy to "a duel of infinite duration" with the Soviet Union. It was a recognition that wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union had broken down, that the United Nations would therefore not function as the American people hoped, and that if Soviet expansion was to be stopped, the United States would have to take the lead in stopping it. It was, in short, an acceptance of the unwelcome fact that international politics was still power politics. The rationale of the new policy was fully developed in an unsigned article in Foreign Affairs, the author of which, it was soon known, was George Kennan. His analysis of Soviet conduct reached the conclusion that "the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." He saw light at the end of the tunnel. Although the United States alone could not bring about the downfall of the Soviet system, it did have the power "to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate ... and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power."[3] Without this prospect the Truman Doctrine would have been incomplete; to win support, a policy must offer reasonable promise of success.

We have it on the authority of President Eisenhower that the Truman Doctrine is "not a new policy nor a partisan policy" but "a policy for America" that has "been extended to all critical areas of the world" and that finds expression in the collective security system linking the United States with at least forty-two countries.[4] The actions and inactions of his Administration reveal, furthermore, that the purpose of the United States is still to contain Soviet power and in this and other ways, in Mr. Dulles's words, to "encourage an evolution to freedom" in the Soviet system. In his last major exposition of American policy, Mr. Dulles made it

clear to close readers that liberation is an aspiration, not a policy.[5] Collective security therefore represents a development of policy, not a basic change of course, and the containment theory, despite campaign oratory, still underlies the American approach to the Soviet Union. The point deserves emphasis for the American people are being asked to spend $3 to $4 billion annually on collective security programs. If they are to continue to accept any such burden, they must know what results the expenditures are expected to produce. In recent years the answer has become unclear because of the misleading argument over containment and liberation. The best answer is still that foreign aid increases the strain on the Soviet system and encourages tendencies which can eventually undermine or mellow Soviet power.

The signal for action in the spring of 1947 was the British decision to discontinue aid to Greece and Turkey, a decision forced by the economic difficulties in which Britain found herself. Awareness of Europe's economic difficulties had been growing in Washington; it was brought into focus by the British decision. The American Government suddenly realized that Greece would become another communist satellite unless the United States came promptly to her support.

The European crisis was attributed primarily to the war's disruption of political and economic life, or, to put it differently, more to Europe's weakness than to Russia's strength. The communists were, of course, exploiting the situation and in this lay a threat of a dangerous shift in the ratio of power, a threat of frightening immediacy in Greece and of alarming potentiality in France and Italy. According to the diagnosis, however, the appropriate treatment for Europe's weakness was economic aid. "I believe," Mr. Truman said, "that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes."[6] In his speech launching the European Recovery Program, General Marshall said: "It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace."[7] The medical analogy was frequently used and was misleading in an important respect, for it encouraged the illusion that Europe's weakness, like anemia, might be cured and that before long the Western European states might resume something like their prewar eminence in world affairs. Their weakness, however, was relative and more than economic recovery was needed to restore their former positions. The full significance of the destruction of the very foundations of the old balance-of-power system was not yet apparent.

One could no doubt interpret these statements of policy in 1947 as foreshadowing programs to strengthen the military defenses of the non-Soviet world and to assist poor countries with economic development. It is only a short step from the belief that totalitarianism is nurtured by misery and want, as Mr. Truman said, to the view that the United States should seek to block communist expansion into poor countries by economic development programs. President Eisenhower, it should be observed, regards aid for economic development as an integral part of the mutual security program and traces it back to the decision to aid Greece and Turkey. In 1947, however, Mr. Truman and General Marshall, to judge by the public record, did not foresee the need to assist other countries with defense and development. The European Recovery Program was seen as the completion of the work of postwar relief and reconstruction, not as the first phase of a new relationship between the United States and friendly countries. The Policy Planning Staff strongly recommended that the recovery program should be planned to "give reasonable assurance that ... this will be the last such program we shall be asked to support in the foreseeable future."[8] As conceived, therefore, the Truman Doctrine might have stood by itself, not unlike the Monroe Doctrine, as a unilateral commitment of the United States to take action in certain circumstances. But matters have, of course, turned out differently. As Mr. Acheson once said: "It is often true in history that men acting

under immediate compulsion are only partly aware of the great consequences of what they have set in motion."[9]

Only a few months later the Senate, with Vandenberg's leadership, called for the development of collective security arrangements. The Vandenberg Resolution in effect brought the Truman Doctrine within the framework of the United Nations and adapted Article 51 of the Charter to the needs of the cold war. Russian behavior helped to assure the resolution's passage by an overwhelming majority: the establishment of the Cominform, the denunciation of the Marshall Plan, and the Czech coup reduced to four votes the opposition to this decision to seek foreign entanglements!

The United States has applied the collective security principle far and wide and it is idle to speculate about what might have happened had it restricted its efforts to the North Atlantic area, supplemented, perhaps, by a few bilateral arrangements. To some people, including the writer of this paper, it seems that the United States has been over-anxious to involve others in arrangements to which they could at best contribute little and which at worst they could use to further aims in conflict with the interests of the United States. It might have been wise, even in the case of some North Atlantic countries, to have pledged support against attack without requiring a reciprocal pledge. At any rate, no great power has, I think, ever before invited the headaches, or worse, that are unavoidable when the sharing of responsibility does not match the division of power.

The passage of the Vandenberg Resolution was followed promptly by the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty, and with the prod of the Berlin blockade, only 13 Senators objected to this translation of the collective security principle into practice. In terms of the political education of the American people, the ratification of the treaty was a significant step: the commitment to regard an attack on any of the parties as an attack on the United States was much more pointed than the Truman Doctrine's unilateral and non-specific pledge to "support free peoples." For a people recently isolationist in large numbers and proud of its independence and strength, it was a shock to acknowledge a fundamental unity of interest with foreigners. In a way it was even harder to acknowledge American dependence on others than to accept the permanent commitment of America's military and economic power to their support. The Congress knew that the approval of the treaty would lead to a program of military assistance and to action in the North Atlantic Council to plan an integrated defense of the treaty area.[10]

The Russian explosion of an atomic device in 1949, together with the communist victory in China, forced a top-to-bottom reappraisal of American foreign policy. It was no longer possible to ignore the shocking military weakness of the non-Soviet world. Except for American air power, there were almost no defenses. It suddenly had to be reckoned that within a few years the Soviet Union might have enough atomic weapons and carriers to deter the United States from using its atomic strength in almost all circumstances, even though unable to match the United States bomb for bomb. A further possibility therefore had to be reckoned with, namely, that the Soviet Union would then be able to exploit its superior strength on the ground unhampered by fear that American air power would be used against its centers of population and industry. This would undermine American policy, for the successful application of the containment theory required sufficient strength to "confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world."[11] The communist aggression in Korea was widely interpreted as confirmation that the communists would indeed exploit their superiority on the ground whenever circumstances were favorable and no reaction by the United States was expected.

It has always been, and will always be, difficult to decide how much and what kind of strength is needed in order to convince the communists that they face

"unalterable counter-force." It may be possible, however, to define a critical point for the United States. If a time comes when the Soviet Union believes that the United States will not initiate the so-called strategic use of atomic weapons for fear of retaliation, the ability to deter Soviet expansion will then depend, among other things, on having strong "conventional" forces. (Conventional forces might be equipped with small atomic weapons for use against enemy forces and bases.) Much more than military strength is involved in the calculations, of course, as George Kennan had pointed out in his original exposition of the containment theory. The superiority on which successful containment depends is political, economic, and moral as well as military, and military superiority can be sustained in the long run only by superiority of these kinds, a truth which it is not always easy to communicate to Congress at appropriation time. The importance of the mutual security program lies in its relation to the problem of developing and maintaining the overall superiority of the non-Soviet world. If, for example, conventional forces gain in importance in the years ahead, as seems probable for the reason indicated, military assistance will also grow in importance as a means of developing such strength.

Since 1950 "the strategy of freedom," to use Mr. Acheson's phrase, has been studied and restudied but thus far it has remained basically unchanged. The most authoritative recent reformulation is contained in President Eisenhower's speech in support of the foreign aid program last spring:

> We must recognize that, whenever any country falls under the domination of communism, the strength of the free world--and of America--is by that amount weakened and communism strengthened. If this process, through our neglect or indifference, should proceed unchecked, our continent would be gradually encircled. Our safety depends upon recognition of the fact that the Communist design for such encirclement must be stopped before it gains momentum, before it is again too late to save the peace. This recognition dictates two tasks. We must maintain a common worldwide defense against the menace of international communism. And we must demonstrate and spread the blessings of liberty.... America cannot exist as an island of freedom in a surrounding sea of communism.[12]

This is a restatement in popular terms of the containment theory. What has changed, in the years since 1947, is the means by which containment is to be achieved. The progression has been from the unilateral commitment of the Truman Doctrine to the reciprocal commitments of the collective security system and from reliance on self-defense to reliance, in large part, on collective defense. Following the communist aggression in Korea, the United States moved rapidly not only to strengthen its own forces but also to create a strong NATO force in Europe, to extend the collective security system around the world, and to "spread the blessings of liberty" by helping poor countries with their economic development.

The military assistance program has contributed to a great expansion of allied forces. Since 1950, according to the President, the United States has provided "some $17 billion in direct military assistance" to its allies, while their defense budgets "have totaled some $107 billion." Whereas in 1950 "the strength of our allies totaled 1,000 combat vessels, 3.5 million men in their ground forces, and 500 jet aircraft," they now have "2,500 combat vessels, 5 million men, and 13,000 jets."[13]

Of even greater interest is the degree to which the United States has become dependent on collective defense. Space does not permit an effort to demonstrate this in terms of bases, divisions in the field, and so forth. The degree of dependence has been frankly acknowledged by leading spokesmen for the Administration, whose testimony on this point ought to be reliable. Admiral Radford has said that the military assistance program "is an essential part of the defense of the United

States and of the free world" and that "the entire United States military program is based upon the assumption that we will have capable allies."[14] Mr. Dulles has said that there is as great a need for the collective security system "as there is need for an Army and a Navy and an Air Force of the United States."[15] The system has become such an integral part of the arrangements for national defense that the President this year requested the Congress "henceforth to appropriate funds for military assistance as part of the regular budget of our Department of Defense."[16]

On these evaluations of America's interest in collective security, there is no more choice about providing military assistance to allied countries than about providing funds for our own armed forces. Plainly, however, military assistance is not on an equal footing with the defense budget in the Congress and appropriations for economic development, which are equally important and which serve the same fundamental purpose, clearly face greater difficulties than military assistance. This is understandable in terms of history, the realities of the political process, and so forth, but it reflects a misunderstanding of the basis of national security in a bipolar world.

This misunderstanding is revealed most clearly in the failure to create political arrangements consonant with the requirements of safety. Military assistance ought to be regarded as an appropriation for defense of the nation's vital interests but it is stigmatized as an appropriation for charity. No form of words can alter the fact that the United States stands in a donor's relationship to the recipients of assistance. And one must question whether an effective common defense can be based indefinitely on this relationship. It is one thing to support allies in time of war when victory over a common foe is an overriding objective and when, in unfortunate contrast with the present, resources are allocated in rough proportion to performance in the common cause. It is another thing to provide support in a cold war of unknown duration. Awareness of a common interest in defense may not always be strong enough to prevent conflicts of interest from eroding the bases of cooperation. Obviously the sense of common interest has not been strong enough to prevent some disastrous mix-ups over foreign policy in the recent past. If we are dependent on a common defense, we need political arrangements which will help us to have confidence that burdens are being fairly shared, to decide or compromise day-to-day disagreements, and in these and other ways to preserve and strengthen the sense of unity essential to common defense.

The Administration's decision to ask for the incorporation of military assistance in the defense budget is much more than a tactical maneuver in the annual battle of the budget; it is symbolic of the distance the United States has moved since 1947 in developing the collective security system. A consideration of the implications of this decision, however, leads inescapably to the question of the reliability of the system, a system on which the safety of the nation depends. Mr. Dulles is confident that Soviet abuse and threats "will not disintegrate the free world" but believes and somewhat surprisingly admits that "the greater danger comes from internal hazards. A collective defense system," he continues, "in which each member is completely sovereign, requires a high degree of voluntary cooperation and agreement. Happily," he adds, "we have that."[17]

No doubt his main conclusion is correct, although its flatness is surprising when one recalls the British New Look, the spectacle of French forces in Algeria, the almost endless delays in obtaining German forces for NATO, the unreasonable difficulties and delays in equipping NATO forces with the atomic weapons needed for the defense of Western Europe, the Cyprus dispute, and moving far to the east, the Girard case, the withdrawal of American ground forces from Japan, the anti-American riots on Formosa, and, to name but one more, the Suez crisis. Reading the passionate official warnings against reduction of the foreign aid program and the almost daily

accounts of more or less serious disagreements with allied governments, one fears that cooperation in defense is overburdening its political support and that the whole structure might topple. If military assistance ought to be integrated into the defense budget, one is tempted to ask whether the American and allied weapon-systems should not also be integrated. And if weapon systems, can foreign offices be far behind? Even in the North Atlantic area, where the institutions for joint action are most highly developed, it has been obvious for some time that the allies have advanced much farther in military than in political organization. On paper SHAPE is capable of performing command functions whereas the NATO Council can make decisions only with the unanimous consent of 15 governments; in an emergency, therefore, the ability of NATO to react will be dependent, in the first instance, more on political than on military factors.

The Administration recognizes that the present system needs improvement. In a speech designed "to set forth the basic concepts which guide our foreign policy," Mr. Dulles had this to say last spring:

> The free-world collective defense arrangements are not ideal. There is nothing automatic about them, and they require a continuing conscious effort by many nations to cooperate and to forgo the petty selfishness and the extremes of nationalism which could poison the relationships. But the relationship is predominantly one of good will and trust. It marks a significant step in the long-overdue progress of international society from anarchy to order. To maintain and develop this progress is a basic principle of our foreign policy.[18]

He did not indicate in what direction he thought progress lay but two weeks earlier in his testimony before a special Senate committee he had made this observation into which it is doubtless easy to read more than he intended:

> Of all the purposes served by government, the first is to provide its citizens with security. That is one aspect, a major aspect, of our international policy. We seek to create as between the free nations a common defense which will give greater security than could be obtained by any one alone. The concept of "common defense" is not new to our people. Our Nation was founded primarily to create a common defense and our Constitution specifies that as one of its major purposes. The same considerations which in 1787 led our States to accept the necessity for a common defense today require the nations of the free world to seek a common defense.[19]

As Mr. Dulles correctly observes, in order to create a common defense the thirteen American states found it necessary to create a political union. As he nearly suggests, the logic of collective security leads in the same direction.

The logic but especially the difficulties of collective security are demanding change, and the United States and its allies are approaching, if they have not already reached, a turning point in the development of their relations. The collective security principle is not adapted to the conditions in some areas and the attempt to apply it should be abandoned, as circumstances permit, in favor of more familiar relationships. A collective security system requires a firmer foundation than the interests the United States has in common with, for example, many of its Asian allies.

In other areas, particularly the North Atlantic, it will be necessary to move beyond present political arrangements, which are founded on the principle of unanimity, to arrangements permitting a majority of some kind to make decisions. As usual, it will be necessary to take a step at a time. New political institutions can

be created only if a new loyalty can replace old divisions. If past arrangements are to be discarded, it must be obvious to thinking people that they are unsatisfactory, even dangerous, makeshifts. Here is a challenge to our powers of political insight and invention.

The conflict between collective security and disarmament

Throughout the postwar period, while working with much success to build a collective security system, the United States has tried in vain to negotiate a disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union. These two approaches, although fundamentally inconsistent, are still being used, the result being to delay the needed development of the collective security system by stimulating hopes for disarmament that will almost surely be disappointed. Collective security is frequently depreciated as an unfortunate but necessary expedient, as an arms race in which the United States must participate pending agreement on disarmament with the Soviet Union.

This was the effect of Mr. Dulles's recent remarks. After describing the need for collective security arrangements and calling them a step in the world's advance from anarchy to order, Mr. Dulles went on to say:

> But we do not believe that the only way to security is through ever-mounting armaments. We consider that controls and reduction of arms are possible, desirable, and, in the last reckoning, indispensable.... Armaments are nothing that we crave. Their possession is forced on us by the aggressive and devious designs of international communism. An arms race is costly, sterile, and dangerous. We shall not cease our striving to bring it to a dependable end.[20]

It is clear that collective security and the arms race are closely linked in Mr. Dulles's mind and that disarmament is regarded as an alternative.

The time has come to recognize that peace is not to be obtained by agreement with the Soviet Union on disarmament. This is a transitional period in world affairs, marked by an unprecedented and, in the long run, unstable bipolarization of power. The basic conditions for an international balance of power have disappeared. The material conditions of life demand world government, but the moral preconditions do not exist. In this transitional period, only superior military strength can assure safety. The United States and its allies have thus far succeeded in maintaining superiority, although the margin is no longer clear and the balance might shift. The Soviet Union has been striving, with impressive results, to catch up. Neither side can admit inferiority and the arms race continues.

The result of this competition has been described as a balance of terror, that is, a situation in which each side has the power to inflict catastrophic damage on the other. A few people advocate unilateral disarmament, believing that competition on these lines is futile and dangerous and that mankind might not survive a nuclear war; their number may well increase in the years ahead. A great many people in the Western countries accept in principle the need for superiority but shrink from the sacrifices entailed in developing and maintaining it. The West (to use a convenient if somewhat unsatisfactory term for referring to the United States and its allies) has not only permitted its margin of superiority to dwindle but also is now cutting back its armed strength without corresponding reductions by the Soviet Union. This is surely the most dangerous policy that could be followed, and one must wonder whether the West will make the fatal error of giving up a superiority which has served it well and on which its future safety depends. The necessary lesson ought to have been learned in the thirties.

The obstacles to disarmament seem insuperable. If any change, to carry President Eisenhower's analysis one step farther, is a gain for one side and a loss for the other, a side that once admitted inferiority would have to expect a cumulative deterioration of its position. In a bipolar world it would have no reserves on which to call to redress the balance. Neither side, therefore, is able to accept a proposal which would shift the power ratio against it, even slightly. (It is possible that in special circumstances limited agreements could be negotiated. The so-called "fourth-country" problem provides an example. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union might each calculate that the advantage it could gain by further nuclear tests would be more than offset by the disadvantage of permitting fourth countries to develop atomic weapons. Agreements of this sort might be of considerable importance. They would not represent progress toward disarmament, however, but a change in the nature of the competition for superiority.)

In the circumstances described, offers by both sides are necessarily suspect. Two possibilities exist: one group may be stronger than the other, or the two groups may be so nearly equal in strength that it is impossible to determine which has the advantage.

If Group A is stronger than Group B, and each side accepts this as a fact, equal reductions in strength would improve A's relative position and would therefore be unacceptable to B, whereas unequal concessions designed to equalize the strength of A and B would obviously be unacceptable to A. If Group A is stronger than Group B but B believes the opposite to be the case, it is conceivable that B might by mistake offer or accept a proposal which would in fact favor A. To guard against this possibility, however, each side will make such large allowances for error in formulating its proposals that they become unacceptable to the other side.

If Group A and Group B have, in fact, almost equal strength, and each side accepts this as a fact, identical reductions will have unequal effects because of differences in geographic position and other factors affecting military requirements. Technical difficulties will almost surely make it impossible, however, to devise two reductions, x and y, such that a reduction of x by A will be regarded by the parties as balancing a reduction of y by B, thus leaving the relative positions of A and B unchanged.

There are, of course, additional difficulties, but these demonstrate that the logic of a bipolar system works against disarmament. The conflict between collective security and disarmament is fundamental. The principle of superiority is at the heart of a bipolar system and can not be reconciled, except in special, limited circumstances, with the principle of equality which underlies disarmament.

Conclusion

The Soviet Union, it must be assumed, will continue to strive for superiority. The United States, it must be hoped, will work with its allies to develop and maintain the superiority which is within their reach. If the United States puts aside the illusion that disarmament will sometime provide an easy way of escaping the burdens of defense, the chances of building a peaceful world will be greatly improved. It is not suggested that the West should not make proposals for disarmament; on the contrary, proposals should be made, but ones which are consistent with the maintenance of superiority over the Soviet system. The West should not obscure its insistence on inequality, nor apologize for it. It should make clear what its requirements are, and what assurances it is prepared to offer the Soviet Union. It will need, furthermore, the political wisdom to make accommodation more attractive than any alternative.

To develop and maintain military superiority over the Soviet bloc and to prevent conflicts of interest from destroying their ability to cooperate, the United States and its allies need to find a political equivalent of collective defense. A few months ago Walter Lippmann quoted Barbara Ward Jackson as having said: "Anyone coming from Europe must candidly report that distaste for the Atlantic Association is widely expressed.... The distrust, the envy, the fear of American power and competition--which are inevitable given the nations' relative strengths--are now unchecked by any opposite sense of working with America to achieve any legal purpose and of experiencing first-hand the energy, the vitality, and the imagination which America can bring to any high task it proposes to itself."[21] Mr. Lippmann, rejecting the tasks suggested by Mrs. Jackson as not high enough, asked himself what purpose might unite the Atlantic nations, and found it in bringing the competition in armaments under control.

Mr. Lippmann has correctly defined, I think, the goal of American foreign policy: it is not disarmament but the control of the competition in armaments (and eventually, it might be added, the effective control of the use of force in the world). If the argument developed in this paper is valid, there is only one way in which the competition can in time be brought under control. The United States and its allies must maintain superiority--political, economic, and moral as well as military--as they have done, all things considered, since 1947. When circumstances compel the Soviet régime to recognize that it will always encounter unalterable counterforce solidly based on overall superiority, there will be reason to hope that the régime will see an advantage in accepting some measure of control over the competition in arms. It is necessary to add that the Soviet régime may not adjust itself to a position of inferiority. There can be no assurance beyond the tendency of men to adapt to situations they can not alter, and in this lies the best chance and the greatest hope of progress.

In my view, therefore, the control of force is to be achieved not by the reduction of armed forces but by the attainment and maintenance of overall superiority. Or, to put it more generally, the control of force is to be achieved by building a community based, originally, on Europe and the Western Hemisphere but gradually widening out to include other peoples who see in this association a desirable way of working for their aspirations and who are ready to accept the full obligations of membership. The arms race will be costly but it need not be sterile and dangerous if we use it as an opportunity to create new forms of political association not only responsive to the needs of peace but also obedient to what we might again dare call the natural law.

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Footnotes

1. Truman, message to the Congress, March 12, 1947. See Department of State Bulletin (hereafter cited as Bulletin), Supplement of May 4, 1947, p. 831.

2. See excerpts from a memorandum submitted to Secretary of State Marshall in the spring of 1947 by the Policy Planning Staff, in Harry Bayard Price, The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning, p. 23 (Ithaca; Cornell University Press; 1955).

3. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, July 1947, pp. 576, 575, and 582, respectively.

4. Eisenhower, address in support of the foreign aid program, May 21, 1957. See Bulletin, June 10, 1957, p. 916.

5. Dulles, address at the annual luncheon of the Associated Press, New York City, April 22, 1957. See Bulletin, May 6, 1957, p. 718.

6. Truman, Bulletin, May 4, 1947, p. 831.

7. Marshall, address at Harvard University, June 5, 1947. See Bulletin, June 15, 1947, p. 1160.

8. Price, p. 23.

9. Acheson, address before the Harvard Alumni Association, Cambridge, Mass., June 22, 1950. See McGeorge Bundy, The Pattern of Responsibility, p. 43 (Boston; Houghton Mifflin; 1952).

10. See Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, June 6, 1949, Senate Executive Report No. 8, 81st Congress, First Session, reprinted in A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents, 1941-1949, pp. 1352-1353, Senate Document 123, 81st Congress, First Session (Washington; G.P.O.; 1950).

11. Kennan, p. 581.

12. Eisenhower, Bulletin, June 10, 1957, pp. 915-916.

13. Ibid., p. 917.

14. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Fourth Congress, Second Session, on the Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1957, April-May 1956, pp. 552 and 554 (Washington; G.P.O.; 1956).

15. Ibid., p. 37.

16. Eisenhower, Bulletin, June 10, 1957, p. 917.

17. Dulles, Bulletin, May 6, 1957, pp. 715-716.

18. Ibid., p. 716.

19. Dulles, testimony before a special Senate committee, April 8, 1957. See Hearings before the Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, p. 395, United States Senate, Eighty-Fifth Congress, First Session, March-April 1957 (Washington; G.P.O.; 1957).

20. Dulles, Bulletin, May 6, 1957, p. 716.

21. Walter Lippmann, "The Common Task," The Washington Post and Times-Herald, June 18, 1957.

POLITICAL THEORY
IN
THE STUDY OF AMERICAN POLITICS

A Paper Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 5, 1957

John C. Wahlke
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"What, in concrete terms, is the utility of traditional courses in the history of political theory for students of American government and politics?" An important connotation of the term "utility" is the notion of possible but not presently practiced uses. But it may be helpful to consider at the same time the actual use of political theory subject matter in the study of American government and the actual content of the average political theory course. To help keep the discussion "in concrete terms" conclusions and illustrations will be drawn from only a few of the widely used books from which many students acquire their conceptions and understanding of these fields.1/

Attention is focussed, in the following discussion, primarily on the undergraduate courses in the American government field. This focus has been selected, not because "study of American politics" is taken to connote the activity of undergraduate students, but because it is felt that the condition of any discipline is reflected to a large extent in the materials and manner of presenting them found in the most basic courses. Things might be different "at the frontiers," but whether the discipline will develop as frontier developments suggest is always a matter of conjecture. By outsiders, at least, the discipline is taken to be what its more general courses suggest it is.

Nothing that is said in the following pages is intended in any way as criticism of any particular authors or their works. In many cases broad generalizations about the field are inapplicable to one or more of the authors cited. In any case, they are based only upon a single textbook, not upon a man's whole work, and may well be quite unjust as generalizations about his most serious thoughts. The aim, however, is not to criticize or to do justice to particular individuals; it is to characterize the fields of study.

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1. The list of the books so used is given in the Bibliography. It is in no sense a "representative sample," since it represents only the writer's subjective feeling (based to a considerable but unquantifiable extent upon experience) that these are, collectively, "representative" of the field, and that none differing significantly from them (with respect to the characteristics hereafter discussed) has been omitted.

I. THE GENERAL FIELD OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

In terms of quantity alone, the "traditional political theory" subject matter found in American government textbooks is somewhat surprising. All texts in the field offer some specific discussion of "theory" or of concepts --- such as Liberty, Authority, Equality, Right, Democracy --- familiar to the student of theory. 2/ Elsewhere, too, they all make frequent references and allusions to the "theories" and works of Locke, Montesquieu and Blackstone, and some to the "theories" and works of Mill, Hobbes, Spencer and others.3/ Particularly in more recent works, the bibliographies give further strong evidence that they assume the subject matter of political theory to be highly relevant to the study of American government, since they commonly cite the works of writers like Tocqueville, Mill and Bryce, as well as commentaries upon American political thought like Rossiter's and Hofstadter's. But two of them (#1, #2) list also the standard political theory commentaries of Sabine, Hallowell, Lindsay, Ebenstein, Elliott and McDonald, Pennock, and others.4/ So both the text itself and the suggestions for collateral reading give students the impression they can learn more about American government and politics if they know also what is taught in their political theory course. Rarely, however, do the texts tell the student specifically how or why such learning may help. This he is left to infer for himself from the way theoretical materials are used in his course.

A. CONCEPTUALIZATION.

A treatise on any political subject is set in some basic conception of the nature of the universe and the order of facts, or phenomena, within that universe which are "political," so it is appropriate to begin by examining the use made of traditional political theory subject matter in setting the conceptual stage for the American government student.

Most texts deal extensively with four different categories of question. One concerns the historical origins of the American system of government, the values controlling the choices of its framers (Liberty, Equality, Rule of Law, etc.) and the value principles supposedly implicit in the resulting structure

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2. The 1951 edition of #2 prefaced every section with a chapter of such "theoretical discussion," and the second edition retains much of this material. One whole chapter of #3 relates to political doctrine and the whole second section, 237 of its 805 textual pages, is described as a discussion of the "theory" of American government. The 1948 edition of #5 (originally published in 1922), however, contains only a page and a half of comparable discussion.

3. See, e.g., #1, p. 30; #2, p. 46; #3, p. 470; #5, p. 61. Federalist No. 10 is reproduced in #1 (along with Federalist Nos. 51 and 78), and Bentham's paragraphs on "Dog Law," as well as Federalist No. 10, is set forth in #4.

4. See particularly the bibliographical notes following Chapters 1, 2, and 7 in #2.

(Federalism, Separation of Powers, Equal Rights, etc.). A second discusses policies and policy alternatives in particular areas of human concern (Agriculture, Business, Labor, Social Welfare, etc.). Another deals with the structure and functioning of the major component institutions (Congress, Courts, Presidency, etc.), while the fourth deals with what the texts usually call "politics," the behavior of certain classes of non-official actors (voters, interested citizens and groups, and party workers in particular). In addition, the texts usually offer some brief discussion of "theory" in the conceptual sense. Following is a tabulation of the allotment of space by five typical works to each of these five categories (listed under that one of the two main aspects of political theory, described below, most relevant to the questions treated by each book in each category):

PROPORTIONATE SPACE ALLOTED TO FIVE TYPES OF PROBLEM
BY FIVE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TEXTS*

			Categories of Problem				
				Relevant to Value Theory		Relevant to Causal Theory	
American Government Text	Total Space** Pages	%	1. Theoretical Foundations	2. Origins, Values & Principles	3. Particular Policies	4. Government Structure & Function	5. Politics & Behavior
#1	790	100%	3%	33%	19%	25%	20%
#2	900	100	2	20	20	40	18
#3	810	100	2	28	31	25	14
#4	700	100	--	21	36	27	16
#5	860	100	1	11	33	42	13
Mean	800	100***	2	23	28	32	16

* - Author's estimate, based upon analysis of contents of major subsections of chapters.
** - Excluding those portions devoted to state and local government.
*** - Row does not add to 100% because of rounding.

Whether or not it is spelled out explicitly[5] there is a rough conceptual scheme underlying this particular organization of American government materials.

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5. See, e.g. #1, pp. 6-10; #2, pp. 6-23; #5, p. 1.

The making of authoritative decisions is accepted as the characteristic feature of "government." Government, in turn, is conceived of primarily in terms of "institutions"---stable organizations of men which both form the accepted locus for making certain classes of decisions, by regularized processes, and are themselves created and maintained as institutions by some sort of decisional process in the community. The concept of "power"---the ability of persons to determine decisions ---is likewise a central concept, particularly in more recent texts which emphasize the processes (functioning) of the American political system. The problems examined in the four substantive categories of subject matter all relate substantially to questions about governmental decision-making: What kinds of decisions (in terms of values achieved) are made? What are the causes determining the kinds of decisions made? What is the process (particularly within governmental institutions) by which they are made? What are the consequences of particular decisions or particular ways of making them? And so on.

As the above table shows, however, the texts devote little space to direct discussion of the theoretical foundations on which they rest.6/ Nor do they relate this conceptual framework to any of the traditional political theories which deal with the appropriateness of such a scheme.

Any political theory, however, is more than just a conceptual framework. It is a body of logically related propositions about what is and what ought to be the case in politics and government. That is to say, it has both a "value element" (a set of preferred values and a philosophy justifying them) and a "causal element" (a set of concepts referring to political phenomena and propositions about cause-and-effect relationships among them).7/ How are these elements of the materials learned in the political theory course applied in the study of American government?

B. VALUE THEORY

The American government course usually approaches problems from a perspective that is heavily value-oriented. The large proportion of space devoted to general value problems (see Table above) is one indication of this orientation. Most texts have as one (if not the) principal aim, "the purpose of quickening student interest in the lively issues of the past and present,...to stimulate the student to think about contemporary problems.8/ In effect, the student is led

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6. Several of them, however, do set forth this relationship for special topics. For example, cooperation and conflict are related to a specified psychological framework in #1, pp. 6-10. Public opinion is related to the theoretical framework of Lippmann in #3, pp. 470 ff. Trends in particular policy areas are usually treated within a socio-economic framework, while pressure groups are dealt with in either group-dynamics or socio-economic terms, or both.

7. The terms "value theory" and "causal theory" and the distinctions between them are discussed in Easton, David, The Political System (N.Y.: Knopf, 1953), pp. 52 ff. See also Sabine, George H., "What Is A Political Theory?", Journal of Politics 1:1-16 (1939), which distinguishes three factors found in any theory---factual, causal and valuational.

8. #2, p. viii.

at every step to the main question, "Do you approve or disapprove of this policy, function power, or form that we are now examining?"

Some texts specifically tell students, in a discussion of how to think analytically about American government, that an indispensable step is the recognition, clarification and choice of the values controlling one's issue choices.9/ Theoriests and their major concepts are usually introduced into the texts in discussions of such values as Liberty, Equality, and Justice. Political concepts like Federalism, Separation of Powers, and Rule of Law are usually related to these basic value concepts. It is often implied, if not specifically stated, that choosing one's values ultimately requires comprehending the philosophies justifying competing values.10/ An implicit but prevailing assumption, then, is that familiarity with the great theories of Western political thought will help the student take his stand on the great issues of American politics--- Ought the government adopt this or that policy (railroad regulation, abolition of slavery, loyalty programs, a national bank, etc.)? Ought the community adopt this or that political practice or procedure (universal suffrage, direct election of senators, constitionally defined limits on executive authority in treaty-making, etc.)? 11/

The practical utility of political theory here is obviously to facilitate students' taking intelligent positions, i.e. forming rational opinions, as citizens contemplating or participating in the American political process. It should help them make up their minds about where to stand as political actors. But this utility is recognized only by implication in the American government course.

Indeed, it is practically destroyed by the common practice of discussing theorists and theoretical concepts under the rubric of "the myths we live by" 12/ or "the American Creed"13/. One more often finds the names of theorists used as

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9. #2, pp. 5-6; #3, pp. 791-795.

10. "In the modern world, there have been many different philosophies of government /the philosophies of anarchists, rugged individualists, regulationists, socialists, and communists/, springing not only from contrasting ideas on the degree, if any, to which people should be allowed control, but also from opposing views on the amount of authority that government, however operated, ought to be permitted to exercise over people's affairs." (#5, p. 2). One of the five typical works states that the purpose of its opening extensive "theoretical" discussion is to set forth "the case for the democratic way of life," in terms of principles by which the structure and functioning of the American political system may be judged." (#2, p. viii).

11. This assumption rests on the further premise (examined below, Part V) that the study of political theory comprises analysis of important theories about political values and is not limited to mere recognitional familiarity with the names of values asserted in them.

12. #2, pp. 24 ff.

13. #3, Part II, especially Chapter 3.

literary devices ("as Hobbes said," "to use the words of John Locke," etc.) than the important propositions of their theories presented as useful knowledge. In other words, the object of interest in the American government course is not the theories of theorists but the ideology of Americans.

A fateful consequence of conceiving "theory" in this fashion is the tendency to de-emphasize the actual theories from which certain basic concepts stem, and to reify those concepts, giving the impression that they have objective existence quite apart from the theoretical systems and philosophies in which they occur. Instead of receiving these concepts as central constructs in propositions (about values) which can be analyzed, discussed and subjected to testing for their validity in terms of factual truth, ethical merit, logic, or some other determinate grounds of validity, students are led to see them as "things" in which people should believe. Instead of being led to see the critical relevance of political philosophy to the making of value choices about American government, they are given a few emotionally significant symbols, with unanalyzed suggestions about the emotions they should evoke in the minds and hearts of good American citizens. The basic idea that value theory, political or any other kind, can be read as a body of meaningful propositions, and thus used as a genuine tool of knowledge, is almost wholly missing from the study of American government.

C. CAUSAL THEORY.

Taking "theory" to mean "ideology" does not necessarily make political theory of no use at all, however. Value beliefs and the symbols associated with them, and sometimes political theories themselves, constitute an important class of political facts in the American or any other political system. 14/ The very terms "ideology," "myth" and "symbol" appear in the theories of Mannheim, Marx, Weber, Lippmann and others for the express purpose of devising causal laws to explain men's political behavior and the functioning of their political institutions. Many American government texts do recognize in general terms that beliefs in (and about) Liberty, Equality, Justice, Rights, and the like can be considered as such political facts, classified and analyzed in terms of theories about ideology. 15/

But along with general and abstract (theoretical!) recognition of the political-fact nature of ideology, there is also general failure to apply this recognition when discussing the behavior of citizens in the American political system. Behavior may be described, but it is never treated as a variable in any way related to the value beliefs of the actors. Nor is the student given reason to suspect that the value beliefs of political actors are facts which must be established by empirical evidence. Sometimes he is given offhand assertions to the effect that natural rights were "in the air" in 1776, or that John Locke's theory was part of the "intellectual luggage" of the founding fathers16/,

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14. "Reflection upon the ends of political action and upon the means of achieving them, upon the possibilities and necessities of political situations, and upon the obligations that political purposes impose is an intrinsic element of the whole political process." (#29. p. xi).

15. See, e.g., #1, pp. 24 ff., for such a discussion of "myth"; #2, pp. 27 ff., for a discussion of "ideology" and "facts"; #3, pp. 470 ff., for a discussion of public opinion, "streotypes" and "symbols."

16. #1, p. 68. Note also #2, p. 51.

but no text offers him any evidence to show that Americans of any political class, since 1787, actually possessed the value beliefs suggested or responded to the symbols of these beliefs in the ways suggested. That these are now operative ideals and symbols in the American system is sometimes inferred logically from the words in the Constitution and related documents, sometimes inferred logically from the structure of American institutions, but more often taken as self-evident and never tied directly and empirically to the political behavior of American people. One is left, thus, with an unanswered but all-important fact question about American ideology: What really are the operative value beliefs, the moving symbols?

One is left with still more important unanswered questions which would relate knowledge of the play of ideology in the American political system to general political knowledge, such questions as: What is the mechanism, the causal sequence, by which these value beliefs and symbols play their part in the American system? What are the causes of particular American patterns of value beliefs and symbol responses?17/ What are their consequences for the structure and functioning of the American system?

It is the function of a political theory to supply generic answers applicable to such particular questions about American ideology. The assertion about the nature and role of ideology in American government which are implied in the American government course are based solely on deduction from some political theory, not on empirical evidence in the American scene. Even when it directs student attention to this or that theory about ideology, it fails to make clear to him that the validity of the statements about American ideology, being based wholly on logical transfer from some theory, are only as valid as the propositions set forth in the theory. If these propositions are valid, then political theory is obviously contributing important insight into the working of American politics. But the understanding of American politics would be much firmer and fuller if the American government course recognized clearly its crucial dependence on political theory for such an insight, and if it suggested to students that the depth of understanding of American politics is fixed by the political theory which guides its study.

What is true with respect to study of ideology in American government is equally true with respect to study of other facets of the subject. Those categories of question where causal theory might be expected to contribute most illumination---the structure and functioning of government institutions, the "politics" and processes of decision-making---are treated ordinarily in simple descriptive fashion. The student is told principally what is done by institutions and people and how it is done, rarely why, or what effect a given way of doing it has on the political system.18/ By discussing structure and function,

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17. The relation between the propositions and concepts of theorists and the empirically demonstrable beliefs of "the people" is a special topic under this heading.

18. Although one text expressly seeks to "bridge the gap between these traditional textbooks...that describe the structure and operation of American government and those that stress the general principles and concepts of political science" (#2, p. vii), the "general principles and basic concepts" mentioned are those of value, not causal, theory.

process and behavior, in only descriptive terms, the course on American government fails to suggest to the student that causal political theory seeks to provide general knowledge about the facts of political life which might be relevant to his study of the American system as a particular case. Indeed, the silence of the American government text may do more than merely fail to suggest the relevance of theory to the study of American government; it may positively encourage the belief that theory has nothing to offer.

To be sure, one often finds propositions purporting to exlain one or another particular aspect of individual behavior or institutional functioning:

> "...it is human nature to dislike being regulated;..."19/

> "/The/ more universal and fundamental causes of change in the work of government have been suggested...as the following: People... Place...Physical technology...Social technology...Catastrophe... Personalities ..."20/

> "The problem /of 'one-man rule'/ will become all the more serious if the twentieth century continues to be a time of endless emergencies."21/

> "The closed primary...encourages party regularity and responsibility."22/

Students might infer from their texts that the traditional political theory course may enlighten them about the nature of the values they must deal with, but it is never similarly suggested to them, by citation of theories and theorists, that the causal theories of traditional Western political thought might help them comprehend any aspects of the actual process of American government, since propositions such as these are never identified with the theories in which they are to be found.

Nor is it suggested to them that statements like these are really causal theoretical propositions, representing various levels of abstraction from very simple explanations of limited consequences of one institutional arrangement (the statement concerning the closed primary) to generic or classificatory summaries of "factors" (the statement concerning causes of change) and base-line propositions which might serve as starting points in a comprehensive general theory of politics (the statement concerning human nature).23/ The many explanatory statements such as those listed above are never related to one another in any fashion. In the same way, the major categories of discussion (as described above) are rarely related to each other in any clearcut theoretical fashion, a

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19. #5, p. 7.

20. #3, p. 18.

21. #1, p. 477.

22. #2, p. 400.

23. It should be obvious that these particular propositions are not to be taken unquestioningly as the nucleus of a political theory which should guide study, or that they are the most likely propositions available, but only that knowledge about politics will advance only as theory develops from the hypothesizing, testing, and rejection or incorporation of such propositions into a coherent system.

quite different order of questions being treated in each. In other words, the study of American government may be based upon a common conceptual scheme but it does not self-consciously utilize a consistent theoretical baseline. Above all, it fails to emphasize to the student that some of the most widely accepted assertions about American politics rest only on inference from general theoretical propositions.

This sweeping generalization ought perhaps be qualified in several respects. In the first place, there is the occasional practice, already mentioned,24/ of presenting certain subsections of material from a more explicit theoretical viewpoint than is applied to the whole subject. It is not uncommon to find express acknowledgment of these theoretical premises underlying discussion of particular, limited topics.25/ In the second place, a general theoretical viewpoint, customarily applied directly only in limited discussion of one particular set of events, is often applied implicitly to other events and problems, and is logically applicable to the entire subject. This viewpoint can be labelled crudely, but accurately enough for our purposes, economic determinism. The version usually mentioned explicitly is that of Charles Beard, and the situation to which it is applied is, of course, the establishment of the national government.26/ Even where this viewpoint is not directly applied, there prevails a related viewpoint that might be called socio-economic-cultural automatism. Though it is usually expressed in such vague and ambiguous terms as to be more a point-of-view than a clear theoretical premise 27/, this might be a starting-point for exposition of the American political system in the light of general theoretical propositions. While it may thus be desirable to qualify the judgment made earlier about the failure to utilize causal theory in the study of American government, these qualifications hardly warrant its reversal.

In the light of the great preponderance of value over causal theory implications in the study of American goverment, the broad assumptions made concerning the ideological nature of values as political facts, and above all the basic concern of the texts with directing student attention to making value choices about policy issues, there emerges an unexamined theoretical premise in the present study of American government considerably more important than the primitive conceptual scheme referred to earlier. The entire structure of the American government course, its guiding objectives, and the use it actually makes of political

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24. See above, footnote 5.

25. See, e.g., #3, pp. 484 ff., especially pp. 504-505.

26. Selections from Beard are presented in #4. Beard's theory is specifically discussed in #2, pp. 61 ff.

27. "We cannot say too often that governments reflect the social environments, or culture, in which they operate." (#3, p. 80). "Government...is part of a vast and complex web of relations among men. We can hope to understand government only by seeing its interplay with men's minds and emotions, with basic economic and social trends, with the ideas that grip mankind." (#1, p. 4). Note also the second proposition listed above, p. 7.

theory subject matter, can be justified logically only by the theoretical premise that the most significant independent variable in the entire political process (of America, at least) is the value-based decisions made by citizens and officials as they play their roles in the system. In spite of general warnings about the irrational nature of human beings, in spite of frequently stated propositions about the influence of social, economic and cultural factors on American institutions and activities, the field of American government still uses and promotes a simple, eighteenth-century rationalistic political model. That this premise is never recognized in the American government text, that none of the theories which explicitly advance such a model are ever mentioned in this context, does not alter the fact that the study of American government rests upon theoretical propositions which pretend to convey generic knowledge about the processes of politics or the fact that the study of political theory includes investigating the validity or reliability of such propositions. While political theory is not presently used either as a source of such generic propositions or a means of testing the logic of particular causal propositions about American government, one of its chief utilities for studying American government might lie in just this usage. 28/

D. SUMMARY.

The utilization of political theory in the general field of American government and politics can be summed up as follows:

1. The incorporation of names of theorists and of concepts invented by them suggests to students that knowledge of political theory is useful for the study of American government.

2-a. The utility most obviously suggested to them is skill in analyzing their own value beliefs and in applying them, as citizens, to making policy choices or judgments about policy decisions.

b. This suggestion is over-ridden by a common tendency to treat value concepts as ideological or symbolic facts, in a way that conceals from students the theoretical nature of the value concepts they use and leaves them unaware that values may be systematically analyzed or that political theory contains a disciplined intellectual consideration of values.

3-a. Despite the prevalence of a uniform if unspecified conceptual scheme, it is never suggested that the conceptual schemes or systems of causal propositions found in political theories are of any utility for the study of American government.

b. It is not only traditional political theories and theorists which are considered irrelevant to the study of cause and effect in American government and politics, but political theory itself.

c. Students are thus left with the impression that the term "theory" applies only to the value aspects and not to the classification and explanation of factual aspects of American government.

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28. The extent to which the political theory course promotes or hinders such use is discussed below, Part V.

4. The net effect is almost total failure to utilize theory either for analysis of values or for explanation of facts, depriving the student of knowledge he could use as a participating citizen and as a contemplative student of American government.

II. THE SPECIAL CASE OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

In most college curricula, the field of American government and politics includes not only the course in American government as such but also courses in American constitutional law, American state and local government, and American political thought. More often than not, courses in legislation and legislative processes, political parties and pressure groups, public administration, and government and business are taught with exclusive reference to the American system of government. What has been said respecting the general American government course can be applied with slight changes of emphasis to most of these subfields, but two of them---constitutional law and American political thought---require more particular attention.

To say (as departmental advisers sometimes do to students) that constitutional law is a "more theoretical" subject than the other subfields of American government does not necessarily mean it draws more upon the kind of knowledge dispensed in the political theory course. It is "more theoretical" in the sense that its study involves primarily manipulation of abstract concepts. But the concepts involved and their authors are not often the concepts or authors a student encounters in his political theory course. 29/ In those few cases where American "theorists" are mentioned, they are mentioned not as theorists but as protagonists in some particular constitutional debate.

The basic abstractions in constitutional law are those like "original package doctrine," "business affected with a public interest," "stream of commerce," "separate but equal," "clear and present danger," "implied powers,"---legal concepts invented by judges, not political concepts invented by political theorists. Seemingly political concepts like "federalism," "separation of powers," "jurisdiction," or "citizenship," are invariably used as more complex and more abstract but still basically legal concepts. Many political concepts having no particular legal significance, like "constitutionalism," "dictatorship," or "socialism," are in occasional use, but rarely with any sense of the theoretical complexities surrounding their use. And still other even more basic political

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29. The indices and texts of five typical books refer fairly often to the Federalist Papers, to Hamilton, Madison, John Taylor, Webster, Calhoun, Henry George, and to a few other American writers sometimes described as "theorists." But in only two of the five books (#8, #10) is there even the slightest mention of Locke, Montesquieu, Aristotle, or any of the "theorists" of the traditional political theory course. Only one of the five works (#7) contains selections from writings other than opinions of judges in legal cases or legal commentaries upon them, and only one other contains any extended discussion of any of the problems dealt with in the political theory course (#10, concerning "higher law" theories).

concepts, like "law," "power," or "authority," are treated, if they are treated at all, as if they were purely legal concepts. The concepts used and the manner of their use suggest that the constitutional law course seeks primarily to acquaint students with the kinds of legal situations in which these concepts have been and might be applied by judicial decision-makers, and to sharpen their facility for analyzing the semantics and logic underlying the verbal use of such concepts. Such a course might be more useful to a potential lawyer than to a student of American government.

The way in which theorists and theoretical concepts are introduced, together with the often-expressed sentiment that, "After all, judicial opinions are political theory, " indicate that "theory" is conceived here to be synonymous with "doctrine." It means a statement of preferences for some particular or denying some particular degree of power to some particular person or institution, or some particular use of power (policy). It is a word relating to goals, norms or values. Insofar as "theory" is discussed at all, it involves only making clear and explicit the value preferences of judges or other actors in the judicial function. The job of the constitutional law student is not to pass judgment upon these value preferences, nor is it especially to recognize bits and pieces of value theory as they enter into the rationale of a specific decision. At best it is to describe, to extrapolate from a morass of judicial decisions, the value preferences of a judge, a whole court, or perhaps of a whole society, at some specific point in time. Only one of five typical works states clearly that it seeks to "give doctrinal and social perspective to the difficult problems of Constitutional Law today," 30/and even that one does not relate the doctrines and perspectives it discusses to the theories familiar to the student in a political theory course.

In short, students in the constitutional law course ordinarily think in terms of legal doctrine. Only rarely is the distinction and the relations between legal and political doctrine brought home to them. Never are they encouraged to wrestle with problems of value theory, and never are they exposed to the notion that political theory is anything but political doctrine.

Another significant characteristic of the constitutional law course is the scant concern it shows for justifying its relevance to American government and politics. The failure to relate legal doctrines to well-formulated political doctrines is matched by failure to consider the role of judicial decisions in the process of government from any standpoint, let alone from the standpoint of diverse theories about the nature of government. Indeed, the very primitive concept of "government" if often left nebulous. Only two of five typical works 31/ contain even descriptive discussion of institutional aspects of American courts in the American political system, and only one of them32/consistently, from beginning to

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30. #6, p. v.

31. #6, #9.

32. #9.

end, focusses discussion on the structure and functioning of government and the pattern of governmental policies as they are influenced by judicial decisions. This one, by the way, is the only one to recognize explicitly what is hardly even to be inferred from the others, that,

> "judicial decisions alone provide an inadequate basis for an understanding of constitutional development. The attitudes of the people or of politically influential groups determine whether or not attempts will be made to expand or curtail the operations of constitutional government in particular directions. The area of conflict may therefore be found oftentimes in Congress rather than in the judiciary."33/

But this particular text does not relate its conceptions about the nature of politics, law and government to any of the theoretical conceptions considered in the political theory course. In other words, even though statements asserting the "political character" of judicial opinions and the "law-making property" of judicial decisions are commonplace, the political role of the juciciary is not the object of inquiry for the constitutional law course.

One may occasionally meet, in the course, such political propositions as,

> "...the courts have in sustaining laws done more than give to those laws an authoritative stamp. They have also added to them a reasoned justification.... /The/ judiciary has created an ideology or opinion or 'myth' which the public can unite in accepting,"34/ or

> "Most fundamental political changes are brought about only after long periods of agitation and discussion."35/

But the point is, such generalizations are never (save in the one case in five already mentioned) related to or supported by the data presented with them, which consist of legal reasonings of judges and miscellaneous historical facts. Theoretical propositions about the role of "myth" or "ideology" in the American system, about the role of "law" in a community like America, or about the relation of legal and judicial to other forms of political power in America can be found in constitutional law materials, but they are not recognized as theoretical propositions, let alone related to the bodies of theory in which they occupy some logical place. Moreover, other basic questions---such as the relative political character of constitutional and other types of law---are never raised at all. Not even judicial review is subjected to political inquiry.

The fact that its data consist largely of judicial decisions suggests that the "decision-making concept," a recent contribution of writers in the field of theory and method, may lie at the heart of the constitutional law field. However, the judicial decision process itself is given less attention than is the governmental or political character of judicial decisions. Beyond the customary platitudes to the effect that "judges are, after all, human," or that their personal philosophies as well as their tastes and humors may influence their decisions, students hear little about the process by which courts decide. One of five typical works 36/ does emphasize the "discretionary nature" of the judges' power

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33. #9, p. 4. One other (#6) is prefaced by a clear conception of litigation as a governmental process, and does open with a chapter of political discussion about judicial review, but the balance of this work offers almost no further discussion of any topic from a political standpoint.

34. #10, p. 8. 35. #9, p. 28. 36. #6.

to decide, but, again, this is an offhand statement drawn from common knowledge or some such source, not a generalization from the data of the text.

If anything, the conceptual framework implicit in most constitutional law courses is much broader than any political schema. Its character is suggested by the fact that constitutional law texts are organized mainly in historical fashion.37/ In all cases, "history" appears to be a Hegelian process involving contests between liberty and non-liberty38/or a series of conflicts between various types of vaguely defined socio-economic groups---"labor," "the rising middle class," "the well-to-do," "business," "management," etc.---over the distribution of property and its benefits. The theory of history implicit in the constitutional law course frequently sees "the times" "causing" changes in legal doctrine, or the courts "reflecting" "vast social and economic changes." The political mechanism involved in such changes through time is never an object of interest for the student of constitutional law. At best he is offered, in addition to familiarity with legal reasoning, vague conceptions of the social and economic consequences of judicial decisions. Nowhere is his attention focussed upon questions about the nature and role of the political in this socio-economic or Hegelian sweep of history.

To be sure, the constitutional law course does not pretend to be a course on the political function of judicial institutions in general. It sets out to examine only one class of judicial decisions, those concerning constitutional questions. It might be thought that examining these decisions entails examination of the relationship of the court to other governmental institutions, especially since the practice of judicial review must be described and explained in this connection, and since these particular judicial decisions are a very significant cluster in the overall set of governmental decisions. However, the habit of being exclusively concerned with the logical niceties of legal reasoning and of dismissing political doctrines summarily in footnotes without concern for their relation to the legal doctrines examined prevents students from asking why this particular field (constitutional law) has been carved out, or what relation it bears to the study of American government as a whole. The political aspects of the specialized topic, judicial decisions dealing directly with governmental power, are as much neglected as are more general questions about the political character of the entire judicial function. In the end, of course, the justification for concentrating on this one specialized topic can be found only by facing up to the more general questions about the politics of adjudication. In other words, for the constitutional law course to add genuinely to one's understanding of American government, it has to be more broadly conceived than is currently the case. Only some political theory can provide the basis for the conception needed.

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37. Either the main outline of the book is wholly chronological (#9, #10, and the first third of #7) or the organization for dealing with each constitutional problem is chronological (#6, #8, the latter parts of #7). The historical evolution of legal doctrines occupies a prominent place in all five typical works. Most of them (all but #10, in fact) devote considerable space in the text or notes to the "historical setting" of all major cases discussed.

38. #7.

This very brief survey of the utilization of political theory in the study of the special field of American politics called constitutional law can be summarized still more briefly:

1. In contrast to the American government course, the constitutional law course does not suggest even indirectly that knowledge of political theory will help the student in his study of constitutional law.

2. In concentrating upon logical analysis of the legal doctrines of judges and lawyers, the constitutional law course may at times recognize the existence of significant political values, but it rarely relates these carefully to the legal doctrines which are the main object of attention, and it never suggests to students that understanding and analysis of those values is important or might be facilitated by understanding of political theory.

3. Because the objective of the constitutional law course is more familiarity with legal doctrine than analysis of the structure and functioning of the American political system, it does not even discuss the kinds of question to which causal political theory might afford answers.

4. With slight exaggeration it might be said that the problem is not to make political theory relevant to the study of constitutional law but to make constitutional law relevant to the study of American government. Only some political theory can show what questions should be raised and how answers to them should be sought, if knowledge about constitutional law is to be an integral part of knowledge about A merican politics.

III. THE SPECIAL CASE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

The fact that the name "American Political Thought" is ordinarily preferred to "American Political Theory," and that almost every text in the field uses the term "thought" rather than "theory" in its title or subtitle39/, suggests immediately that the subject matter of courses here is more American government than political theory. The object of inquiry is not substantive theories about general politics or substantive theories about American politics, but "the American political mind," "the American tradition," "the American democratic faith," or "the fundamentals of our political thinking."40/

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39. Of six typical books, five use the phrase "American thought" in the title or subtitle, and one (#16) is subtitled "A Textbook in Political Theory."

40. Note the titles and subtitles of #11 and #16, and the section headings of #12. See also #13, p. v, and #15, p. iii.

The American theory course usually deals almost entirely with concepts and problems which relate to the value aspects of political theory. In dealing with these problems, the course seeks rather to expound the value beliefs and related political preferences of American authors, politicians and citizens than to analyze the value theory which might link political preferences to basic value beliefs. Inasmuch as America has produced few comprehensive or systematic theorists, it is perhaps natural that the data of the American theory course consist primarily of piecemeal comments by different sorts of writers on a variety of political issues.41/ The point is, however, that students are not ordinarily directed to consideration of the value theories which supposedly are relevant to the value beliefs and political preferences exhibited in their texts. Casual reference is sometimes made to the more systematic theories considered in the course in Western political theory, but more often European theories and theorists are presented as "historical roots" of American thought, or as interesting parallels to some phase of it. They are not presented as tools for the critique and analysis of the beliefs and preferences displayed in the American theory course.42/

What is sought, in place of criticism of values in terms of theory, is a summary picture of "the American political mind," in other words, description of an American ideology. While all the texts would probably agree that one purpose of presenting such a picture is "to stimulate the student to make an intelligent synthesis of his own,"43/ they in fact discourage students from the kind of intellectual effort required in such "synthesizing." As in the American government course, the student is likely to get the impression that Liberty, Equality, Justice, and above all Democracy, are things in which one can believe or not, without mental effort, and to recognize their symbolic value rather than their place in a coherent theory of values.44/

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41. On this point, note McCloskey, Robert G., "American Political Thought and the Study of Politics," Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 51:115-129, p. 115.

42. One text (#13) devotes substantial parts of three of its seventeen chapters to European origins, including the works of Hobbes, Locke and Harrington. Two others devote at least a major portion of an opening chapter to similar subject matter, including the works of Calvin and Luther. The others allude to European theories as "historical roots," but without extensive discussion of these theories. None of the texts give any space to comparable discussion of European theories later than the eighteenth century.

43. #14, p. viii.

44. McCloskey (op. cit.) argues that the utility of studying American thought stems from the assumed role of American "theorists" as both reflectors and creators of an American mind, which enables study of them to "lead us to understanding about our political character..." (p.117), Although American theorists, he says, teach an American" less about absolute truth, they can teach him more about America." (p. 118). The criticism of this view offered here is in close agreement with the criticism offered in Diamond's comments on McCloskey's article. Diamond, Martin, "Comments on McCloskey," Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 51:130-134 (1957).

Even more than the American government course, the American theory course fails to demonstrate the actual ideological character of the value beliefs and symbol responses alleged to make up the ideology of Americans or certain groups of them. While the texts set forth alleged tenets in the American doctrine, articles in the American creed, basic beliefs in the middle class philosophy, and so on, the data presented are the written words of a very limited number of miscellaneous writers, very few of whom were influential political actors. It may be reasonable to assume that the political actions of any given writer were somehow motivated by the beliefs he set forth, but the relation of his beliefs to those of the American people or some large subsection of them, or at least to some influential actors, ought to be clearly stated, if the student is to comprehend the role of these ideas in the American political system. The point is, however, that the role of those ideas in the American system is not now a problem which the American political theory course seeks to discuss. Its main concern is to expound the values and doctrines which certain writers have set down.

Another reflection of this preoccupation of the American theory course is its failure to consider any aspect of the institutional facts of American political life.45/ What actually happened to this or that political institution at a given point in time? What factors seem to have influenced the shape and functioning of these institutions? Above all, what effects have the value beliefs attributed to the American public had on political institutions? These are not important questions for the course in American theory. European theories and theorists may be mentioned in the course, but the texts rarely bother with their causal propositions which seek to answer general questions of this order, being interested in them, if at all, only for their political preferences. Hobbes can be adequately capsulized as a "conservative authoritarian,"46/ Locke as a champion of vested interests, Marx as a champion of the working man, and so on. So causal political theory is not presently used in the American theory course, whether for illumination of the general processes of American politics or for analysis in particular of the role of political ideas in those processes.

The political conception underlying the American theory course is sometimes as ambiguous and vague as that of the constitutional law course. It is

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45. McCloskey, in recommending as a new approach, that ideas and institutions be studied together, seems at one point to emphasize that "ideas have institutional consequences," and to suggest that the role of ideas in shaping institutions should become the subject of empirical inquiry. Despite this general statement, however, he still appears to consider that the main concern in the study of American thought should be elucidation of the American mind: "The idea is not that going institutions always and exactly reflect the mind of America, either past or present, but that they can provide an extremely important clue to a comprehension of that mind." (Op. cit., p. 121). In other words, American political institutions are to be studied primarily as evidence for displaying the American political mind. What, then, is the reason for studying that mind? If it is to gain insight into American institutions, we appear to be trapped in a tightly closed circle.

46. #13, p. 7.

interesting to note that, of six representative works, two[47] are explicitly described as treatises in intellectual history. Even where the term "political" is used in the title, no clear conception of the nature of politics and government guides the selection of materials or the discussion of problems. All six representative books are organized in primarily chronological fashion, which in itself suggests the absence of any clearcut organizing political schema. Most of them imply, if they do not specifically assert, a fundamental belief in the hopeless complexity of human affairs, from which one infers that it is impossible to disentangle the subject matter of politics from all other aspects of human life.[48] The only political questions treated in the average American theory course are issues about the relative desirability of different policy alternatives, and these, as has just been seen, are approached exclusively in terms of the simple value preferences they involve.

On the whole, then, the materials of the Western political theory course are little used by a student of American political thought:

1. If study of political theory means criticizing theoretical propositions about value or about cause and effect in politics, the American political thought course is not a course in political theory.
   a. Its concern is with exposition of American ideology rather than critical evaluation of systematic theories of political values.
   b. It does not deal with conceptual and causal elements of any ideology.
   c. It is not concerned with value theory or causal theory as propositions to be examined for their validity.
2. Although the subject studied is American ideology, it is not studied in a political framework.
   a. It is guided by no clear conception of politics and government.
   b. It does not consciously seek generalizations or conclusions about the role of American ideologies in the American political system.
   c. It does not utilize theoretical propositions of theorists about the political nature and role of ideologies.

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47. #12, #15.

48. "Change in ideas about the cosmos is caused by the advance of scientific knowledge. Increase in knowledge also affects ideas about the relation of the individual to society. Other factors, such as shifts in world politics, may cause changes in intellectual climates. The problem is of vast complexity and has not been fully explored." (#12, p. v.)

d. The conceptual schemes and theoretical propositions of European political theorists are therefore not considered relevant to the study of American political thought, except for occasionally exhibiting verbal parallels with American writers.

IV. THE UTILITY OF POLITICAL THEORY

Conclusions about the potential utility of political theory in the study of American government can be summarized in general terms at this point. Regardless of present or past performance, political theory ought to contribute to understanding of American politics in quite positive fashion:

1. It ought to help students clarify their own value preferences, so that they understand the value choices and value judgments they make. Such understanding requires more intellectual effort than passive acceptance of certain symbols and beliefs as "good." It involves disciplined analysis of the sort of value propositions set forth in political theories.

2. It ought to afford them a basic conception of what politics is all about, as systematic as possible a knowledge of the general processes of government and politics, in terms of verifiable propositions about the causes and consequences of general types of political situations, structures and practices.

   a. Unless related to such a general theory of politics, knowledge about American government and politics is mere purposeless acquaintance with innumerable discrete facts. The propositions of general theory not only give meaning to particular propositions about American politics, but are an important means for testing their logic and consistency. Unless the American political system is seen as a particular case of the general process of government, it can hardly be said to be understood.

   b. There is also a certain utility for political theory itself, when American politics is studied in the light of theory. Valid generalizations about the American political system can be used to verify or modify the propositions of general political theory, thus contributing to ever deeper understanding on the ground where all political study must rest.

3. Unless causal theory is used in the fashion just described, value theory, even if perfectly utilized as suggested above, can be of no practical utility to the prospective citizen studying American politics.

   a. Without reliable knowledge about cause and effect in politics, even the most carefully thought out value choices made by political actors can never be more than verbal choices, never have more than aesthetic or some other such psychological value

to the individual chooser. To receive or enjoy the values chosen, the chooser must associate his value choices with action choices. And rational action choices can be based only on predictions about the effects of actions chosen and of other causes operative in the situation where choice is made. Such predictions can be made with assurance only on the basis of some causal theory.

b. In particular, only some causal theory can explain to the student or to the political actor what role his value beliefs and value choices may actually play in the real world of American politics and government. Without theoretical explanation of the processes of politics, there is no reason for anyone ever to make a political decision based on rational value choice.

In short, political theory is indispensable to the study of American government and politics. The sounder one's grasp of theory, the more complete his understanding of the American political system. Without theory of some sort, however vague, tacit, or even unrecognized, there can be no understanding. Without understanding, the student has less hope of accomplishing whatever he intends to accomplish as a participating citizen or official.

V. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE POLITICAL THEORY COURSE

These suggestions about the utility of political theory obviously reflect a highly idealized picture of the condition of political theory itself. They presuppose that political theory affords a certain knowledge which may well not be found in that field as it is presently taught to students. The underlying presuppositions are probably clear enough from all that has been said so far, but they ought nonetheless be set forth plainly:

1. The study of political theory is undertaken for some purpose beyond whatever pleasure of mere contemplation it might afford the student.

   a. No purpose is served if "study" involves nothing more than enabling students to name the works and the years of publication of a handful of theorists.

   b. No purpose is served if it seeks only to enable students to recognize some particular form of words or turn of phrase as the literary creation of some particular theorist.

   c. No purpose is served if the student learns only that a particular theoretical treatise was written in a certain situation and under certain circumstances.

2. Since every political theory is a body of related assertions or propositions about the world of politics and governments---propositions both about what is the case and why and about what ought to be the case and why---one principal objective of

the study of political theory is the analysis of these propositions, for purposes of agreement or disagreement with them. In other words, political theories all profess to dispense knowledge about the political world, so they must be studied for the purpose of extracting such knowledge from them.

a. From this standpoint, any theory may be examined and criticized for the clarity of the concepts it uses.

b. Any theory may be examined and criticized for the statements of fact it makes.

c. Any theory may be examined for its logical consistency in the use of its concepts and the propositions it asserts.

d. Any theory may be examined and criticized for the kinds of evidence by which it proves its propositions or by which they might be proved.

e. But the main objective of all these operations is the same---to establish the validity or invalidity of some or all of the propositions which make up the theory.49/

f. This is the objective in examining both the value and the causal aspects of a theory.

3. The ultimate objective of the study of political theories is thus Political Theory itself. The principal reason for studying political theories is to promote theorizing about government and politics---in other words, to contribute to development of a general theory of politics.50/

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49. "Validity" is here an extremely broad term. It refers to conformity with whatever rational grounds of belief in propositions the theorist has philosophically justified for the proposition examined, and includes all the connotations of the word "truth"---agreement with simple empirical fact, ethical merit, logical consistency, conformity with recognized authoritative premises, etc. For a view contradicting this one in important respects, see #29, p. xi.

50. Lest these views appear too restrictive, making the study of political theory a far more specialized subject than it is customarily accepted to be, it should be emphasized that there is one more major premise underlying everything which has been said---namely, that political theory and American politics are both to be approached from the viewpoint of the political scientist, the student of politics. To maintain that the study of political theories, or any other branch of political science, is really much broader than suggested above, to maintain that the goal of the science of politics is total knowledge about God, man and the universe, or to seek from the science of politics cosmic generalizations about the nature of ethics, the purpose of life, or the meaning of history implies, I think, that political science cannot be a discipline, and that the study of politics as a specialized branch of knowledge is impossible. This is not to deny that such topics are fit subjects of human inquiry. But it is to deny that they are the distinctive objects of political inquiry.

a. Even if political science as a discipline does not give the student such a general theory, the student himself must use some embryonic theory of his own when making statements or drawing conclusions, value or causal, about politics. The study of political theory thus necessarily promotes some level of theorizing, and this is its chief utility to the student.

How well does the "traditional course in the history of political theory" equip a student to use theory in this fashion? This final question leads to consideration of "What we think we are doing /in the theory course/, or alternatively what we should be doing instead."51/

It might seem on the face of it that study of political theory involves analysis, one by one, of the theories of a limited number of writers, most of them distinguished for their comprehensive and systematic treatises on the general subject of politics.52/ The important question is, What is the student expected to do with them? Why should he read them at all? What are the main purposes of the theory course? The texts in the field reflect a disturbing variety of answers to such questions. They range from the purpose of "providing aesthetic pleasure and enjoyment as well as intellectual challenge and stimulation"53/to discovering "a rational Grand Tradition of Culture and also (quite distinct) the beginnings of a science of politics,"54/ and include the simple reason that, "A knowledge of Plato's Republic, of Aristotle's Politics, of parts /Why only parts?/ of Augustine's City of God., belongs to a general education."55/ To the student who reasonably asks, when confronted with the works of the "saints," "What should I do with this?", the answer implied to him must at times resemble the classic lines of the heroine in gas-light melodrama, "Take me, Oh Sylvester Farthingdale! I am yours! Do with me what you will!"

Given diversity and lack of clarity about the fundamental purpose of the theory course, it is logical to expect a multiplicity of approaches and perspectives in the field. Usually, as the course title shows, the approach is primarily historical.56/ In some cases, the study of political theory is specifically con-

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51. Letter from panel chairman John D. Lewis, January 13, 1957.

52. While critics of American political thought frequently grumble at the "second-rate" character of writers studied in that field (note again McCloskey, op. cit., p. 115), relatively few complain that the Western political theory course includes writings of men not qualified to be called "theorists." Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Marx---these and many other system-builders furnish ample forage for the student who likes his ideas in comprehensive bundles. While there may be more "second-rate" (non-theoretical) writers examined in the theory course than commonly supposed, particularly in the modern period of the course, it is assumed for the balance of this discussion that the subject matter of the political theory course is made up of a finite number of full-fledged political theorists.

53. #20, p. ix.

54. #17, p. x.

55. #23, p. 1.

56. Of fifteen typical works, ten are organized in purely chronological fashion, and one is organized under eighteen topical headings, each associated with a historical period, theorists being treated within each topical section in chronological sequence.

ceived to be a branch of the study of history.57/ Most texts devote considerable space to exposition of the "historical setting" in which particular theories were produced, describing the political institutions, the nature of political, social and economic conflicts, the current modes of thought in all fields of life, or other aspects of the historical setting.58/ On the other hand, many texts pursuing a purely historical approach ignore problems of historical setting or relations to historical facts of the age and deal exclusively with the "historical relation to his predecessors and successors"59/ of a man's various abstract notions.

Not all texts which rely on a purely historical method of presentation explain to the student why he should know the historical setting or the historical sequence of political ideas. But many of them do make clear the assumption that such ideas are an important class of political facts, whose role in political events is the real subject of the political theory course. The objective of the study of theory, in such works, is conceived to be understanding of "the forces which are working on men's minds,"60/ "the major ideas that have animated the political thinking of the Western world,"61/ or the "operative ideals" of certain groups of men.62/ In other words, the subject of political theory is taken to be the ideologies of men.

Where such a perspective is found, however, there is commonly the same kind of failure to demonstrate the factual existence of the beliefs in question as was found in the American government field. Recognition may be given that "theory" (obviously meaning ideology) "is not to be found in any work of the study, in any single language: it appears in the utterances and pronouncements of the leaders of States and parties and Churches..."63/ But even where this

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57. "Ancient and medieval institutions have received much attention...; but no one hitherto has sought to follow through ancient and medieval times the course of ideas on the topics of political science. It is to fill the void here indicated that the present volume is submitted." (#19, pp. vii-viii).

58. See, for example, #19, #22, #25, #29.

59. #23, p. 1. See also #20, p. ix; #25, p. v; #28, p. 6.

60. #27, p. vii.

61. #21, p. vii.

62. #24, p. 1.

63. #27, p. vi.

characteristic of ideology is recognized, the materials offered the student overwhelmingly related to the formal expression of ideas in tracts and treatises by writers universally recognized as theorists.64/ No work suggests the necessity for empirical verification of the existence of the ideologies and beliefs discussed, as ideologies, let along for empirical study of the operation of ideology in any political system.

It is sometimes suggested that the theories of writers have themselves been potent causes of political effects, as well as more or less disembodied expressions of the thinking of broad groups of men.65/ But the political theory course makes no more effort to demonstrate such causal relations as a fact than it does to demonstrate the existence of asserted ideologies.

Sometimes it is recognized that the ideology, or "operative ideals," may be reflected in the shape and functioning of actual institutions, that one can by the processes of logic infer from the facts of political life the "theory" which must govern the actions and patterns of behavior which constitute political facts and institutions.66/ Such an assumption underlies all those works which offer the student, addition to verbatim or paraphrased statements of writers, any description of functioning political systems.67/ However, it is not customary to offer students even such descriptive accounts, much less to strive consistently to relate the political thoughts and theories under

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64. Consult, in this connection, #18 (which mentions its intention to include ideas animating "social movements," p. v); #20 (which refers to the influence of political ideas on actual politics as an important problem for political theory students, p. x); #23 (which asserts that "theories" are an "expression of the spirit of an age," p. 8); #28 (which states its intention to discuss the "ideas and beliefs" of "the California fruit-grower or the Pennsylvania coal-miner, the sheep-rancher of Queensland or the cultured clubman of Buenos Aires," p. 4); and #31 (which argues that depending exclusively upon the formal works of theorists "gives a history of political literature rather than of political thought," p. 12).

65. "In some instances writers have been included...because they have had considerable influence on politics, and because their statements typify an entire school of thought." (#20, p. x).

66. "Much political theory....is found tacitly underlying the form of actual organization and methods.... A study of the history of political institutions and of the actions and policies of states is therefore essential, as they occasionally show more clearly than words the actual principles that dominated men's minds." (#31, pp. 12-13).

67. Such descriptive material is found, e.g., in #19, Chapters 1, 4 and 5; #22, pp. 19-25, 63-76, 234-252, 288-297, 423-426, 536-539, 702-703; #29, Chapter 1; and #31, pp. 34-38, 75-78.

examination to the institutions described.68/ For the most part, the student is left to consider political institutionsonly as they might be mentioned by the theorists he reads.

It cannot be said, therefore, that the political theory course, even where its concern is with ideology, adequately instructs students with regard to the role of belief patterns in government. If the political theory course sought to establish and to convey general propositions about the role of ideology in functioning political systems, basing these generalizations upon particular facts of ideology which the theory course might survey for the purpose of pointing out such generalizations, it would occupy a legitimate place in the curriculum of empirical political science. If it offered the student such propositions, they would obviously be of the utmost utility in suggesting what role American ideologies play in the American political system. But the political theory course at present hardly gives students much in the way of scientific generalizations about the actual political role of ideas.

Not many teachers (including the writer) and no text would define political theory as a special scientific study of one factor in empirical politics, of course. Some texts go no farther than the intent to explain more fully to students some things they are already presumed to believe69/, but most do give some sense that the political theories they study contain alternative answers to basic political questions on which a thinking man must hold some position.70/ Expressly or by implication, the political theory course certainly rests on and conveys some impression that, if one of its main functions is to facilitate a person's taking positions on such questions, students must be concerned with the validity of the propositions, both value and causal, which they study. It is doubtful, however, that the political theory course at present does much more to equip students for considering questions of validity than convey this vague impression.

To begin with, there is the practice noted earlier of presenting materials in primarily historical and descriptive fashion, without very extensive discussion of the problems of method and proof, of epistemology and logic, involved in passing judgment on the propositions to be analyzed.71/ If there are

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68. At best, five of fifteen typical works present minimal discussion of this kind. It is noteworthy that such discussion is in all five cases confined almost exclusively to the institutions of primitive, Greek and Roman societies.

69. Such seems the intent implied in statements like, "to understand the 'modern mentality' is to understand ourselves." (#23, p. 15).

70. "It is in the successive answers to these and to cognate questions /What is it that makes the state one? What is the foundation of obligation to the state? Where shall power be lodged? How shall it be exercised?/ that we find the material of the history of political thought," (#25, pp. 2-3).

71. Only three of fifteen typical works present at least a few pages of such general methodological discussion. See #17, pp. 3-9; #22, pp. 3-15; #24, pp. 27-51.

standards or rules of thinking and analysis, the student will rarely find it out directly from his theory text.72/ He will generally be cast adrift in a sea of "ideas" with little help in the general problem of dealing with them.

In particular, he will not always find the distinction between value theory and causal theory carefully drawn for him.73/ If he is astute enough to recognize the distinction for himself, or fortunate enough to have an instructor who will draw his attention to it, he will note that the propositions receiving most attention in the political theory course are value propositions, and the judgments he is called upon to make mostly value judgments: Which is better, monarchy or democracy? Middle class or working class values? Two houses to a legislature or one? Is justice the "interest of the stronger" or an objective standard? Does force or moral obligation account for legitimate claims to political obedience?

Because criteria of validity for value propositions are the subject of acute disagreement among theorists and teachers---constitute, in fact, perhaps the most difficult philosophical problem for a student---this preoccupation with value questions may actually dull the student's mind to the importance of making judgments, of deciding upon the relative validity of contradictory propositions. One text specifically tells him that, "Taken as a whole, a political theory can hardly be said to be true," and that he will "approach the whole history of Western political theory from the point of view of this sort of social relativism."74/ From this the student may readily but incorrectly infer that he can thoughtlessly choose to believe any or none of the conflicting propositions he reads, and that the objective of his study is at most to enable him to recite the rudiments of justification offered by some theorists for some propositions.

Because discussion of values is predominant in the political theory course, the student is likely to recognize even less the necessity for making decisions about the validity of causal propositions and related factual statements he encounters. There is, among political theorists, more widespread agreement upon

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72. Of course he may discover it in some collateral reading, such as the article by Sabine, op. cit., the book by Easton, op. cit., or Jenkin, Thomas P., The Study of Political Theory (N.Y., Doubleday, 1955). But it is doubtful that many political theory courses utilize such readings or devote much time to such problems.

73. Such a distinction is not made anywhere in #21, #23, #25, #26, #27, #30, or #31. For examples where the distinction is explicitly pointed out (and often used in interpretation and discussion) see #17, p. 8; #18, p. 3, #19, p. 27; #22, pp. 3-15; #24, pp. 27-51; and #29, p. ix. On the basic importance of making this distinction for the student, see Fairman, Charles, "The Estate of Political Science," Western Pol. Quart. 1:1-11 (1948).

74. #29, pp. xi-xii.

the proper criteria for passing judgment in causal matters than upon the criteria appropriate for value theory. Indeed, there is almost agreement that the creation of a political science proceeds in large measure from the cumulation of verified causal propositions of the sort which abound in most political theories.75/ But because the value propositions of political theory are generally treated without mention of the need to agree or disagree with them, it is commonly assumed by students that causal propositions may be dealt with in similar casual unconcern.76/ Almost never do they hear that political theories may contain a nucleus of verifiable or disprovable propositions which can be used in the development of a political science, a current and vital body of concepts and propositions which summarizes what we know about politics---know as firmly as physicists know what atomic theory tells them---or that the comprehensiveness, logical order, and validity of its causal propositions are one important standard for assessing the relative importance (to students of politics) of any political theory. They are left with the impression that "political science" is some other branch of study, divorced from and not very relevant to political theory in general or political theories in particular.

There are a few textbooks and, no doubt, more than a few courses in political theory which do attempt to force the student into the kind of analysis of both value and causal theory which leads to the evaluation of theoretical propositions as substantive knowledge about politics. However, such an orientation

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75. The acid controversies among political scientists revolving around "science," "general theory," and such symbol-words are not usually centered on disagreement about the possibility of cumulating causal propositions or about the criteria of validity for them. They are usually, at bottom, questions about the meaning or significance of such propositions and systems of propositions---i.e., disputes about epistemology and ontology.

76. The argument here closely parallels that of Easton (op. cit., Chapter 10) concerning the nature, causes and consequences of "historicism" in political theory.

In view of the tensions and hostilities resulting from ideological split within the camp of political scientists, it is perhaps appropriate to add here a disavowal of certain intentions that may be imputed to the writer. None of the above argument is in any way advocacy of the "scientific" as against other methods of political study, or in behalf of "empirical" as against "metaphysical," "behavioral" as against "institutional," or other conceptions. It is not any particular school of thought, any particular conception of politics, any particular method of political study, which is in question here. The argument says simply that none of these schools, conceptions, or methods are now being used in the political theory course to validate what theorists assert, because validation is not undertaken at all.

is still a comparative rarity.77/ Most students undoubtedly go through their course in political theory with no sense of the need for accepting or rejecting state beliefs or the relevance of political theories to knowledge of politics.

If there is any single conclusion to all that has been said so far, it is that political theory will be most useful in the study of American politics---or any other branch of political science, for that matter---when political theorists finally agree on what it is that they are teaching. Political theory, as a grab-bag of historical facts and interesting "theories," might be of some utility to the student for getting him a few more college credits or to the average citizen for making him appear to be an educated or cultured man. Political theory, as the study of ideology, might be of use to political scientists concerned with the role of one among many factors in the process of government. But the study of political theory will be most useful to the citizen, the studeent, and the political scientist alike when it becomes analysis of propositions about values and about cause and effect, undertaken for the purpose, first, of agreeing or disagreeing about their validity, and, second, applying them to such particular cases as the American political system.

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77. Organization of a book or course around "great issues" or "problems," however vaguely these are defined, necessarily inclines a student in that direction more than a purely historical and descriptive organization and presentation. As examples of quite different kinds of topical organization, see #18, #21, and #27. Of fifteen typical works, only one (#24) is an analytical work in the sense of that term implied here. One does survey the field with the express assumption that it surveys at least the beginnings of data for "a Science of Politics." (#17, p. x). (It is worth noting, in view of the defensive posture usually taken by upholders of the traditional way of life of the political theory course toward anyone using the word "science," that this latter work proceeds in historical fashion and covers the same ground as all other widely used texts. The difference is a difference only in the sense of purpose underlying the survey).

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THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT IN TRAINING IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

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The study of traditional political philosophy has been neglected more by teachers and students of international relations than by those among us who are concerned primarily with American and comparative government. While I am convinced that this estimate is presently correct, there is mounting evidence that it may not remain so for long. Since there is comfort in finding that one has company in his convictions, I may be permitted to cite two of the now fairly numerous band who have begun to write as though continuing disregard of formal theory is to be deplored. Among men of affairs, one finds the Labour M.P. Denis Healey writing that his Party has too often fallen victim to "utopianism" because as a whole it "lacks any systematic theory of world affairs...."* Though a non-partisan observer might say, less charitably, that the Party's theory while more systematic than most was simply wrong, Healey's essay nevertheless underscores the importance of theory in the practical realm of Party policy. On this side of the Atlantic one notices and may be impressed by the fact that Dean Acheson, a man who while Secretary of State is said to have viewed dimly the value of more abstract analyses of the substance of foreign relations, now pleads with some urgency and argues with considerable eloquence the need for precisely such activity.** One could easily extend such examples and more easily still add to them a list of scholarly studies that reflect a deepening concern with international-relations theory.

Yet clarion calls to get out there and theorize do not themselves establish the usefulness of the political philosophy of the past. A high regard for systematic theory is often coupled with disdain for traditional political philosophy. The question remains: What if anything can present-day students of international

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* Denis Healey, "Power Politics and the Labour Party," R.H.S. Crossman, ed., New Fabian Essays (London: Turnstile Press, 1952), pp. 161-162.

**See his introduction to Louis J. Halle's Civilization and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955).

relations learn from perusing classical works in political philosophy?

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The political scientist concerned with problems of coalition warfare will clearly profit from familiarity with the history of the Napoleonic wars. The play of mind over historical matter will suggest patterns, parallels with more recent events, pitfalls to be avoided, hypotheses to be considered. The political scientist concerned with civil-military relations will gain a variety of insights from contemplating the cases of Bismarck, of his immediate successors, of the German generals under Hitler. In similar fashion one may argue that for the study of numerous problems there are clues to be gained from a long and thoughtful look at the writings of political philosophers. In Plato and Aristotle, for example, in Machiavelli and Hobbes, in Adam Smith and Friedrich Engels, from the earliest to the most recent Western political philosophers one finds the problem of civilian control of the military and of the effects of military organization on constitutions and governance identified and commented upon as matters of major importance. No argument is required to establish the thought that speculations of eminent minds on matters of abiding importance have some relevance today. Yet one can scarcely build an impressive case for the study of political philosophy on these grounds. Even were I to summarize here the materials just mentioned, I could say little to the retort that, while on these problems Hobbes had something of interest to say, one can learn much more from a comparative study of British and German institutions and practices, from an historical study of American institutions and practices, or from any of a number of other approaches. On this level, the argument for the study of political philosophy is the same as the argument that one profits from knowing some history, that knowledge and ideas may be picked up from Thucydides and Ranke, or, for that matter, from Aristophanes and Shakespeare. There are things of a practical sort to be found in political philosophy, and they are too often overlooked, but it properly remains with the person who is teaching or doing research to decide which materials will be most helpful. It would be foolhardy to

press this particular claim of the political philosophers too far.

Though the first claim of the political philosophers upon our attention is notably weak, the second is not. The interests that the teacher reflects in his teaching most often reflect in turn his estimate of the day's most pressing problems. His manner of approaching these problems most often embodies the currently most popular methodology, however vaguely grounded and sketchily elaborated. The pragmatic and fluctuating character of work in the field of international relations attests to these facts. In this century, teachers and students have shifted their concentration first from international law and the workings of the Peace Movement to diplomatic history and international organization and then from the composition and uses of power to the decision-making processes. The changing focus of interest has paralled changes in events. There is not necessarily anything wrong with this. Most of us incline to disguise the extent to which courses in international politics are courses in current events, whereas concern with the present is as respectable as concern with the past. What is disturbing, however, is the lack of self-criticism among those who have adopted a particular approach and more disturbing still the extent to which the problem of interrelating different approaches has been neglected.

Whether our interest be how to avoid a war and how to win one if avoidance is impossible or, conceivably, how to make a war possible at a time that it can be won, we are all in one way or another concerned with the causes of war and the conditions of peace, whichever of the approaches just mentioned may claim our major attention. This continuing concern opens the way to a critical, theoretical consideration of the particular relevance of different approaches to the study of the factors making for war or peace.

But what rewards can such an undertaking promise? Whatever the putative gains, one may again argue that historical studies, bypassing often intricate theoretical problems, promise gains still larger. Why not, for example, study past wars, figure out their causes and ask ourselves what can be done to eliminate

them or restrict their operation in the future? Or why not look directly at points of tension in the world and study them empirically in order to devise means of alleviation? Such approaches are often used. On the basis of the latter type of study Warren S. Thompson warned in the 1920's that the countries of the world suffering from the pressure of numbers on resources would wage war to solve their problems unless the "have" countries shared their riches of land with the "have nots."* The estimate of cause seems to be stated in a form that permits empirical-historical testing. On closer inspection, however, a number of difficulties become apparent. Clearly, differential population pressures, even where the differentials are large and greatly to the disadvantage of some states, do not always produce wars. It becomes impossible to estimate the significance, or insignificance, of this one factor without relating it to others. But what are the other factors and how great is the importance of each of them?

In order to make sense of the hypothesis we need somehow to acquire an idea of the interrelation of many possibly relevant factors, and these interrelations are not given in the factual data. We establish or, rather, assert them ourselves. To say "establish" would be dangerous, for descriptive statements and statements of cause are of two different orders. Empirically one can demonstrate that a particular statement is not absurd, that there is some basis in fact for it. This, however, is seldom conclusive; often it is not compelling. One may find a high correlation between variations in rainfall in Afghanistan and in the suicide rate in New York City. No one would thereupon assume a causal relation between the two sets of data. To do so would be to insult common sense. But just what does the phrase "to insult common sense" mean? It means that there is no elaborated and accepted system by which a statement of interconnection becomes plausible.

Stating these points may make them seem obvious, yet they are often overlooked. They constitute not merely a justification for theory but an argument that theorizing is an omnipresent, though often merely implicit, operation. As a simple

* Warren S. Thompson, Danger Spots in World Population (New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 1929).

illustration consider the following statement, typical of many made in Communist China. Having referred to the friendship and cooperation that exists "where states reflect the will of the people," as with China and the Soviet Union, the author inquires into the causes of tensions elsewhere in the world. She finds them in the interests and activities of men like Charles Wilson who, "being both the chief manufacturer of war materials for the United States government and its Secretary of Defense, says: 'What is good for my business is good for the country.' " Such men feed and grow fat on the enmity among peoples that they have themselves produced.* Factually much of her statement is substantially though not literally accurate. Wilson is Secretary of Defense, he was president of a large corporation, that corporation has supplied and does supply a large amount of war material to the United States armed forces, and he did make a comment somewhat similar to the one she attributes to him. The element of factual accuracy in the statement does not, however, make it plausible to me. Nor is it factual accuracy that makes the statement plausible to a communist. The "facts" she relates simply supply evidence for a belief already entertained. The belief consists of a picture of the world, an understanding of the causal connections among events, in short an elaborated system that gives meaning to data otherwise unrelated. Is the elaborated system, in this case the Marxist explanation of the causes of war, an accurate one? No amount of data collecting can prove it so, for data do not interpret themselves. The facts may seem to support a given theory; they may support a radically different theory still better.

Accepting this argument, one may conclude that it supports the contention that in his work the social scientist, unlike the natural scientist, is unavoidably subjective. Yet the same difficulties plague and must continue to plague the natural scientist. A brief excursion into the realm of the natural sciences will

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* Song Ching Ling, "Friendship of the Peoples and Peace," China Reconstructs (Peking), January-February, 1954, pp.2-4.

serve to make clearer the role of theory and the limits of empiricism in all enquiry.

The Ptolemaic system was accepted for centuries and a multitude of observations confirmed its scientific adequacy. In the sixteenth century Copernicus, going back to the earlier hypothesis of Aristarchus, advanced a radically different theory. His reason for doing so was more a dissatisfaction with the aesthetically unpleasing complication of the Ptolemaic system than it was the difficulty of fitting increasing amounts of data into the then commonly accepted theoretical structure. E.A. Burtt, a modern philosopher of science, says flatly that there were at the time of Copernicus "no known celestial phenomena which were not accounted for by the Ptolemaic method with as great accuracy as could be expected without more modern instruments. Predictions of astronomical events were made which varied no more from the actual occurrence than did predictions made by a Copernican. ...in this case there was distinctly no gain in accuracy." He adds that "Contemporary empiricists, had they lived in the sixteenth century, would have been first to scoff out of court the new philosophy of the universe."*

Francis Bacon, the seventeenth-century prophet of empiricism, attacked the metaphysics of Aristotle and opposed the assumption of a priori certainty wherever he found it, though this meant ridiculing the methods and accomplishments of Kepler, Galileo, and Gilbert. Newton, influenced by both the deductive mathematical and the inductive experimental schools, came more and more to proclaim himself an apostle of the second. "Whatever is not deduced from the phenomena," he wrote in the Principia, " is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical of physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this philosophy particular propositions are inferred from the phenomena, and afterwards rendered general by induction."** Knowledge of the real

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* Edwin Arthur Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954), pp. 36, 38. The book was first published in 1924; a revised edition appeared in 1932.

**Ibid., p. 218.

world about us is to be seized directly by an inductive method that as rigorously excludes ad hoc hypotheses as it does grandiose metaphysics. But did Newton escape metaphysics or, in trying to escape, did he merely accept uncritically the metaphysical assumptions of his age? Burtt argues that he did the latter. To the question, what is real, he replied in effect, that to which my method can be applied. To the question, how can one obtain a knowledge of the whole, he replied, by studying its parts.

Laplace hailed Newton not as the genius of his age but as the genius of all past and future time. He had discovered the laws of the universe, which like America can only be discovered once. But discovery, in science as in geography, is partly a matter of acceptance. And, as Hume so well argued, it is a logical error to assume that certainty can be produced by piling up experimental evidence. It is tempting to believe that explication can be undertaken without philosophic assumptions and to believe further that a multitude of experiments confirming a particular proposition can produce certainty. Yet Newton's system, though it fostered magnificent scientific and technological accomplishments, though its major propositions were tested and proved over a period of centuries, now appears as but a special case of a more general system.

The preceding discussion emphasizes the role of theory, of assumptions and preconceptions. This is not to decry empirical testing of theories and hypotheses but rather to convey the thought that the frequently heard plea for more hypotheses in testable form and for more theories so constructed that testable hypotheses can be derived from them should always be accompanied by a warning. Empirical verification, while important, cannot produce certainty, in the social or in the natural sciences, for by the most intricate and oft-repeated tests one does not exclude alternative possibilities. The tests are conclusive only with reference to the assumptions postulated. There is then not only the necessity of checking theory against facts but also the necessity of checking one theory against others. To establish the credibility of a proposition, logical-analytic as well as empirical

operations are required. Secondly, to sum up Burtt's criticism of Newton in the simpler language of Alfred North Whitehead, "Induction presupposes metaphysics."* The second point is intimately related to the first. Robert Merton, for example, has asserted that "Systematic sociological theory...represents the highly selective accumulation of those small parts of earlier theory which have thus far survived the test of empirical research."** Proceeding in this manner one may, no doubt, produce systematic theory. The theory, of course, may turn out to be analogous to the Ptolemaic theory, systematically constructed, with its eighty-odd equations empirically tested and forming a schema able to explain the phenomena at hand. The difficulty is built in, not accidental, and the clue to it is given in the word "selective." Selected, one must ask, according to what principle? Empiricists have come to admit that their researches proceed from hypotheses. Hypotheses, Merton avers, are best derived from "theories of the middle range." And how does one formulate the middle-range theories? Apparently this is done by drawing inferences from and logically interrelating propositions of still smaller size, for the immaturity of the social as compared to the physical sciences does not permit social scientists "to deal fruitfully with abstractions of a high order...."# We must build <u>toward</u> the higher order of abstraction. This overlooks the fact that many of the greatest natural scientists, even in the nonage of their disciplines,

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*Alfred North Whitehead, <u>Science and the Modern World</u> (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925, reprint of 1948), p. 65. The rest of the passage is worth quoting. "In other words, it ((induction)) rests upon an antecedent rationalism. You cannot have a rational justification for your appeal to history till your metaphysics has assured you that there <u>is</u> a history to appeal to; and likewise your conjectures as to the future presuppose some basis of knowledge that there <u>is</u> a future already subjected to some determinations. The difficulty is to make sense of either of these ideas. But unless you have done so, you have made nonsense of induction."

**Robert K. Merton, <u>Social Theory and Social Structure</u> (The Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois, 1949), p. 5. The point is often made. I focus on Merton's formulation since it is the most thoughtful and perceptive one I know of. His indicated awareness of some of the points made here (cf. esp., <u>ibid.</u>, pp. 9-10, 85-86), however, makes more puzzling his one-sided emphasis on "theories of the middle range."

#<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 84.

built upon highly abstract and truly breathtaking generalizations.

In a recent article, the physicist John Rader Platt concluded that "the pressure of scientific determinism becomes weak and random as we approach the great unitary syntheses. For they are not only discoveries. They are also artistic creations, shaped by the taste and style of a single hand."* The effect of the idea, and of the mode and method of inquiry, is far reaching; and submerging the idea, allowing it to remain implicit, makes the statement no less true. Whitehead points up the materialist predilections of modern science, rooted in a set of assumptions both fructifying and self-denying. The Copernican-Galilean--Newtonian image of the world focused scientists' attention on motion and matter and fostered an advance in physics at the expense of first neglecting and then introducing a bias into the study of chemistry and biology.**

In social and political affairs, one finds equally impressive examples of the far-reaching effects of central ideas, implicitly or explicitly held. Some events and conditions must be explained in terms of others. Often of decisive significance in the explanation is the answer to the question, where does the explanation begin? In accounting for the recurrence of war, for example, liberals and socialists have markedly inclined to an inside-out explanation. The behavior of states varies with their internal structure--political, economic and social. In the liberal formulation, despotism is warlike and democracy is the uniquely peaceful form of the state. This formulation has, however, been controverted as often as it has been advanced. Herodotus observed that it is comparatively easy to persuade a multitude to foolish military adventure, and the same observation was made by both Aristophanes and Thucydides.*** Ever since, similar refutation has been undertaken whenever

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* John Rader Platt, "Style in Science," Harper's Magazine, October 1956, p. 75.

**Whitehead, op. cit., especially chs. v, vi.

***The History of Herodotus, tr. George Rawlinson (Everyman's Library; London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1949) II, 46, 110. Aristophanes, The Knights, The Acharnians, and Peace. Thucydides, tr. B. Jowett (2nd ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1900), Bk. VI, par. 18.

circumstances made it relevant. But historical refutation is seldom accepted as conclusive. In 1953 The New York Times argued editorially that "No true democracy... can be aggressive. Aggression begins at home. No free majority will ever vote for it."* If a democracy does initiate a war, one can always define it as preventive rather than aggressive. Failing this, one can always argue that the supposedly free majority that supported it was not in fact free enough.

As significant, however, as the attempt to sustain or demolish the proposition in empirical or scholastic fashion is the effort to establish an opposing causal perspective by starting the explanation at a different point. It has, for example, often been argued that the formula "democracies are peaceful; autocracies are war-like" reverses the causation. It is in this view not the internal structures of states that determine questions of war and peace, but questions of war and peace that, sometimes at least, determine the constitutions of states. This is the thesis that Leopold Ranke derived from, or applied to, the history of the states of modern Europe.** The same thesis has been used to explain, in part or in entirety, the structure of other constitutions.***

Most English liberals at the time of the First World War argued that the militarist and authoritarian character of the German state prompted Germany to seek the war that soon embroiled most of the world. At the same time some liberals, most notably Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, argued that no single state could be held guilty. Only by understanding the international system, or lack of system, by which all of the leaders were forced to act with slight regard for conventional morality, could one understand and justly assess the processes by which the war was produced.# Dickinson was blasted by liberals and socialists alike for reversing

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* March 23, 1953, p. 22.

**"The Great Powers," tr. H.H. Von Laue in Theodore H. Von Laue, Leopold Ranke, The Formative Years (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950).

***Cf., for example, Leon Homo, Roman Political Institutions, tr. M.R. Dobie (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1929), especially pp. 146, 364-369.

G. Lowes Dickinson, The European Anarchy (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1917).

the dominant inside-out explanation. Acceptance or rejection of explanatory theses in matters such as this most often depends on the skill of the pleaders and the mood of the audience. These are obviously not fit criteria, yet it would be foolish to argue that simply by taking a more intensive look at the data one could build a compelling case for one or the other explanatory theory. Staring at the same set of data, the parties to the debate came to significantly different conclusions, for the images they entertained led them to select and interpret the data in different ways. The estimate of cause is an idea related to but not identical with the occurrence one seeks to explain. The idea we entertain becomes a filter through which we pass our data. If the filter is good or the data selected carefully, they will pass like milk through cheese cloth. The recalcitrance of the data may cause us to change one filter for another, to modify or scrap the theory we hold--or it may produce ever more ingenious selections and interpretations of the data, as has happened with many Marxists trying to salvage the thesis that with the development of capitalism the masses become increasingly impoverished.

If empirical investigations vary in incidence and result with the ideas the empiricists entertain, it is worth asking ourselves if the ideas themselves can be subjected to scrutiny. Obviously they can be. It is at this point that political philosophy can make its major contribution. The potential contribution has, however, seldom been recognized. One can explain this lack of recognition as but another instance of the influence upon social scientists of the pragmatic temper of American society. But for a cogent explanation more than this is required. The social sciences develop within relatively well-ordered communities compared to the disorder of international relations. For this reason it becomes easy for nonpolitical scientists, and it seems to be increasingly easy for political scientists themselves, to overlook the constant and pervasive influence of political institutions. And because most political philosophers have neglected international relations or at best touched upon them in passing the tendency to apply to the international scene analyses worked out for domestic politics is heightened.

The study of politics is distinguished from other social studies by concentration upon the institutions and processes of government. This focuses the political scientists' concern without constituting a self-denying ordinance against the use of materials and techniques of other social scientists.* On the latter point there is no difficulty for the student of international relations; there is considerable difficulty on the former, for international relations are characterized by the absence of truly governmental institutions, which in turn gives a radically different twist to the relevant processes. Yet there is a large and important sense in which traditional political philosophy, concentrating as it does upon domestic politics, is relevant for the student of international relations. Peace, it is often said, is the problem of the twentieth century. It is as well one of the continuing concerns of political philosophers. In times of relative quiescence the question men put is likely to be: What good is life without justice and freedom? Better to die than live a slave. In times of domestic troubles, of hunger and civil war, of pressing insecurity, however, many will ask: Of what use is freedom without a power sufficient to establish and maintain conditions of security? That life takes priority over justice and freedom appears as a psychological imperative in the political writings of St. Augustine and Luther, of Machiavelli, Bodin, and Hobbes. If the alternative to tyranny is chaos and if chaos means a war of all against all, then the willingness to endure tyranny becomes understandable. Order takes precedence over liberty. The problem of identifying and achieving the conditions of peace, a problem that plagues man and bedevils the student of international relations has, particularly in periods of crisis, bedeviled political philosophers as well.

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* Cf. David B. Truman, "The Impact on Political Science of the Revolution in the Behavioral Sciences," Research Frontiers in Politics and Government (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1955), pp. 202-231.

Concern with the conditions of stability and peace necessitates in turn concern with the causes of disorder, including the most dramatic disorder, war. This may be called the theodicy problem translated into secular terms: man's explanation to himself of the existence of evil. The late R.G. Collingwood has suggested that the most direct route to understanding the writings of philosophers is to seek out the questions they were attempting to answer. I am suggesting that posing a central question and ordering systematically the different answers that can be given to it is the most direct route to the construction of international-political theory. I am arguing further that in attempting to construct such a theory one can profit greatly from a close familiarity with the works of those commonly regarded as major figures in the history of political philosophy. If, as I have suggested above, we cannot escape from philosophy, then to ignore the political philosophy of the past is to proceed on the assumption that each generation, or even each person can and should be his own political philosopher. Aside from the difficulties posed by differences in capabilities and temperaments, this attitude makes for a great repetition of work already done.

Yet one must admit that answers given by political philosophers to the question, why do wars recur, are bewildering in their variety and contradictory qualities. I have time here merely to say, with the briefest of substantive comments, that reexamining political philosophy with an eye open to the question just posed leads one, or at least has led me, to the conclusion that under the following three categories the variety can be ordered without artificially reducing it, thus facilitating comparative and critical evaluation. Though painfully aware of the dangers of treating so eclectically and summarily the corpus of political philosophy, I think it necessary to do so since it is frustrating to hear an argument that political philosophy has contributions to make without at least a hint of what these contributions may be.

According to one image of international relations, the nexus of significant causes is found in the nature and behavior of man. Wars result from selfishness,

from misdirected aggressive impulses, from stupidity, from lack of information; other causes have to be reinterpreted in the light of these factors. If these are the causes of war, then the end of war must come through uplifting and enlightening men or securing their psychic-social readjustment. This estimate of causes and possible cures has been dominant in the writings of many serious students of human affairs from Confucius to present-day pacifists. It is the leitmotif of many modern-day behavioral scientists as well. Clyde Kluckhohn, to cite one example from the many available, has identified "the central problem of world peace" as one of minimizing and controlling "aggressive impulses."* W. Fred Cottrell, to cite another, defines the presently remaining prerequisite for peace as "a clear understanding on the part of all elites that war is inferior to peace in pursuit of their values."** One may, however, agree with the first-image analysis of causes without admitting the possibility of meaningful prescription for their removal. St. Augustine attributes to man's love for "so many vain and hurtful things" a long list of human tribulations, ranging from quarrels and robberies to murders and war.# The explanation is for him an unbreakable one, going beyond any man-made remedy. Man's sin explains both the necessity of political constraints and the necessarily defective quality of all political institutions. With many states, he once wrote, we have wars among them; given a world state, we would have wars within it.## The thought finds its echo in the present when George Kennan, one of the most perceptive commentators on international politics, defines the conduct of government as a "sorry chore...devolving upon civilized society, most unfortunately, as a result of man's irrational nature, his selfishness, his obstinacy, his tendency to violence.### There is here an

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*Clyde Kluckhohn, Mirror for Man (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1949), p. 277.

**W. Fred Cottrell, "Research to Establish the Conditions for Peace," The Journal of Social Issues, XI (1955), p. 20.

#St. Augustine, The City of God, Bk. XXII, ch. xxi.

##Ibid., Bk. XIX, ch. vii.

###George F. Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), p. 48.

attractive world-weary wisdom as well as a valuable caution against expecting too much from changes in forms and institutions. Yet the first image, if rigidly held, becomes sterile. The search for causes is an attempt to account for differences. If men were always at war, or always at peace, the question of why war, or why peace, would never arise. What does account for the alternation of periods of war and peace? Human nature no doubt plays a role in bringing about war. Human nature, however, cannot by itself explain both war and peace, except by the simple statement that man's nature is such that sometimes he fights and sometimes he does not. And this statement leads inescapably to the attempt to explain why he fights sometimes and not others. The partial quality of the first image leads us to go beyond it in seeking the understanding that enables one to account for differences.

In the second image, the basic causes of war are found in the political structures and social, economic conditions of the separate states. The initial argument is that all wars can be attributed to defects in some or in all states. The statement is then often reversed: If bad states make wars, good states would live at peace with one another. With varying degrees of justification this view has been attributed to Plato and Kant, to nineteenth-century liberals and revisionist socialists. Differing in their descriptions of good states as well as on the problem of bringing about their existence, they agree on the principle involved. Thus Thomas Hill Green, liberal-idealist of the mid-nineteenth century, saw no reason why states, as they improve internally, "should not arrive at a passionless impartiality in dealing with each other...."* But how good would good states have to be before most occasions for conflict among them would disappear and those remaining could consistently be settled by cold reason? This question endures even if one can imagine a process by which the generalization of a single pattern of the state could take place.

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*Thomas Hill Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, par. 175.

In the third image, the locus of major causes is found neither in men nor in states but in the state system itself. The first and second images are criticized not so much as being wrong but as being partial. Their partial qualities drive one to seek the more inclusive nexus of causes. The old problem of political philosophy--do men create the societies and states in which they live or do those societies and states, so to speak, remake the men who live in them?--here appears in a different form. Rousseau had argued that the sources of conflict are not so much in men as they are in society. In asking if a man would not be a fool to enclose and cultivate a piece of land when the first comer may rob him of the fruits of all his toil, he puts his point negatively.* In commenting upon "the most perfect society imaginable" that would presumably exist among "a people of true Christians," he notes that "all the citizens without exception would have to be equally good Christians; if by ill hap there should be a single self-seeker or hypocrite..., he would certainly get the better of his pious compatriots."** He thus implies a criticism that, with terms changed, applies to the second as well as the first image. One cannot begin to behave decently unless he has some assurance that others will not be able to ruin him. This thought Rousseau develops and applies to states existing in a condition of anarchy in two short works, translated by C. E. Vaughan as A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe and The State of War. A state may want to behave peacefully; it may have to consider undertaking a preventive war, for the nations of Europe are willful units in close juxtaposition with rules neither clear nor enforceable to guide them. This is his basic explanation for the behavior of all of them, though like Alexander Hamilton he would add that to presume a lack of hostile motives among states is to forget that men are "ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious." A monarchical state may go to war

*Jean Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality in The Social Contract and Discourses, tr. G.D.H. Cole (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1950), p. 212.

**The Social Contract, pp. 135-136. I have added to the English translation the word "equally" in order to render the French text more accurately.

because the vanity of its king leads him to seek glory in military victory; a republic may go to war because of the folly of its assembly or because of its commercial interests. That the king be vain, the assembly foolish, or the commercial interests irreconcilable: none of these is inevitable. However, so many and so varied are the causes of war among states that "to look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereigns in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of the ages."* The third image while not excluding the first and second, places them in a defined perspective. This perspective is especially well developed in Rousseau, though one finds it in Hobbes, Hamilton and others as well.

Before making some comments by way of conclusion, I want to caution that each image may be taken, optimistically, as a clue to necessary and sufficient prescriptions for peace or, more realistically, as a description of crucial difficulties under which men must live. The third image, moreover, makes clear why, in the absence of tremendous changes in the factors included in the first and second images, war will be perpetually associated with the existence of separate sovereign states.

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There is, at least in the United States, a certain uneasiness among those who teach international relations. The uneasiness is rooted in a pervading ambivalence in the teacher's attitude toward his subject matter. At one extreme, it is argued that international relations is a discipline as coherent and respectable as sociology, anthropology or political science itself. This definition of the field is displayed in the curricula of some universities where international relations has achieved the status of a separate department; it is manifest as well in a number of books, notably in Quincy Wright's recent work, The Study of International Relations, in which the substance of international relations becomes the

*The Federalist Papers, No. 6. Cf. No. 4 (Jay) and No. 7 (Hamilton).

synthesizing of all possibly relevant knowledge. At the other extreme it is sometimes argued that, far from being a discipline, international relations is not even a subject. It is instead a collection of diverse materials ordinarily within the province of historians, economists, geographers, social psychologists and others, all related in some vaguely defined manner to the problems posed by relations among states. In the absence of a system for ordering its materials, the study of international relations is fairly placed in the second category. Such study may produce many insights, but they remain like a number of pearls, or glass beads, lying around loose. Their value may be great, but to separate the pearls from the beads a jeweller's glass is required, and, once the pearls have been selected, their use is slight unless they can either be placed in a setting or put on a string. One can, of course, order his materials on a common sense basis without a full-blown political theory. Such efforts, though impressive in some ways, often result either in sterile systems of classification that fail to interrelate seemingly disparate materials causally and dynamically, or they display erratic and naive judgment in the attempt to comprehend the movement of the real world. One may differ on how great these dangers are, but none would assert that they are absent. The argument of this paper is that more frequent and more systematic concern by the teacher of international relations with the classics of political philosophy will help him to order and comprehend the data with which he must work and will improve his critical judgment of statements of cause and interrelation. The function of political philosophy is to help to form, sharpen and critically ground the fundamental understandings that we all have tucked away somewhere in our minds. Partial theories then elaborate, complicate and contribute immediate relevance. The first without the second can be sterile; the second without the first produces the difficulties just mentioned.

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Rural Party Organization and the Realignment Process in Michigan

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A durable party realignment seems to include two major elements. There is first a marked and persistent change in voting behavior, so that an important and politically decisive number of individuals and groups transfer their party identification from one party to the other. If this electoral realignment is to be consolidated into a long-term political realignment, a second step must follow. Where, as is usually the case, there is a new majority party, that party must, in its organization and in its policy stands, reflect the views and interests of its changed constituency. It will moreover have to alter the complex pattern of organizational behavior appropriate to its former minority status and begin to behave like the organizational underpinning of a governing institution--the normal majority party.[1]

[1] For an excellent general treatment of the realignment problem, see Paul T. David, "Comparative State Politics and the Problem of Party Realignment" in Research Frontiers in Politics and Government (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1955), pp. 168-201.

We may assume further that there is likely to be a time lag between the electoral realignment and the organizational realignment. In fact, it is possible that organizational inertia will be so great that the new majority electoral party will be unable to bear the burden of operating a majority party organization, with the result that the realignment will prove abortive, and there will be a tendency for voting behavior to lapse into its familiar grooves.

Such an abortive realignment seemed to have occurred in Michigan in the 1930's. The 1932 elections brought the Democrats such a victory as they had never enjoyed since the founding of the Republican party. Franklin D. Roosevelt was the first Democratic presidential candidate to carry the state since Franklin Pierce in 1852. The Democratic gubernatorial victory was only the fifth since the birth of the GOP, and the first not caused by an internal split in the powerful Republican ranks. The entire Democratic state ticket was swept into office, and a Democratic legislature to boot. Democratic optimists who observed the heavy Democratic majorities in industrial Wayne county could not be blamed for thinking that the day of Republican domination was over. But it

wasn't.

It quickly developed that the pitiful little band of "post-office Democrats" which passed for a state organization were totally incapable of managing a governing party's organization, even if their leaders had been given every chance. They reacted to their victory like starved children turned loose in a candy factory, stuffing themselves with patronage plums, and denying the fruits of victory to the numerous recent recruits to the party's ranks. More important, the old guard leadership failed to see that the electoral realignment was a symptom of deeply felt policy demands which quickly associated themselves with the symbology of the New Deal.

The result was that the Michigan Democratic party organization, such of it as there was, quickly came apart at the seams. A vicious factional struggle between the old guard and the New Dealers took place in 1934, and the incumbent Democratic governor was defeated for renomination by a candidate who promised to out-New Deal Roosevelt. He never had the opportunity to make good his promises, because the party split enabled the Republicans to win the 1934 elections. It began to look as though 1932 was a flash in the pan.[1]

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[1] For an extended discussion of this period, see John P. White, "The Governor of Michigan as Party Leader: The Case of Governor Comstock" in Papers of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts, and Letters, Vol. XLII (1957), pp. 179-194.

The Democrats were able to win the Governorship again in 1936, when liberal Frank Murphy rode Roosevelt's coat-tails successfully. Murphy was defeated for re-election in 1938, and departed for Washington to join Roosevelt's cabinet without having made much of an impression on the state party organization, now once again firmly controlled by the old guard. Another conservative Democrat was elected Governor in 1940 and defeated in 1942. In 1944, though Roosevelt carried the state, the state ticket was soundly trounced. The party hit rock bottom in 1946, when Republicans won even the local offices in Wayne County, and the Democrats were almost shut out of the state legislature, electing only four out of 32 senators and five out of 100 representatives.

But at last in 1948 there began to emerge the organizational realignment so long overdue in the Michigan Democratic party. Under the leadership of G. Mennen Williams and Neil Staebler (State Chairman since 1950) a powerful liberal-labor coalition was formed which set out to revitalize the Democratic party. After sharp but bitter struggles, the old guard remnant was driven from the state organization, and a long, tedious program of oganization building was begun in every part of the

state.[1]

[1] For two views of the Williams coalition, see Stephen and Vera Sarasohn, Political Party Patterns in Michigan (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1957) and Faye Calkins, The CIO and the Democratic Party (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952).

The process is by no means complete, however. In the nature of things, the Williams group had first of all to concentrate on the state organization and then on the 83 counties. Much remains to be done on the local level. This paper is an attempt to examine some of the problems involved in the reorientation of local rural party organization.

The basic unit of local rural government in Michigan is the township. Michigan is one of the relatively few states in which the township retains its vitality. To the consternation of local government experts, this governmental antique is a hardy and tough institution in Michigan. The township has lost some of its functions over the years, but it still assesses and collects taxes, and dispenses rough and ready justice through its Justice of the Peace courts. The township supervisors, sitting as a group, form the county board of supervisors (along with a number of city representatives who are usually outnumbered and outmanuevered). The township officers are thoroughly organized and form one of the most effective pressure groups in the state capitol.

There are over 1200 townships in Michigan, and almost all of them were there before the white man. The state of Michigan simply conferred governmental powers on the tracts of land known as "Congressional Townships". The ordinance of 1785 provided that "The surveyors...shall proceed to divide the said territory (the Northwest Territory) into townships of six miles square...".[2]

[2] Arthur W. Bromage and Thomas H. Reed, Organization and Cost of County and Township Government (Detroit: Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research, 1933), Ch. 1.

Except in the wilderness of the far northern part of the state, almost all of Michigan's townships are still the familiar six mile rectangles, and with insignificant exceptions all are governed by the same machinery, be they forest tracts or crowded suburban localities. The jurisdiction of the township government includes all area within its borders except the area of incorporated cities. Residents of incorporated villages are still governed by the township.

The township is also the basic unit of party organization in rural Michigan. Several provisions of state law insure this. In the first

place, the law requires that "There shall be a township party committee for each political party in every organized township in this state".[1]

[1] Laws Relating to Elections (Lansing: Office of the Secretary of State, 1955), Sec. 352.

The only function prescribed by law for the township committee is that its chairman shall determine the time and place for the holding of the biennial party caucus, which in most townships nominates candidates for township office, and elects a new party committee.[2] The township is

[2] Ibid., Sec. 351.

legally entitled to representation on the county committee of each party. The law provides that not less than two members shall be chosen from each township.[3] However, these township representatives are chosen by

[3] Ibid., Sec. 563.

the county candidates, who select all members of the county committee.[4]

[4] Ibid.

Thus, in the legal party structure there is no direct connection between the county and township committees.

The townships are also represented in the county conventions, which elect delegates to the state party conventions, where candidates for major state office (except Governor and Lieutenant Governor) are nominated. The delegates are elected by the voters of the precinct they represent, and the apportionment of delegates is made by the county chairman.[5]

[5] Ibid., Sec. 568.

Ordinarily, these elections of precinct delegates attract very little interest, and it is not uncommon for a person to elect himself delegate simply by writing in his name.

Such, briefly, is the legal status of the township as a governmental unit and as a unit of party organization. Now let us turn to an

examination of the problem of organizational realignment at the township level. The problem here is only a specialized case of the general problem of reorienting party organization to reflect an electoral realignment at the state level. There are several aspects to this problem.

First, there is the problem of old guardism, which so severely plagued the state Democratic party in the thirties. To what extent do traditionalist Democrats control township party machinery, and how, if at all, can they be integrated into the state and county organization?

Secondly, there is the problem of activating party organization where none exists. The Democratic party in Michigan still faces the fact that in many townships there simply is no Democratic organization. This is a heritage of the long years of one-party Republican domination of the state.

A third problem is the integration of new leadership groups into the oganization. This is especially a problem where there is a well-entrenched pre-realignment party organization which may resist any influx of outsiders.

Finally, there is the problem of coordinating the activities of the party organization at various governmental levels. At the local rural level, this means the problem of the relationships between the county committee and the townships. This problem is exacerbated by the failure of the formal legal structure to provide any sort of organizational nexus.

The remainder of this paper represents a study of these problems as they appear in one county in the state. It is recognized, of course, that generalizations about the entire state based on a case study of one county are risky, and it is not suggested that the county studied is in all important respects typical of the 83 counties in Michigan.

Washtenaw County

The county under study is located in the extreme southeastern portion of the state, bordering on Wayne County (Detroit) to the east. It had, in 1950, a population of 134,606, making it the eighth largest of Michigan's 83 counties. The eastern part of the county has experienced a growth in population related to the westward spread of the Detroit industrial complex, while the western half of the county is heavily rural, with a more stable population. The 1950 census classed 64.4 per cent of the population as urban, 25.5 per cent as rural non-farm, and 10.1 per cent as farm population. However, while there has been a trend toward urbanization of the population, governmental reorganization has not kept pace with this trend, so that the proportion of the population living under local rural (township) government has actually increased rather than decreased.

TABLE 1

NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION UNDER CITY AND TOWNSHIP GOVERNMENT WASHTENAW COUNTY, MICHIGAN, 1930-1950

	1930		1940		1950	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
Cities[1]	37,087	57	43,163	53	69,912	52
Townships	28,443	43	37,647	47	64,694	48
Total	65,530	100	80,810	100	134,606	100

[1] There are three cities: Ann Arbor (pop. 47,279); Ypsilanti (pop. 18,267); and Saline (pop. 1,525). A fourth city, East Ann Arbor (pop. 1,819) has recently been annexed to Ann Arbor.

In its political history, Washtenaw county offers impressive evidence of the hardy persistence of traditional party loyalties. It was not swept into the Republican camp by the party realignment following the foundation of the Republican party in 1854. The county did vote for Fremont in 1854 and Lincoln in 1860, but returned to the Democratic fold thereafter, and until 1896 it voted for every Democratic presidential candidate except Horace Greeley in 1872.[2]

[2] W. Dean Burnham, Presidential Ballots, 1836-1892 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), pp. 532-533.

The party loyalties of the conservative, isolationist Democrats of Washtenaw were attacked both by the steady erosion of hopelessness, as the state party proved incapable of competing with the Republicans on anything like even terms, and by several sharp blows from the national political arena. The Bryan silver heresy caused a sharp drop in the Democratic vote, and the entrance of the United States into World War I during a Democratic administration offended many of the numerous Germans in the county. After World War I, solid urban Republican majorities made the Democrats definitely the minority party in the county, but in the rural areas, Democratic loyalties died harder, and the "return to normalcy" in many of the townships meant a partial return to Democratic voting patterns. Thus, in 1926, the Democratic candidate for Governor ran very strongly in the rural areas of Washtenaw County, carrying 15 of the 20 townships and a clear majority of the rural vote. Although the urban vote gave the county to the Republicans by just over 52 per cent of the total, the demonstration of Democratic strength was all the more remarkable since their candidate was obviously out for exercise and

not victory.[1]

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[1] All election statistics used in this paper are derived from appropriate editons of the Michigan Manual, unless otherwise noted.

Two years later, national politics again reshaped the pattern of electoral behavior in Washtenaw. Several writers have noted the importance of the Smith-Hoover campaign initiating the national realignment that ushered in the New Deal era.[2] In Washtenaw county, the same

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[2] Cf. V. O. Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections", Journal of Politics, Vol. 17, No. 1 (February, 1955), pp. 3-18; also Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), passim.

Democratic gubernatorial candidate who had run substantially ahead of his ticket and received a majority of the rural vote in 1926 now saw his percentage in the same area cut to less than 26. The depression produced a temporary resurgence of Democratic strength, but as indicated in Table 2, the thirties and forties saw a consolidation of the majority status of the Republicans. Thus we have as our object of study a county that is usually described like almost all of the out-state counties of the lower peninsula of Michigan, as a Republican county.

TABLE 2

DEMOCRATIC PERCENTAGE OF VOTE FOR SECRETARY OF STATE, ALL TOWNSHIPS IN WASHTENAW COUNTY, MICHIGAN, 1926-1956

1926	40.5
1928	24.3
1930	44.6
1932	49.8
1934	41.5
1936	40.8
1938	31.9
1940	31.3
1942	27.7
1944	30.1
1946	22.9
1948	34.0
1950	35.9
1952	36.1
1954	40.0
1956	41.0

The data on township organizations contained in this paper are derived from a study of the 18 townships in which there is some form of Democratic party organizational activity. Interviews were had with a group of party leaders, selected by the Democratic chairman as being most influential in their respective township without regard for their friendship or enmity toward the county committee. In addition, the 1957 Spring election offered an opportunity to study party organization in action. Of the 60 major township offices (Supervisor, Clerk, and Treasurer in each of 20 townships) the Democrats contested about two-thirds, and finally elected 14 candidates--six supervisors, four clerks, and four treasurers. This is a more than respectable showing, and might seem to augur well for the future of the Democratic party in this Republican county. However, closer examination of the party organization behind these fourteen victories indicates a wide divergence in the orientation of the township parties.

The largest single group of successful candidates is composed of six winners from three townships where the Democratic party is controlled by incumbent office holders who ante-date the Williams era. This suggests the possible existence of the problem of rural traditionalism, one of the organizational problems raised earlier in this paper.

The Traditionalist Organizations

In four of the 20 townships, the Democratic party has demonstrated a continuing ability to win local offices over an extended period while their respective townships have voted Republican in all other elections. These townships are almost entirely rural, and have relatively small populations. Democrats hold office in all of these townships. Of the

TABLE 3

POPULATION OF FOUR "TRADITIONALIST" TOWNSHIPS

	Pop. 1940	Pop. 1950	Rank (of 20)	Pct. Increase 1940-1950	Rank (of 20)
Bridgewater	884	939	15	4.5	19
Dexter	564	1154	12	104.6	4
Lima	926	1039	17	12.2	16
Sharon	601	670	19	11.5	17

major township offices, Democrats hold all three in Dexter, two in Lima, one in Sharon, and, since the 1957 elections, none in Bridgewater.[1] As

[1] In 1957, the Democrats lost the office of Supervisor in

Bridgewater for the first time in 35 years. The incumbent decided to retire and run for Justice of the Peace. He was easily elected, and enjoys a heavy flow of cases, since his farm is located on an inter-state highway, and is most convenient for the state police.

Table 4 illustrates, the six major Democratic incumbents have enjoyed long tenure. During most of this time, state Democrats were not very popular in these townships, as indicated in Table 5. Moreover, a comparison of these percentages with those given in Table 2 shows that the four townships were significantly more Republican in state elections than the rest of the townships in every year except 1930.

TABLE 4

NUMBER OF YEARS IN OFFICE OF DEMOCRATIC INCUMBENTS

	Supervisor	Clerk	Treasurer
Dexter	9	31	19
Lima	30	25	--
Sharon	17	--	--

TABLE 5

DEMOCRATIC PERCENTAGE OF TWO-PARTY VOTE FOR SECRETARY OF STATE
1926-1956

	Bridgewater	Dexter	Lima	Sharon
1926	49.1	54.2	47.5	33.3
1928	26.2	41.0	24.8	16.3
1930	56.6	57.3	57.6	44.9
1932	51.5	63.5	62.3	41.6
1934	45.4	53.3	38.9	26.3
1936	36.8	45.6	47.9	31.7
1938	26.3	39.2	35.4	19.0
1940	29.2	31.5	31.4	12.9
1942	22.3	31.5	21.5	11.7
1944	21.0	27.7	18.7	13.7
1946	22.8	27.8	15.3	15.2
1948	22.1	34.9	17.9	19.2
1950	27.1	31.2	19.3	23.6
1952	28.0	33.6	21.1	15.7
1954	25.9	37.9	26.7	22.7
1956	27.3	37.6	26.5	26.6

In these townships, the party organization long ago ceased to be a device for combatting Republicanism. One supervisor summed up the prevailing attitude by saying "In this township, anyone who's elected is elected by the Republicans, so it doesn't pay to run down the Republican party." Direct observation seems to bear out V.O. Key's description of rural party organization in one-party areas:

> In those areas party as such often has no meaning as a combination to fight the opposition. It is rather an expression, continued from generation to generation, of the consensus of a more or less undivided community... The politics of the locality is a politics of personality and of administration rather than a politics of issues. The issues have long been settled and the outcome embodied in a durable equilibrium of power and status within the community.[1]

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[1] V. O. Key, American State Politics: An Introduction (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 227.

The question is how local party organizations are able to maintain a politics of personality and administration, rather than of issues, when they are affiliated with a dynamic state and county party which aggressively promotes a politics of ideology and issues. The answer seems to be that through various techniques such affiliation is reduced to nothing more than a sharing of a common name, and in the process local politics is effectively insulated from the dangerous arena of state politics.

We have already observed that the formal legal structure of parties in Michigan is such as to invite an autonomous township politics, since there is no organic connection between the township political committee and the county committee. In each of the four traditionalist townships, there is a legally constituted three-man Democratic committee. Its members are elected every two years at the same party caucus which nominates candidates for township office.[2] None of

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[2] The direct primary, which is optional for townships in Michigan, is not used in any of these townships.

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the four township committees functions as a campaign organization. There seems to be an ill-defined feeling that appeals to vote for a party ticket as such would boomerang, in that they would tend to destroy the mystique of "vote-for-the-man-not-the-party" which is a major prop of the state-local ticket splitting the local Democrats

are seeking to induce. This does not mean that the party committee has no importance, however. Its major function seems to be in the nominating process. As mentioned before, it is the legal responsibility of the township chairman to set the time and place of the party caucus, and the committee will see to it that the right people are present at the caucus. The party caucus is very poorly attended, and in 1957 not more than ten persons were present at any of the four caucuses in this group of townships. Such small turnouts make it easy for the party committee to control the nominating process. This control is so pronounced that it is often possible to use it to consummate bi-partisan arrangements. Here we have a good example of how the party organization may be used to embody what Key calls the "durable equilibrium of power and status within the community."

In the friends-and-neighbors atmosphere of township politics, incumbency is a major advantage, and there is evidently a reluctance to challenge the vested interest an incumbent has in his job, regardless of his party label. Where there is a bi-partisan group of township officers, it may happen that the incumbents of both parties will form an in-group which presents a united and hostile front to outsiders of both parties. If the party committees are controlled by incumbents, and if the party committees control the nominating process, it is easy for the Republicans and Democrats to come to a gentlemen's agreement that incumbents are not to be opposed. In Sharon township, for example, the Democratic Supervisor has not had an opponent in the last ten elections. By the same token, the incumbent Republican Clerk and Treasurer have been unopposed in the last nine elections. The result is a bi-partisan slate of unopposed major candidates, and a total lack of electoral choice.

Another example is found in Lima township. Until 1953, all three major office holders were Democrats. In that year, the Republican candidate for Treasurer was elected, evidently because it was widely felt that she (a recent widow) needed the job worse than the incumbent. Subsequently, she became a member of the incumbent in-group, and is regarded as a Democrat. However, the Republicans continue to nominate her, and the Democrats do not nominate a candidate for the office.

Where there is not a bi-partisan group of incumbents, the probability of bi-partisan nominations is lessened of course. There is no evidence of bi-partisanship in Dexter township, for example, but there the Democrats control all the major offices and all but one of the minor offices. In short, one cannot escape the conclusion that in these townships, politics is not so much a case of Democrats versus Republicans as it is ins versus outs, with the ins holding most of the advantages.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find that it is the fixed policy of all four township party organizations not to participate in political campaigns above the township level. Interviewing of the four township party leaders disclosed that three of them would be in favor of non-partisan or local party township elections. On the other hand, all four feel that they could be elected just as easily on the Republican ticket, but see no reason to change party labels. But while they are willing to continue as Democrats in local politics, they display a low degree of identification with the state and national party. Of the four party leaders, one classed himself unqualifiedly as a Democrat in state and national politics, one as an independent, one as non-partisan, and the fourth as "not very political and not much of a Democrat." Two of the four leaders expressed their approval of Governor G. Mennen Williams, a third felt that on the whole Williams had been a good governor, though his ties with organized labor were to be deplored, while the fourth was openly hostile toward the Governor, because of his alleged radicalism. Whether friendly or hostile to Williams, however, none of these party leaders could recall ever having done anything to support Williams or any other state candidate. All four were opposed to any active campaigning by the county organization in their respective townships.

The attitude of these party leaders toward state politics can be described as non-involvement, but not as hostile factionalism. There was no more evidence of identification with any state-wide old guard group than with the present leadership of the state party. This may be partly due to the fact that the Williams victory over his factional opponents at the state level has been so complete that there seems to be no presently viable opposition to the ruling coalition. More probably, however, it is simply another manifestation of the local insularity that is typical of this type of local politics.

What conclusions can we draw regarding the importance of traditionalism as a problem of state and county party leadership? Since this study concerns only one county, it is impossible to speak with any certainty regarding the incidence of traditionalism in the state as a whole. A more ambitious research project would be necessary before we could state the probable number of governmental units and the proportion of the state's voters which are influenced by local political traditionalism. We can say that in Washtenaw County, at least, the percentage of population involved is very low. Scarcely more than two per cent of the total population of the county lives in the four townships just discussed. Even a radical electoral realignment in these four townships would, in itself, have little effect on the political balance of the county. However, before we dismiss traditionalism as an unimportant factor, several things should be

remembered. In the first place, we might assume that the incidence of traditionalism is related inversely to the incidence of urbanization, and sice the county under study is one of the more highly urbanized counties in the state, it probably has a lower than average incidence of traditionalism. Secondly, the structure of local rural government in Michigan is such that the political importance of townships is out of proportion to the number of voters they contain. If, for example, it is true in other counties as it is in Washtenaw that a majority of the Democratic supervisors (and thus members of the county board) are traditionalist Democrats, this has importance for the character of the public perception of the Democratic party.

Thus, traditionalism in local rural politics may be an important barrier to intra-party channels of communication, and may, over large areas of the state deprive the party of any real grass-roots affiliate organizations. But where traditionalism really represents a stable community consensus, it is difficult to see what a county organization can do about it without creating serious new problems. In Washtenaw county, the county committee takes a laissez-faire attitude, on the theory that nothing can be done anyway, and on the supposition that it is a good idea to have people who call themselves Democrats running successfully in local elections.

In many cases, it would probably not be difficult to unseat the traditionalist Democrats. As we have seen, their control rests with their domination of the nominating process. This means that the party caucus is at once the focal point and the Achilles' heel of traditionalism. It would often be possible for a quite small but determined group to overwhelm the handful of regulars who attend the party caucus, and to nominate liberal Democrats in their places. Such a victory would likely turn out to be an empty one, however. An example of caucus-packing occurred in Washtenaw county in 1953. In Lodi township, a thinly populated rural area much like the four townships discussed above, the Democrats had been in power for many years. The incumbents were so sure of their control that the Supervisor was not even present at the party caucus of 1953. The next day he found that an insurgent group, headed by a former city dweller, had taken over the caucus and denied him and the incumbent Clerk renomination. The victory was short-lived, however, because in the general election the community reacted to this political maneuver by electing all the Republican candidates. The result of this debacle has been the total collapse of the Democratic party in the township. The newcomers were so chastised by their defeat that they have not been willing to go it alone another time, and the old guard refuses to have anything to do with them. In the last two elections, the Republicans have been unopposed, and now have on their side that most precious of assets, incumbency.

In conclusion, the evidence seems to indicate that in the traditionalist townships examined, the Democratic party leadership probably reflects real and important elements of community consensus. It is not a question of an anachronistic leadership group hanging on to power despite an electoral realignment which calls for the representation of new interests and attitudes. This is not to say that traditionalism in local politics may not retard the completion of the realignment process; but the evidence is clear that as yet it is the traditionalists who represent majority opinion, and not the liberals in control of the state party.

Patterns of Reaction to the post-1948 Realignment

This brings us to a consideration of the problems of party organization where, in contrast to the townships discussed previously, there has been a genuine electoral realignment corresponding to the state-wide shift from Republican to Democratic majorities. As of 1957, there are only two such townships in Washtenaw county. They are the two largest in population, Ypsilanti with a 1950 population of 14,630, and Superior, with 7,181. Both are in the eastern tier of townships bordering on Wayne county; and both, during and since World War II received a heavy influx of urban population due to the westward expansion of the Detroit industrial area. Ypsilanti township surrounds the city of Ypsilanti, and so has never been an entirely rural area. Superior, on the other hand, was a typical rural township until World War II. Both townships were Republican strongholds for many years, but since 1948 they have become reliably Democratic in state and national politics. Table 6 illustrates the electoral realignment. The Williams vote has been more impressive, but not as good an indicator of party strength as that cast for the Democratic candidate for Secretary of State.

TABLE 6

DEMOCRATIC PERCENTAGE OF VOTE FOR SECRETARY OF STATE, SUPERIOR AND YPSILANTI TOWNSHIPS, 1940-1956

	Superior	Ypsilanti
1940	31.0	34.0
1942	28.1	29.3
1944	48.3	42.8
1946	34.1	28.3
1948	56.1	43.8
1950	59.6	48.1
1952	60.0	47.8
1954	67.2	53.8
1956	61.3	52.3

On April 1, 1957, the Democratic majorities in these townships made themselves felt at the local level, when for the first time the Democrats swept all offices in both townships. In voting behavior, then, the two townships have displayed similar patterns. In party organization, however, they offer interesting and important contrasts. These contrasts arise from the fundamental fact that in Superior township there was a party organization which ante-dated the realignment, while in Ypsilanti township there had been a long history of one-party Republican domination of local politics.

Superior township seems to offer an example of remarkably successful adjustment by the local party organization to a complete upheaval in local politics. In 1940, this was almost entirely a rural area, having a population of only 1,321. During the war, its population increased by a staggering 443.6 per cent to 7,181. The single most important factor in this population increase was the wartime construction of a "temporary" federal housing project known as Willow Village. The barracks-like project was intended to house workers at the nearby Willow Run bomber plant. The people who came to work in the bomber plant and live in Superior township were doubtless heavily Democratic in their party affiliations, but they made little impact on the politics of the township during the war, except that a rather larger than usual Democratic vote was cast for national and state candidates in 1944. The transient character of much of the wartime population prevented their impressive numbers from shifting the township from the Republican to the Democratic camp.

Following World War II, the Willow Run bomber plant was closed, and was converted into an airport, which still serves the city of Detroit as its major commercial air terminal. Willow Village did not close down, however. The post-war housing shortage caused it to remain open. Rather quickly it deteriorated into a slum housing area, inhabited largely by Negroes and other low income groups who could not afford better housing. The residents, now no longer wartime transients, began to vote in larger numbers, and in 1948 the Democratic breakthrough occurred, with Governor Williams leading the Democratic ticket with 61 per cent of the township vote, as compared to 35 per cent for the Democratic candidate in 1946.

The pronounced electoral realignment in state politics which took place in 1948 was not fully reflected in township politics until 1957. In the interval the township continued to be governed by a bi-partisan group of Republicans and traditionalist Democrats. A gentlemen's agreement existed whereby the Democratic supervisor, who had been in office since 1933, was not opposed by the Republicans, and the Republican Clerk and Treasurer had no Democratic opponents.

Such an informal agreement can only be effectuated if the contracting parties can control the nominating process. Prior to 1957,

the township nominated by party caucus. As in the case of the rural townships examined earlier, the incumbents in both parties had long dominated the caucus. It slowly became clear, however, that the continued existence of the caucus system was dangerous for the incumbents, because of the increasing possibility of finding themselves confronted by a packed caucus. This was undoubtedly a sound reason for instituting the primary system, but it sealed the doom of the old bi-partisan bloc.

The first blow was struck from the Republican side. The moribund Republican township committee was revived under the domination of persons who were critical of the bi-partisanship so long displayed by the incumbent Republican Clerk and Treasurer. The committee disowned the incumbents, and sponsored rival candidates in the Republican primary. This confronted the Democratic leadership with a severe problem. While a modus vivendi had been worked out with the incumbent Republicans, there could be no guarantee that they would win renomination. Moreover, it was immediately evident that the committee could not effectively prevent Democratic "outsiders" from filing as candidates for Clerk and Treasurer. The committee decided that the bi-partisan deal was off, and a full slate of candidates was filed. The organization slate was not entirely successful in the Democratic primary. Its candidate for Treasurer was defeated, as were two candidates for minor offices. In the Republican primary, the two major incumbents successfully beat off the challenge of the organization candidates.

The Democratic organization, under the leadership of the incumbent Supervisor, accommodated itself to the new situation. The Democrats campaigned as a group, and took a strong policy stand on the major issue confronting the township--the matter of zoning and redevelopment of the Willow Village area. They tied their campaign closely to that of the state Democratic candidates, on the correct assumption that the township would, in any event, support the state ticket.[1]

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[1] Township officers are elected at the bienniel spring election. The state ticket in this election includes candidates for State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the State Board of Education, the Board of Regents of the University of Michigan, the Board of Agriculture (governing board of Michigan State University), State Highway Commissioner, and, on a non-partisan ballot, Justices of the Supreme Court.

The 1957 election returns disclose that the rural part of the township continued to support the bi-partisan group of office holders, but the Willow Village area responded to the Democratic campaign by an overwhelming support for the entire Democratic ticket.

TABLE 7

VOTES CASE FOR MAJOR TOWNSHIP OFFICES, SUPERIOR TOWNSHIP, 1957 [1]

	Supervisor		Clerk		Treasurer	
	D	R	D	R	D	R
Precinct 1 (Rural)	291	203	113	379	114	376
Precincts 2,3,4 (Urban)	531	53	463	109	482	106
Totals	822	253	576	488	596	482

[1] Data supplied by Township Clerk, Superior Township

It is clear that despite the voting behavior of the one rural precinct in Superior, bi-partisanship is a thing of the past. The party realignment which began in 1948 in the state elections has finally percolated down to the township level, and has found its expression in a reorientation of the township party organization. In this case, then, there has been a successful transition from a party organization oriented toward localism, traditionalism, and minority party techniques to the status of a locally dominant party that is closely and vocally affiliated with the state party.

It seems probable that the effectuation of this kind of transition is at once the major problem and the major area of opportunity for the Democratic state and county leaders who are trying to build up the grass roots strength of the party. It is therefore important to analyze the components of a successful transition. In the first place, such a transition involves the assimilation of new leadership groups into the party organization with a minimum of factional disruption. Secondly, there must thereby be created an electoral coalition that is stronger than either the old or the new elements taken separately. As we have seen in discussing other townships, premature attempts to oust old guard leadership are futile. Candidates flying the banner of the state party are not likely to have much success until the state party itself demonstrates an unmistakable vote-getting power in the local area. When that time comes, there will be, as there was in Superior township, a real incentive to factional compromise, since both the amalgamating factions will have something to bring into a coalition that will be recognized as valuable by the other side.

These conditions were met in Superior township, with the result that a Democratic ticket headed by an old-time rural traditionalist

and including representatives of the important Negro group and of organized labor was swept into office. It would seem, then, that the existence of a local Democratic organization, and the incumbency of local Democrats, even those of a traditionalist stamp, can be turned to good account under the proper conditions.

In the other township in which an electoral realignment has taken place since 1948, there was no old guard organization, no bi-partisan arrangement, and presumably a clear field for the creation of a local party organization to represent the new Democratic majorities. But while the Democrats won the local election of 1957 in Ypsilanti township, the status of the party organization there is much less healthy than in Superior.

Ypsilanti township lies directly south of Superior, and has the largest population of any of the 20 townships in the county. Between 1940 and 1950, the population increased from 4,153 to 14,630, a 219.7 per cent gain. Prior to 1949, Ypsilanti was a one-party township, characterized by intense Republican personal factionalism. There was no Democratic organization, and no Democratic candidates except occasional self-starters.

As in Superior township, the vote polled by Governor Williams in 1948 was the signal for a shift from Republican to Democratic majorities in the township. Where the Democratic candidate in 1946 had received only 31 per cent of the vote, Williams failed by only 25 votes to carry the township. Thereafter, he never failed to gain a majority of the township's votes in his four subsequent campaigns. As indicated in Table 6, the Democratic candidate for Secretary of State broke into the majority category (along with the rest of the state ticket) in 1954.

With the encouragement of the county committee, a group of liberal Democrats organized a township committee in 1949. The committee has from the beginning been headed by a tool and die maker who has a background of trade union activity. The other persons who have been active members of the committee since its formation are typical of the "lib-lab" groups which have been the mainstay of the Williams coalition. They include an academic engineering research coordinator, a quality control specialist, the wife of a welder, and a test driver for an automobile manufacturer.

By 1953, this group was able to file a complete slate of candidates, and to get approximately 40 per cent of the township vote. Two years later, the Democratic candidates averaged about 45 per cent. Democratic majorities in state elections in 1954 and 1956 (cf. Table 6) made it clear that Republican control of the township government would soon end. In early 1957, the Democratic nominations

began to look very worthwhile. The salaries involved ($8000 for the Supervisor, $7000 for the Clerk and Treasurer), while not munificent, are high enough to seem attractive to a considerable number of aspirants. Moreover, the township government is in a position to dispense valuable favors, and probable winners may be valued as friends by various types of businessmen.

The organization Democrats found themselves faced with a primary fight. A miscellaneous group of candidates, who seem to have had little in common except a thirst for office, allied themselves into a loose primary slate against the organization candidates. The insurgents were led by a candidate for Supervisor who had become well known in the township as a result of an unsuccessful candidacy for Congress in the 1956 elections. He had won the Congressional nomination against the candidate supported by most party leaders, and so was experienced in the art of party insurgency. Neither he nor his running mates had been active in township, county, or state party organizations. The county committee, embarassed by this turn of events, assumed a posture of official neutrality. The relatively inexperienced township committee proved unable to meet the challenge of the outsiders, and its slate was defeated in the Democratic primary. Subsequently, the insurgents went on to defeat the Republicans easily, gaining about 60 per cent of the vote.

This first Democratic township government now seems a liability rather than an asset to the party. Since coming into office, the insurgent coalition, always loose, has dissolved into a feuding group of incumbents, with charges of perfidy, dishonesy, misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance being hurled from one Democratic office holder to another.

The non-organization minded insurgents did not bother to try to unseat the members of the township Democratic committee, and it is still controlled by the liberal faction. It now seems, however, that only open and generous support by the county committee could restore the township organization to its former position.

The role of the direct primary in the downfall of the Ypsilanti township committee calls to mind Key's hypothesis that

> ...the creation by direct primary legislation of new channels to power, more readily accessible and less readily monopolized than antecedent procedures, operates over the long run to modify the nature of the informal structure of party leadership in biparty systems.[1]

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[1] Key, op. cit., p. 194.

While the direct primary is a venerable institution in most American jurisdictions, it is a nominating device that is only slowly being adopted in Michigan townships. The abandonment of the caucus system and the adoption of the direct primary is likely to come about especially in those communities most likely to have experienced a growth in Democratic strength--the former rural areas becoming urbanized and industrialized. If it is true, as Key seems to believe, that the direct primary is an "institutional depressant of party life," it might well be that the development of Democratic majorities in a local community will often cause the disruption of the inner party leadership, especially where the existing leadership is not rooted in the political skills learned only through experience.

That this need not necessarily be the case, however, is demonstrated by the recent happenings in Superior township. Still, the upper echelons of party leadership can hardly afford to rely on good fortune to produce successful adaptations of party organization to a changing political ecology. Interestingly enough, Key follows his indictment of the direct primary by offering a possible remedy:

> An increase, for example, in the effort devoted to the development and maintenance of a state-wide integrated party system might offset institutional depressants of party life that operated when such efforts remains more or less constant.[1]

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[1] Ibid.

If an integrated party system requires an integrated party organization, the state party and the county organizations loyal to it would probably be ill-advised to rely on a complete laissez-faire policy in regard to changes in the internal party structure of local government units. This certainly applies to the Michigan Democratic party, which enjoys an almost unique position in American state politics because of the consistency with which it proclaims its devotion to well-defined policy goals.

Conclusion

This paper has examined some of the problems of local rural party organization in a post-realignment period, as they appear in one county of the state. The phenomenon of rural traditionalism was examined in four townships, and the techniques of insulating local

from state politics were described. It was suggested that local traditionalism is associated with minority status of the state party in the local area, and that premature attempts to unseat traditionalists are likely to be futile.

The paper also examined the problems of party organization in local areas where an electoral realignment has produced normal Democratic majorities. It was demonstrated that in one township there has been a successful transition from minority traditionalism to an effective majority party organization, while in another township, a recently formed liberal township committee was overwhelmed by primary opposition from an unaffiliated group of office-seekers.

It was suggested that party leadership at state and county levels may find it necessary to intervene in order to offset the disruption of internal party organization at the local level which may result from the operation of the direct primary in newly Democratic localities.

GOVERNMENT SECRECY

Remarks of J. R. Wiggins
Executive Editor, Washington Post and Times Herald
Delivered at Annual Convention of
The American Political Science Association
New York City, September 7, 1957

"There has never been a period in our history when authority has genuinely liked the idea of full publicity for its activities and unchecked criticism of its conduct." *

I borrow this broad assertion of a plain truth about governmental impulses toward secrecy from Harold Herd's 1952 volume on the history of journalism because I think it makes it clear that the desire of government to operate in secrecy has been with us a long time.

He also has the explanation for it, if truth were to be acknowledged, in the blunt language of Sir Roger L'Estrange, Cromwell's Surveyor of the Press, who in 1663, as Herd explains, rejected the idea of a public newspaper on the ground that it made the multitude too familiar with the actions and counsels of their superiors and gave them "not only an itch but a colourable Right to be Meddling with the Government."

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*(The March of Journalism, Harold Herd, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London, 1952. Page 12.)

A lot of other reasons and excuses for secrecy are ventured from time to time, but there is in most of them, a touch of L'Estrange's dark suspicions and anxieties. What the government official most often fears is the public's "itch" to be "meddling with Government."

It is not reasonable to hope that government can be wholly divested of its disinclination or that officials can be freed of their fears of public curiousity. It is reasonable to expect that by a proper exertion of their right to know citizens may keep this impulse to secrecy in check.

If they do not so exert themselves, they will be required shortly to abandon their right to know utterly and completely. And when they have abandoned their right to know, they will have abandoned, along with it, the right to govern themselves.

There has been a noticeable movement in this direction. From the 17th to the 20th century there was a general progress toward disclosure by government. There were some short run reverses to be sure, but there is no doubt about the direction of events. Free men, slowly but surely, began to take apart the mountain of restrictions upon inquiry assembled by Henry VIII from 1529 to his death. They did away with the licensing of printing, the granting of printing monopolies, the use of religious injunctions, the resort to star chamber proceedings, the employment of general warrants, the secrecy of parliament, the savagery of proceedings against seditious

libel and contempt, the tax on newspapers and other devices against enlightenment.

In the early years of the Twentieth Century there was, in the western world, general acknowledgment that citizens had a right to know about their government. That acknowledgment has been increasingly withheld, as the result of the secrecy growing out of two world wars and a period of cold war, because of the changing structure of government, in consequence of the sheer size of government, and as a result of a diminishing faith in the loyalty, intelligence and judgment of the people.

If we would discover how serious a threat this is to popular government, we may best resort to John Stuart Mill who put above all other agencies for the improvement of government "the utmost possible publicity and liberty of discussion whereby not merely a few individuals in succession, but the whole public, are made to a certain extent, participants in the government and sharers in the instruction and mental exercise derivable from it."

Or we might well consult Macaulay who warned that nothing could be more irrational than to give to the people power and to withhold from them the knowledge without which power may be abused.

When we deal with secrecy, we deal with a device that threatens the very foundations of free government. The threat exists whether the reason for invoking secrecy is good or bad. Reasons, such as military security, may be good reasons, and they may warrant the risk, but the risk nevertheless is there. When we buy security with freedom, the bargain may be justified, but it remains a purchase at a high price, and we ought never to so deceive ourselves as to the effects of secrecy that we may be led to imagine that we have not paid much for our safety.

The governmental secrecy that is dictated by the need for military security confronts a democratic society with a grave problem. We live in an age of conflict. The contest between our free society and Communism is likely to last throughout the lives of all persons here in this room. And as long as it lasts, we shall have to submit to the withholding of some information about our weapons, our capabilities and our military plans. To acknowledge this is to leave unanswered such pregnant questions as: "How much information should be withheld?" or "Who should decide what information is to be withheld?" or "How shall we punish those who disclose the information that someone has decided should be withheld?"

Some of our military officials would answer the first of these questions in a very forthright way by saying that all information that the military wishes to be withheld should be withheld.

President Eisenhower, in Executive Order 10501 tried to answer it by giving military, and 16 other agencies in government, the right to classify information in Top Secret, Secret and Confidential categories, under appropriate definitions. The order, however much it enjoined officials to acknowledge the need for public information, provided no penalties for those who improperly obstructed it, and did place those who disclosed too much in peril of prosecution under espionage laws. Prudent people, confronted with all the risks on the side of disclosure and none on the side of too much secrecy have operated as might have been expected. First the Coolidge Committee of the Defense Establishment, and more recently, the Security Commission, decided that the power to classify had been subject to widespread abuse and that the duties of declassification had been woefully neglected.

Basically, this program has said that those who make the decisions on what is to be withheld are to be those whose primary concern is secrecy. Yet, should not such decisions be made by exposing the isolated and individual issue to the impact of both necessities? The military should be required to say why it wishes to keep a matter secret. Someone else should be permitted to argue why it should be disclosed. The decision ought to be a balancing of risks. We have not had such a balancing of risks because there is not real conviction in government that there is a risk in secrecy, while the belief that there are grave dangers in disclosure are rampant. Both risks exist. Both risks ought to be weighed. They ought to be weighed by some sort of tribunal capable of considering both risks.

Curiously enough, both the Coolidge Committee and the Loyalty Commission, after sweeping condemnation of over-classification for military reasons, concluded with recommendations for more drastic proceedings against those who disclose classified secrets.

They were agreed that the punishment for disclosure ought to be more severe. The Loyalty Commission wished to amend the espionage act so as to make the disclosure of classified information by persons in the unauthorized possession of Secret or Top Secret matter punishable by up to 5 years in prison and $10,000. fine. In its argument for such severity, the Commission adverts to the miscreants who jeopardize the nation's military security by their disclosures. And the Chairman of the Commission, Mr. Loyd Wright, has compiled a long list of alleged instances of disclosure by publications which he has characterized as constituting "dark chapters of betrayal." His examples are not given by name but it has been possible to identify some of them. His first example is a case 15 years old which occurred during the Pacific War. He says that a metropolitan newspaper disclosed the fact that the Japanese Code had been cracked by the United States, that the Japanese thus learned of the success of our cryptographic analysts, that they then changed the code and that the deprivation of this intelligence prolonged the life of Japanese seapower in the Pacific.

The "metropolitan paper" involved was the Chicago Tribune. It did not disclose the fact that the code had been cracked but it printed the Japanese order of battle at the Battle of Midway in June 1942 with sufficient accuracy so that the Navy feared the Japanese would suspect their code had been cracked. But the Japanese did not suspect it. They did not change their code, but continued to use it until the following April when the United States forces, by virtue of the information they obtained from continuing to read Japanese messages, were enabled to intercept Admiral Yamamoto's plane and shoot down the Japanese naval commander. The war was not prolonged thirty seconds by anything published about the Japanese code, in the Chicago Tribune or elsewhere.

It is not possible to identify all of Mr. Wright's "cases" but others are also recognizable as quite groundless as arguments in support of the most draconian punishment for unauthorized disclosure ever suggested in this country in time of peace or war.

Yet, I suppose there are many who feel as though there is so much danger involved that the punishment ought to be severe. The trouble with such severity is that it also menaces the nation's military security. If the punishment for disregard of military orders against publication is too severe it may result in the suppression of information essential to national survival, notwithstanding the risks involved.

There are few better examples, I suppose, than the Northcliffe disregard of British secrecy rules in World War I. When Lord Northcliffe discovered that Britain's war-time military supply was not putting into the hands of troops in France the munitions required to fight the war, he defied military secrecy to let the British people know. And when the British people knew the facts, they demanded reforms in the government that put to rights the chaos and disorganization in munitions supply. Northcliffe disregarded the rules of military secrecy. He disclosed classified information. And if his newspapers did the same thing now, and the amended espionage act were in effect, he would be punished under our criminal laws. His punishment or that of any other individual editor, would be of small moment if silencing one publisher or editor did not tend to silence at the same time, all criticism dependant upon disclosures identified by some military person as violative of secret classification.

The consequences of publication in defiance of such rules is not always instantly apparent. In the long view of history, the New York Times defiance of the classification of General Matthew Ridgway's letter of resignation as Chief of Staff of the Army, may turn out to be quite as important as Northcliffe's disclosure. The Ridgway letter was classified "Confidential." The Times printed it anyway. The Ridgway thesis was that the nation was neglecting its conventional arms to concentrate all its resources on weapons to fight thermo-nuclear wars and that this policy might divest us of the means of fighting anything

but all-out wars risking the destruction of all mankind. Whether Ridgway was wrong or right, he voiced a point of view and expressed an opinion to which a great many respected and expert military men adhere and the people were entitled to have his warning, to weigh it and study it and make up their own minds. The Defense Establishment decided otherwise.

This sort of suppression withholds from the public the information required to make the decisions on which the survival of the nation may depend. It is idle to talk about public opinion when the facts that constitute the raw material of public opinion are withheld. The man who voices an opinion based on full information voices his own opinion; the man who voices an opinion based on part of the information available voices the opinion of the man who supplies part of the information.

Information on the operations of the Atomic Energy Commission is also being withheld in the name of military security. This withholding is having an effect, not only upon our military security, but upon the peaceful utilization of atomic energy as well. The American people are utterly unable to judge for themselves any of the great issues of weapons development and employment and peacetime application of atomic energy. They have to take the word of someone else on decisions in this whole area. When there is a difference of competent scientific opinion, no one will supply the answers.

Can a clean bomb be made? Will a bomb that is constructed "clean" void radioactive debris into the air upon contact with the ground? Does continued testing of thermo-nuclear weapons involve only a negligible risk to human life or have the tests already resulted in an increase of 10,000 leukemia fatalaties a year and other biological consequences beyond measure in terms of human suffering? You can get guesses and answers almost everywhere except from the people who have the classified information and cannot talk about it. For a long interval, the American people, by common consent allowed information in this area to be kept secret, but there are sober and knowledgeable scientists today who doubt that secrecy any longer serves much constructive purpose, so far as scientific discovery is concerned, and there are some who think that on balance, more risks are involved in secrecy than would be involved in full disclosure of everything except weapons information itself.

The menace of secrecy is not by any means confined to the disputed and controversial fields of military operations and atomic energy. Wholly outside the area of classified information, government at the federal, state and local level is withholding information that citizens need in order to discharge their role in the operation of their own government.

Congress is holding more than a third of its committee meetings in secret, notwithstanding the rules of the reorganization act requiring that these meetings be in public except upon the affirmative vote of the members or for purposes of marking up bills.

Courts are meeting behind closed doors in an increasing percentage of their proceedings, because juvenile court statutes enjoin them to do so, because other state legislation countenances secrecy in similar courts, because some types of proceedings are feared as a corruption of public morals, because some judges assume that the right to a public trial is a right of the accused only and not a right of the whole citizenry. Blackstone, Bentham and Cooley and Wigmore, great law writers on both sides of the Atlantic, have pointed out the public interest in open court proceedings. Oliver Wendell Holmes summarized the issue neatly in a Massachusetts case in 1884, emphasizing that it is not only the litigants who have an interest in public trials. He then said:

> "The chief advantage to the country which we can discern. . . . is the security which publicity gives for the proper administration of justice. It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place under the public eye, not because the controversies of one citizen with another are of public concern, but because it is of the highest moment that those who

> administer justice should always act under the sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is performed." *

It is in the executive departments of federal, state and local governments, however, that the situation is most serious. One by one the state governments are moving to remedy the inadequacy of the statutes on disclosure of the public business, at state and local levels. In the federal government, however, officials compel the citizen to come as a supplicant for access to more and more information and when the information is released, it often is released as a matter of grace and not surrendered as a matter of right. The federal official, in the last 30 years, has come to ask increasingly of the inquiring citizen, "Why do you want to know?" and "What do you wish to use the information for?"

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*Cowley vs Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392 - 1884.)

Much of this federal withholding has been done under an old housekeeping statute passed in 1789, (5 USCA 22), providing that department heads shall have appropriate custody of their papers and files. It certainly was not intended, at the time, as any approval of secrecy; but the House Committee on Government Operations has had a sub-committee under John Moss of California, investigating the basis for bureaucratic withholding and it has found that this statute is the authority most frequently cited. Congressman Moss is readying some amendments to this statute to make it clear that it has not been the intent of congress to countenance secrecy under the aegis of this law. The amendments ought to pass. They will not put an end to all improper federal secrecy but they will help. Senator Hennings of Missouri has introduced an amendment to the Administrative Procedures Act which would clarify the right to know about independent offices, bureaus and commissions, and it ought to pass too.

Together, these two amendments will help reclaim the right of citizens to know about their own government.

It is high time that the right be rescued by Congress from the whims of the executive department when even the Secretary of State writes to Arthur Hays Sulzberger to deny that the right to know is comprehended within the meaning of the First Amendment. "The Constitutional freedom of the press," he said on May 2, 1957, "relates to publication and not to gathering news."

As Cooley has pointed out, the purpose of the First Amendment's clauses was "to protect the right to a free discussion of public events and public measures, and to enable every citizen at any time to bring the government and any person in authority to the bar of public opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct in the exercise of the authority which the people have conferred upon them. . . . The evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens. "*

When government at any level, slams the door of secrecy in the face of public inquiry, whether the inquirer be the lowliest citizen or the most imposing publisher, that act is calculated to "prevent free and general discussion of public matters" and as such it is a trespass upon the rights assured in the First Amendment.

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* Constitutional Limitations, 7th Ed. pp 603-604.

And when, by secrecy, or other device, these rights are denied, the other broad guarantees of the constitution will not long survive their melancholy end. Official zeal having discovered that there are no limits of usurpation beyond which unlawful process may not run with impunity, will not long delay divesting citizens, one by one, of rights that they no longer have the tongues to defend.

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Excerpts From the Address by Governor G. Mennen Williams
American Political Science Association
Noon - September 5, 1957
Henry Hudson Hotel
New York City, New York

Let me first thank you for the honor of your invitation. As one who has been in government almost all of his adult life, I have long been aware of the American Political Science Association and its impact on the nation's political activity. In fact, I have long marvelled at your stature in the field despite the drag of amateur members such as myself. I have also long enjoyed associating with many of your active members, both within and without my state. Those associations have been both fruitful and pleasurable to me personally. What is more I know they have been fruitful for the people of my own state in that many of them have resulted in substantial improvements in Michigan government.

My closest association with some of your members has come in my Executive Office operations. Seated in the room today are some of your brethren on my staff and in the Department of Administration for whose past services I am most grateful. They have not only made the job of Governor of Michigan less difficult but they have made the Executive a more efficient and effective instrument for your government. As a consequence, I am deeply grateful for the opportunity to talk with you who have done so much to maintain the vitality of the American political system.

It was suggested that I address myself to the subject of "federal-state relations." I am most eager to do this---not just as a Governor who, after almost nine years in office and at least five years of Federal experience exclusive of military service should have some ideas on the subject---but also as a politician who recognizes that state rights is not only a subject but also something of a cult with a litany all of its own.

Let me hasten to say, I shall not endeavor to lecture on the law or the political science aspects of our subject. As a matter of fact, I'd just as soon try to teach that other Williams how to hit a baseball or a certain popular figure how to hit a golf ball as to give a lecture to such professionals as you ladies and gentlemen.

What I should like to take up this noon is the condition in which we find the federal-state system as we move into the second half of the Twentieth Century and how that system is preparing itself to meet the rising challenges of the near future. It is pretty apparent that the federal government faced with the unprecedented challenge of guiding the world to peace and the country to prosperity finds itself all tied up with a multiplicity of local activities as well. The States faced with the explosive and exploding problem of metropolitan living have failed to come to grips with this and many another problem with the result that their citizens have looked more and more to Washington. Why this is and whether and how our federal-state system can adapt itself to serve this and succeeding generations is what I'd like to explore with you this afternoon.

The relative lack of interest shown by the American people toward state and local governments will complicate our efforts to revise the federal-state system. As Professor Key stated it, they "are not boiling with concern about the working of their state government." Because of the depression, the World War and the cold war, there are understandable reasons for this apathy. But a strengthening in public interest and respect for state and local government is essential to continued progress in the United States.

It is my belief that in an age of Madison Avenue and machine made uniformity we need to strengthen every bit of creative diversity we possess. Our many great cities and our forty-eight, hopefully fifty, great and differing states, can provide a rich variety of thought and action no single centered nation can hope to attain.

It is true, as any candid observer must agree, that our pattern of state and local government may fail to meet the challenge of creative action and relapse into futile frustration and eventual national centralization. Certainly such a gloomy view was prevalent and seemed justified in the dark days of the thirties when bankruptcy faced every level of government below the nation and it alone possessed the fiscal strength to shoulder the burden of relief and combat the giant evils of unemployment and economic stagnation. Happily that storm was weathered and a series of measures we know as the New Deal and Fair Deal built stabilizers into the American economy and put a ceiling on human misery.

Many thought the states obsolete, a kind of vestigial remnant of our national evolution, impotent to help but powerful to hinder the national effort to solve our pressing problems. Certainly in that period mayors learned to beat a path to Washington without even a stop over in their state's capitol. Cities on the front line of the battle against human misery found sympathetic ears and hard cash in Washington when state governments seemed bleakly negative.

Some of this stemmed from superior resources at the disposal of the national treasury but all too much from a built-in lack of sympathy with urban problems in state legislatures. The well worn trail to Washington will become a four lane super highway if urban areas now containing the great majority of our people are given the cold shoulder or asked to come hat in hand to beg for scraps from rural-oriented state governments still unaware of, or hostile to their needs.

But all too unnoticed, there has been more recently a revitalization of state government in the decade following the War. While most public attention has been directed to events in Washington, many state capitols have been the scene of ferment and surprising accomplishment. I will announce that almost everyone in Michigan, regardless of party, would agree that there has been ferment in Lansing during the last nine years; and I believe that many would agree there has also been accomplishment.

As a Governor, I have found the powers of the state impressive and their opportunities for service challenging in the highest degree. Public service in the states and local government need be no trivial thing; rather it can command to the full creative and moral imagination. I can bring you good report of this. In the past few years, Neil Staebler, the state chairman of the Democratic Party in Michigan, and his associates have enlisted recruits to man the party organization and contest elections throughout the counties of the state. This is no mercenary army or band of sunshine patriots, but the firm foundation of an enduring institution of responsible government, a party bound together by program of social justice and enlightenment, and the immeasurable satisfaction of vital participation in self-government.

State political parties can be built and they can quicken civic energies now dormant. The states can regain stature as significant political communities through a rebirth of responsible parties. And thousands who now know democracy only as the threadbare slogans of test book or preachment will know the manly satisfaction of pulling their weight at the civic oar rather than sitting idly by as supercargo or deadweight.

The reason for the present condition of state government is well summed up in Adlai Stevenson's phrase; "States Rights would not be an issue if there were not so many states wrongs."

The sad truth of the matter is not that the federal government has forcibly divested the states of functions that they were manfully performing but rather that it has had to do those things for the citizens of the states that their state governments were refusing or neglecting to do.

There has never been any need for the federal government to act in the field of workmens compensation because the states have moved, granted in varying degree, to provide economic security to those who become injured or sick as a result of their job. But because there was little state action to provide security for those laid off their job through no fault of their own, the federal government had to establish a program of unemployment compensation. Even then, the states were left a great deal of discretion in their individual programs and of course, they administer their own programs.

It says in the books and the orators profess, with some truth I suspect, that people like their chores done by the government closest to them. But I strongly suspect that a good many citizens are more interested in getting their chores done than in what government does them. In other words, it may turn out that the government closest to the people is not so much the government that is closest geographically but the government that is closest sympathetically.

It is quite probable that I am not the only Governor in America who has been awakened by some anxious citizen who has a problem. The range of such problems is unbelievable. They are just as likely to involve the entry of a sweetheart from Central Asia into the United States, which, of course, involves the Federal Government as they are some state problems. Then I, not infrequently, hear complaints about the level of assessment of property taxes. This in Michigan is ordinarily as local a function as can be. Of course I have my share of calls to get irate citizens out of jail who have offended some local ordnance in the presence of the local constabulary. Such a citizen is not concerned with any separation of local and state functions or executive and judicial powers. He merely wants out -- and right now.

The President, our Senators and Congressmen get their share of misdirected requests as my office well knows from politely worded referrals to us from those offices.

How often local government officials get calls for state services I really don't know -- except that all of them in Michigan admit to getting requests for race track passes -- which dubious service used to be a state monopoly in Michigan until the tracks decided they would pass out their own largess.

Obviously I have d alt with unsophisticated examples, but they are too frequent to be deemed uncommon.

What's more I am sure that each of you can recall some instance where a citizen or group of citizens who wanted something done started with their local government. If their local government failed the, they as likely as not went to their state government. If relief was not forthcoming from the state, they went on to Washington. Then the next time they wanted something, they just didn't bother with their state or local government, they went to where they got service the last time.

In all of this, there is no abstract question of governmental theory or philosophy. There is only the concrete question of getting something done.

Labor legislation is a case in point. The labor unions are quite apt to be strong for federal legislation whereas the National Association of Manufacturers is often quite insistent that the matter should be left to the judgment of the several states. While there may e some important political theory mentioned, I strongly suspect that labor found that the Wagner Act was more effective than the sum total of state legislation. The NAM on their side found that a number of state legislatures could be induced to pass "right to wreck" or "right to work" laws as you prefer to call them and that there were a much greater number which could be counted on to maintain the status quo.

As I said before, I am mightily impressed by the powers of the states, when properly used. I have profound belief in states rights and responsibilities. I believe that state administration of enlightened program can be the most efficient way of meeting our society's problems. This is particularly true when contrasted with national centralism.

States rights or decentralized governmental responsibility and authority is also a strong guarantee of democracy against autocracy or totalitarianism as all of us here today know well. I don't mean here to say that the existence of States Rights guarantees successful government. The history of our independent colonies and our Articles of Confederation shows this is not necessarily true. What I do mean to point out here is that decentralized authority and responsibility keeps democracy alive locally and kills off inexpedient dictators.

History is full of examples to prove this point. But I would like to speak only out of my own experience. South America is an area where people continue to struggle for democracy against many odds. One reason I suspect Peron was so successful in seizing national power in Argentina is that the states are almost federal subdivisions. The chief executives of these subdivisions are all appointed by the federal authority and such power as is constitutionally granted to the states is mostly paper power. Therefore the practice of self-government is much more limited. I recognize that France maintains a democracy with a high degree of centralization. I do not say centralization and democracy are impossible. I do, however, say the decentralization and the local exercise of political power does in my mind strengthen the probabilities of democracy. It produces self-reliance and furthermore develops the ability and know how of democracy.

States rights has become a cult, with a sometimes strange and incomprehensible litany. All of us have watched the politicians who would die for states rights but then dazzle you with footwork getting at the head of the line for federal handouts.

Public attention has been focused on states rights as a result of the President's address to the Governor's Conference at Williamsburg. He called upon the Governors to assist him in determining which federal programs could be turned back to the states. A Federal-State Joint Committee has been appointed by the President and the Governors to study his suggestions and propose what action is needed.

Some of us were a bit skeptical of the President's proposal in view of his actions on the highway question. The Governor's Conference had gone on record favoring a return to the states of all federal highway functions, and the taxes collected by the federal government for highway purposes. The President's answer was to send Mr. Nixon to the Governor's Conference and ask support for the Clay Program, calling for a vast expansion of federal highway activity.

All of us share the President's desire that those functions which can be done by the states are promptly turned back to them. I hope that he shares the liberals concern that people come before theory.

One of my colleagues, Pennsylvania's dynamic Governor George M. Leader, had some excellent advice to offer the Federal-State Joint Committee, as it met for the first time in Hershey. He urged the Committee to conduct its discussions "primarily in the broad terms of people, problems and programs, rather than in the narrow terms of resolving jurisdictional disputes between rival governmental bodies."

This is precisely the one view which can lead to a measurable improvement of our federal-state system. A mad rush by political leaders to divest the federal government of power purely for the sake of divestment can create a vacuum in which progress will halt. It will not be enough to determine that the states are theoretically capable of performing certain duties now done by the federal government. There will have to be a firm guarantee that the states will perform these tasks, so that the problems of the people will not go unsolved.

Above all, the determination of which functions can be best performed by which level of government should not be approached as an exercise in organization. Flow charts and tables of organization may give the appearance of a modern, streamlined government, but the people for whom that government exists may also be getting good old-fashioned short shrift from it.

One of the first problems which must be solved if we expect the states to assume their legitimate roles is adequate financing. The federal government long ago, for all practical purposes, took over the major share of the nation's tax resources when it moved into the personal and corporate income field. I do not believe that the many scattered taxes on which states must rely can provide a solid basis for concerted state action.

It would be my suggestion that we look into the possibility of giving a federal income tax credit, not just a deduction from taxable income, to those paying personal and corporate income taxes to the state for specific purposes, probably starting with education. Of course this would have to be limited to a maximum percentage of credit, and should be so framed as not to encourage the states to tax for the sake of taxing but only for worthwhile objectives.

It may be that federal law could be revised to allow an individual or corporation a credit of 85% of a maximum 6% tax on his next income. I offer these figures one possibility not as my program. I would hope that the Joint Federal-State Committee would give their attention to a proposal and others that would provide a tax base on which the states could work.

The challenge then to the federal government is to move out of fields which can be occupied by the states. The challenge to the states is to move vigorously to accept these new responsibilities. I should like to take up for a moment what I believe to be the greatest problem facing the states.

At the beginning I stated that the greatest test of our federal system may come as the urban revolution and its effects are felt. I suggest that we must thoroughly review that system to insure that it provides a workable vehicle for the future.

Most of our attachment to the federal system is the result of an almost innate American passion for what we colloquially term the "grass Roots" kind of government. This, in turn resulted in the formal progression of government from the local to the state to the federal. Those services closest to the everyday life of the people--garbage disposal, water, and sewage facilities, public transportation--were left to the local government. The state, of course, built the roads, locked up the major criminals, whisked the mentally ill out of the local community, and even on occasion, regulated business or labor. Washington fought the wars, delivered the mail, and during the 19th Century, did its best to counteract those few radical states which tried to regulate business or labor.

Certainly, this picture was under constant transformation. The trend toward increased activity at the federal level only mirrored the rapid technological advances which shrunk the nation's physical confines and vastly increased the difficulty of solving many problems at any level beneath the national.

Yet this federalism of ours has not been sufficiently transformed to mirror the unbelievable shift in from rural to urban residence by Americans during the last fifty years. We have come in that time from a nation which was 39% urban to one which is now 64% urban. We can furthermore look forward to increasing that percentage to over 80% urban within the next twenty five years.

We now find, as the latest issue of Forum magazine points out, that 96 million people, more than 56% of our total population, live in 174 metropolitan areas We know also that this will increase by more than half to 150 million people by 1975. But the most challenging fact of this tremendous concentration of people within small geographic areas is that, in addition to the state and federal governments, the public affairs of our metropolitan citizens are in the hands of more than 16,000 units of local government.

Day after day, from almost all of these metropolitan areas, a constant tale of difficulty emerges. Those governmental activities closest to the people's lives have become the hardest of all to perform. How to get water in, and sewage out of a metropolitan area whose people are governed by a central city and hundreds of suburban units becomes a problem equal to the logistical problems of a major war.

You who work in the field know as well as I the problems which accompany the actual details of solution. Fear of losing local autonomy or fear of higher taxes can be barriers just as difficult to overcome as the physical problems of finding water and transporting it.

You who work in the field know the controversial nature of the various plans offered to achieve cooperation. Consolidation and annexation proposals seem to generate tremendous heat. So also do the plans for federal control through financial assistance. The use of ad hoc devices such as special districts and authorities has been notably successful in some instances, but many believe that their continued growth would lead to complete scatteration of function. Finally, and of most accepted currency, there is the idea of a federated city, wherein some of the sovereignty of the local units is given over to a super body directed to control particular functions by processes arrived at by majority consent of the local units.

The debate as to the efficacy of each of these proposals will continue, The solution or solutions of the problems involved, will, no matter what system of government is created, have a profound effect on federalism. Our traditional values and theories will have to give way to accommodate the new structure which will evolve from deliberations.

For instance, I believe with Luther Gulick that the states have the paramount responsibility for providing the framework of local government. It is a responsibility which the states will shirk at their peril, if they value at all the role which they play within the federal system. If they do not act to provide the means whereby the local units can best meet their needs, they will be bypassed, as they have in the past. Irate urban citizenries will create their own solutions, without or in spite of state action. The loser in such event can only be in the states.

Within this room there are many whose special training and research offer abilities which must be utilized if we are to adapt our federal system to what Adlai Stevenson so aptly termed the NEW America. Our specialists in state and local government must be called upon, eagerly and often.

But after the experts have determined the solutions, the real task will have just begun. It is then that the art of politics will be tested to its fullest. None of the solutions will be worth a jot if they are not accepted by the people. No pre-fashioned, theoretical framework can be forced upon an unwilling public. The difficult job of achieving this public acceptance will be left to the political parties and their leaders. As it has throughout the history of democracy, final success rests in the wisdom and energy of the men and women who have chosen the public life.

As Jefferson said of the ward republics and as Pericles said in an earlier society, democracy is a way of life that has to be lived, and lived actively, not just by the few but by the many. It is a quality of human life not to be measured in its success merely by the economy and efficiency of government, but by what it does to lift and ennoble the human spirit. The true role of the states and local government is not the decentralization of power to achieve some eighteenth century clock-maker's dream of political equipoise, nor even the higher goal of defeating the dangers of tyranny. Rather, their role is to provide as many of us as possible with the moral opportunity to be citizens, to participate in significant political decisions, to be lifted out of the pettiness of merely private cares to the enoblement of shares civic life. Governments are no mere utilitarian enterprises. When they become such, they lose their holds on the souls of men.

It is for this reason that we must approach the task that confronts us in the re-fashioning of our federal system. This is no mere problem of transportatic comfort, convenience, economics, or foreign policy. It means building a governmental structure in which men may not merely live, but live well.

Jefferson feared the multitudes piled one on top of the other in great cities. Fortunately, he erred in his time. We, too, have cause to fear a faceless mass, a mere human heap however well administered that cannot govern itself, cares not to govern itself, passes this worksome task to authorities, commissions or other devices of what Eric Fromn calls the "escape from freedom."

We are facing an era when our powers of production will permit human leisure which Greek philosophers thought the privilege of the few and that only at the expense of slavery. To be worthy of this leisure, we must plan not merely for the recreation of parks and beaches, but the recreation of the human spirit to be found in a vigorous civic life. Our governments of the future can be either convenient human heaps for commerce and mass entertainment, or hopeful partnerships in all art, all culture, all that ennobles the spirit of man. This is no vain dream. A brilliant age of cities and states is within our grasp if we have the heart and will. This is the promise of American politics. I ask that you who know best this promise do all that you can to insure its fulfillment.

Political Philosophy and the Language of Politics

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I

Sooner or later every body of systematic thought tends to develop a self-consciousness of its own limitations. Thus the supremacy of theology during the Middle Ages was followed by a series of forced withdrawals in which the natural world was surrendered to science, the political world to the autonomies of political and social philosophy. Today we are witnessing a revolution in which philosophers are struggling to shed the role of arbiters of human existence and destiny in order to confine themselves to analyses of linguistic usages. Similarly where once there had been high hopes that mathematics would supply the master key for unlocking all of the mysteries celestial and human, there is now a sober acceptance of the limitations inherent in any conventionalized system of signs and definitions.

These grand themes may seem a pretentious preface to the present topic, yet they contain a simple lesson which is easily forgotten: that a body of knowledge may still perform a useful, even critical, function despite its limitations. Today in most of our leading universities the history of political theory is singled out as the one "field" in which a graduate student is not only expected but required to take formal training. In recent years the precedence of political theory has not gone without challenge. There have been an increasing number of complaints that this system is outmoded; that the political theorist is primarily engaged in dissecting dead doctrines; that the history of political thought

is customarily taught as a course in Great Books; that most political theories contain precious little that is political and much that is "metaphysical" and esoteric. On the basis of these criticisms it is often suggested that the historical orientation of political theory be replaced by a methodological one, or that the political theorist concern himself with constructing "models" which might then be used to illuminate empirical inquiries.

As might be expected in these circumstances, the beleaguered political theorists have responded with a flat condemnation of modern social science as nihilistic and gnostic, arguing in effect either that the possibilities of political knowledge had been exhausted by Plato or that the political condition had been illumined once and for all by Christianity. Although the present paper will make no attempt to evaluate the merits of these two positions nor to arbitrate between the aggressiveness of the one and the hauteur of the other, it will assume in the course of the argument that each is correct, but not for the reasons advanced. That is, the traditionalists are quite right in contending for the value of retaining the main corpus of political philosophy as the vital center of the discipline of political science, while, on the other hand, the more empirically minded political scientist is justified in believing that the study of political philosophy will not provide him with a ready-made methodology or with a set of rigorously formulated testable hypotheses. Against the traditionalists it may be said that because the modern social scientist adopts an approach to knowledge radically different from classical or Christian

models, it does not follow that the yield is trivial, morally harmful, or false. It is an ignoratio elenchi to condemn one approach by canons appropriate to another. Similarly, the social scientist---and this holds for the student of comparative politics as well---is impoverishing his own resources when he argues that a body of knowledge which in incapable of serving his immediate needs in the form of testable hypotheses is disqualified from serving him in any way.

It has been suggested above that the contribution of political theory depends upon understanding the limitations which belong to it as a body of knowledge. Towards this end, let me mention some typical statements selected at random from some famous political theorists:

> "security for man is impossible unless it be conjoined with power" (Machiavelli, Discorsi, I, i, 8);
>
> "it is not the rights and privileges which he enjoys which makes a man a citizen, but the mutual obligation between subject and sovereign" (Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, Tooley translation, pp.20-21);
>
> "there can be no true Allegiance and there must remain perpetual seeds of Resistance against a power that is built upon such an unnatural Foundation, as that of fear and terrour" (Halifax, The Character of a Trimmer, ed. W. Raleigh, p. 57);
>
> "as soon as man enters into a state of society he loses the sense of his weakness; equality ceases, and then commences the state of war" (Montesquieu, Esprit des lois, I, iii).

Now the generality of these statements is such that an empirically-minded political scientist would despair of their practicality. What, then, is their utility? Or, to place the matter in a sharper focus, what is the political theorist doing when he advances statements of this order?

Any system of political ideas represents a distinctive way of looking at and organizing political experience; hence we might start by saying that a political theory is a form of vision directed at phenomena relevant to the inquiry of the theorist. There are, however, two distinct but related senses of "vision" and both have played an important part in the history of political theory. We can speak of vision as referring to a kind of perceptional report, as when Aristotle described the different forms of constitutions and definitions of citizenship, or when Machiavelli related the tactics employed by the princes of his day. But vision has also been used in another sense, as when Plato projected a picture of the political order purged of distortions and dissymetries. In this second meaning the imaginative element has been uppermost, and although Plato constitutes an extreme example, the element itself has been present in every political theorist. The reason for the recurrence of this imaginative element lies in an implicit assumption of political theory and one which has marked it off from earlier scientific theory, namely, the belief that the phenomena of politics, unlike those of nature, could be transfigured through a combination of thought and action. The point on which I would like to fasten attention for the moment concerns political phenomena. If for the moment we were to shed our preconceptions and adopt a naive attitude and then ask, what are political phenomena? we can better appreciate that phenomena do not spring spontaneously into thought nor do they display the label "political" for all to read. What we call "political" phenomena and the types

of categories and concepts we use, that is, our political vocabulary, are the products of a long philosophical development in which the great political philosophers have contributed to the definition of a distinctively political realm.

Now the process of defining the "political" area has not been markedly different from that which has taken place in other fields of inquiry. No one would seriously contend that the fields of physics or chemistry have always existed in a self-evident, determinate form waiting only to be discovered. If, to a significant degree, a field of inquiry is a product of definition, the "political" field can be viewed as an area whose boundaries have been marked out by centuries of political discussion. And just as other fields have changed their outlines so the boundaries of the political field have been shifting ones, sometimes including more, sometimes less of human experience, activity and thought. In political thought the process of definition has been accomplished through the concepts, categories and symbols fashioned by political thinkers. They have used these constructs to select and organize at a mental level certain aspects of human experience. Through the use of concepts and categories such as "power", "rights", "the state", "revolution", the political theorist has sought to give coherence and order to a segment of human experience.

One of the most important aspects in the development of the language of politics, and one which any student of the history of political ideas soon comes to recognize, is the conversation carried on by political philosophers not only with their contemporaries but with other political

philosophers long since dead. In this sense the history of political thought represents a dialogue carried on over time and one wherein the participants have been constantly defining and redefining the substance and limits of politics. Out of this dialogue has emerged one of the great achievements of the West, a well-defined tradition of political thought from which the major categories of political thinking have been evolved. It would be possible to pursue this discussion further to point out the advantages that accrue from possessing such a tradition, and to explore both the conservatizing tendencies of an inherited vocabulary and the special challenge which it poses for the intellectual rebels. My point, however, is that the history of political philosophy furnishes the student of political science with a valuable sense of the development and continuities of his own discipline, something which is strikingly absent in our sister disciplines of sociology and economics and only recently attended by historians. This, in turn, points to still a further quality of the kind of knowledge represented by the study of political thought. The fact that a succession of political thinkers have generally adhered to a common political vocabulary and have accepted a large number of problems as being properly the subject of political inquiry has served to make the political thought of earlier centuries comprehensible, as well as exciting. By contrast the discontinuities evident in scientific fields make it quite unlikely that a modern scientist would recur, for example, to medieval science either for support or inspiration. This has, of course, no bearing on the alleged superiority of scientific over philosophical inquiry.

It is mentioned merely to point out that the tradition of political thought is not so much a tradition of discovery as one of meanings extended over time.

These functions performed by a tradition of political thought also provide a justification for the study of the historical development of that tradition. In studying the writings of a Plato, a Locke, or a Marx we are in reality familiarizing ourselves with a fairly stable vocabulary and set of categories which help to orient us toward a particular world, the world of political phenomena. But more than this, since the history of political philosophy is an intellectual development wherein successive thinkers have added new dimensions to the analysis and understanding of politics, an inquiry into that development is not so much a venture into antiquarianism as a form of political education. By education I do not mean merely that the study of political theory contributes to a broadly liberal and humanistic curriculum, but rather education in the sense of imparting to the student a sense of what it means to think in political terms, using the vocabulary, grammar, and concepts appropriate to the political nature of his subject-matter. This constitutes no mean contribution, for with the excessive compartmentalizing of knowledge has come a prissy, almost feminine refinement of subject-matters, an obsession with purity which has encouraged the depoliticization of such fields as history, economics, literature, and philosophy. It is now possible for a student to take courses in the philosophy of Plato or Locke without ever suspecting that each of these thinkers possessed strong political commitments to which he sought to give

philosophical expression. Similarly, a student in economics is often inclined to equate the area where "politics" converges on economic issues as a zone of indifference for his own subject-matter. In contrast, political theory remains unabashedly political. Consequently the demands which it places on the student are not merely of the rigorous type associated with any body of philosophic thought. The additional demand is that the student think politically, that he identify himself with the political context of, say, Aristotle, Hobbes, or Marx. If the teacher is skillful and the student imaginative, the latter will be led to ask: what were the issues posed by theorist X? why were they important and in what senses were they political questions? what matters were considered relevant by X to resolving the problems posed? In the case of Hobbes the student must not only grapple with the issues posed by political anomie, but with the claim that the methods of science and mathematics were relevant to political knowledge. With Rousseau, the student projects himself into a social setting where the citizen has become alienated from the political order and in Rousseau he finds an attempt at a metaphysic of reconciliation. In confronting Marxian theory he must face up to the political implications of industrialization and the political claims growing out of the social and economic structure of industrial society. But the point in all of this is that the study of the ideas in question demands much more than an attempt to "learn" dated doctrines. It is, instead, a form of political participation which requires that the student insert himself into a political context and ponder the factors relevant to the problems posed.

This type of training is invaluable to the student of comparative politics for developing a sense of the political. His vocation demands that he constantly project himself imaginatively into different political societies; that he know what are the relevant political questions to ask; and what general considerations---such as the prevailing institutions, the governing groups, the distribution of power, social structure, dominant ideologies, etc.---must be borne in mind when analyzing a set of problems. That these general considerations must be refined and modified, that they may have to be drastically altered, is admitted; but this in no way derogates from the value of a body of knowledge which assists in orientating the inquirer so that his inquiry will be a political one.

In this connection there ought to be laid to rest the notion that political theorists have been engaged primarily in creating airy concepts, metaphysical ghosts, which have little or nothing to do with political realities. The act of theorizing has not been a completely arbitrary procedure whereby the theorist, like the poet of Lord Kames, has used his powers of imagination to fabricate "images without any foundation in reality." The phenomena confronting the theorist, the field of actions, events, and relationships forming the focus of his inquiry, possess a previous coherence by virtue of the habits, traditions, and institutions operative in the society. In this way political traditions and institutions, in helping to select, arrange, and organize certain phenomena, impart an order to these phenomena and thereby help define the field of speculation. In a different connection it has been said by a contemporary philosopher that in the concepts

and symbols used in our thinking we try to make "a temporal order of words" stand for "a relational order of things."[1] If we apply this to political matters we can say that political institutions and established patterns of behavior provide the internal relationships between the "things" or phenomena of political nature and that political philosophy seeks to make meaningful assertions about these "things". In other words, institutions serve to establish a coherence to political phenomena; hence when political philosophy comes to deal with these phenomena the latter do not represent disconnected events or activities hurtling through a Democritean void, but phenomena already endowed with coherence and interrelationships. Consequently, when the student is engaged in analyzing political philosophies he is not dealing with bloodless abstractions but with political experience crystallized in thought.

At the same time, however, many of the great statements of political philosophy have been put forward in times of crisis, that is, when political phenomena appear less effectively integrated by institutional forms and habits. Institutional breakdown releases phenomena, so to speak, causing political behavior and events to take on something of a random quality and destroying the customary meaning which had been part of the old political world. This situation need not be described at length for a twentieth century audience, yet once again the history of political theory is helpful in providing object lessons in how men go about restoring meaning to political phenomena and redefining what is political. The condition alluded to above

was most effectively symbolized by the seventeenth century conception of the "state of nature" which was intended to represent a condition lacking the relationships and institutional forms characteristic of a functioning political system. It had also been present in the concern of Greek political theory with stasis and anomie. But the point is that while the task of political philosophy is greatly complicated in periods of disintegration, theories such as those of Plato, Machiavelli, and Hobbes are evidence of the strong "challenge and response" relationship between the disorder of the actual political world and the role of the political philosopher as the encompasser of disorder. At such times the range of possibilities appears infinite, for now the political philosopher is not confined to criticism and comment: he must reconstruct imaginatively a shattered world of meanings and their accompanying institutional expressions. He must, in short, fashion a political cosmos out of political nature. The vicarious experience which this affords the student of politics is invaluable for giving him a sense of the priorities in a political system and of the shift in priorities according to the exigencies of time and place. It is also a solemn warning against attaching too much faith in the ability of certain categories to capture permanently the mercurial elements of political life.

II

In the preceding discussion I have tried to make the simple point that the study of political theory can contribute to the comparative study of politics by equipping the student with a political education and a

political vocabulary. The obvious objection to the foregoing is that it rests on the assumption that the student of comparative politics is interested only in Western European political societies. Doesn't training in the vocabulary and categories of Western political thought encourage a parochial outlook and inhibit the advancement of a truly comparative politics which would include non-Western societies as well? In fact, this kind of objection is less impressive than it seems. In the first place, if one is to mount the slide of "cultural relativism", one has to follow it all the way. This means admitting that no reliable or non-trivial knowledge of another political society is possible for an outside observer. Secondly, if one examines the research being conducted or proposed on non-Western societies, it becomes apparent that the usual categories of political thought are very much in evidence.(2) This is inevitable, if for no other reason than that the research findings are being addressed to an audience familiar only with Western modes of political thought. Thirdly, it is apparent that since the middle of the nineteenth century, the West has exported not only science and technology, but also political ideas and institutions. In other words, the dialogue mentioned earlier is now being extended to a wider circle of participants, while the political experience registered in thought is of a greater variety. As evidence of this one need only point to the speech of February 27th by Mao Tse-tung where the familiar language of Hegel, Marx, and Lenin was applied to interpret the experience of contemporary China. Finally, if the student of comparative politics is loyal to his claim of being a student of politics, and not a sometime anthropologist or sociologist,

then his main focus is directed towards political situations and his main assumption must be that political situations recur in various kinds of political systems. It is here that the history of political thought speaks most directly, for it contains a variety of perspectives on political situations. The political theorist has continually raised the question of the meaning and nature of public decision-making, of the types of goods for which men and groups compete, of the kinds of criteria relevant to resolving controversies concerning these goods, of the conditions social, economic, political which make for order and stability, etc.

In conclusion a few very brief remarks on the problem presented by the search for a "science" of comparative politics. One approaches this subject with a certain amount of hesitation owing to the fact that there appears to be widespread disagreement among the students of comparative politics concerning the proper image of their own discipline. Is it to be a functional approach? a study of distinct political systems? of areas? or is it to aim at a kind of master science of comparative politics, an overall Comtean system applicable to every political system?(3) The only point of unanimity among contemporary spokesmen appears when they roundly denounce what they call "descriptive" studies, although I would defy any of them to produce an example of an important study which is "purely descriptive".

In assessing the contribution which political theory can make to a science of comparative politics it is of the utmost importance to clarify the level of generality or specificity at which one is operating. Insofar

as an inquiry is directed at confirming or falsifying a specific hypothesis, such as one concerning the relationship between party organization inside the legislature with that on the "outside", the inquiry cannot expect to find any answers in the traditional literature of political theory. The reason for this is not merely that the inquiry is concerned with a type of situation largely unknown to the political theorists of the past, but rather that the type of statement common to these theorists is not susceptible to being proved or disproved by the criteria of validation currently employed in empirical studies of comparative politics. It is true that the writings of Aristotle, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and Marx, to name only the more obvious examples, do contain assertions which can be subjected to testing, although it is more than doubtful that any of them could stand up to the rigorous standards of scientific proof. At the same time, most political theories contain a large number of analytic or tautological statements which, for logical reasons, are largely useless for empirical purposes. As long as political inquiry remains impaled on the analytic-synthetic dilemma, and as long as that dilemma is interpreted in a naively literal fashion, the bulk of traditional political literature can be dismissed. Fortunately, a growing appreciation of the complexities involved in validating empirical propositions seems to be pointing the way out of the blind alley created by logical positivism.(4) In the first place, a tautology may be discarded for empirical inquiries, yet it does not follow that it is completely meaningless and of no use whatsoever. Secondly, it may very well be that in the near future a third realm located somewhere between analytic

and synthetic will be admitted; a realm hospitable to propcsitions which cannot be refuted by the canons of observation now employed for empirical verification, but susceptible instead to different kinds of proof, less rigorous perhaps than those used in science, but not insignificant for being so. This is a far too complicated matter to pursue further, but it should serve as a warning to the student of comparative politics who not only tends to adopt an image of scientific method widely at variance with that employed by scientists, but has failed to face up to the possibility of there being several logics of inquiry.(5) Instead of rushing to imitate scientific models the first order of business for the student of comparative politics ought to be to elucidate the nature of the subject matter and the type of logic appropriate to it.

1. Suzanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (Mentor Edition), New York, 1952, pp. 58-9.

2. See for example the categories proposed by G.M. Kahin, Guy Pauker, and Lucien W. Pye, "Comparative Politics of Non-Western Countries," American Political Science Review, Vol. XLIX (1955), pp. 1022-1041.

3. Among the literature on the subject the following is suggestive of the disagreements: Roy Macridis, The Study of Comparative Government (New York, 1955); Herman Finer, The Theory and Practice of Modern Government, (New York, 1949); the critique of Levy's model by Barrington Moore, Jr., "The New Scholasticism and the Study of Politics", World Politics, Vol. VI (1953), pp. 122-139.

4. Morton G. White, "The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism" in S. Hook (ed.), John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and of Freedom (New York, 1950) and also by the same author, Toward Reunion in Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass., 1956); J.W.N. Watkins, "Between Analytical and Empirical", Philosophy (April, 1957), pp. 112-131; Karl Popper, "Degree of Confirmation", The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. V (August, 1954), pp. 143-149.

5. See for example the remarks in P.H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Penguin edition, 1954), pt. I; R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford, 1952), Chs. 1-2.

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METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT, 1975: AN EXTRAPOLATION OF TRENDS

The New Metropolis: Green Belts, Grass Roots or Gargantua?

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Paper presented at the American Political Science Association,
New York, 1957

I

Like matrix, model, and measurement, extrapolation is a word which a political scientist should handle with care. It cannot be abruptly excluded from our professional vocabulary: to do so marks a man as insensitive to some of the important recent developments in our trade. But neither can it be taken at face value, for this implies an ability to stand up to the mysteries of mathematics with light-hearted confidence and possibly a readiness to plunge into the icy waters of extreme behaviorism.

Taken alone, the first hazard raises serious problems for the ordinary garden-variety political scientist, trained in an era when only economists mastered calculus. Strictly speaking, an extrapolation is a conditioned projection, and we cannot slip by with the deceptively simple textbook definition of "an extension of trends beyond the limits of the data on which they are based." Good form requires that relationships among variables be established for a present series, and then the additional values for the particular function in question calculated on the explicit assumption that existing relationships will be maintained or that they will change in a definite forseeable way. To perform a genuine extrapolation of a function broadly labeled

"metropolitan government" would involve not only a more rigorous definition of the term than we have yet developed but also a capacity to identify all the relevant variables which affect that "function" in the extension of a trend.

Of course, few practitioners of projection in the social sciences aim for such mathematical purity. In the words of Raymond Vernon "projections are not true or false; they are simply more fully reasoned or less so." Few seriously claim to have quantitatively defined "a government" or to have discovered all the subtle forces which play upon it. Extrapolation in the study of human events is recognized as an imperfect road to learning, full of bumps and detours, and often ending abruptly in a dead-end.

Nevertheless, even if we are modest in our technical expectations, there is the second issue to be faced--the philosophical implications of even a limited attempt to extrapolate trends. By emphasizing empirical developments so heavily, some commitment is made to the importance of descriptive investigations per se, and the possibility arises that the analysis will stop there. In thinking that possibly governments can be "trended," that present uniformities in social, economic, and political behavior may portend future uniformities with specificity, some credence is given to the view that methodological distinctions among disciplines are wearing away and that accuracy of observations--not evaluation of their implications--is the sole test of a competent political research. In the background of many an empirical study lurks a vision of the day when the physicist and the philosopher will lie down peacably together.

These assumptions may be quite true, but if stated categorically, they are bound to set loose a full scale methodological debate. For the sake of harmony alone, then, this analysis extends only a toe--gingerly--into the sea of quantification. No actual extrapolation is undertaken, in the sense that series of values are established for important variables and their relationships studied. Certainly, no trends are "discovered" for the variables discussed are all supplied by our companion disciplines of economics and sociology, and our purpose here is to investigate their bearing on political behavior. Further, although the importance of empirical inquiry is readily admitted, the analysis proceeds on the conviction that normative commentary is still an important responsibility of the political scientist. It is a mistake for him to work in splendid isolation, unacquainted with other worlds of scholarship; but it is also a mistake for him to abandon the consideration of values which has been his specialty.

All this has been better said before. It is said again, however, because the course of metropolitan research seems to support the position. Once the examination of what we are finding out about our metropolitan areas is completed, no trend appears inexorable, and questions of value appear together with matters of fact. When the returns are in, political science remains free to repair to its traditional retreats of caprice and whimsy, and its obligation to render judgment is not diminished but intensified.

II

Growth and change in almost every aspect of American life form the backdrop of the studies of metropolitan regions and

provide a concomitance of forces from which an analyst must choose. Innovations in transportation and communication, changes in housing construction and residential finance, mutations in the pattern of industrial development, almost instinctive aspirations for space and separate family accommodations, all play their part. So do the rising birth rate, the tradition of restlessness, nourished and intensified by the Depression and the wars, the surging "upward mobility" within the middle class, prosperity and the family ethic.

From this concomitance, most of us who discuss the "metropolitan dilemma" and who call for radical reorganization of metropolitan government have traditionally selected three forces as being of major importance. The first is the pattern of population growth and distribution within the typical SMA, in particular the disproportionate increase in suburban residential population traceable for at least thirty years.[1] The second is the slow diffusion of industry and large commercial activities throughout the area which has been taking place as new enterprises build their factories and shopping centers in fringe areas and old ones desert the central city to join them.[2] The third is also diffusive in character, although less tangible: the gradual spread of the cultural ethos of the metropolis to enfold formerly independent communities and to blanket the hinterlands with a common set of mores and values.[3] To most of us, each of these trends, taken alone, appears to have negative consequences for the fragmented pattern of government in metropolitan areas, and taken together, seem to point positively in the direction of a common conclusion.

The now familiar negative aspects of suburban population growth are primarily three. The first concerns the costs of metropolitan governments. The journey to work, which the separation of residence and place of sustenance imposes, appears both to burden unfairly the central city and to impose crushing demands on the suburbs. The core is required to handle the costs of servicing a daytime population thirty to fifty percent in excess of its permanent number; the suburbs have unnecessarily large capital budgets since, in the welter of jurisdictions, economies of scale and size cannot be realized. Duplication and overlapping of facilities between suburbs and the core city and among suburbs result.

The population shift and the journey-to-work pattern which ensues appears to have a second negative effect. It seems to lead to a deterioration in the political process. The sturdy burgher class deserts the city, but the rigor of the commuting schedule makes its effective participation in suburban affairs unlikely. Big city politics are seen as becoming increasingly a struggle between the very rich and the very poor; suburban governments are held to be controlled by the old residents, merchants, and real-estate dealers, with only an occasional high-minded foray by the League of Women Voters. Most metropolitan inhabitants have their feet in at least two political jurisdictions; they are half-citizens, defranchised either in law or in fact.

Third, what politics remains is likely to be bifurcated. As the suburban exodus goes on, we are told that the fringe and the central city are drifting farther and farther apart, the

former increasingly Republican, the latter Democratic, so that the metropolitan areas are likely to be split into two warring camps. Prospects for mutual cooperation and understanding diminish, the metropolitan situation becomes cast in a rigid mold, and the opportunity for responsible consideration of regional problems diminishes.[4]

These implications of suburban growth per se seem dismal enough, but the second force of industrial diffusion adds a further difficulty. It appears to compound the metropolitan fiscal problem by making impossible an orderly matching of resources to requirement, by taking away revenues from the jurisdictions which need them most. Again, the plight of the central city is highlighted. Its tax base, already weakened by a large proportion of tax-exempt property devoted to educational and cultural purposes, is weakened further by the departure of business. Slums and blighted areas take the place of busy commercial districts, renewal efforts become more difficult, and welfare and public safety costs increase. Meanwhile in the outer ring some suburbs receive windfalls from new industry, but adjoining ones are saddled with the expenses of the workers living in cracker-box houses and putting four children per family through school. Because population and economic location patterns do not coincide, the traditional inequities and inadequacies of the American local tax structure are further intensified.[5]

As the metropolis extends its cultural influence, a third set of "negative" consequences ensues. Discrete local communities disappear; friendships become scattered randomly throughout the area; associations made in the course of work are different from

those developed in residential neighborhoods. Only the ties of kinship and the stultifying communications of mass-media remain to bind men together.[6] This development is thought to have two untoward effects: first, as men wander aimlessly in the lonely crowd, the capacity of existing units of government to function vigorously and effectively is impaired for they no longer engender civic consciousness and a sense of belonging. Second, without regional institutions, no loyalty to a higher order is possible. All that remains is a weak notion of metropolitan patriotism, a New Yorker's superficial pride in being part of the Big Show. So regional problems find no vehicle for their solution and the capacity to look ahead, to plan rationally, to awake a regional consciousness is lost.

In a positive sense and in a broad way observers believe these trends are interrelated and that they lead to a common conclusion so far as political analysis is concerned. The separation of home and place of work, the rise of "nuclear centers of dominance" in the metropolitan economic system, the spread of metropolitan culture, taken together seem to signify that a metropolitan community has come--or is coming--into being. We have been imprecise about what the word "community" means. Rarely are political scientists as rigorous in their definitions as, for example, one of the panel members from a companion discipline has been.[7] But generally, we have assumed that if an aggregate of people in a given area achieve economic autarchy, if social intercourse extends over the area, and if common mores and customs exist, the basic foundations for a genuine community are present. The three factors we have studied seem to indicate that fairly self-sufficient

metropolitan economic systems have developed, that social interaction now takes place across the entire area, and that a growing consensus about values is at hand. The prerequisites for the metropolitan community appear imbedded then in the trends we emphasize today.

Given this positive interpretation, the common conclusion is that for a single community, there should be a rationally constructed set of political institutions. The metropolitan dilemma is defined as the existence of many governments within a common economic and social framework. The metropolitan solution has been variations on the theme "one community--one government" by any one of the half dozen ingenious political inventions. Running through all these recommendations is the premise that if somehow present units of government are brought together ,if they can share resources and administrative responsibilities, the negative consequences of the forces now at work will be avoided and impact guided into useful channels. If such reorganization is not forthcoming, we have always believed these areas face governmental crises of substantial proportions. To drift with the tide, is to court political, financial, and administrative disaster for urban government in the United States.

III

The facts on which the case for metropolitan government depends are quite real, and we have not misread the figures. Yet nothing demonstrates the complexity of analysis so well as the results of our reliance on three trends, and three trends alone. Despite our predictions, disaster has not struck: urban govern-

ment has continued to function, not well perhaps,but at least well enough to forestall catastrophe. Traffic continues to circulate; streets and sewers are built; water is provided; schools keep their doors open; and law and order generally prevail. Nor does this tolerable state of affairs result from an eager citizenry's acceptance of our counsel: we know only too well that our proposals for genuine reform have been largely ignored.

It may be, of course, that the breaking point has simply not been reached. There is certainly little sign that the tide of suburban growth is ebbing, or that industrial diffusion is slowing down, or that the representatives of the new American character are remorseful now that their values have been so cruelly exposed. If we are to look forward to 1975, we have good reason for believing that these trends will continue until the linear city is in being on both our coasts and probably in regions in between. Yet conditions were already serious enough in the nineteen-twenties to prompt investigation and to set loose prophecies of doom. Developments have continued unabated, and it is a fair question, given the technological changes of recent years and the stubborn public reluctance to listen to our counsel, to ask if we have discovered the whole story.

If we dip back into the arrays of factors and forces at work in metropolitan regions, other trends appear, and the more they are studied, the more important they become. In effect, when other trends,formerly left unexplored,are reviewed, they seem to operate as countervailing forces that modify the trends on which we have concentrated our attention. At times they abate the consequences our basic factors imply; at times, they change the

relationships we have assumed existed. And, at least in one important respect, they present a completely different picture of the SMA than we have been accustomed to portraying.

For example, while it is true that the disproportionate growth in suburban population shows every sign of continuing, it is also true that the extraordinary period of prosperity goes on. As the dominant feature of our economy, inflation swells the cost of government, but it also swells, although belatedly, the revenue. Urban governments have managed spectacular increases in their tax returns in the past few years, and we are told by no less authority than the President's Commission on Intergovernmental Relations that the potential of the property tax is by no means realized.[8] Moreover, the rising level of incomes has an economic consequence quite apart from any particular tax structure: once basic necessities of life are satisfied, higher tax burdens, however imposed, are more tolerable, and borrowings become easier, so long as the market is not surfeited.[9] Thus communities may be forced to a general reassessment of property values, or they may skate on fiscal thin ice, but they need not undertake a general structural reorganization. Metropolitan governments may be forced to pay the excessive costs which the fragmented pattern requires, but they apparently are able to do so without encountering municipal bankruptcy.

Nor should other forces which bolster the capacity of metropolitan governments to sustain themselves be overlooked. While no major structural reform has been accomplished, state and federal grants-in-aid have helped support critical services and new municipal tax sources have been discovered and utilized.

The plight of the central city has been to some extent relieved by grants and shared taxes, and by state assumption of important responsibilities. The commuter has either directly by earnings taxes or indirectly through his payments to state and federal governments contributed some of his share to the core municipality. The special district has been used more and more frequently to overcome statutory debt limits, to tap new revenue sources, and to scale jurisdictional barriers in important functional fields. And some suburbs have been content to forego services, to get along with amateur governments, and to ignore the welfare state in order to remain autonomous.[10]

In less easily explicable ways, the deterioration of the urban political process seems to have been checked. Healthy signs of reinvigorated, capable political leadership have appeared in many of our large cities. Newcomers in suburbia have won important political battles, over schools and public improvements. Even the prophecy that the suburbs are irrevocably Republican and the central city irrevocably Democratic seems suspect in the light of the most recent election returns.* The party battleground is more complex than previously supposed.

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* Relatively little attention has been given to the subject of metropolitan voting behavior, and no general hypotheses seem firmly established. The Banfield analysis assumed a constant city Democratic majority of 60% and a Republican suburban majority of 60%. This assumption may be unrealistic given close analysis of the 1952 and 1956 national elections. For 14 metropolitan areas showing increasing Republican strength in 1952 over 1948, the gain in 8 central cities was greater than in their suburbs. In 1956, Republican central city gains continued, only San Francisco and Los Angeles managing a slight Democratic comeback. In spot Congressional elections in suburban St. Louis, sharp Democratic gains were registered between 1946 and 1954. A study of Boston metropolitan elections, state and national, between 1940 and 1954, showed 15 suburban towns growing increasingly Republican, (cont.)

While the apparently obvious consequences of disproportionate suburban growth have been modified, other developments have affected the revenue side of the picture. Metropolitan areas as a whole have continued to hold their own in relative economic importance, and industry has continued to move out to the fringe. Yet, by concentrating on the pattern of industrial diffusion alone, we have overlooked even more important economic changes which sharply modify the "mismatched supply and demand" thesis.*

The first of these is the shift in consumer demands. As output and income per worker have grown, and per capita consumption risen, a relative decline has occurred in the consumption of agricultural products and a relative increase in the demand for "services." Employment has expanded dramatically in the fields of trade, amusement, research, education, medical care--the white collar category in general. Since these are the fields where real output per man has not increased very rapidly, the proportion of the labor force thus absorbed expands more rapidly than the absolute decrease in other categories would imply.

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9 increasingly Democratic, and 13 changing from Republican to Democratic. While these analyses do not provide anything like a firm basis for positive speculation they do cast considerable doubt on the theory of suburban "conversion" to Republicanism, so prevalent in recent years.

*In the following discussion of metropolitan economic developments, the analysis is based upon interim findings of the New York Metropolitan Region Study. I am indebted to Raymond Vernon, Director of the study, and the other economists on the staff for their patient revelations of the mysteries of regional economics. The study has not yet reached the point where the trends discussed can be stated in quantitative terms, and considerable modifications of the reasoning here summarized may take place before the project's conclusion in 1959. At the present time, however, these findings appear fairly well substantiated. The Study, and the economists therein are, of course, not responsible for the interpretations and inferences I have made so far as metropolitan government is concerned.

Second, the structure of manufacturing activities has changed. Not only have industry classifications included a larger number of truly white collar workers--management, advertising, special repair and maintenance staffs--but manufacturing processes and products have become increasingly specialized. There are an increasing number of specialists who offer intermediate processes and products to a number of different industries, and their facilities provide the small manufacturer with "external economies" which allow him to compete effectively with larger firms. There are an increasing number of "unstandardized" final products, too, as firms depart from offering a few stable lines and present their customers with an array of choices.

Together with the decline in the pull of raw material sources as a locational factor, the relative increase in transportation costs, and the growing size of metropolitan markets, these changes in demand and in the structure of manufacturing help explain the continued growth of urban areas as entities. More important for our purposes, they move in the direction of counterbalancing the consequences of the industrial diffusion trend within metropolitan regions.

The rise in the importance of "services" in the urban economy means a broadening of the non-residential tax base exclusive of industrial plants. Offices, salesrooms, medical buildings, trade establishments of all sorts and sizes, while not as advantageous to municipalities in their cost-revenue ratios as manufacturing plants, still return more in taxes than they demand in public services.[11] As the white collar occupations grow in importance, the facilities in which they work become part of the

resource base, and as they are scattered through the region in general they provide alternative sources for revenue quite apart from those supplied by factories. If only industrial location trends are studied, this growing number of service establishments is overlooked and important additions to the resource base omitted.

The changes within the structure of manufacturing also makes an exclusive reliance on the industrial location trends undependable, particularly since, quite frequently, only larger firms are singled out for attention. The increasing specialization which characterizes more and more modern manufacturing means that the processes in any given industry from receipt of raw material to delivery of finished goods may be dispersed throughout a region. Large plants and service facilities may drift toward the suburbs in search of cheaper space, but this does not necessarily mean that former locations in the central city or inner ring remain deserted.

On the contrary, many small firms frequently find a location within the central city attractive, for here are available all the specialists in the intermediate stages of production whose services can be contracted to permit competition with larger plants. Other "external economies" arise: fractional use of transportation facilities at less-than-carload or truckload lots, urban public services--police and fire protection, water and sewage facilities--which might not exist in the suburbs, rented space, a larger labor market, and so on. The appearance of unstandardized end products also enhances the central city's position, for purchases usually depend on visual inspections, and when styles and grades of material are important, inventories have to be kept within strict limits. These conditions make the core attractive as a "seed-bed" for

industrial development, and take up the slack as larger firms depart.

Moreover, for all firms, large and small, the central city offers certain unstandardized inputs which are best provided in a central location. Advertising agencies, law firms, banks, home offices, some types of salesrooms, are activities which require proximity with their competitors, both because of the irregular schedule in which they may be used, and because "knowledge of the industry," gossip of the trade, face-to-face confrontation are prerequisites for doing business. Here again the central city offers advantages which few suburbs can yet supply.

When the changes in the manufacturing structure are considered, neither the central city nor the suburbs seem in such desperate straits as are often described. As industrial diffusion goes on, and available land taken up, more suburbs will receive "windfalls." More will actively search them out as well, for changes in plant architecture and the elimination of unfavorable site conditions, smoke, smells, water pollution, mean that many suburbs formerly hostile to development, will become enamoured of "light industry." Those who do not, or will not find industry will have their resources bolstered by service establishments following the market or by special facilities within an industry which can be separated from the parent plant.

Meanwhile, the central city is likely to find alternative economic activities, plants of small firms, business offices of large ones, and the cluster of professional and semi-professional services on which both depend. Moreover, the overriding necessity of these economic activities to maintain their central location

makes their response to tax changes highly inelastic. Existing levies can be increased, or even new taxes on earnings and income imposed, and these special groups will still "stay put." Together with continued prosperity and a rise in real income, this inelasticity helps explain the recent successes in discovering new revenue sources. It further reduces the "certain" consequences of financial crises which population and industrial trends portend to the status of mere possibilities, less likely than alternative courses of development.

Not only are our demographic and economic series suspect, the less tangible hypothesis of "metropolitan dominance" comes in for critical scrutiny, also. Without questioning the accuracy of the measures of newspaper circulation, postal delivery areas, telephone exchanges and journey-to-work patterns which imply the existence of a metropolitan "community," contradictory trends can be established. It is possible to submit that each region is an economic entity, that it has a circulatory and communication system of its own, and still argue that a scatteration of society has accompanied the scatteration of government; that metropolitan growth promotes a "huge mosaic of massed segregation of size, class, and ethnic groups" a "crazy quilt of discontinuities."[12]

Admittedly, as indicated earlier, when we speculate about community, we are talking about a nebulous term. The models used for the study of community are many; the essential elements of community life are still uncertain and their relative importance unweighed.[13] Yet it is significant that when authorities speak of the break-up of local communities in the metropolitan area, and

the onrush of metropolitan dominance, their departure point is almost always the primary community, preliterate society, savage village or feudal holding where economic autarchy, social isolation and consensus of values were most complete.[14] Such a community if it ever existed at all, never existed in the United States. Our archtype has been the New England town or the hamlet of the Old Northwest, both quite different in their organization of space and their feeling for community affairs, but both relatively sophisticated types, having substantial economic and social intercourse with the outside world, numbering speculators and entrepreneurs among their inhabitants, and displaying mature political systems. While their differences were many, the common elements of these communities were the qualities of propinquity, homogeneity, interdependence, and equality, which produced our ideal local government--grassroots democracy.[15]

If these qualities are taken as the essentials of small-town life, then modern suburbs may be on the way to finding a substitute for economic self-sufficiency and social isolation to promote a sense of community consciousness. They may be using their political boundaries to differentiate the character of their residents from their neighbors and using governmental powers--zoning, residential covenants, taxation, selective industrial developments--to promote conscious segregation. From the variety of classes, occupations, income levels, races and creeds which the region contains, a municipality may isolate the particular variant it prefers and concentrate on one type of the metropolitan man. In a sense it may even produce a "purer" type of community than the

American archtype, because it has a wider range of choice and it need not reproduce all the parts of a self-contained economic system. It can simply extract the particular functions it choses to support, and achieve a social homogeneity never before possible.

Moreover, growth itself may aid and abet the process of strengthening community bonds in subareas of metropolitan regions. To the extent that a feeling of fellowship waxes strong in the early stages of community growth, that "political democracy evolves most quickly while the process of organization and the solving of basic problems are still critical," many suburbs may resemble earlier American towns in their political and social processes.[16] At any rate, provocative comparisons have been made between group and individual characteristics in modern housing developments--the acknowledgment of equality and the recognition of interdependence in Levittown and Park Forest--and frontier towns of old.[17]

A thesis that small communities are reappearing in the metropolitan areas, that the high-water mark of the process of communal disintegration has passed is conjectural. But so is the rationale for the new metropolitan man, unattached and unrooted, and some interesting statistics support the first hypothesis. For one thing, the existence of fragmented governments do break up the area into manageable proportions--more suburbanites live in towns between 10,000 and 25,000 than in towns of any other size.[18] For another, modern suburbs have captured that portion of the middle class most oriented, in terms of education, occupation, income and family status, toward being responsible members of their locality.[19] Third, subareas in metropolitan regions are displaying a tremendous variety in their economic functions, social rank and ethnic and

occupational order.[20] Most important of all, this variety does not seem to be random in nature, but the result of conscious coalescing according to a pattern of spatial homogeneity. In brief, each suburb may be gathering its chosen few to its bosom, and not just in the broad terms which Burgess and Hoyt have outlined. More specifically, a clustering according to occupations seems to be taking place, in which different occupations, representing different status points in the social spectrum, put space between each other, and the wider social differences, the further apart the members of disparate occupations live within the metropolitan area. Tracing this development in the Chicago metropolitan area, Otis and Beverly Duncan found a consistent pattern of residential segregation among occupations and a preference for neighbors which showed closely related occupations.[21]

If this process of natural neighborhoods goes on in an area in which each neighborhood is equipped with a local government, then instinctive feelings of communion are enhanced by the fact of legal and political power. A cultural sui generis results, and the existence of separate political institutions, separate powers to be exercised, individual elections to be held, reinforces the bonds which make the neighborhood. Within the region as a whole, we may be witnessing a popular attempt to dissect the metropolitan giant into small pieces, and to cap each with legal authority and some degree of civic consciousness.

To the extent that this is true, the notion of one metropolitan community may be misleading, and the characterization of modern culture as new may be overdrawn. Economically the region may be one, but it may be powerless to bid for the loyalties of

its residents against the claims of the smaller neighborhoods. Its inhabitants may be conformists, gregarious, adjusted, seeking approval from their peer groups, participating eagerly in every form of social endeavor, but these qualities may not signify a new dominant culture. Instead, they may mark a return to the small-town life De Tocqueville found, an expression of protest against the stratified, pecuniary structure of the Victorian city, a desire to recreate again the "...opportunity for companionship and friendship, for easy access to local services, and for certain forms of security...," a new vision of open-country culture to stand against the metropolis.[22]

There is not enough reliable data over a long enough period of time to weigh the relative pulls of metropolitan dominance and grassroots renaissance. But there is enough data to allow us to be sceptical of the one community hypothesis, particularly when the history of public resistance to metropolitan reform is on our side. At least it seems clear that local loyalties are by no means abandoned, and that, if by some political sleight-of-hand, a metropolitan government is created, it may not find the instinctive springs of support and popular understanding which is supposed to be anxiously waiting for the creation of regional institutions.

IV

So far this analysis has undertaken only to expand the frame of reference in which metropolitan politics and government is usually considered, to bring other factors and forces under review, and to qualify conclusions derived from a limited review of empirical facts. The results of the inquiry certainly do not

unveil the metropolitan future, nor do they indicate what steps should be taken. Our findings to date have been tentative and negative. There may not be seriously adverse financial or political effects arising from suburban growth. There may not be a shortage of resources for the central city or the inner ring. There may not be one community to bring into maturity. In short, there may not be a metropolitan crisis which all of us have expected for so long, either now or in the future.

This does not mean that there are no metropolitan problems, nor that there is no case for reform. Problems there are aplenty: ugly implications of the growing segregation of classes, races, and occupations in suburban ghettoes; marginal costs and wastes and inefficiencies in government finance and organization to be eliminated, the overriding issue as to whether we will realize the potential, in politics, in land use, in social intercourse, in the amenities of existence which metropolitan regions promise. We may not face catastrophe, but this is no reason for countenancing one-hour commuting schedules, for permitting blight, for condoning the repellent sprawl of cheap commercial developments, inadequate parks, congested schools, mediocre administration, traffic jams, smog, pollution, and the hundred and one irritations which surround us. Even if we can exist in the present metropolis, the fact of survival does not excuse a failure to plan the future with more care, to avoid the mistakes we have made in the past and to bestow a more worthwhile legacy.

Yet, while these are real problems and genuine issues, they are not categorical necessities. They are fundamentally questions of value and of judgment, of what we should do and what we ought to do.

In short they are issues for political science to tackle in its traditional way, and no trend is clear enough to give us the easy answer "we have to do it one way." Alternatives are before us; the issue of choice remains, and the burden of responsibility is off the shoulders of the economist and the sociologist and back again on ours.

Within this normative framework, the alternatives are several and, in this analysis, only a brief summary of their implications can be undertaken. But those which seem most important are three--greenbelts, grassroots or gargantua--and they are genuine alternatives. Quite frequently, we have tended to think of metropolitan planning, federation and consolidation as related steps to the single goal of achieving political institutions suitable to the metropolitan community. In practice, we have frequently chosen between them on the grounds of political expediency. Yet, these reforms do not move in the same direction; they lead us down quite different paths and, in a certain sense, a choice among them can be "extrapolated", too. In a reasoned way we can explore the implications which a certain set of values have for the future, judged by the benchmark of constitutional democracy. When this is done, though the task of metropolitan reform is complicated, its objectives are clarified. The discussion proceeds on the basis of a comparison of the values involved, in place of an excitable response to "inexorable" trends.

So far as the greenbelts alternative is concerned, the vision of order, balance, and beauty has timeless appeal for political philosophy as it has for the profession of planning. There are overtones of Plato and Aristotle "an organic sense of structural

differences," a corporate whole, in the concept, and there is the tough-minded insistence of Patrick Geddes, Ebenezer Howard, and Lewis Mumford that the vision is practical. When technology promises so much in terms of the capacity to shape nature to man's purposes, when the age of abundance is actuality, it seems reprehensible to permit the shapeless metropolitan sprawl. With such little effort, balanced communities could come into being, rational transportation systems provided, land set aside for recreational and cultural purposes, and the way cleared for Jefferson's common man to find "life" values in place of monetary values. The promise of individual dignity is combined with the aesthetics of a pastoral scene from which insects are banished and in which running water is supplied, and the metropolitan region becomes a true commingling of the best of rural and urban virtues.

There is of course a serpent in the garden of greenbelts as there was a crucial flaw in the Greek polis. Who defines the shape and substance of beauty, who determines the balance of each community, who arbitrates good taste, who decides the values of life? The advocates of greenbelts have always answered with injured innocence "the people," but they have been peculiarly reluctant to specify the means by which the people decide. They have, in modern times, reluctantly admitted that planning is properly a staff function, but when the chips are down, they have been scornful of the politician who curries votes and indignant at his intrusion. The planners who have gained the most notoriety are those who have been the most ready to ignore the role of the elected official, to be contemptuous of the slow process of popular deliberations, and to hold themselves aloof from the electoral

process. In short, while one implication of the greenbelt philosophy is harmony, another is in Charles Cherington's words "ashcan socialism." Until the defenders of this alternative are much more specific as to the ways and means they will use to reconcile their values with the public's in a liberal tradition, we are rightly suspicious of their plans.

In contrast, the grassroots alternative clearly avoids the danger of professional controls imposed from above, and of an excessive commitment to communal order and balance. If we retain our belief in the efficacy of small communities and small governments which spring spontaneously into being, there is actually very little action called for at all. Given the accuracy of the economic and social statistics reviewed earlier, the likelihood of suburban governments disappearing or of crises forcing an expansion of public authority does not appear great. We can drift with the tide, fairly confident that the course of events will produce the best possible arrangement for the metropolitan complex.

This wedding of an ancient image in American political folklore to favorable modern trends makes the second approach both attractive and plausible. First the existence of all shapes and sizes of communities within the region offers an individual a freedom of choice as to where and how he wishes to live. Second, the continued segregation of occupations, classes, and races fits in well with modern doctrine on how to "manage" social conflict. Let each man find his own, abstain from social contact with antagonistic elements, abjure political disagreement and debate by joining a constituency which shares his values, and his tensions, anxieties, and uncertainties are relieved. The virtues of small

town life come to the fore, and the elemental qualities of neighborliness, friendship, and civic spirit are revived.

Yet even though the grassroots thesis has ample precedent in our history, underneath it lurk some assumptions which seem unpalatable. The individual who choses his community in the metropolitan-free-market in the same way in which he buys his car is essentially a laissez-faire man. He pursues his own self-interest to the maximum, and depends on natural order of events to provide for the common good. Local governments become truly a bundle of services, to be purchased by those who can afford them without regard to more general social consequences. Those with resources insulate themselves from those without, and issues of equity and humanitarianism become muted. The garden city planners may place too much reliance on the social nature of man, but grassroots advocates reach toward the opposite extreme of unfettered individualism.

Further, given the general American consensus on values, our basic commitment to democracy and capitalism, the management of social conflict is not likely to be our most pressing public problem. The pressures for conformity, the profoundly anti-individualistic element which punishes the deviate so swiftly in our society, the absence of variety, are more serious issues. Encouraging a scatteration of communities and governments in the metropolitan area does not solve this problem; it intensifies it. The individual may be free to choose his community, but once this selection is made, it is difficult for him to change his values if he wishes to stay in his own home town. The small community is friendly and comfortable and it promises fraternity, but it is

also intolerant, inquisitive, barren of privacy. It is at least an open question whether this creation of political boundaries around disparate groups and classes is an appropriate development in a democracy or whether it truly frees the individual in the manner its advocates intend. Perhaps, variety, disagreement, discussion, and debate are to be encouraged rather than avoided.

To the extent this proposition is true, there is something to be said for the third alternative--of gargantua--the creation of a single metropolitan government or at least the establishment of a regional superstructure which points in that direction. If genuine metropolitan political institutions and processes are provided, the excessive marginal costs which overlapping and duplication bring about are reduced, a genuine arena exists for debate about meaningful issues which affect the area as a whole, and there is an opportunity to realize the metropolitan potential which is at our disposal.

In this instance, decisions about the regional destiny is not the exclusive province of professional value-makers, it lies with the constituency as a whole. Freedom of choice remains for the individual, for the entire variety of spectacles and experiences which a metropolis offers is open to him. But, in a political sense, this freedom is accompanied by responsibility. A man cannot escape his neighbor by retreating to an exclusive suburb; he has to face him, to persuade or be persuaded. Political parties cannot rest secure in the knowledge that they have preponderant majorities in particular jurisdictions; they compete in a region with so many diverse temperaments, outlooks, as almost to guarantee a close two-party fight. Harmony does not appear

automatically, it is painfully put together by compromise, by adjustments, by trial and error.

A plea for gargantua is not an attack against neighborhoods, against the importance of "moral integration" or against the need for fellowship and companionship. It is simply a plea against confusing these socially desirable qualities with the prerequisites of good government, against equipping neighborhoods with political prerogatives. We do not have, in the philosophical sense, a conservative tradition in the United States which emphasizes communal purpose and morality or gradations in social status. We have instead a liberal tradition, however confused in its definition of individualism and beset with contradictions, and the essence of that tradition is that there is a distinction between society and government, a preference for legal contractual relationships in public affairs in place of personal ones. Solutions which either in the name of the public good or paradoxically in the name of rampant individualism emphasize communal bonds excessively, seek harmony instinctive or contrived, and discourage variety, are alien to the highest purpose of that tradition. Men have always found privacy, civility, and urbanity, the marks of civilization, in great cities even though they have often paid the price of anonymity and loneliness. They are most likely to find the same qualities there today.

In the end, the case for metropolitan reform, the drive for larger governments and for one community is as strong as ever. It is not a case built on necessity, on the threat of impending disaster, or on the consequences of modern technology. It is a case

dependent on value judgments and philosophical disputation. But it is a strong case and perhaps a more appealing and persuasive one once its norms have been frankly admitted, and pretensions of scientific objectivity left behind. Metropolitan reform may not have been right so far as its analysis of empirical data is concerned, but it has always been righteous in the best sense of the word, and it remains righteous today.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf., Victor Jones, Metropolitan Government; John C. Bollens, The States and the Metropolitan Problem; the preparatory material presented for the National Conference on Metropolitan Problems, East Lansing, 1956, and individual metropolitan area surveys. Several of the latter rely on population trends almost exclusively to develop proposals for metropolitan government reform. For a general analysis of demographic developments see Amos H. Hawley, The Changing Shape of Metropolitan America.

2. The Future of Cities and Urban Redevelopment, Part II, Coleman Woodbury, editor, and Financing Metropolitan Government, a symposium conducted by the Tax Institute, place special emphasis on this trend.

3. Cf. For a general summary of this position, S. A. Queens and D. B. Carpenter, The American City, Chapter 7; R. D. McKenzie, Recent Social Trends, Chapter 9, and Don J. Bogue, Structure of the Metropolitan Community.

4. Edward C. Banfield, "The Changing Political Environment of City Planning," paper delivered at the 1956 meeting of the Association.

5. This conclusion is a major point in almost every description of metropolitan government. Charles Adrian, in Governing Urban America, Chapters 2 and 11, gives an able summary of this and the other negative consequences discussed earlier.

6. An authoritative review of past and current literature dealing with the character of the metropolitan community is found in Scott Green's "Individual Participation in Mass Society," a paper prepared for Conference Study of the Community, Northwestern University, 1956.

7. Conrad Arensberg, "The Community Study Method," The American Journal of Sociology, September, 1954. See also Albert J. Reiss, "Some Logical and Methodological Problems in Community Research," Social Forces, October, 1954.

8. Allen P. Manvel, "Trends in Municipal Finance," Municipal Yearbook, 1957, showing the doubling of annual revenue for the 481 largest cities between 1942 and 1955 and the six-fold increase in non-property taxes.

9. Projecting the municipal bond market is a risky business and certainly a strong case can be made that cities have explored this avenue to the limit in the last few years. Over the long run, however, if continued prosperity is assumed, it seems clear that municipal offerings will continue to play an important part in the investment market.

10. Non-property tax revenue accounted for 27% of all local revenue in 1953. State and federal aid was about 8 billion dollars. It is also worth noting that an inverse relation usually exists between grants and non-property taxes by local units of government, so that units incapable of exploring a broader tax structure are bolstered disproportionately by aid formulae. For a fuller discussion, cf. The American Assembly, The Forty-Eight States: Their Tasks as Policy Makers and Administrators, 1955.

FOOTNOTES
(continued)

11. George A. Duggar, "The Tax System and a Responsible Housing Program," unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1956.

12. Arensberg, op. cit.

13. Reiss, op. cit.

14. Grier, op. cit.

15. Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, "A Meaning for Turner's Frontier," Political Science Quarterly, September and December, 1954.

16. Stuart and Elkins, op. cit.

17. Ibid.

18. Otis Duncan and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Social Characteristics of Urban and Rural Communities, 1950. The citations here are both with respect to conclusions in the book, as well as indication of source data from which independent statistical series have been developed.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Otis D. and Beverly Duncan, "Residential Distribution and Occupation Stratification," The American Journal of Sociology, March, 1955.

22. Woodbury, op. cit., p. 367.

THE IMPACT OF URBANISM ON THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 1957-1977.
TO BE DELIVERED AT THE
CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
BY
MAYOR FRANK P. ZEIDLER
ON SEPTEMBER 7, 1957

In a discussion of the impact of urbanism on federalism in the decade from 1957 to 1977, the basic question of whether or not the United States will be at war or peace during that time must be answered. Two assumptions might be made -- one, that there will be a war with the full or partial use of atomic weapons, and the other, that there will be peace, but with the continual threat of war in the background. To tell which of these conditions will result is too difficult for me so that I must give two answers based on each assumption, of the impact of urbanism on federalism.

The first assumption that seems most probable to me, despite its inherent pessimism is that the United States government and the government of the Soviet Union will be unable to come to a decision of permanent peace. The result will be the devastation by nuclear bombs of the principal cities of the United States and Russia. The main reason I have for believing this is the condition that seems to exist inside of the Soviet Union. The leaders of that nation are not similarly responsive to public pressures as are leaders in the United States. They also are caught in the cage of Leninist ideas and all that that system for the seizure of power implies. Anyone in government who speaks softly toward the "enemies" of the Soviet system as conceived under Leninism cannot come to power. Anyone who does come to power has reached it with the use of force and violence -- a pattern of conduct which will not be shed upon arrival at the pinnacle of authority. It is not logical to assume that Soviet

leaders will be any less given to using force and violence against other nations, particularly the United States, which is the selected enemy, than they were against using such force and violence on their own people and comrades.

As a result of this state of affairs, the public expressions of the leaders of the Soviet Union must of necessity be one of hostility to the United States; or if the terms directed toward the United States are terms calling for co-existence, these terms must so be expressed that the party clique in Russia believe that their leaders are merely seeking to lull the United States to a sense of security while they further improve the position of Russia to attack and destroy the United States.

The actions of the Russian leaders naturally bring a reaction in the United States; communism becomes the principal object of attack by many orators, political, religious, and economic. The resulting continual denunciations of the leaders of each nation by the other over a period of time, in my opinion, must inevitably lead to an international conflict. This may be a gloomy view, but many current developments seem to point to a renewed struggle even if there is an attempt at disarmament.

The targets of destruction in an atomic war are the places from which a counterattack may be launched, important military installations, and concentrations of people and industry which are to be found in urban districts. If tensions were to grow more severe and if disappointments in the disarmament program turn people to bitterness who have sought a disarmament program, it is inevitable that friends and enemies alike will start to think of the fate of people and structures in the urban areas. These areas are the most vulnerable parts of the United States and its federal system. It seems quite probable

that a form of black mail can be directed against a government, such as that of the United States, by threatening the destruction of its principal cities. It seems to me that we are in this situation at the present time.

The existence of this threat has caused some thought on the part of urban officials and federal officials, about the method of reducing vulnerability of the urban areas of the United States. State officials have not paid much attention to this problem at all. It is my fear that by the time an atomic war may come, nothing of any great significance to reduce the vulnerability of the United States will have occurred. Some cities may have developed evacuation plans without the proper reception areas in the rural districts for the evacuees. It is also my fear that the rural districts will be poorly equipped to deal with the masses of a fleeing urban population at the time of an atomic showdown.

I suspect, therefore, that for the next decade there will be a continued concentration of people in the metropolitan areas attracted by employment and high standards of living available in such areas. I suspect also that very little attention will be paid either by industry, by the federal government, or by state governments to the decentralization of industrial establishments or to the reduction of the increasing vulnerability which is occurring in the metropolitan areas of the United States.

This situation of the increasing vulnerability of the urban areas has the gravest consequences for the nation; it could mean the destruction of the nation and the end of our federal system. Herein lies the greatest weakness of federalism at the present time.

The role of the state governments in the protection of the federal system in atomic defense is most important. These governments at the present

time are almost completely inactive about, or unaware of the atomic threat. Since most state governments are dominated by small town people acting in the name of farmers and since the rural animosity of the urban dweller persists as a foundation fact of each legislature, the legislatures will not take the proper action to protect the urban areas, and they see little danger to rural areas.

The ignorance and indifference of governors and state legislatures on the question of the atomic home defense of the United States is colossal. The primary reason for this is that the state parties vieing for control in each state find no political value in civil defense or protection of the vulnerable urban areas. They carry on politics as usual as if the great scientific achievements that have occurred in the past fifteen years have never existed. The indifference to and hostility toward the urban areas by state governments can conceivably be fatal to the United States federal system. It may bring us to our first major military defeat and perhaps destruction of the nation in our 181 years of history. The impact of increased urban growth on the United States in view of the weakness and inefficiency of state governments may probably cause a chain of events to bring the federal system of the United States crashing down in an atomic war.

To reduce the vulnerability of the United States would require a decentralization of the urban population and a decentralization of industry. Neither the states nor the federal governments at this time are prepared to exercise the necessary power and authority to achieve this result; neither are the cities. One course of action requires an increase in federal and state taxation to provide the necessary shelters for people against intercontinental

ballistic missiles. In another action, the state governments would necessarily have to recreate metropolitan regions overriding both the central cities and competing suburbs in order to provide a master plan of development and growth which would reduce the vulnerability of the masses of population. In a third move, the state and federal governments would have to insist on the relocation of critical industry so that it is more evenly dispersed around the United States and so that a single massive blow directed at the country would not cause irreparable devastation and effect from which the nation could not recover.

To achieve all of these results, in my opinion, is beyond the capacity of either the state or federal governments and also beyond the desire of the people living in the urban areas. When this public incapacity to act in self-protection is put up against a hardened system such as that of the Soviet Union, which can order populations to move, force the relocation of industry, and reduce vulnerability, it becomes apparent that the American system of federalism has some weaknesses and maintains its position only because of its potential striking power. However, the lack of proper planning for the atomic age cannot be entirely laid upon the state governments nor upon the weakness of the leadership in the federal government. It is also due to the psychology of people who are weary of the sound of war, who desire luxurious suburban living, and who cannot as a group begin to exert themselves to the necessary but disagreeable tasks which would result from a proper plan for urban defense in the United States.

The major parties in power, reflecting the popular view, refuse to stare the prospect of atomic war in the face or to propose the necessary measures which would diminish the effects of an attack on this nation. Only

in the urban communities do there seem to be pressures on the part of a few leaders to make the governments more effective in the defense of people. The action of urban leaders may bring some modification in the pattern of urban growth. It may result in a slightly increased urban pressure on the federal government to do something about urban problems as state governments fail to act. There will be, then, up until the time an atomic showdown occurs, some closer liaison between the urban centers and the federal government, and some drawing away from the state governments by urban governments as state governments fail to meet their needs.

A condition of increased hostility between large cities and state governments may result. The voters in large cities, in the North particularly, may continue to follow the Democratic party while suburban and rural voters will continue to follow the Republican party. Since rural and suburban voters may likely total the largest bloc such a division will also increase the chances of the taking away from the urban areas their proper representation in state legislatures, and there will develop permanently in state constitutions the system which is called in Wisconsin the "Areacrat" form of government; namely, that form in which area rather than people are represented in the state legislature.

I also look in this decade for increased state concern for some suburban areas as against the central cities, largely because the people in the suburban areas will have considered their status and life improved to the point that they will leave the Democratic Party and vote for the party of conservatism and the status quo, the Republican Party. Legislation directed against the development and the improvement of the urban centers will often be sponsored by wealthy suburbanites who make their living in the central area.

I also look for a continued migration of Southern Negroes and

Southern white workers to the Northern cities. The core of these cities is the only place they can go to live and because of their numbers and poverty, this core will continue to deteriorate faster than local authorities, or state governments, or the federal government can rebuild it. The state governments in this situation may try to lend their weight for political reasons to increasing the densities of population and making the minority problem in the central areas greater. They may do so because of their dislike of the central cities, their fear of political philosophy held by people in them, and their desire to hold the economic and class differences between the people of the suburban communities and the lower economic groups that migrate into the cities seeking work.

Thus, out of these political divisions that exist between the people in the cities and the state governments there will be even less opportunity for the threatened peoples in the target areas prior to an atomic struggle to make their representations heard in the state and national governments in order to lessen the conflict of a war.

In view of the struggle that is going on, therefore, between the United States and the Soviet Union, sometimes hot and sometimes cold, there is a likelihood the disagreement may come to a head some time within the next decade with the result that both the Soviet Union and the United States will be devastated. I do not believe that the people of the United States can live successfully under the tensions placed upon them by the Soviet Union, and I do not believe that the Soviet leaders realize what they are doing to the people of the United States in keeping them at a boiling point with their intransigence and constant attacks against the United States which are reported in the United States' press.

Assuming that by 1977 such an attack will have occurred, and a war concluded some years earlier, the year 1977 would undoubtedly see the cities of the nation engaged in rebuilding, some on entirely new sites and some in the older areas. The population of the cities, of course, would be much diminished, as would the population of the nation. There would probably be even a lessened number of people in the smaller communities of the United States owing to the ensuing starvation and epidemics that would take place if people were removed wholesale from the larger cities and if those cities were destroyed.

The result of an atomic war could not help but mean radical changes of government with people of diverse cultures and backgrounds scattered in new locations. It is interesting to speculate what such changes would occur. It is entirely possible that the people of the United States, devastated by an atomic war, could not resist the movements of people from more overcrowded parts of the world into the nation to settle in considerable numbers. In the matter of construction, such rebuilding as would take place would perhaps in initial phases be more or less haphazard and not planned. As for transportation, there would undoubtedly be fewer automobiles, since as a result of an atomic war, won or lost, the United States certainly would not enjoy the lion's share of the world's gasoline and oil resources. There is the probable increased use of atomic power, but even with this power source there would undoubtedly be a lower standard of living in urban areas and a considerable disarrangement of the transit systems which make large cities possible.

It is my opinion that a type of federal system of government would survive a world clash because the challenge to the powers of the states in the great urban areas, would no longer exist. The disarrangement and chaotic conditions of the federal government as a result of atomic warfare would force more

responsibility on state governments at least temporarily. However, if the United States survived without being conquered or overrun either by an attacking enemy or by other nations which were relatively uninjured in an atomic war and which would seize control of a shaky government, then it is conceivable that the federal government might reassert its authority over the state governments. It is also possible, that Southern states faced with the inability to deal with the Negro question might seek to develop a regional government apart from the rest of the United States.

A course of action worth considering as a result of an atomic war is that the federal government might become more seriously concerned about the great metropolitan areas, and by constitutional change or other amendment take these areas away from the jurisdiction of state governments and make them responsible directly to the United States government. This would be done to provide proper planning, and dispersal of population and industry and proper construction in urban areas to overcome the defects which became plain as a result of atomic attack.

To sum up: Under the assumption that there would be an atomic attack, the present impact of urbanism on the federal system is to place a problem before state governments and the federal government which is impossible for these governments to solve because of political factors. This condition results in the vulnerability of the United States to the point of possible destruction of many of its people and their industries and to the possible end of the United States as an independent government.

The second of two assumptions that we can make on the future of cities is that they will persist at least until 1977 without an atomic attack, but under a constant threat of such a condition occurring. Even under this

threat a great increase of the population will occur in the urban centers of the United States; these centers will become much larger and more numerous. Many urban areas now separated by the open country will become one continuous and contiguous set of urbanized communities. The pressures of population and the need for critical services such as water and sewer in these areas will undoubtedly promote the creation of the metropolitan concept of government in spite of the opposition of state governments and suburban communities.

The unwillingness of state legislatures to face up to the growth of urban areas will impel certain urban groups to continue to go to the federal government seeking grants in aid for the solution to their problems. If the situation is bad enough, there may be attempts to have the major metropolitan areas made special wards of the federal government for certain purposes. As the metropolitan growth occurs there may likely be a growth in hostility between the state governments and the central cities. The political cleavage between the two urban areas and state governments will influence elections of the United States during the next two decades.

The need for furnishing special units of government to deal with regional sewer and water problems, and with traffic problems will introduce great complexities into the laws of the state governments. Since state governments desire not to see the growth of the political power of the metropolitan areas, they will persist in seeking to fragment and to cut up the metropolitan areas into urban and suburban conflicting groups as a means of dividing and ruling.

One can expect, also, that there will be a continued stratification of population in the urban areas with the wealthy people and the people of white ancestry moving to the suburban areas where a kind of economic caste system will develop. People of colored ancestry may continue to move from the rural south

into the core cities of metropolitan areas. This situation, in which the bloc of Negro voters in central cities grows greater, will further promote the desire of the controllers of state governments to isolate the central cities in metropolitan areas and to choke off their growing political strength.

The possibility of central governments in some areas being greatly influenced by Negro voting blocs would undoubtedly materialize in many cities in the next two decades. The development of the urban areas, therefore, in the northern part of the United States will be directly subjected to the policies of the Southern states with regard to Negro minorities who may leave either because of economic pressure or civil pressure on them to drive them out of their home state. The presence of such blocs will bring demands for housing, fair employment practices, civil rights, and welfare legislation. Other people, too, will continue to crowd into the cities to enjoy the convenience of living and the high wages that are to be found in such areas.

The growth of urbanism will also tend to promote the conflict between public ownership and social welfare ideas, on one hand, and the concepts of private enterprise on the other. Large numbers of people who are wage earners without any security other than that of their physical strength will tend to promote legislation which will guarantee their welfare and their security even in times of unemployment. This type of legislation, being considered hostile by the rural and suburban persons of the states, will result in struggles between the urban and the rural forces in the state legislatures and will spill over into the Congress. This same ideological conflict carried on in the field of housing will mean that the opponents of municipal housing will continue to be vigorous; and that, as a result, there will constantly be a shortage of adequate housing for the people crowded in the urban centers of the United States, since

private enterprise will not be able to supply the urban population with adequate low cost shelter because of fence-me-in economic laws.

Fostering the spread of suburbanism will be the creation of express roads through the major cities. Within these cities there will be the development, though on a limited scale, of homogenous, easily identifiable communities in the older areas. Some of these will be desirable, others will merely be slum areas not redeveloped but bounded by traffic ways which set them apart from surrounding communities. Out of each of these areas certain identifiable political yearnings will come. If urban redevelopment results in a mass dispossession of many small owners and the creation of a large tenantry, it is possible that federal and state laws will reflect the pressure of the tenants against the landlords.

The great growth of population without a proper expansion of resources to feed the population and to provide it with fresh air and water may cause a significant deterioration in the standard of living for many people. A difficult problem will arise in the attempt to tax for educational purposes because of a larger number of children. It is possible that a resistance to property taxes for education will become so strong that the educational program of the nation will have to be seriously diminished.

The increased use of mechanical devices will also bring a rash of laws necessary to curtail their deleterious effects. Laws against improper uses of motor vehicles, against noise, dirt, and unsanitary conditions will undoubtedly result in the further concentration of population. Most of these laws will be developed in state legislatures but only after a resistance from the rural people who cannot conceive of the need for such laws.

Partly because the urban needs will be so great and the urban communities will put pressure on the federal government to solve these needs, state legislatures may make grudging concessions to the urban problems; but it is not likely that state legislatures will bow in any direction toward legislation which might be described as socialism if they can help it; and in addition, there will be constant agitation in state legislatures to dismantle all of the operations of the federal government except those dealing with the development of military forces for an attack.

The increase of the population in the urban centers may also put a strain on the agriculture of the United States, and it is entirely possible that unless there is some better planning of agricultural development and water resources that the urban areas may suffer shortages of essential supplies some time within the next two decades. Even with the threat of atomic warfare, it is entirely possible that there may be recessions in business which will have their repercussions particularly on the urban communities and bring forth from them a demand for federal social legislation rather than state legislation to alleviate the conditions of unemployment.

The total results, therefore, of the pattern from 1957-1977, if the nation lives at uneasy peace with Russia, will be to diminish the strength of the state legislatures and to increase the strength of the federal government despite all propaganda to the contrary because of the pressures of urban living.

Over the next 20 years certain struggles between different groups in the great urban areas will also have their reflection on the federal system. The first of these struggles is the struggle between two economic groups which are able to finance elections to gain a dominant hand in the voice of the communities. The one group is a group represented by owners and management, most of whom are suburban dwellers; and the other group is that reflected in

organized labor.

There will be an attempt by both groups to attain ascendency in the government in metropolitan areas. Since most of the management people live in the suburbs, they will devote their attention particularly to changing state laws which will permit them by remote control or through special districts of government to control the destinies of the central city. In this action they will have the support of the rural legislators.

The labor movement will attempt to resist this move by maintaining control of the central cities independent of the legislatures. If the legislatures invade too extensively this control of the central cities, it is entirely possible that labor-elected city representatives will seek relief and protection from the federal government.

A second struggle which will take place will be a struggle on the part of the organized supporters of vice, gambling, and crime to gain control of the central areas. The central cities are oftentimes regarded as "play spots" and there is a tendency of local officials to wink at organized vice and crime in certain districts of their cities. This leads to the flourishing of gangs and organized hoodlums; and in most cities these organized hoodlums, working either through the management or labor groups, and sometimes working through both groups, have been enabled to control city government with the resulting deterioration of government and wholesale corruption.

This type of struggle will be intensified in the future because some people's appetite for vice and gambling will not be appreciably diminished. If the organized criminal elements gain control of the cities, they will use the same tactics and techniques to gain control of state governments. They are completely impartial as to their connections and are

equally at home among management representatives as they are among labor representatives. They will "work" either group to gain the control as the conditions may require.

In many places, the organized criminal elements are working in close liaison with so-called leaders of respectable business. In other places, they have worked their way into influential positions in the central labor bodies. Federal legislation may be directed to overcome this problem because the state governments are often helpless,unable to act, or unaware of the problem.

The third major conflict which may find its reflection in the federal system is the conflict between migrating peoples, particularly between peoples of substantially diverse cultural groups such as the southern Negro and the northern white of European extraction, or the Puerto Rican and the northern white. The great influx of Negroes into the northern areas, for the present, may increase the desire of the northern political leaders to call for increased activity in civil rights and fair employment practices. But it is possible that in the long run there may be a segregated caste system developed as the northern whites seek to withdraw from contact with the Negro community. This withdrawal will occur when the mental image that the northern white has of a Negro as being a harassed and relatively helpless person is changed to an image of the Negro as a brutal attacker of women on the streets, one given to the use of narcotics, a brawler, and a slovenly person. Thus, by a relocation of the Negro population from the rural south to the northern cities there may be a greater tendency in the north to follow the pattern of the southern states, and this in turn will have its subtle reflections in the federal system.

Another problem which may have its bearing in the federal government

is the growing number of young men who, kept apart from useful employment or from honest work necessary to support themselves, may readily lend themselves to gang formations. These formations can be shrewdly mobilized as a political force, even as youth movements in Germany were organized by political leaders. Any depression, in which the younger persons are deprived of money for automobiles and the pleasures which they are enjoying at the present time, might conceivably lead to a fascist development in the United States, because many young people, unaware of the facts of economics, may follow a demagogue.

COMMENTS ON "IMPACT OF URBANISM ON THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 1957-1977," by Mayor Frank P. Zeidler of Milwaukee (Prepared for American Political Science Meetings, September 7, 1957, New York.)

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Mayor Zeidler has without question performed an important public service in setting forth in his paper a number of observations, some of which are quite unpleasant, meriting the consideration of not only responsible public officials on the national, state and local levels but, also, of the citizens of the United States.

To refuse to face the implications of nuclear war would be to indulge in the behavior erroneously attributed to the maligned ostrich--a posture not in keeping either with the reputed intelligence or the dignity of human beings, not to mention their requirements for survival. To face the prospect of nuclear war and its consequences, as described by the Mayor, is a sobering experience which should lead to anticipatory and preventive behavior. In fact, the reading of Mayor Zeidler's paper by every American could be among the factors, in my judgment, which would reduce the prospect of nuclear war with the Soviets. Fortunately, since most Americans are not members of the American Political Science Association and are not likely to read the Mayor's paper, there are other factors operative which are likely to preclude atomic war which are, on the whole, ignored by the Mayor.

I should like, therefore, to deal briefly with Mayor Zeidler's observations in respect to his first assumption--namely, that there will be a devastating nuclear war between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. Suffice it to say that, as far as the prospect of conflict is concerned, I do not believe war will result from the factors discussed by the Mayor; nor even from factors which he has not discussed, which would be more likely to produce war.

The untenability of Mayor Zeidler's first assumption should not be permitted to obscure his valuable observations on national, state and local

governmental relationships, on the inadequacies of some aspects of our federal system, and on the vulnerability of the U. S. to nuclear war. Particularly valuable in the Mayor's treatment of these problems is the vivid picture he conveys of the vacuous and inept character of state governments in respect to the emerging problems of metropolitan areas; the "rotten borough" political control of mass urban populations by recalcitrant, selfish, dictatorial and sometimes corrupt minority "down state" groups; the provincial, naive and sometimes vicious character of "areacrat" government; and the pathetic inability of local political machines or government to deal with metropolitan area-wide issues.

It is perhaps unnecessary to mention that the language used in summarizing the Mayor's observations is mine, not his; but I believe it is reasonable to call a spade a spade.

Whether or not our federal system collapses because of the nuclear war the Mayor envisages or the sheer inability of our "horse and buggy" governmental structure to deal with 20th century technological, economic and social organization, the fact is that the American people are paying a terrifically high price, both in monetary and human value terms, for the lag between our 20th century patterns of living and our 18th century governmental structure. This lag could conceivably have great explosive force as metropolitan area problems and confusion proliferate, a force which, if not the equivalent in its destructive capacity to nuclear war, could blast huge holes into present state and local governmental structure and processes. Such an eventuality, of course, would greatly strengthen the federal government, because it would be the only mechanism through which the pieces of disrupted state and local government could be put together.

The greatest threat to the power and integrity of state governments, in my judgment, is not the federal government but the combination of ignorance,

willfulness, selfishness and dictatorial refusal to submit to majority rule of "down state" political bosses who are apt to be pleading "states rights" while simultaneously denying individual or majority urban rights. The chief threat to present forms of local government is the irresistible tide being generated by metropolitan area problems which will sooner or later innundate city and other local governmental units if they retain their present King Canute like attitudes.

Some of these basic issues are treated in a more realistic framework in the second part of Mayor Zeidler's paper under his second and more tenable assumption, namely, that there will be no atomic war by 1977. In respect to the relative power of state legislatures and the federal government, the Mayor concludes that if we live "at uneasy peace with Russia" between 1957 and 1977 the net result of developments "will be to diminish the strength of state legislatures and to increase the strength of the federal government." The Mayor sees this trend as the result of "the pressures of urban living."

I am inclined to agree with this general conclusion of Mayor Zeidler's even though there is considerable room for disagreement with the specific elements which he utilizes as a basis for it. It is not possible within the space allotted to me to deal with all of the interesting points raised by the Mayor but among those with which I would like to register some disagreement are the following:

(1) Mayor Zeidler envisages "a growth in hostility between the state governments and the central cities," a cleavage between central cities and their suburban areas, and the tendency for suburban areas to unite with down state areas in coalition against the central cities.

Certainly there is a basis for drawing such a generalization in terms of recent voting behavior, especially in the last two presidential elections. But

the projection of this behavior as a trend is at best fraught with great uncertainty. It overlooks at least several factors which may conceivably produce a quite different situation, even within the next two decades.

First let us examine the magnitudes of the populations involved. For example, by 1975 of a total possible population of 215 millions in the United States, about two-thirds--or about 142 million persons--are likely to be resident in standard metropolitan areas, with only a third of the population in the remaining areas of the country. Of the population within the Standard Metropolitan Areas only half will be resident in central cities and the remainder in suburban areas. Certainly it will be true that suburban area populations together with non-standard metropolitan area populations will greatly surpass central city populations, in fact surpass them by a ratio of two to one. But the community of interest between metropolitan suburban populations and non-metropolitan area populations is, in my judgment, greatly exaggerated in the conclusion which Mayor Zeidler reaches. The following are among the considerations that lead me to believe that community of interest between suburban and central city populations will grow closer rather than further apart, and tend to preclude suburban-non-metropolitan area coalition:

a) Standard Metropolitan Areas are at present absorbing 97 per cent of the total population increase of the nation, with disproportionate increases in outlying suburban areas which grew 7 times as rapidly as central cities between 1950 and 1955 (28 per cent as compared with 4 per cent). The rapidity of metropolitan area growth, especially suburban growth, together with the fact that a relatively large proportion of suburban growth is derived from the central cities through migration, is in my judgment more likely to make the suburban areas more closely resemble central cities in the next two decades than the suburban areas of the past decade. That is, the continued process of metropolitan area growth is extending so far beyond central city boundaries that

large parts of suburban areas will contain working class and lower middle class populations of the type which was previously located in inner zones of central cities when metropolitan areas as a whole were smaller. Mayor Zeidler, and I may say other political analysts, tend to assume--and I believe erroneously--that migrants from central cities to suburbs become conservative and Republican in association with the higher social-economic strata previously associated with suburban living. But the Mayor, and the political analysts who follow the same line, fail to recognize that by the time the suburbs contain 50 to 56 per cent of the population in standard metropolitan areas, they will no longer be made up entirely of upper and upper-middle class groups.

b) Mayor Zeidler assumes that the Negro migrant to the central cities will retain his low social-economic characteristics and previous political behavior and visualizes that "a kind of economic caste system will develop." He assumes that lower class Negroes will remain in central cities with the suburbs containing "the wealthy people and the people of white ancestry." This assumption completely ignores the past history of migration to cities and the processes by which migrants have been absorbed into "urbanism as a way of life." Without having the time to elaborate this point I should like to observe that the Negro migrant to the central city will, without question, follow the same patterns of social and spatial mobility blazed by our successive waves of immigrants who settled in our central cities. Just as the immigrant underwent a process of "Americanization", the in-migrant Negro is undergoing a process of "urbanization". The Negro is already rising, and will continue to rise, on the social-economic scale as measured by education, occupation, income and the amenities of urban existence; and the Negro will diffuse through the entire metropolitan area and occupy outlying suburban as well as central city areas.

c) Urban renewal programs, already underway on a substantial scale in a number of metropolitan areas, are likely to be accelerated during the coming

years as the political complexion of the federal administration changes. This is a process by which our metropolitan areas are beginning to be turned inside out. While the decayed inner zones of our cities are being renovated, and blight in our middle-aged areas retarded, it is the rapidly growing suburban areas which threaten to become the slum areas of the future (some in fact are slum areas as rapidly as the concrete dries). The inner zones of our central cities grew and decayed not structure by structure but by subdivision, neighborhood and community. It is our suburban areas that are now growing by subdivision, neighborhood and community; and they may decay in a fashion paralleling that which we observed in our central cities. In consequence, the projection of observed past patterns of the residential occupancy of metropolitan areas, a pattern of social-economic stratification with the lower income groups toward the center of the city and higher income groups towards the suburbs, is extremely dangerous. It is not likely that this pattern of social-economic stratification will turn inside out, but it is highly probable that the metropolitan area of the future will be much more heterogeneous in the sense that there will be both low and high economic areas in central cities, including the inner zones of central cities, and in the suburbs. Such a development would, of course, completely negate Mayor Zeidler's projection of political alignments coinciding with observed past patterns of residential social-economic stratification.

d) There is some evidence that the metropolitan area will in the future be used by the population in a cyclical fashion corresponding to the stages in the family cycle. That is, in the early stages of marriage a couple is likely to be resident in the central city near their place of work. When the children come they are likely to move to the suburbs for grass. Some of course will return at once to the central city when they discover that they do not get enough water for the grass, or that the water is too expensive. Those that remain will

do so until their children leave home, at which point cutting the grass becomes burdensome and the elderly couple returns to the central city. Increased use of the metropolitan area in this fashion would, of course, produce a metropolitan area consciousness which would tend to unite suburb and city rather than produce the type of cleavage to which the Mayor refers.

e) It is not possible to agree with Mayor Zeidler's fear that patterns of metropolitan area growth "may cause a significant deterioration in the standard of living for many people," or that "the educational program of the nation will have to be seriously diminished." There is no reason to anticipate that our product per head will not continue to go up during the next two decades and the standard of living of the mass population also continue to rise. Moreover, the pressures for increased education which continue to be generated by our evermore complex technological, economic and social order may confidently be expected to produce further rise, rather than decline in educational levels. It is safer, I believe, to predict that even the U. S. Chamber of Commerce will be reconciled to, if not enthusiastically in favor of, federal participation in rising educational standards which we are almost certainly to observe within the next two decades.

These are among the considerations which lead me to conclusions quite different from those of Mayor Zeidler in respect of central city, suburban and state government alignments. I agree that for a variety of reasons the role of state governments will diminish in the coming decade despite recent hullabaloo to the contrary. But I feel that the central city and suburban areas will find increasing bases for coalition and unity in action; and, moreover, I feel safe in predicting a great proliferation of various mechanisms designed to cope with metropolitan area wide problems. Furthermore, in at least one section of the country--the South--it is likely that metropolitan area government will replace central city and suburban governments. This movement will certainly be highly

desirable in terms of adapting the structure of government to conform with realities of 20th century patterns of living, even though it may come to the South before it does to the North and the West because metropolitan area government may be one of the devices used to prevent the Negro from controlling central cities.

(2) Out of the considerations outlined above, and some others, I should like to register disagreement with Mayor Zeidler's description of "certain struggles between different groups" over the next twenty years and their effects on the federal system. To economize on space I shall also register these disagreements seriatum:

a) I find the Mayor's dichotomization of the electorate into "owners and managers," on the one hand, and "organized labor," on the other, all too simple. Moreover, for reasons I have already indicated, even though owners and management may continue to be mostly located in the suburbs, most of the suburban dwellers will not be owners and managers. Also, organized labor will be living in the suburbs as well as in the central cities. Political cleavages will, therefore, in my judgment, be based neither on the organized labor and the owner-management dichotomy, nor on the central city and suburban dichotomy. Certainly the two dichotomies will not nicely coincide.

b) Similarly, I find the Mayor's statement that organized criminal elements may gain control of central cities and attempt to do the same with state governments, unrealistic. Organized crime is by no means confined to central cities and in fact some types of organized crime flourish best in either suburbia or exurbia. If anything, the trend has been for diminution of the power of organized crime in metropolitan U. S. A. and this is a trend which I am optimistic enough to believe will be continued for the next two decades.

c) I find the "third major conflict" to which the Mayor refers "the conflict between migrating peoples, particularly between peoples of substantially diverse

cultural groups such as the Southern Negro, the Northern white of European extraction or and Puerto Rican and Northern white" inconsistent with the lessons of American history. In the retrospect of the next several decades the Mayor's observations on this score may seem as unreal as if he had said fifty years ago that there would be conflict between immigrants from Europe and native populations, or conflicts between immigrants from Northern and Western Europe and those from Southern and Eastern Europe and between each of these and native populations. There are bound to be problems of transition in the urbanization and assimilation of both the Negroes and Puerto Ricans, but there is no reason to believe that they will not enter the American scene as first class American citizens in the same way as the successive waves of immigrants did in the past.

d) Finally, I should like to register a mild protest about the Mayor's observation in respect to "the growing number of young men who, kept apart from useful employment or from honest work" may "lend themselves to gang formation" or "be shrewdly mobilized as a political force, even as youth movements in Germany were organized by political leaders."

In terms of basic trends our youth are increasingly receiving the benefit of more and more education as well as those of higher standards of living. As a member of academia I must necessarily take the position that increased exposure to higher education will make our youth at least as bright, and often brighter, than their political leaders who, because they are older are apt to be less educated.

Certainly we have reason to fear the consequences of a severe depression of the type to which the Mayor refers--including the consequences of demagogic leadership. Again, however, I would like to register an optimistic note in that there seems to be little reason to fear a depression during the next two decades. Among other things we seem to be able to count on the political stupidities of Communist Russia to continue to bolster the American economy. For example, the

recent announcement of the Soviet Union in respect to the ICBM will undoubtedly guarantee for at least some years federal governmental expenditures that will preclude any serious depression.

Finally, as the result of ever-rising levels of education and improved means of communication, I am inclined to believe that the powers of the demagogue are becoming increasingly limited. Certainly the failure and utter collapse of the last great demagogue on the national scene, who unfortunately did no credit to the State of Wisconsin which, on the whole, has contributed materially to national political sanity, would indicate that risks for the demagogue on the national scene are mounting rapidly. Moreover, as I read the polls it was not youth but their ill-educated seniors who made up the backbone of our most recent demagogue's following.

It has been my function to serve as a critic of Mayor Zeidler's paper. The fact that I have devoted most of my remarks to disagreement should not detract from the general excellence of the Mayor's presentation of some of the more baffling political and governmental problems which face us in the next two decades. In tackling these perplexing issues frontally, Mayor Zeidler has displayed both intellectual leadership and great courage. It is a great pity that we do not have a vast array of such papers by not only a large number of mayors but, also, governors, cabinet members, state and national legislators and perhaps even anoccasional president. I am aware of course, that we do not have many such papers because most successful elective officials do not combine the characteristics which enable them to be elected with the scholarly qualities which have led Mayor Zeidler to this rostrum.

I have disagreed with a number of specific points made by Mayor Zeidler. In closing, however, I wish to express great admiration for his personal and political qualities which have led him to present this stimulating, exciting and significant paper.

Comments of Joseph S. Clark on:
"The Impact of Urbanism on the Federal System, 1957-1977" by Mayor Frank P. Zeidler of Milwaukee.

I tend to disagree with Mayor Zeidler's view that war will likely occur between the United States and the Soviet Union in the next twenty years. Surely the United States does not wish war and would start one only if aggressive action by the Soviet threatened vital national security interests of our country or its allies. The Soviet Union, in my judgment, is convinced that its way of life and political philosphy represent the wave of the future. Military action, in their judgment, is not necessary for world conquest. That will come, in their view, automatically, at the end of a period of peaceful coexistence. While some act of folly might trigger a world war in the next twenty years, I believe the probabilities are the other way.

Assuming Mayor Zeidler is right, however, I find no profit in discussing the impact of urbanism on the Federal system. The devastation of a world war would so distort urbanism (and probably our traditional Federal system) that speculation as to the form of government and social organization which would follow such a catastrophe is, in my judgment, futile.

While for some years I followed Mayor Zeidler's lead in urging a drastic step-up in the priority of civil defense to reduce the vulnerability of urban areas, I have come to the conclusion, as indeed has he, that our country is unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices in terms of taxes and personal inconvenience to establish a more effective system of civil defense. Moreover, as weapons of offense continue to increase their lead over counter measures of defense, it is useless to attempt to disturb the complacency not only of our people but of all levels of government - local, state, and national because there just isn't any effective, workable, practical method of reducing vulnerability of urban areas enough to make any difference.

I agree with Mayor Zeidler that the ignorance and indifference of governors and state legislatures is colossal with respect to all urban problems, not merely civil defense. I further agree that this indifference and hostility can be fatal to the United States Federal system. I share Mayor Zeidler's prognosis of increased hostility between large cities and state governments. What he calls the "areacrat" form of government applies in Pennsylvania as well as in Wisconsin. I sometimes think our State Legislature has its representation of population base in trees rather than in people.

I would think, however, that the offensive is with the urban communities and that the wealthy suburbanites in the long run are on the defensive. They, too, are under-represented in state legislatures, and, since they earn their living directly or indirectly through the economic fan-out of the cities, their primary interest is with the urban centers and not with the rural districts. Racial and social irritations between city and suburb are real. But, in my judgment, their economic interests which tend to become identical despite city wage taxes, etc., will overweigh these irritations.

While there may be a continued migration of southern Negroes and southern white workers to northern cities, I believe local government will be strong enough to enforce housing, sanitation, and zoning codes and thus offset the increase in the densities of city population which Mayor Zeidler fears. No doubt racial tensions will increase but I believe there will be a sufficient dissemination of minority groups throughout the metropolitan area to minimize the seriousness of the suburban-urban clash.

Accordingly, I look for a spread of metropolitan government in all or our large urban areas. This I believe will take different forms. Each metropolitan area is a laboratory in which new governmental techniques are under experiment. The need for unified political units to deal with shelter, traffic,

water, and other urban survival problems is so great that it will require elimination of present political lag in dealing with these problems.

I would comment on Mayor Zeidler's summary on Page 10 of his paper: War between the United States and Soviet in the next twenty years is a possibility but not a probability. If it occurs, it will be so devastating that there is no profit in a discussion of its result on the impact of urbanism on the Federal system.

Turning to Mayor Zeidler's second assumption; i.e., that no atomic attack will occur before 1977, I agree that a great increase in population in the urban centers will occur and that many urban areas now separated by open country will become a series of contiguous urbanized communities. There are, however, some automatic limits to this growth. First is the limited fresh water available and our lag in developing water resources to their maximum. Second, is the inefficiency resulting from failure to solve traffic and transportation problems. Perhaps a significant straw in the wind is the recent revelation that New York City has lost population.

A corollary of this last factor is the tendency of industry to move a considerable distance away from the central city to areas where movement is not inhibited and in which psychologically both labor and management can operate under less tension.

I agree whole heartedly with Mayor Zeidler's prognosis respecting the growth of the metropolitan area government movement. A similar regional government movement based on river valleys and water resources is likely, in my opinion, to acquire great strength. I am more optimistic than Mayor Zeidler respecting our ability to solve our racial problems in urban areas. Even in the South today the racial problem is far less acute in cities than in rural areas. Louisville has integrated its schools; Nashville begins integration

this fall; New Orleans is hovering on the brink, thanks largely to the Catholic Church; Atlanta has excellent racial relations within limits, as a recent article in The Reporter magazine demonstrates.

Passage of Federal legislation protecting voting rights may in the end result in the emigration of whites from areas where Negroes are in the majority. This would solve racial problems in certain rural areas while increasing them at the state level. It would have little effect on national politics.

Despite the spread of prosperity down to lower economic levels, a national chart of family income still shows a pyramid politically; i.e., there are many more voters near or under a decent subsistence level economically than there are family units who are well-to-do or rich. In other words, politics on the whole is still a countervailing power to control of the country by the rich and well-to-do. I anticipate, accordingly, a renewal of the march towards greater social welfare. I agree with Mayor Zeidler that this will be resisted most strongly at the state level. It will be recalled that the Kestnbaum Commission on Intergovernmental Relations pointed out that state governments were the weak link in our Federal system. It is interesting to recall that municipal government has left the doghouse to which Lord Bryce consigned it in 1887.

I do not share Mayor Zeidler's pessimism respecting our food supply nor his concern about our ability to solve our educational problems. In both instances and also in the case of water, I would expect the national government to provide the initiative and funds to solve these problems in reasonably satisfactory style. The means of solution are avilable in terms of fertilizer, dams, and Federal grants for school construction, teachers salaries, and

scholarships, thus bypassing regressive state and local tax systems by raising necessary funds via the Federal income tax.

Neither do I share Mayor Zeidler's concern about the clash between different groups in great urban areas. Owners and management represent a small minority of the voting public. There will be some curb on the power of money in elections. Without it owners and management have little ultimate political power. I do not necessarily consider this a blessing; but I believe it to be a fact. Similarly, recent elections indicate a limit on the power of organized labor to control the votes of its members. I have already indicated my view that the economic interest of suburbanites in the core city will minimize their opposition to measures needed to preserve urban health. So will the spread of metropolitan area government.

I share Mayor Zeidler's concern about the power of organized crime. This is a real meance becoming daily more serious as more conservative and responsible family groups migrate to the suburbs. It is the principal threat to successful urban democracy. I agree that Federal intervention both through legislation and criminal prosecutions in the Federal courts will be required to break up organized crime.

While I share Mayor Zeidler's concern about the development of a segregated caste system in the North, I believe existing techniques at local levels aided by church groups are likely to overcome this danger.

Perhaps we need a modernization of our whole Federal system to meet the impact of urbanism. The advent of Modern England began with the First Reform Bill which abolished most of the rotten boroughs and substantially expanded the franchise. Writing in 1835, Richard Cobden said: "We fervently believe that our only chance of national prosperity lies in the timely remodeling of our system, so as to put it as nearly as possible upon an equality with the improved

management of the Americans."

Perhaps we need a similar remodeling now. Two of our most striking governmental defects are: 1. There are too many trees and wide open spaces represented both in state legislatures and the Congress; and 2. Political boundaries do not coincide with social and economic realities.

The idle musings of those called to panel discussions such as the present sometimes become the action programs of tomorrow. Were it not so we would be wasting our time and our breath. Accordingly, with my tongue in my cheek and taking a calculated risk that the thought will cause many to suspect my sanity and might well destroy what remains of my public career, I suggest the following:

(1) Develop public support for an amendment to the Constitution to redraw the boundaries of the forty-eight states to conform to social and economic realities. Such an amendment could never pass as it would require at a minimum the consent of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress or of the legislatures of the several states and ratification by the legislatures or by conventions in three-quarters of the states. Nevertheless, public agitation and discussion might lead to a somewhat less drastic and yet satisfactory solution. Think of the fun the uninhibited map-maker would have being divorced from political reality. He might well carve up New England into two states, the first predominantly rural - Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire; the second predominantly urban, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and that part of Connecticut which is not merely suburban New York.

New Jersey might disappear in a sort of Polish partition - one-half to New York, one-half to Pennsylvania. Delaware would be similarly doomed with Maryland taking the lower two counties while Wilmington and the rest of New

Castle County join Pennsylvania. Ohio would make a bid for Erie and that part of Pennsylvania on the western slope of the Alleghenies.

And if he were brave enough, think of the fun he could have carving up Texas.

California might be split in two, the dividing line running south of the San Francisco metropolitan area. And, of course, the great plains and mountain states including the Southwest would end with a senatorial representation more nearly proportionate to the population.

I suspect state loyalties in many areas of the country are relatively mild. The primary loyalties of most Americans are to their city, county, or region and to the United States of America. Only the politicians who have a vested interest would bleed and die for their states although doubtless some of our southern friends would still dissent.

Perhaps some constitutional wizard can evolve a method of achieving the desired end, certainly the result would be to create state governments whose political ability to deal with social and economic problems on a realistic basis would be enormously increased. Representation in the Senate of the United States would likewise coincide more closely with social, economic, and political reality.

(2) In 1946 the Supreme Court of the United States, by a 4-3 vote in the case of Colegrove v. Green 328 U.S. 549, declined to issue a decree declaring that Illinois statutes apportioning the State of Illinois into Congressional districts were invalid because lacking compactness of territory and approximate equality of population. The Court held the issue was of a peculiarly political nature and therefore inappropriate for juducial determination. Of the judges remaining on the Court, Black and Douglas dissented,

Frankfurter and Burton were with the majority. The dissenters felt the Illinois statutes denied the full right to vote and the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. They dismissed the argument of the majority as "a mere play on words", refuting the contention that courts are impotent in connection with evasions of all political rights.

The new members of the Court since the Colegrove decision are Chief Justice Warren and Judges Clark, Harlan, Brennan, and Whittaker. One may speculate whether the present Court would come to the same conclusion, particularly if faced with something like the Georgia County Unit system. It might also be argued that State statutes which gerrymander election districts in favor of rural elements violate the requirements of Article IV, Section 4 of the Federal Constitution, under which the United States guarantees to each state a republican form of government. Perhaps the means is at hand to obtain equal representation in state legislatures as well as the Congress.

These may be suggestions of desperation but some way must be found to provide a more representative form of government at both the state and Federal level if the problems of urbanism are to be solved before the city and its surrounding metropolitan area disintegrates in chaos.

Comments of Wallace S. Sayre on
"The Impact of Urbanism on the Federal System, 1957-1977",
by Mayor Frank P. Zeidler of Milwaukee

Mayor Zeidler is a realist, allowing himself only the barest traces of optimism in his grim prophecy of the next twenty years in urban America and in the federal system.

His first and his own favored prophecy--that before 1977 the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. will have slugged it out in a nuclear war of devastation--is one which deprives us of any useful frame of reference for discussing such a minor matter as urbanism and the federal system, as well as serving forcibly to remind us that none of us will be around to care. Accordingly, I pass quickly (though not without a parting shudder) to his second prophecy, leaving his first to the imaginative powers of some new Orwell or Dante--here on the panel, in the audience or elsewhere.

If we continue for twenty years to have "cold war" or "hot peace", Mayor Zeidler's second prophecy permits us to survive, but through a time of troubles. In fact, some may view his first prophecy with more sympathy as his second unrolls its gray prospects, for he sees political and governmental wars, ethnic and racial turmoils, suburban snobbery in low alliance with rural lag, central city populations in poverty, hunger and thirst, the underworld seizing new opportunities, unemployed youth marching in cadence to demagogues upon the city streets, and brooding over the whole unhappy scene the unenlightened malice of the state governments. A few rays of hope are allowed to break fitfully through the ominous overcast: the federal government has a benevolent potential, and metropolitan area government may advance rapidly from infancy to maturity. But we are not to be encouraged into any easier breathing, Mayor Zeidler reminds us, for the odds remain stacked against all those who failed to keep the family farm.

These dismal forebodings arouse a political scientist to summon up all his optimistic resources--the Constitution, the federal union, the political parties, the urban and metropolitan community, the rationality of voters, the initiative of elected chief executives, the expertise of the bureaucracies, and even the vulnerability of state legislatures to urban ingenuity. The remainder of these comments will be devoted to prayerful consideration of the possibilities that Mayor Zeidler's second-prophecy apparitions in our urban future may have been induced by too heady a Milwaukee brew and so may yield to the therapy of Ylvisaker's panel.

Mayor Zeidler's first premise is his most hopeful one. If I may paraphrase it, this second premise runs as follows: <u>the urban centers will form an alliance with the national government in a political contest against the state governments and suburbia</u>.

If this should come to fruition (and there are many signs to support Mayor Zeidler's prediction), then a political scientist would be disposed to anticipate victory for the cities. They have the votes to influence mightily the nominations for the Presidency in both parties and to affect critically the Presidential elections. This fact alone gives the cities a high status in the national party system, an asset which Mayor Zeidler seems to underestimate. Favored access to the Presidency and to the national parties (especially in their Presidential manifestations) are assets of inestimable value and should, if cultivated by urban initiative, lead--if not to a U. S. Department of Urbiculture--to a greater flow of aid from the national treasury to the urban centers, to closer ties between the executive branch of the national government and the cities, even perhaps to national government recognition of the metropolitan areas (less as "wards" perhaps than as favored proteges). We might actually envisage, if we were to indulge our optimism as boldly as Mayor Zeidler does his pessimism, the

national government-metropolitan area alliance (especially if assisted by a similar alliance by the river-valley regions) as the solvent which would lead to an urban federal system substituted for our present rural one.

But Mayor Zeidler's second premise brings us back to the troubles closer home: he believes, if I may again paraphrase, that the cities may be outflanked in the states by an aggressive determination on the part of the state legislatures and the suburban governments to "isolate" the central cities, by inhibiting the efforts toward metropolitan area integration, by increasing its fragmentation, and by resisting the cities' political strength in other ways.

These tendencies are visible, and Mayor Zeidler does not exaggerate their evident motivation. But perhaps he overlooks some urban resources and opportunities to protect the cities, and perhaps even to envelop the opposition on its suburban flank. The first of these resources is the state governorship. The governor, like the Presidency, is an asset of urban America; its influence is great in his nomination and election in every urban state; he cannot escape his urban commitments at home, and if he aspires to the Presidency he cannot afford even the invisible wish to escape. Nor can either state party afford to be caught out in an overt alliance against the urban electorates; any such liaison would need to be a midnight affair. The staying power of such attachments is fragile in the daylight of political debate. Party leaders are among the most cautious and prudent of men when dealing with large electorates; they are not vindictive men; they are brokers. Thirdly, the rural and suburban legislators typically work out their career aspirations within a political party whose leaders and "contributors" may live in the suburbs but mostly do their business in the cities where mayors and governors have the combined power to restrain, if not to humble, their exuberance. Further, the city government bureaucracies and the state government bureaucracies are

usually in close alliance when "outsiders" (particularly rural and suburban "outsiders") intervene; their influence will most likely be a moderating one, if not actively hostile to any effort to "isolate" the central cities. Finally, the urban-suburban hostility may have more surface than depth; as suburbia quickly becomes less than paradise, plagued by the same difficulties of urbanism as the central cities, its electorates may find more ties with the city electorates than with rural ones.

In short, the larger initiative in the states may belong to the cities. The suburban "third force" may come back home from its springtime escapade, anxious to be urban again even as junior partner in a metropolitan firm. In this event, the rural legislators rather than the central cities would be isolated.

Mayor Zeidler's third premise, if I may condense as well as paraphrase, is that the central cities will be harassed by a rising tempo of ethnic and racial politics, by lower standards of living, by youthful unemployed, by an aggressive underworld--with most of these related to a sharper conflict, on a broader stage, between the welfare state and the not-too-much-welfare state.

Again, I would read more favorable prospects into the future than does Mayor Zeidler. In the 'twenties and 'thirties, the sociologists predicted the decay of the central cities, the flowering of suburbia--in the 'fifties, thanks to the grace of federal urban redevelopment money and the urge of corporate America to work in air-conditioned glass-enclosed offices, the central cities are being reclaimed (for example, Clark's Philadelphia and Wagner's New York) faster than the slum-dwellers can move to the suburbs. Ethnic and racial politics, juvenile delinquency, even the gangsters, are being distributed more evenly over the whole metropolitan landscape. To put the matter more soberly, ethnic and racial politics would seem to be moderating rather than intensifying (and they have always had their great solvent values as well as their irrationalities);

the central cities are repudiating their premature obituaries; and the signs of a return to McKinley in our politics and public polities seem largely oratorical and semantic. The platforms of 1960, one may anticipate, will be a reaffirmation of the narrowly competitive goals of Stevenson and Eisenhower, not an endorsement of Byrd and Taft.

In tardy summary, then, I would (having put Mayor Zeidler's first prophecy aside as too intolerable to endure even in speculation) look more optimistically than does he upon the prospects of second prophecy. I believe the cities are on the move, and that suburbia will, however reluctantly at first, follow in their wake--for the suburbs, too, belong to urban America, and must soon see that nostalgia is less satisfying than common sense.

What do these more optimistic interpretations forecast in terms of the federal system? If I, too, may be bold, they suggest:

1. A gradual but steady political and governmental transformation within the urban states: the urban and suburban electorates (neither ever monolithic, and to become rapidly less so) combining to make the state governments more urban in policies and arrangements (the governor and the bureaucracies their sword, the rural legislators in retreat); the rise of metropolitan area governments or treaties buttressing this trend as well as accelerating it; the leaders of the political parties (especially in Presidential, gubernatorial, U. S. Senatorial, and "metropolitan" elections) responding to this urbanization of our politics.

2. An accompanying transformation of the relationships between these urbanized states and the national government: more direct dealings between the cities and the metropolitan areas, on the one hand, and the national government on the other (although the states may continue as the formal channel); the growth of national government bureaus with urban or metropolitan assignments; the greater

interlocking of the multi-level bureaucracies (those increasingly potent participants in all our decision-making); the Presidency becoming more and more the political magnet and the governmental instrument of urban-metropolitan America.

When and if these trends are fully under way, who will need to worry about--how long can anyone forestall--legislative reapportionment in the states? Who will say we cannot afford to indulge in the then largely symbolic debate about the virtues of suburbia versus the tensions of cities? Most of us would then even be willing to concede the values of preserving the traditional state boundaries as testimony of our rural past--including in our generosity toward institutions historic both "The Citadel" of the United States Senate (that most rural monument of our heritage) and the Office of Mayor in our central cities (overshadowed by the new Metrogovernors).